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The intellectual grounds for this book were first formulated in a session entitled 
‘Beyond the Arab Spring: The aesthetics and poetics of popular revolt and 
protest’, convened by Pnina Werbner and Martin Webb for the Association of 
Social Anthropologists’ annual conference, which took place on 3–6 April 2012 
at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. The theme of the conference 
was ‘Arts and Aesthetics in a Globalising World’. Several of the contributors 
to the book participated in the conference. Dimitris Dalakoglou from Sussex 
University assisted in the initial formulation and planning of the session but 
could not attend. After Delhi, since many of those we invited could not make 
it to the conference, we decided to hold a further international conference, this 
time in London. That London conference, which gathered participants from 
Egypt, India, the USA, Australia and Europe, took place in mid-March 2013 
at Aga Khan University. It was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for 
Anthropological Research. We would like to thank the Foundation for its very 
generous support. For the London conference Kathryn Spellman-Poots joined 
Martin and Pnina, and the conference was held under the auspices of Aga Khan 
University’s Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations. The University 
provided the premises, the conference back-up and, ultimately, a home for the 
book with Edinburgh University Press. We would like to say how extremely 
grateful we are to the University for its generous support.
In addition to contributors we would also like to thank the discussants in 
the various sessions: Anne Alexander, Emma Tarlo, David Graeber and Marie 
Gillespie, whose stimulating and insightful comments helped to raise important 
issues for debate. Additionally, we are grateful to Susan Osman, who presented 
a paper in London but was unable to contribute to the book. Her photograph 
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of Tunisian graffiti taken in 2011 does, however, adorn the book’s cover. Nabiha 
Jerad, her co-author, was tragically injured in a car accident in Tunisia and later 
died. Her participation would have been invaluable.
As the book was almost ready to go to press, the violence in Egypt gave a 
further tragic twist to what had hitherto been an optimistic, hopeful project. 
Dalia Wahdan and Hanan Sabea, the two contributors on Egypt, were heroic in 
trying to forge an understanding of the events as they unfolded.
Timeline of the Global Protests, 2010–13
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n 
pa
rli
a-
m
en
ta
ria
ns
 re
sig
n 
in
 
pr
ot
es
t a
t t
he
 v
io
le
nc
e 
ag
ai
ns
t p
ro
-d
em
oc
ra
cy
 
de
m
on
st
ra
to
rs
.
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A
pr
il
Tw
el
ve
 S
hi
’i 
m
os
qu
es
 
de
m
ol
is
he
d 
in
 B
ah
ra
in
.
Ju
ne
3 
Ju
ne
 −
 T
he
 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f Y
em
en
, 
A
li 
A
bd
ul
la
h 
Sa
le
h,
 
is
 in
ju
re
d 
in
 a
 fa
ile
d 
as
sa
ss
in
at
io
n 
at
te
m
pt
. 
H
e 
te
m
po
ra
ri
ly
 m
ak
es
 
V
ic
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t A
bd
 
R
ab
bu
h 
M
an
su
r 
A
l-
H
ad
i t
he
 a
ct
in
g 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f t
he
 
na
ti
on
.
A
ug
us
t
20
−8
 A
ug
us
t −
 T
he
 
B
at
tl
e 
of
 T
ri
po
li 
oc
cu
rs
 
in
 L
ib
ya
. R
eb
el
 fo
rc
es
 
ca
pt
ur
e,
 a
nd
 e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
ga
in
 c
on
tr
ol
 o
f, 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l c
it
y 
of
 T
ri
po
li,
 
th
er
eb
y 
pr
ac
ti
ca
lly
 
ov
er
th
ro
w
in
g 
th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
f t
he
 
di
ct
at
or
 M
ua
m
m
ar
 
G
ad
da
fi.
 R
eb
el
 fi
gh
te
rs
 
en
te
r T
ri
po
li 
an
d 
oc
cu
py
 th
e 
‘G
re
en
 
Sq
ua
re
’, 
ch
an
gi
ng
 it
s 
na
m
e 
to
 th
e 
‘S
qu
ar
e 
of
 
th
e 
M
ar
ty
rs
’.
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O
ct
ob
er
23
 O
ct
ob
er
 −
 T
un
is
ia
 
ho
ld
s e
le
ct
io
ns
 fo
r t
he
 
N
at
io
na
l C
on
st
it
ue
nt
 
A
ss
em
bl
y.
 T
he
 re
lig
io
us
ly
 
ba
se
d 
En
na
hd
a 
pa
rt
y 
ta
ke
s 
th
e 
la
rg
es
t s
ha
re
 o
f t
he
 
vo
te
s, 
w
it
h 
ab
ou
t 3
7 
pe
r 
ce
nt
.
9−
10
 O
ct
ob
er
 −
 C
op
ti
c 
C
hr
is
ti
an
s i
n 
Eg
yp
t 
pr
ot
es
t a
ga
in
st
 th
e 
de
st
ru
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 c
hu
rc
h.
 
T
he
 a
rm
y 
re
sp
on
ds
 b
y 
at
ta
ck
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ot
es
te
rs
 
w
it
h 
ta
nk
s, 
ki
lli
ng
 
m
an
y.
 
20
 O
ct
ob
er
 −
 
M
ua
m
m
ar
 G
ad
da
fi 
is
 
ca
pt
ur
ed
 a
nd
 k
ill
ed
 b
y 
re
be
ls
 in
 th
e 
ci
ty
 o
f 
Si
rt
e.
 
23
 O
ct
ob
er
 −
 T
he
 
N
T
C
 o
ffi
ci
al
ly
 d
ec
la
re
s 
an
 e
nd
 to
 th
e 
20
11
 
Li
by
an
 c
iv
il 
w
ar
.
N
ov
em
be
r
19
−2
1 
N
ov
em
be
r −
 
M
an
y 
pe
op
le
 o
nc
e 
ag
ai
n 
pr
ot
es
t i
n 
C
ai
ro
’s 
Ta
hr
ir
 S
qu
ar
e,
 
de
m
an
di
ng
 th
at
 th
e 
SC
A
F 
sp
ee
d 
up
 th
e 
tr
an
si
ti
on
 to
 a
 m
or
e 
ci
vi
lia
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t. 
C
la
sh
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
pr
ot
es
te
rs
 a
nd
 so
ld
ie
rs
 
oc
cu
r, 
an
d 
m
an
y 
pe
op
le
 
ar
e 
in
ju
re
d 
or
 k
ill
ed
.
19
 N
ov
em
be
r −
 
M
ua
m
m
ar
 G
ad
da
fi’
s 
so
n,
 S
ai
f a
l-
Is
la
m
 
G
ad
da
fi,
 is
 c
ap
tu
re
d,
 
af
te
r h
id
in
g 
in
 N
ig
er
ia
. 
D
ec
em
be
r
20
 D
ec
em
be
r −
 M
an
y 
w
om
en
 p
ro
te
st
 in
 E
gy
pt
 
ag
ai
ns
t h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts
 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
.
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20
12
Ja
nu
ar
y 
24
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
− 
T
he
 
Eg
yp
tia
n 
Fi
el
d 
M
ar
sh
al
 
an
d 
le
ad
er
 o
f t
he
 
m
ili
ta
ry
, M
oh
am
ed
 
H
us
se
in
 T
an
ta
w
i, 
an
no
un
ce
s t
ha
t t
he
 
de
ca
de
s-
ol
d 
st
at
e 
of
 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
w
ill
 b
e 
pa
rt
ia
lly
 li
fte
d 
th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
da
y.
D
em
on
st
ra
ti
on
s 
ar
e 
m
et
 w
it
h 
po
lic
e 
vi
ol
en
ce
.
10
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
− 
T
he
 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f S
yr
ia
, 
B
as
ha
r a
l-
A
ss
ad
, g
iv
es
 
a 
sp
ee
ch
 in
 w
hi
ch
 h
e 
bl
am
es
 th
e 
up
ri
si
ng
 
on
 fo
re
ig
ne
rs
 a
nd
 sa
ys
 
th
at
 it
 w
ill
 re
qu
ir
e 
th
e 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
Sy
ri
an
s t
o 
st
op
 th
e 
re
be
ls.
Fe
br
ua
ry
 
27
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
− 
T
he
 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f Y
em
en
, 
A
li 
A
bd
ul
la
h 
Sa
le
h,
 
of
fic
ia
lly
 re
si
gn
s a
nd
 
tr
an
sf
er
s h
is
 p
ow
er
s 
to
 h
is
 V
ic
e 
Pr
es
id
en
t, 
A
bd
 R
ab
bu
h 
M
an
su
r 
A
l-
H
ad
i.
3 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 −
 T
he
 
Sy
ri
an
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
be
gi
ns
 a
n 
at
ta
ck
 o
n 
th
e 
ci
ty
 o
f H
om
s. 
M
ar
ch
A
ro
un
d 
20
0,
00
0 
pe
op
le
 in
 a
 m
as
s a
nt
i-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t d
em
on
-
st
ra
ti
on
 a
re
 d
is
pe
rs
ed
 
w
it
h 
te
ar
ga
s.
18
 M
ar
ch
 –
 N
at
io
na
l 
D
ia
lo
gu
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
la
un
ch
ed
, w
it
h 
th
e 
cl
os
in
g 
ce
re
m
on
y 
he
ld
 
on
 2
5 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
14
, 
co
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
at
 Y
em
en
 
w
ill
 b
ec
om
e 
a 
m
ul
ti
-
re
gi
on
 re
pu
bl
ic
A
pr
il
20
 A
pr
il 
− 
M
an
y 
pe
op
le
 o
nc
e 
ag
ai
n 
pr
ot
es
t i
n 
C
ai
ro
’s 
Ta
hr
ir
 
Sq
ua
re
, d
em
an
di
ng
 
a 
qu
ic
ke
r t
ra
ns
fe
r 
of
 p
ow
er
 to
 a
 n
ew
 
Pr
es
id
en
t.
Te
ns
 o
f t
ho
us
an
ds
 
of
 a
nt
i-g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
pr
ot
es
te
rs
 fl
oo
d 
Bu
da
iy
a 
hi
gh
w
ay
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
fir
st
 d
ay
 o
f p
ra
ct
ic
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
Fo
rm
ul
a 
1 
ra
ce
 in
 
Ba
hr
au
n.
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M
ay
23
−4
 M
ay
 –
 T
he
 
Eg
yp
ti
an
 p
eo
pl
e 
vo
te
 
in
 th
e 
fir
st
 ro
un
d 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
id
en
ti
al
 e
le
ct
io
ns
. 
A
hm
ed
 S
ha
fiq
 a
nd
 
M
oh
am
ed
 M
or
si
 a
re
 
th
e 
tw
o 
w
in
ne
rs
 o
f t
hi
s 
el
ec
ti
on
. 
A
 p
ro
te
st
 st
re
tc
he
s 
ov
er
 5
km
 a
ga
in
st
 
un
io
n 
pl
an
s w
it
h 
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a.
 T
hi
s i
s 
re
pe
at
ed
 in
 Ju
ne
.
25
 M
ay
 −
 T
he
 S
yr
ia
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t c
ar
ri
es
 o
ut
 
a 
m
as
sa
cr
e 
in
 H
ou
la
, 
ki
lli
ng
 1
08
 p
eo
pl
e,
 
am
on
g 
th
em
 4
9 
ch
ild
re
n.
 
Ju
ne
13
 Ju
ne
 −
 F
or
m
er
 T
un
is
ia
n 
pr
es
id
en
t Z
in
e 
al
-A
bi
di
n 
B
en
-A
li 
is
 g
iv
en
 a
 li
fe
 
se
nt
en
ce
 b
y 
a 
Tu
ni
si
an
 
co
ur
t. 
2 
Ju
ne
 −
 F
or
m
er
 
Eg
yp
tia
n 
Pr
es
id
en
t 
H
os
ni
 M
ub
ar
ak
 is
 
se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 li
fe
 in
 
pr
iso
n 
by
 a
n 
Eg
yp
tia
n 
co
ur
t. 
16
−1
7 
Ju
ne
 −
 T
he
 
Eg
yp
tia
n 
pe
op
le
 v
ot
e 
in
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 ro
un
d 
of
 th
e 
pr
es
id
en
tia
l 
ru
n-
of
f e
le
ct
io
n,
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 M
oh
am
ed
 M
or
si 
re
ce
iv
es
 th
e 
m
os
t v
ot
es
.
24
 Ju
ne
 −
 E
gy
pt
’s 
el
ec
tio
n 
co
m
m
iss
io
n 
an
no
un
ce
s t
ha
t M
us
lim
 
Br
ot
he
rh
oo
d 
ca
nd
id
at
e 
M
oh
am
ed
 M
or
si 
ha
s 
w
on
 E
gy
pt
’s 
pr
es
id
en
tia
l 
ru
n-
of
f. 
M
or
si 
w
in
s b
y 
a 
na
rr
ow
 m
ar
gi
n 
ov
er
 
A
hm
ed
 S
ha
fiq
, t
he
 la
st
 
Pr
im
e 
M
in
ist
er
 u
nd
er
 
de
po
se
d 
le
ad
er
 H
os
ni
 
M
ub
ar
ak
. T
he
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Ju
ne
co
m
m
iss
io
n 
an
no
un
ce
s 
M
or
si 
to
ok
 5
1.
7 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 o
f t
he
 v
ot
e 
ve
rs
us
 
48
.3
 p
er
 c
en
t f
or
 S
ha
fiq
.
Ju
ly
7 
Ju
ly
 −
 T
he
 N
T
C
 
su
pe
rv
is
es
 th
e 
fir
st
 
de
m
oc
ra
ti
c 
el
ec
ti
on
s 
of
 L
ib
ya
. T
w
o 
hu
nd
re
d 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f a
 G
en
er
al
 
N
at
io
na
l C
on
gr
es
s 
ar
e 
el
ec
te
d 
to
 re
pl
ac
e 
th
e 
C
ou
nc
il 
an
d 
to
 
or
ga
ni
se
 p
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 
el
ec
ti
on
s i
n 
Li
by
a.
12
 Ju
ly
 −
 T
he
 S
yr
ia
n 
ar
m
y 
ca
rr
ie
s o
ut
 a
 
m
as
sa
cr
e 
in
 th
e 
vi
lla
ge
 
of
 T
re
m
se
h.
 A
s m
an
y 
as
 2
25
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
ki
lle
d.
 
15
 Ju
ly
 −
 T
he
 In
te
r-
na
ti
on
al
 C
om
m
it
te
e 
of
 th
e 
R
ed
 C
ro
ss
 o
ffi
-
ci
al
ly
 d
ec
la
re
s t
ha
t t
he
 
Sy
ri
an
 u
pr
is
in
g 
is
 n
ow
 
a 
ci
vi
l w
ar
. 
18
 Ju
ly
 –
 A
 b
om
bi
ng
 
in
 D
am
as
cu
s k
ill
s m
an
y 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f P
re
si
de
nt
 
B
as
ha
r a
l-
A
ss
ad
’s 
in
ne
r 
ci
rc
le
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 h
is
 
br
ot
he
r-
in
-l
aw
, A
se
f 
Sh
aw
ka
t. 
27
 Ju
ly
 −
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
fo
rc
es
 a
nd
 re
be
ls
 b
eg
in
 
fig
ht
in
g 
a 
ba
tt
le
 to
 
ca
pt
ur
e 
Sy
ri
a’
s l
ar
ge
st
 
ci
ty
, A
le
pp
o.
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
Tu
ni
sia
E
gy
pt
Li
by
a
B
ah
ra
in
Ye
m
en
Sy
ria
A
ug
us
t
Pr
ot
es
ts
 c
on
ti
nu
e 
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 2
01
2 
w
it
h 
m
an
y 
ac
ti
vi
st
s a
rr
es
te
d 
an
d 
se
nt
en
ce
d 
to
 li
fe
 
in
 p
ri
so
n 
fo
r p
lo
tt
in
g 
to
 o
ve
rt
hr
ow
 th
e 
m
on
ar
ch
y.
 
N
ov
em
be
r 
22
 N
ov
em
be
r −
 
Eg
yp
ti
an
 p
ro
te
st
s 
st
ar
t, 
w
it
h 
hu
nd
re
ds
 o
f 
th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f p
ro
te
st
er
s 
de
m
on
st
ra
ti
ng
 a
ga
in
st
 
Eg
yp
ti
an
 P
re
si
de
nt
 
M
oh
am
ed
 M
or
si
 a
ft
er
 
he
 g
ra
nt
ed
 h
im
se
lf 
un
lim
it
ed
 p
ow
er
s t
o 
‘p
ro
te
ct
’ t
he
 n
at
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 le
gi
sl
at
e 
w
it
ho
ut
 ju
di
ci
al
 o
ve
r-
si
gh
t o
r r
ev
ie
w
 o
f h
is
 
ac
ts
. M
or
si
 d
ee
m
s t
he
 
de
cr
ee
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 to
 
pr
ot
ec
t t
he
 e
le
ct
ed
 
co
ns
ti
tu
en
t a
ss
em
bl
y 
fr
om
 a
 p
la
nn
ed
 
di
ss
ol
ut
io
n 
by
 ju
dg
es
 
ap
po
in
te
d 
du
ri
ng
 th
e 
M
ub
ar
ak
 e
ra
.
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D
ec
em
be
r
8 
D
ec
em
be
r −
 M
or
si
 
an
nu
ls
 h
is
 te
m
po
ra
ry
 
de
cr
ee
 w
hi
ch
 h
ad
 
ex
pa
nd
ed
 h
is
 p
re
si
-
de
nt
ia
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
 
an
d 
re
m
ov
ed
 ju
di
ci
al
 
re
vi
ew
 o
f h
is
 d
ec
re
es
, 
an
 Is
la
m
is
t o
ffi
ci
al
 
an
no
un
ce
s, 
bu
t a
dd
s 
th
at
 th
e 
re
su
lt
s o
f t
he
 
te
m
po
ra
ry
 d
ec
la
ra
ti
on
 
w
ill
 st
ill
 st
an
d.
20
13
Ja
nu
ar
y
25
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
− 
M
as
si
ve
 
pr
ot
es
ts
 a
ga
in
st
 
M
oh
am
ed
 M
or
si
 
de
ve
lo
p 
al
l o
ve
r E
gy
pt
 
on
 th
e 
se
co
nd
 a
nn
i-
ve
rs
ar
y 
of
 th
e 
20
11
 
re
vo
lu
ti
on
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
in
 T
ah
ri
r S
qu
ar
e,
 w
he
re
 
th
ou
sa
nd
s o
f p
ro
te
st
er
s 
ga
th
er
. A
t l
ea
st
 si
x 
ci
vi
lia
ns
 a
nd
 o
ne
 p
ol
ic
e 
of
fic
er
 a
re
 sh
ot
 d
ea
d 
in
 th
e 
Eg
yp
ti
an
 c
it
y 
of
 
Su
ez
, w
hi
le
 4
56
 o
th
er
s 
ar
e 
in
ju
re
d 
na
ti
on
w
id
e.
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Fe
br
ua
ry
6 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 −
 L
ea
di
ng
 
op
po
si
ti
on
 fi
gu
re
 C
ho
kr
i 
B
el
ai
d 
is
 a
ss
as
si
na
te
d 
ou
ts
id
e 
hi
s h
ou
se
, w
hi
ch
 
is
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
m
as
si
ve
 
de
m
on
st
ra
ti
on
s. 
O
n 
23
 
Fe
br
ua
ry
, t
he
 fi
rs
t T
un
is
ia
n 
H
ar
le
m
 S
ha
ke
 v
id
eo
 is
 
po
st
ed
 o
n 
Yo
uT
ub
e.
In
 e
ar
ly
 F
eb
ru
ar
y,
 
Sy
ri
an
 re
be
ls
 b
eg
in
 a
n 
of
fe
ns
iv
e 
on
 D
am
as
cu
s. 
12
 F
eb
ru
ar
y 
− 
T
he
 
U
ni
te
d 
N
at
io
ns
 st
at
es
 
th
at
 th
e 
de
at
h 
to
ll 
in
 
th
e 
Sy
ri
an
 c
iv
il 
w
ar
 
ha
s e
xc
ee
de
d 
70
,0
00
. 
B
y 
Ju
ly
 th
e 
fig
ur
e 
ha
s 
ri
se
n 
to
 1
00
,0
00
.
M
ar
ch
T
he
 S
yr
ia
n 
N
at
io
na
l 
C
oa
lit
io
n 
is
 g
ra
nt
ed
 
Sy
ri
a’
s m
em
be
rs
hi
p 
in
 
th
e 
A
ra
b 
Le
ag
ue
.
Ju
ly
A
nt
i-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t p
ro
te
st
s 
er
up
t i
n 
Tu
ni
si
a.
3 
Ju
ly
 −
 M
oh
am
ed
 
M
or
si
 is
 d
ep
os
ed
 a
s 
Pr
es
id
en
t o
f E
gy
pt
 
in
 a
 c
ou
p 
d’
ét
at
, 
fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
cl
as
he
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
se
cu
ri
ty
 fo
rc
es
 
an
d 
pr
ot
es
te
rs
. T
he
 
dr
af
t c
on
st
it
ut
io
n 
is
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
an
d 
C
hi
ef
 
Ju
st
ic
e 
A
dl
i M
an
so
ur
 
is
 n
am
ed
 in
te
ri
m
 P
re
s-
id
en
t. 
T
he
 E
gy
pt
ia
n 
ar
m
y 
cr
ac
ks
 d
ow
n 
on
 
pu
bl
ic
 m
ed
ia
 a
nd
 sh
ut
s 
do
w
n 
se
ve
ra
l n
ew
s 
ou
tl
et
s t
ha
t i
t d
ee
m
s 
pr
o-
M
or
si
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
A
nt
i-
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
pr
ot
es
ts
 e
ru
pt
 in
 L
ib
ya
.
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Ju
ly
A
l J
az
ee
ra
. U
nk
no
w
n 
gu
nm
en
 o
pe
n 
fir
e 
on
 
a 
pr
o-
M
or
si
 ra
lly
 in
 
C
ai
ro
, k
ill
in
g 
si
xt
ee
n 
an
d 
w
ou
nd
in
g 
20
0.
3 
Ju
ly
 −
 Ju
st
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
de
ad
lin
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
, 
M
or
si
 o
ffe
rs
 to
 fo
rm
 a
 
co
ns
en
su
s g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
bu
t t
hi
s i
s i
gn
or
ed
 
by
 G
en
er
al
 S
is
i, 
co
m
m
an
de
r o
f t
he
 
ar
m
y.
 M
oh
am
m
ed
 a
l 
B
ar
ad
ei
, t
he
 G
ra
nd
 
Sh
ei
kh
 o
f A
l A
zh
ar
A
hm
ed
 e
l-
Ta
ye
b,
 th
e 
C
op
ti
c 
Po
pe
 T
aw
ad
ro
s 
II
 a
nd
 y
ou
th
 m
em
be
rs
 
of
 th
e 
Ta
m
ar
od
 
m
ov
em
en
t s
up
po
rt
 th
e 
co
up
.
T
he
 M
us
lim
 B
ro
th
-
er
ho
od
 b
eg
in
s a
 
si
t-
in
 a
t t
he
 R
ab
aa
 
al
-A
da
w
ey
a 
m
os
qu
e 
an
d 
ne
ar
 C
ai
ro
 
U
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
th
at
 la
st
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Timeline of the Global Protests, 2010–13
The Israeli Social Protest 
2011
June A Facebook group, formed by Itzik Elrov to protest against the price of cottage cheese and 
calling to boycott the product, is joined by over 100,000 people. This ‘cottage protest’ 
stimulates a widespread discussion regarding the rise in food prices and the high cost of 
living in Israel, and is widely seen as a precursor to the social protest. 
July 1 July − Following eviction from her apartment, twenty-five-year-old film editor Daphni 
Leef opens a Facebook event announcing an ‘emergency situation’, inviting people to join 
her in pitching tents on Tel Aviv’s Rothschild Boulevard in response to the housing crisis. 
She is soon joined by a small group of activists who begin to organise the protest.
14 July − The first tent is pitched on Rothschild Boulevard. Approximately 200 residents 
spend the night in the encampment, which is visited by the Mayor of Tel Aviv, Ron 
Huldai. A small number of tents are pitched in Jerusalem too.
16 July − The National Union of Israeli Students joins the protests. 
17 July − Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu calls on the protesters to help him lead 
housing reform.
19 July − Tent encampments are set up in several cities across Israel, including Ashdod, 
Beer Sheva, Haifa, Holon, peripheral neighbourhoods in Tel Aviv and elsewhere. These 
encampments (and those established later) galvanise discussion groups and a variety of 
activities in the afternoons and evenings throughout the summer.
23 July − The protest movement’s first large demonstration takes place, attended by over 
20,000.
24 July − Approximately 1,000 protesters march towards the Knesset in Jerusalem, causing 
major traffic disruptions. 
26 July − Representatives of twenty-five encampments meet to decide on the protest 
movement’s goals, which are defined as a broad demand for social justice. Prime Minister 
Netanyahu presents his programme to solve the housing crisis, which is rejected by the 
protesters. 
27 July − Israel’s largest organisation of trade unions, the Histadrut, joins the protest. 
Various local municipalities declare their support for the protest and announce strikes.
28 July − Thousands march with their children as part of the ‘stroller march’, protesting 
costs of education and childcare.
30 July − Second large demonstration in Tel Aviv, attended by 85,000 to 150,000 people. 
Several other demonstrations take place across Israel.
August 1 August − Israeli President Shimon Peres meets the protesters.
2 August − Number of tent encampments continues to increase. Representatives of sixty 
encampments attend a joint meeting.
3 August − National Housing Committees law is passed in the Knesset, despite the oppo-
sition of protest leaders who argue that it is a spin by Prime Minister Netanyahu.
4 August − Public demonstration by Histadrut members in Tel Aviv, attended by 12,000.
6 August − Third mass demonstration, attended by 200,000 to 350,000 people from all 
over Israel.
7 August − Prime Minister Netanyahu appoints the Trajtenberg Commission, headed 
by Professor Manuel Trajtenberg, to propose solutions for the socioeconomic problems 
raised by the protesters. Most protest leaders express discontent with the move, and an 
alternative committee led by Professors Avia Spivak and Yossi Yonah is established. More 
‘stroller marches’ take place across Israel.
13 August − In a strategic attempt to show support for the protest outside of Tel Aviv, 
mass demonstrations, attended by tens of thousands, are held in Haifa, Beer Sheva, 
Modi’in, Netanya and Afula.
18 August − As a result of a terrorist attack, protest leaders call off public demonstrations 
planned for the weekend. A quiet protest march is held in Tel Aviv. 
22 August − The first of several organised squatting events takes place, with 150 activists 
occupying an abandoned building in Tel Aviv to protest housing policies. A few clash with 
police and are arrested.
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August 24 August − Iconic protest leader Daphni Leef calls on Professor Manuel Trajtenberg to 
resign from the commission he leads, raising criticism from several other public figures 
associated with the protest movement, including Chair of the National Union of Israeli 
Students Itzik Shmuli.
26 August − Second major squatting event takes place in an abandoned building in Tel 
Aviv.
27 August − Mass demonstrations take place across Israel, attended by tens of thousands.
September 3 September – In what is probably the largest demonstration in Israeli history (billed as the 
‘March of the Million’), approximately 300,000 demonstrators go out to the streets in Tel 
Aviv, with another 100,000 demonstrators in other locations across the country. Most of 
the tent encampments are dismantled following the demonstration, due to the perception 
that they have reached their limit. The remaining encampments are mostly occupied by 
the poor and homeless.
7 September – Protests arise against plans by the Tel Aviv municipality to evacuate what 
remains of the Rothschild tent encampment. There are demonstrations in front of city hall.
10 September – ‘Roundtable events’ take place across Israel, with public discussions about 
socioeconomic issues.
17 September – The International Day of Action against the Banks includes a 
demonstration on Rothschild Boulevard in front of Bank Hapoalim.
26 September – The Trajtenberg Commission completes its report, recommending changes 
in taxation and customs, education, housing and public transportation, among other areas, 
to be funded mostly by cutting defence budgets. Some of the recommendations are later 
approved by the government, although actual implementation is uneven.
October 3 October – The Rothschild Boulevard tent encampment is evacuated by the municipality.
15 October – A global protest demonstration in Tel Aviv, with roundtables and public 
gathering, is attended by 1,500.
20 October – Events are staged to celebrate 100 days of protest.
29 October – Demonstrations take place across Israel, with approximately 50,000 attending 
the one in Tel Aviv.
31 October – The Knesset commences its winter session, with several hundred citizens 
protesting outside. Virtually all speakers refer to the social protest. ‘The Social Guard’, a 
new initiative monitoring the Knesset’s work and informing the public, begins its work.
December 9 December − National Human Rights march is held in Tel Aviv.
2012
January 1 January − Hundreds of protesters demonstrate against the planned evacuation of the tent 
encampment in Tel Aviv’s Shekhunat Hatikva.
15 January − The Shekhunat Hatikva encampment is evacuated by the Tel Aviv munici-
pality. Demonstrations are held in front of city hall, with several arrests. 
June 22 June − Several activists attempt to re-establish the Rothschild encampments and are 
stopped by police, with some injured and detained, including Daphni Leef. During demon-
strations against police violence the following day, some bank windows are smashed and 
major streets blocked. 
July 14 July − Demonstrations, attended by several thousand, take place across Israel on the 
first anniversary of the protest. In the largest demonstration, in Tel Aviv, protester Moshe 
Silman attempts suicide through self-immolation. He dies six days later. 
2013
January 22 January − Two of the most prominent activists associated with the protest movement, 
Stav Shaffir and Itzik Shmuli, are elected to the Israeli Knesset as part of the Labour Party. 
May 11 May − Approximately 12,000 people attend demonstrations across Israel, protesting the 
new government’s budget that calls for raising taxes and welfare cuts. 
July 13 July − Several thousand protesters go out to the streets of Tel Aviv to mark the 
two-year anniversary of the protest. 
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India’s Against Corruption Movement, 2010–12
2010 Public protests emerge in response to revelations of large-scale corruption cases, in 
particular concerning contracts for the preparation of the 2010 Commonwealth Games 
in Delhi, the sale of licences for 2G mobile phone bands and fraudulent land deals.
A coalition of established public figures and anti-corruption campaigners, including 
Anna Hazare, Baba Ramdev, Arvind Kejriwal, Kiran Bedi and Supreme Court advocates 
Shanti and Prashant Bhushan emerges under the banner of India Against Corruption 
(IAC), with an inaugural press conference held at the Press Club of India in Delhi on 
29 October. 
A central aim of the group is to campaign for civil society involvement in the drafting 
of the Lokpal bill. At this time legislation is being drafted by the United Progressive 
Alliance (UPA) government to institute an ombudsman to investigate and adjudicate 
complaints against parliamentarians, particularly concerning political corruption. The 
Lokpal bill had originally been proposed in 1968 and had been debated, but never 
passed, by successive parliaments. 
During this period a social media campaign also emerges, leading to the organisation of 
a nationwide day of action on 30 January, featuring marches and public protests in cities 
across India.
2011
April In protest at the exclusion of civil society representatives from the drafting committee 
for the Lokpal bill, and concerned about the content of the government’s draft, Hazare 
initiates a ‘fast unto death’ from 5 April at Jantar Mantar in Central Delhi, demanding 
stronger legislation against corruption.
8 April − With Hazare still fasting, and amid mounting public pressure and protest, the 
government and activists come to a compromise in which the drafting committee will 
be headed by the then finance minister Pranab Mukherjee and the advocate and activist 
Shanti Bhushan, a former law minister who had been involved, as co-chair, in the first 
draft of the Lokpal bill in the 1960s. Other activist members of the committee include 
Hazare, Kejriwal, Prashant Bhushan and Justice Santosh Hegde.
9 April − Hazare breaks his fast in response.
16 April − The first meeting of the joint committee to draft the Lokpal bill is held.
June 4 June − Baba Ramdev, a leading yoga guru with a large international following, begins 
an indefinite hunger strike in front of massed crowds at Ramlila Maidan in Delhi, 
demanding the return of ‘black money’ stored in international tax havens. During the 
night of 5 June, a police operation is mounted to clear the protest site by force. Baba 
Ramdev is arrested and returned to his ashram in Haridwar, in the northern state of 
Uttaranchal, and prohibited from entering Delhi for fifteen days.
9 June − Hazare issues an ultimatum that a strongly worded Jan Lokpal (people’s 
ombudsman) bill must be passed by 15 August (Independence Day) otherwise he will 
start another fast from 16 August. There is, however, insurmountable disagreement 
between the government and civil society representatives over the content and reach of 
the bill.
August 15 August − With his team’s demands unmet, Hazare announces that the fast will go 
ahead as planned. A government order is imposed which states that public assembly will 
not be allowed at the planned protest site at JP Park or at other significant sites.
16 August − Anna Hazare is detained by the police before he can start his hunger strike 
at JP Park. Other leading activists are also taken into custody. After refusing to sign a 
personal bond to be released on bail, Hazare is sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment in 
Tihar Jail, Delhi. Large-scale protests prompt the government to release Hazare, but he 
refuses to leave prison until permission is given to protest at JP Park.
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August 17 August − With Hazare still refusing to leave jail, permission is given for a twenty-one-
day protest to be held at the Ram Lila grounds. 
19 August − Hazare leaves prison and travels to the Ram Lila grounds to begin his fast, 
via the iconic national sites of India Gate and M. K. Gandhi’s death memorial at Raj 
Ghat. In the following days, huge crowds attend the protest and the government makes 
appeals to Hazare to end his fast and offers to consider various versions of the Lokpal bill 
which have been prepared by different civil society groups. 
26 August – The government asks Hazare to guarantee that he will end his fast once the 
debate of the bill opens in Parliament. 
28 August − His demands met, Hazare breaks his fast at around 10am by drinking a glass 
of fruit juice in front of a huge crowd of supporters. Large crowds also gather at India 
Gate following Hazare’s call to celebrate victory.
December 11 December − Hazare performs a day-long fast at Jantar Mantar in Delhi protesting 
against amendments to the Lokpal bill proposed by the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee. 
22 December − The expected introduction of the Lokpal bill in the Lower House of 
Parliament does not take place and the passage of the bill is slowed by party political and 
procedural issues. Hazare announces that a hunger strike will take place on 27, 28 and 29 
December.
27 December − Hazare begins a fast in Mumbai, but compared with earlier protests 
the number of supporters is low. The Lokpal bill passes through the Lower House of 
Parliament on this day but is subsequently delayed in the Upper House, the Rajya Sabha.
28 December − Hazare ends the fast a day early, citing ill health and medical advice.
2012
March To protest the introduction in Parliament of a Lokpal bill perceived as weaker than that 
demanded by the Hazare protests, a day-long fast is planned for 25 March at Jantar 
Mantar in Delhi. The event also highlights the lives of a number of activists murdered 
in the preceding months and years for their attempts to expose corruption. The event 
receives wide media coverage and is attended by several thousand people.
June 3 June − Hazare performs another one-day fast at Jantar Mantar, along with Baba 
Ramdev.
July 25 July − Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia and Gopal Rai, leading activists from the 
India Against Corruption group, begin an indefinite fast at Jantar Mantar, joined by 
Hazare four days later. The fast ends on 3 August 2012.
November In November, the IAC group splits when Arvind Kejriwal, Manish Sisodia, Prashant 
Bhushan and others launch a new political party, the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), and 
prepare to contest elections on anti-corruption issues, initially in Delhi. Hazare and 
other activists of the IAC reject this strategy and continue to campaign in a non-party-
political manner.
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Botswana Strike
2011
April 18 April − The Botswana Federation of Trade Unions, representing 93,000 government 
workers, announces a ten-day strike.
7 April − The strike is extended indefinitely in the light of the government breaking 
agreed strike rules.
May 10 May − The Industrial Court orders all essential workers back to work.
17 May − The government fires all striking essential workers.
June 9 June − The strike is ‘suspended’
2012
May–June The High Court Appeal Case by the Botswana Federation of Public Sector Unions 
(BOFEPUSU) against the dismissal and non-reinstatement of workers takes place. 
Judgment by Chief Justice Dingake in favour of the unions is delivered on 21 June.
August 9 August − Judge Dingake at the High Court denies that the government has the right to 
extend the schedule of essential services.
2013
January 21 January − The Court of Appeal overturns BOFEPUSU’s High Court victory, despite 
the unions employing distinguished South African advocates. Almost 500 workers lose 
their jobs permanently as a result.
23 January − The Court of Appeal upholds the Industrial Court’s 2011 decision that 
essential services be prohibited from striking, instructing strikers to go back to work.
June 28 June − BOFEPUSU reports Botswana to the International Labour Organisation.
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Wisconsin Protest 
2011
February 11 February − Newly elected Republican governor Scott Walker introduces his ‘Budget 
Repair’ bill that (1) drastically restricts state employees’ right to collectively bargain 
on wages; (2) removes unions’ ability to negotiate on benefits, sick leave, workplace 
conditions and grievance procedures; (3) permits employers to discipline or fire workers 
without cause; and (4) requires public employees to contribute a significantly higher 
percentage of their pay into pensions and healthcare costs.
14 February − On the first day of large demonstrations, 1,000 University of Wisconsin 
students march on the Capitol.
15 February − More than 10,000 Wisconsinites march to the Capitol to oppose the 
Budget Repair bill. Hundreds fill the Capitol to testify at the Legislature’s Joint Finance 
Committee hearing on the bill, until the official session is ended at 3am. This is despite 
the fact that hundreds are still waiting for an opportunity to speak.
17 February − In an effort to slow down the breakneck process and facilitate debate, 
fourteen of Wisconsin’s Democratic senators flee the state, so that Republicans are one 
vote short of the quorum necessary to vote on the bill.
19 February − Approximately 68,000 people converge on the Capitol to continue the 
protest against the Budget Repair bill. Tea Party supporters rally 3,000–5,000 people to 
counter the anti-bill demonstration.
25 February − Without notice, Republican leadership in the State Assembly calls for a 
vote on Governor Walker’s bill. With seconds to react, many Democrats who try to vote 
are unable to do so.
26 February − In freezing rain and snow, 70,000–100,000 protesters rally at the Capitol.
March 1 March − Walker publicly announces a full proposed budget in a speech at the Capitol.
9 March − Despite the fact that no Democrats are present, Republican legislators detach 
the fiscal provision of Walker’s bill and vote exclusively on union-busting measures. The 
bill is passed.
11 March − Governor Walker signs the bill into law.
18 March − Governor Walker’s bill is blocked from being implemented by Dane County 
Circuit Court Judge Maryann Sumi. She rules that the bill was passed in a manner that 
violated Wisconsin law, which requires twenty-four hours’ notice before a vote.
26 March − Given Wisconsin’s open-meetings law, Judge Sumi voids Governor Walker’s 
bill.
June 14 June − Judge Sumi’s ruling is reversed by Wisconsin Supreme Court.
29 June − Governor Walker’s Budget Repair bill becomes law.
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Occupy Wall Street
2011
June 9 June − Canadian anti-consumerist magazine Adbusters registers the domain name 
Occupy WallStreet.org
July 13 July − Adbusters calls for a protest on 17 September, where 20,000 people should ‘flood 
into lower Manhattan, set up tents, kitchens, peaceful barricades, and occupy Wall Street 
for a few months’ and demand ‘democracy not corporatocracy’.
August 23 August − ‘Hactivist’ collective Anonymous releases a video pledging its support for 
the protest and encouraging its members to participate by supporting a Tumblr page blog 
entitled ‘We Are the 99 Percent’, referring to the beleaguered majority that gets nothing 
while 1 per cent gets everything.
September 9 September − Supporters of Occupy Wall Street start posting their photos and stories to 
a new ‘We Are the 99 Percent’ Tumblr page.
17 September − The protest begins, with around 1,000 people gathering in downtown 
Manhattan and walking up and down Wall Street. The protesters settle into Zuccotti 
Park, two blocks north of Wall Street.
20 September − Police start arresting mask-wearing protesters, using an arcane law dating 
back to 1845 that bans masked gatherings unless part of ‘a masquerade party or like enter-
tainment’.
24 September − Around eighty people are arrested during a permit-less march uptown, 
and video footage of the event –especially the use of pepper spray on a group of women – 
earns Occupy Wall Street its first major media coverage. An Occupy Wall Street-inspired 
protest starts in Chicago.
26 September − Filmmaker Michael Moore addresses the crowd at Zuccotti Park. Noam 
Chomsky sends his regards.
27 September – Actress Susan Sarandon and Princeton academic Cornel West show up at 
the protests.
28 September − Transport Workers Union Local 100 becomes the first big union to 
support Occupy Wall Street via a member vote.
October 1 October − Some 700 protesters are arrested in a march across the Brooklyn Bridge. 
Some protesters say the police purposefully lured and trapped them on the multi-tiered 
bridge’s road level; the police say they warned protesters to stay on the walkway level. 
The mass arrests push the protests to the front page of newspapers and the top of TV 
news broadcasts. Occupy Wall Street-inspired protests start in Washington, DC and Los 
Angeles.
3 October − Protesters dressed as ‘corporate zombies’, in full zombie regalia and clutching 
fake cash, parade down Wall Street. The protests have spread nationwide, including 
Boston, Memphis, Minneapolis, St Louis, Hawaii and Portland, Maine.
5 October − At least thirty-nine organisations, including New York City’s largest labour 
unions and MoveOn.org, join Occupy Wall Street for a march through New York’s 
financial district. Organisers say 10,000 to 20,000 people marched; the media puts the 
number somewhere below 15,000. In the evening, ‘mayhem’ is said to break out when 
crowds overrun police barriers and officers swat protesters with batons and spray them 
with mace. Republican presidential candidate Herman Cain weighs in on Occupy Wall 
Street, stating on CBS News, ‘Don’t blame Wall Street, don’t blame the big banks, if you 
don’t have a job and you’re not rich, blame yourself!’
6 October − Around 4,000 protesters march in Portland, Oregon. More demonstrations 
unfold in Houston, Austin, Tampa and San Francisco. Asked about Occupy Wall Street, 
President Obama says, ‘I think it expresses the frustrations the American people feel, that 
we had the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression, huge collateral damage all 
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October throughout the country … and yet you’re still seeing some of the same folks who acted 
irresponsibly trying to fight efforts to crack down on the abusive practices that got us into 
this in the first place.’
7 October − Mayor Michael Bloomberg criticises the protesters in a radio interview, saying 
they are ‘taking the jobs away from people working in this city’ and that the protests are 
‘not good for tourism’.
13 October − Brookfield, the company that owns Zuccotti Park, announces that protesters 
must vacate the park at 7am on 14 October so it can be cleaned. Brookfield promises that 
demonstrators will be let back in after the four-hour power washing, but says it plans to 
enforce park rules prohibiting tents, tarps and sleeping in the park. Infuriated protesters 
view the announcement as Bloomberg’s plan to shut down the movement, and begin 
cleaning the park themselves, also vowing to ‘defend the occupation’ from police.
15 October − The wave of protests spreads worldwide, from Europe to the Americas to 
Asia. While the demonstrations are generally peaceful, violence erupts in Rome when 
rioters hijack the protest there. In New York, thousands of people march to the US 
Armed Forces recruiting station in Times Square to protest spending on foreign wars.
18 October − President Obama delivers a mixed message on Nightline, saying he ‘under-
stands the frustrations’ of the protesters, but that the movement is ‘not that different from 
some of the protests we saw coming from the Tea Party’.
21 October − The host of an opera radio show aired by National Public Radio affiliates is 
fired for participating in the Occupy DC movement, sparking controversy.
25 October − The Egyptian activists who toppled Hosni Mubarak lend their support to 
the protesters in the US and Europe, issuing a statement published by The Guardian. In 
Oakland, California, police clear about 170 protesters from their encampment outside city 
hall and arrest ninety-seven demonstrators. When hundreds of protesters return later in 
the day, police fire teargas canisters into the crowd.
November 5 November − Protesters march on major banks and financial institutions in honour 
of ‘Bank Transfer Day’, an attempt to urge Americans to move their money from big 
corporate banks to smaller community credit unions. In the month leading up to Bank 
Transfer Day, an estimated 600,000 people pull their cash out of major banks.
15 November − In Oakland, police arrest twenty people and clear protesters from the 
plaza where they had been living; the mayor’s legal adviser resigns in protest. At 1 am in 
New York City, police begin evicting protesters from Zuccotti Park on Mayor Bloomberg’s 
orders, arresting those who refuse to leave and barring reporters from getting close to the 
scene. A judge rules that although the protesters do not have a First Amendment right to 
camp out in the park, they are allowed to return to Zuccotti sans tents and tarps.
17 November − In honour of the movement’s two-month anniversary, and in response to 
the eviction of demonstrators from Zuccotti Park, hundreds of protesters march towards 
the New York Stock Exchange and eventually occupy other locations throughout the city. 
Other occupiers hold similar demonstrations across the country, in Los Angeles, Dallas, 
Denver and several other cities. Hundreds of people are arrested.
19 November − Campus police at the University of California, Davis, pepper spray 
protesters who are peacefully obstructing a public walkway. Footage of the incident 
quickly goes viral online, prompting the school’s chancellor to place the offending officers 
on leave and order an investigation.
Timeline of the Global Protests, 2010–13
Student Protests and Occupy London, United Kingdom
2010
October 12 October − The Browne Review, or Independent Review of Higher Education 
Funding and Student Finance, is published, suggesting among other things the removal 
of the £3,290 cap on tuition fees.
November 3 November – The coalition government announces it will put into practice the 
majority of the proposals put forward by the Browne Review, including major cuts to 
higher education institutions. Furthermore, the government makes public an intended 
rise in the cap for tuition fees, from £3,290 to £9,000.
10 November − ‘Demo 2010’, a national student demonstration organised by the 
National Union of Students (NUS) and the University and College Union (UCU) 
takes place in central London. The NUS claims that around 52,000 people attended 
the march, and that it was the largest student demonstration in a generation. Around 
200 participants occupy 30 Millbank – headquarters to the Conservative party’s 
campaign – and clashes with the police occur.
24 November − Student demonstrations take place in central London and in other UK 
cities, including Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool and Manchester.
The University for Strategic Optimism’s inaugural lecture takes place at the Borough 
branch of Lloyds Bank in London.
30 November − Student demonstrations are held in central London and in other UK 
cities such as Nottingham, Birmingham and Bristol. Occupations and marches take 
place. The University for Strategic Optimism holds a lecture at a Tesco Superstore in 
London.
December 6 December − An occupation and teach-in is held at Tate Britain in London by organ-
isations including Arts Against Cuts.
9 December –  Students in London and Edinburgh march on the day when the Houses 
of Parliament vote on the tuition fees bill. At 5.41 pm protesters hear that the bill has 
been voted in.
2011
February 15 February − ‘Art Against Cuts’ perform their ‘Orgy of the Rich’ at a Sotheby’s 
auction house in London, protesting the discrepancies between profits made in the art 
market and austerity measures in the UK.
March 25 March − The University for Strategic Optimism’s ‘Free Free Market Market’ perfor-
mance action takes place outside the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Skills in 
London.
26 March − ‘March for the Alternative’, a demonstration opposing public spending 
cuts and organised by the Trades Union Congress (TUC), takes place in central 
London. The protest is described as the largest demonstration in the UK since the 
protest against the war in Iraq in February 2003.
May 28 May − UK Uncut’s ‘Emergency Operation’ takes place in cities across the UK. 
Activists dressed as doctors and surgeons occupy branches of four main banks with the 
intention of opposing the government’s proposed changes to the NHS and highlighting 
the role that banks had in the nation’s deficit.
October Occupy London sets up camp outside St Paul’s Cathedral. A second camp in Finsbury 
Square and other smaller camps and occupations follow.
2012
February 28 February − The Occupy London camp at St Paul’s is evicted.
May 1 May − A ‘Flash camp’ at Trafalgar Square and a protest in central London and the 
West End take place.
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Spain’s Indignados Movement
2011
February 9 February − A new online initiative named NoLesVotes (Don’t Vote for Them) is 
launched by leading internet activists in Spain. The new platform calls on citizens not 
to vote for any of the country’s major parties in response to the passing of the so-called 
‘Ley Sinde’, an anti-digital piracy bill. US diplomatic cables obtained by WikiLeaks had 
previously confirmed activists’ suspicions that the bill was drafted under pressure from 
the US government and its culture industry lobby. 
March A ‘Platform for the Coordination of Pro-mobilisation Groups’ is created around a mani-
festo calling for mass demonstrations against Spain’s political class to be held on 15 May. 
This platform soon morphs into Democracia Real Ya (Real Democracy Now), joining 
forces with NoLesVotes, Anonymous, Juventud Sin Futuro (Youth Without a Future) and 
a range of other online and grassroots platforms to form a broad citizens’ coalition. 
May 15 May − Over 100,000 people march in sixty cities across Spain under the slogan 
‘¡Democracia Real Ya!’ (‘Real democracy now!’). Although the marches are well attended 
they attract relatively little mainstream media coverage. 
16 May − A group of around forty protesters, some of them linked to the world of 
hacking and free/digital culture, decide to pitch camp at Madrid’s main square, Puerta 
del Sol. 
17 May − Early in the morning the police evict the campers from Puerta del Sol. News 
of the eviction spreads rapidly via social media, including through Twitter hashtags such 
as #nonosvamos (#wearenotleaving) and #yeswecamp. This leads to some 200 people 
retaking the square, followed by many thousands more in the coming days. 
20 May − By now, close to 30,000 people have taken to the Madrid square in full view 
of the national and international media. This demographic explosion is mirrored online 
as countless social media items are hastily produced and shared. Dozens of other cities 
around Spain follow suit, and the nascent Indignados/15M movement is now a global 
media event. 
Mid-May to 
mid-June
Protesters occupy Spain’s main squares for a month. The encampments swiftly evolve 
into ‘cities within cities’ governed through popular assemblies and committees. 
Committees are formed around practical needs such as cooking, cleaning, communi-
cating and carrying out actions. Decisions are taken through both majority-rule vote and 
consensus.
27 May − News of the violent eviction of peaceful campers from Plaça de Catalunya, 
Barcelona, by the regional police is widely shared on social media and by the main-
stream media.
15 June − Indignados’ peaceful image is tarnished when irate demonstrators harass 
Catalan politicians as they enter the regional parliament in Barcelona. This incident 
provokes a brief crisis within the movement as its spokespersons seek to distance them-
selves from it. A peaceful counter-demonstration a few days later restores the move-
ment’s non-violent credentials. 
Mid-June Protesters relocate to local neighbourhoods (barrios) following arduous consensus-
seeking assemblies. The aim is now to take the movement from the central squares and 
streets to these local neighbourhoods, but not without first warning the authorities that 
protesters ‘know the way back’. Neighbourhood assemblies are created in many local-
ities, albeit with uneven levels of participation. 
October 15 October − The Indignados align themselves with similar movements elsewhere, such 
as Occupy in the US or the anti-austerity protests in Greece and Portugal, to launch a 
wave of protests in more than 1,000 cities around the world.
Timeline of the Global Protests, 2010–13
Recent 
develop-
ments
In Spain, the Indignados movement has continued to evolve as a loosely articulated 
constellation of techno-political ideals, practices and actions. For example, in May 
2012 a group called 15MpaRato was created to take legal action against Rodrigo Rato, 
the former IMF managing director and chief executive of Bankia. That same month 
Bankia had requested a €19 billion bailout from the Spanish government. In less than 
two weeks, the new platform had built a strong social media profile and raised sufficient 
money through crowdfunding to initiate the legal process As a consequence, Rato 
appeared in court that December to face charges of fraud, embezzlement, falsifying 
accounts and price manipulation. Other ongoing initiatives include the Mortgage 
Victims Platform, the Casa Precaria in Madrid (offering advice on self-employment), a 
Catalan network of cooperatives and the Citizens’ Tide, ‘a coalition of 350 organisations 
… that have mobilised hundreds of thousands against privatisation and austerity’.
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
Greece’s Indignados
2011
February 23 February − There is a recurrence of violent protests and strikes involving up to 
100,000 people as German Chancellor Angela Merkel calls for a renewal of the loan 
programme to Greece that had been conditioned on fiscal tightening. The measures 
adopted by Greece are considered harsh by the protesters.
May 25 May − Anti-austerity protesters organised by the Direct Democracy Now! movement, 
known as the Indignant Citizens Movement (Kínima Aganaktisménon Politón), start 
demonstrating in major cities across Greece.
28 May − Demonstrations continue with at least 7,000 people gathered in front of the 
Greek Parliament. A number of new flags appear, including those of Tunisia, Argentina, 
Armenia and Hungary. At least twenty people set up tents in the square. Major demon-
strations also take place in Thessaloniki, Patras and Heraklion. In Thessaloniki a cycling 
race is organised as part of the demonstration.
June 5 June − Second day of pan-European demonstrations marking the twelfth continuous 
day of demonstrations in Greece. An estimated 200,000−500,000 gather at Athens’ 
Syntagma Square, making it the largest demonstration in Athens since the 1980s.
29 June − Violent clashes occur between the riot police and protesters as the Greek 
Parliament votes to accept the EU’s austerity requirements. Accusations of police 
brutality are reported by international media.
August 7 August − A sit-in at Thessaloniki’s White Tower Square is held throughout July and 
early August, until the municipal police evacuate the square of all protesters camped 
inside.
14 August − The indignants at Heraklion’s Eleftherias Square agree to leave the square 
peacefully.
October 5 October − A general strike takes place. During the demonstrations police clash with 
youth.
November 17 November − As part of the ongoing protests that lead to the resignation of the 
Papandreou government, over 50,000 people march in Athens.
2012
February 12 February − As many as 500,000 protesters gather in Athens outside Parliament House 
to voice opposition to Lucas Papademos’ caretaker cabinet’s austerity measures being 
debated in Parliament, a precondition for the next €130 billion lending package from 
the European Union and the International Monetary Fund to the Greek government, 
without which the country faces sovereign default by 20 March. Police use large amounts 
of teargas and flash grenades, while protesters hurl stones and Molotov cocktails. In total 
forty-five buildings are set ablaze, and twenty-five protesters and forty officers injured. 
The protests are preceded by a twenty-four-hour nationwide general strike on 7 February, 
when the two largest labour unions in Greece said the proposed measures would ‘drive 
Greek society to despair’.
April 5 April − Demonstrations against the government after a pensioner named Dimitris 
Christoulas commits suicide by shooting himself, refusing to share the fate of those 
people who have had to search for food in rubbish bins. 
2012–13 Anti-austerity opposition is expressed through political parties, which have attempted to 
appropriate the spirit of the 2011 protest at Syntagma Square. Indignation with austerity, 
however, remains a central feature of everyday life in Greece. 
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Political Aesthetics
This book is about the political aesthetics of the popular revolts and protests 
that swept across the world at the turn of 2010, starting from a small country in 
North Africa. The mass uprisings against authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in 
the Arab world that followed came to be known as the ‘Arab Spring’, an implicit 
reference to the Spring of Nations, the mid-nineteenth-century European wave 
of revolutions that united workers and the middle class across a swathe of coun-
tries in demands for democracy, liberalism, republicanism and freedom. Political 
aesthetics refers to the fact that, as Crispin has argued, ‘not all art is political, but 
all politics is aesthetic; at their heart political ideologies, systems and constitu-
tions are aesthetic systems, multimedia artistic environments’.1 As the essays in 
this book demonstrate, the building materials for an aesthetics of protest and 
revolt are mined from social, political and national histories, and assembled 
to subvert the aesthetically embodied, materially constructed edifices of tyran-
nical, authoritarian or neoliberal regimes. Peaceful political mobilisation and 
democratic claim-making, lacking the instruments of violence and domination, 
negate such edifices through counter-aesthetic movements of symbolic and 
experiential solidarity. Political aesthetics are thus central to all political move-
ments because, as Crispin goes on to propose, not only is some art political, but 
political aesthetics, whether of regimes or the protest movements seeking to 
dislodge or radically reform them, concern the very ‘design of political systems’, 
seen as ‘aesthetic environments’.2 Image-making is central to much political 
aesthetic, as Lila Khatib argues in relation to the Middle East: 
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The image is at the heart of political struggle, which has become an endless 
process of images battling, reversing, erasing and replacing other images … 
Political struggle, then, is an inherently visually productive process. It is also 
visual to a large degree: It is a struggle over presence, over visibility.3
As Christopher Pinney proposes in this volume, images of the past continue ‘to 
animate, in complex ways, the political landscape and the repertoire of political 
possibilities in India’. The political struggles this book aims to describe and 
analyse have not been just visual, however, but are expressed in song, humour, 
poetry and bodily participation. Protesters’ imaginaries of good and evil embodied 
in regimes and in their utopian alternatives were manifested and materialised in 
actors’ imaginative creations. In different, widely separated parts of the world 
they utilised aesthetic popular media, electronic media, shared hand gestures, 
visual and material discourses, artistic creations, actions and theatrical speeches 
to convey their message. 
There had been other, previous waves of insurrection across countries 
and even continents. These included the early and late anti-colonial move-
ments and, more recently, the East European and Latin American democratic 
uprisings.4 Of course many protests emerged out of activism against corruption 
and authoritarianism over many years, as in the case of Egypt and Tunisia which 
had witnessed earlier activist and trade union mobilisations, or India, in which 
the campaign against corruption had been fought by activists for many years.5 
The historical continuities as well as the differences between the 2010−12 
popular movements and past popular mobilisations are certainly significant and 
integral to any analysis. But the point we make collectively in this volume is 
that the new protests were also ‘new’ in theoretically significant ways. They were 
not simply echoes of earlier protest movements, but utilised innovative political 
aesthetics in an age of global media and social networking; their material, visual, 
physical and sensual manifestations were a means of mobilising and contesting 
corruption, inequality, autocracy and neoliberal policies.
Topographies of Power: The Aesthetics of Political Form
To further explicate the claim that all politics is aesthetic, we begin by considering 
the architectural and spatial forms and organisational principles that animate 
the political. Form articulates moral as well as symbolic meanings. We asso-
ciate power at one outer extreme with Nazi or Fascist architecture, the massive 
neoclassical structures − impenetrable, imposing, monumental − built by such 
regimes.6 Authoritarian structures, in their very impenetrability, substantiate the 
chasm between those who govern and ordinary people by asserting aesthetically 
their hierarchical domination over their environment. In the modern world, 
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particularly in authoritarian states, government ministries like the Ministry of 
Interior in Egypt, where the security files of so-called dissidents were lodged and 
detainees held illegally, are constitutive of this vertical domination.7
In the protest movements and uprisings described here, the counter-image 
to these formidable structures was, above all, the tent: light, moveable, make-
shift. All the various occupy movements – from Tahrir Square in Egypt to the 
Indignados’ encampments and occupations in Spain, Greece, Israel, the UK and 
the USA, created over time demotic mini-republics, with kitchens, libraries 
and dialogue spaces. Caton, Al-Eriyani and Aryani describe the encampment 
in Change Square in Sana’a as ‘the longest standing tent city in the history of 
political protest’. In India, it was the pandal, a type of temporary cloth marquee 
deployed at weddings, religious and political gatherings, that shaded Anna 
Hazare and other activists during their protest fasts, as Martin Webb and Chris-
topher Pinney show in this volume. Paula Serafini argues in her chapter that the 
‘tent [became] a dominant symbol of Occupy, often portrayed in photographs 
by the media as a synecdoche for the movement’. At one politically significant 
moment, she tells us, the movement decided to 
set up a ‘flash camp’ in the middle of Trafalgar Square, signalling the 
comeback and resistance of the movement with an act and a prop (the tent) 
which embodied its essence. The intention was clearly not to mark a new 
settlement site − since setting up tents in Trafalgar Square would guarantee 
an immediate eviction. The intention was to make a statement, to remind 
the world that the fight was not over, and that occupations could happen 
anywhere and anytime.
In another act of protest, this time in New York City, ‘protesters lifted their tents 
over their heads and held them open in the air, in a symbolically charged act of 
subversion’. Claire Tancons reports that in a march organised by the interfaith 
clergy group Occupy Faith NYC, the Council of Elders and various Occupy Wall 
Street-affiliated arts and culture groups such as Not an Alternative, in addition 
to candles, ‘marchers carried so-called mili-tents to symbolise occupation’. Tent 
cities were often targeted by authorities, usually in the form of attacks by the 
repressive forces of the state in which tents were often raided, set fire to or 
violently removed from public squares. 
In Botswana, Pnina Werbner argues, not a tent but a giant Morula tree 
became the centre of worker protest, an alternative, ‘traditional’ site for a 
workers’ forum, countering the image of the magnificently built Botswana state 
parliament located nearby in the capital. In Wisconsin protesters occupied State 
House in flamboyant protest, as Garlough shows. Urban public squares, often 
redolent with the symbolism of prior revolutions, became the centre of many 
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of the protests. Khatib remarks that Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Liberation Square, 
steeped in a nationalist history commemorating liberation from colonial rule, 
became a ‘mini cosmos of the country’s moral order as expressed in spatial order, a 
space that was controlled by the state and which had seen many protests crushed 
by the Egyptian police’.8 During the uprisings Tahrir Square became a ‘complex 
space’ of aesthetic production: Hanan Sabea and Dalia Wahdan describe the 
music, art and poetry that came to be performed in the square. In Yemen too, 
Bedouin poets recited or sang their poetry in the huge Taghayyur (Change) 
Square in Sana’a. Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, an urban space connecting 
key landmarks of Israel’s struggle for independence, Livio and Katriel tell us, 
became the site of protest against the state and its uncaring government. In all 
the revolutions, uprisings and protests, monuments of the regime’s authoritative 
domination were adorned with graffiti or protest posters. In all, sacred civic 
space was reinscribed anew. 
Form is also evident in the contrast between vertical and horizontal politics. 
Whereas the hierarchical nature of autocratic regimes is evident, horizontality 
has become a trope and practice associated in many of the movements, in which 
leadership is virtually absent. ‘Horizontality’, often materialised in discussion 
‘circles’, is understood in terms of dialogical tactics of non-privileged, egalitarian 
listening to others and allowing speaking in turns. Thus Livio and Katriel tell 
us that 
Citizen-strangers spent many evening hours sitting in ‘dialogue circles’ … 
Broadly modelled after similar ‘general assemblies’ in Spain and elsewhere 
… these discussion forums were an exercise in grassroots participatory demo-
cracy characterised by a desire for non-hierarchy, collective and consensual 
decision making, and public transparency, in an attempt to challenge and 
contest dominant social and political relations.
Non-leadership in some anarchist-inspired occupations, like Occupy Wall 
Street, meant new inventive forms of horizontality. In reaction to the police 
banning of megaphones, supposedly because of noise pollution, the ‘People’s 
Mic’ or ‘human megaphone’ was invented. Graeber captures the aesthetics of 
speaking to large audiences through this relay system in which everyone within 
earshot repeats what is said to the next circle, and then the next. This, he says, 
had a ‘curious, and profoundly democratic, effect … since anyone can speak, 
and everyone must repeat, it forces participants to genuinely listen to everybody 
else’.9
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The Aesthetics of Leadership
The stress on horizontality in many of the protest movements arises, of course, 
because autocratic leaders everywhere attempt to project their absolute domi-
nance through pervasive images of grandeur and inviolability. In this volume 
Igor Cherstich examines the fall of Gaddafi in Libya, from ghost-like near-
immortality to flesh-and-blood (evil) humanness. Gaddafi cultivated his semi-
divine public persona as the father and symbol of the nation through billboards 
and posters that dominated Libyan urban space. At the same time, Cherstich 
tells us, Gaddafi the man gradually disappeared from public sight. The revolution 
reversed the great leader’s apotheosis by tearing down the billboards and icono-
clastic caricatures, as well as by physically attacking and desecrating the body of 
the tyrant. This confirmed what many had suspected: that the ghost was just a 
man. Ironically, perhaps, in the light of the above discussion of tent symbolism, 
in addition to his huge fortress-like compound in the centre of Tripoli, Gaddafi 
used a giant Bedouin tent to host foreign dignitaries, and even transported a 
tent to Italy on a state visit. In Tunisia, the spectacular corruption feeding the 
lavish lifestyle of President Zine al-Abidin Ben-Ali, Simon Hawkins tells us, was 
a specific source of anger, fuelling the protests.
Humour, satire, parody and caricature deployed to debase autocratic leaders 
have been the hallmark of the protest movements in many parts of the world. 
In Botswana, workers constructed the President as an autocrat by singing songs 
of rebellion that mocked and satirised him and members of his cabinet, Werbner 
tells us, while the press caricatured him in satirical cartoons. In Wisconsin, 
Garlough reports, Governor Walker was satirised in posters and through 
masquerade in which Krampus, a nineteenth-century mid-European scary folk 
figure who dispenses moral judgement, appeared at the forefront of several 
marches around the Capitol, shaking his fist and bearing a sign stating ‘Walker, 
Krampus must talk with you’. 
If some leaders are imaged as corrupt and evil by protesters, other leaders 
are imaged as exemplary persons, embodying the highest values of the nation 
and, indeed, the world. The image of M. K. Gandhi was a repeated trope in the 
2011 protests, worldwide; it was invoked in Tahrir Square and in many other 
non-violent movements during 2011. In the Indian anti-corruption protests the 
globally reproduced image of the distinctive ascetic aesthetic which Gandhi 
himself cultivated during his lifetime was deployed as an inspiration for a new 
generation of Indian activists fighting present-day corruption. As Pinney and 
Webb show, Gandhi’s image and moral legacy was in turn woven together with 
images of revolutionary martyrs in the struggle for Indian independence. This 
included men such as Bhagat Singh who had opposed colonial rule through acts 
of violent resistance and prison hunger strikes, and was ultimately hanged by 
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the British colonial government. Unlike some of the ‘horizontal’ movements, 
the Indian anti-corruption protests were led by charismatic leaders who asserted 
moral authority through displays of asceticism modelled on the Gandhian 
practice of satyagraha (truth force). In the case of the most prominent activist, 
Anna Hazare, the soubriquet ‘dusra (second) Gandhi’ attached to him by 
supporters explicitly referenced the earlier struggle against illegitimate colonial 
power, attaching some of Gandhi’s charisma to a new iconic figure and rebooting 
the Indian idiom of ‘saintly politics’10 for a new decade. 
If dictators everywhere display their images in giant posters, these became 
the object of desecration by protesters. Ironically, however, in a tragic reminder 
of the fragility of democracy, huge photos of Egypt’s army chief General Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi, who was called upon to ‘save’ the 2011 revolution, came to 
be juxtaposed with former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, in what 
appeared to be a nostalgic yearning among many Egyptians for a strong man.11 
The juxtaposition signalled the possible end of the Arab Spring in Egypt.
We, the People: Poetry, Song and the Poetics of Protest
It started with the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia as protesters first rose up to 
chant the slogan that became the hallmark of the Arab Spring: ‘The People 
Want the Fall of the Regime’. From Tunisia the chant spread to Egypt, Yemen, 
Bahrain, Libya, the Sudan, Syria and even Jordan and Lebanon. Beyond the 
Arab world the chant was picked up in the ‘tent protest’ in Israel. Hanan Sabea 
recalls that on the Friday of Rage in Egypt 
as the imam ended the prayer, ‘the people’ arose in unison at the many 
mosques and squares of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Port Said, Mansoura, and 
many other cities and towns in Egypt to chant one slogan, ‘Ash-sha’b yurid 
isqat an-nizam’ (‘The people want to dismantle the system’).
 ‘But who are “the people”,’ she asks, ‘and how are they constituted as a collective 
articulating a revolutionary demand for change?’ 
In Yemen, a report quoted by Caton et al. described the performance of 
singers and musicians in Change Square: 
In the evenings, singers take their place. One musician, Muhammad Nasser 
al-Adroei, is rapping his way to revolution. ‘Be wise, the government is 
poison, the one who annoys it is killed,’ he raps in Yemeni dialect. The 
crowd joins him for the chorus, chanting that much-repeated slogan of the 
Arab revolutions: ‘The people want the fall of the regime.’
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Not only rappers defined the political aesthetic of the Yemeni revolution, as 
Caton et al. argue in this volume. In a poetic version of the chant, Bedouin 
poets who joined the uprising called out in a zamil poem performed before a 
crowd:
Ya ‘Ali [the President], the people have decided/
Don’t delay! There is no way for you to go/except the exit.
In Israel young protesters adapted the slogan ‘The people demand social 
justice’ (ha-am doresh tzedek xevrati). As the staccato, drum-like chant echoed 
and re-echoed throughout the Middle East it left open the question of who 
the people were. In her chapter on Egypt Sabea argues that ‘the category “the 
people” – variously articulated as “al-shaab” or “the street” (al-sharaa) – emerges 
as the collective that speaks and acts together, and in the process of speaking 
and acting defines an emerging political’. It was a poet who first invoked the 
people against the regime, Sabea tells us, in ‘I dreamed of being a people’ − part 
of Ahmed Fouad Negm’s poem ‘As if You are Nothing’, composed in October 
2010. The poem, she says, ‘embodies glimpses of a different imaginary which 
has been born of decades of precarity that marked the consolidation of the 
neoliberal sociopolitical and moral order in Egypt’. Certain historical moments 
and spaces of confrontation become key nodes, Sabea says, enabling the emer-
gence of a critical imaginary that assembles a different possibility of ‘a people’ 
and a polis.
A newly constituted people imagines itself and emerges in opposition to 
tyrannical, autocratic or unjust leaders, from Gaddafi to Governor Walker or Ian 
Khama in Botswana, all of whom protesters constructed culturally and aestheti-
cally, and it is vis-à-vis these figures of the regime that they enacted a solidary 
collectivity. In Tunisia, Simon Hawkins describes how Tunisian protesters appro-
priated the Tunisian flag from national domination. They virtually inscribed the 
flag on their bodies, painted flags on their faces and draped themselves in the flag 
− a phenomenon which also characterised the anti-corruption protests in India. 
The images created travelled worldwide, only to return to Tunisia and ignite 
huge local protests, in a dialectical process in which the local and the global 
interacted dynamically. Wherever the rebellion was against financial institu-
tions or corruption, ‘the people’ emerge through horizontal practices and the 
creation of moral spaces of pure practice, as in many of the Occupy movements.
Around the world emergent collectivities transcended their social heteroge-
neity through a shared aesthetic, and – as many of the contributors note here 
– through everyday practices of living together, maintaining hygiene and clinics, 
clearing rubbish, sharing food, endless talk and joyful celebrations. Everywhere, 
the uprisings and protests were remarkable not only for their huge mobilisations 
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but for their inclusivity across divisions of class, religiosity, gender or ethnicity.12 
During the Arab Spring insurrections, men and women, secular democrats and 
later, Islamists, stood up with their bodies against the might of armed soldiers, 
police and criminal thugs. Elsewhere, as in Israel, social divisions were some-
times marked spatially, Livio and Katriel report, partly a result of the way the 
protests had evolved, but they nevertheless displayed greater unity in diversity 
than had ever been achieved in the past. In New York City, absent initially from 
Occupy Wall Street were coloured minorities but, as Claire Tancons reports 
here, ‘Occupy the Hood and Occupy Harlem emerged, urging people of colour 
to participate in the movement’ and creating ‘Downtown/Uptown alliances’. 
In Greece, Dimitrios Theodossopoulos describes the moral self-constitution 
of the people as epitomised by two opposed rhetorical tropes – indignation 
(aganaktisi) and austerity (mnimónio). ‘Used as figures of speech with imagi-
native, moral, rhetorical force,’ he says, ‘they depict a world of agonistic conflict 
between Greek citizens and the constraints set by their government and/or the 
international establishment.’ In India the memory and moral authority of M. K. 
Gandhi became one of the rallying images of a diverse mass of protesters, mainly 
from India’s new middle class but encompassing beyond that a wide range from 
all classes, castes and communities.13
Once regimes topple, it is often difficult to sustain the sense of unity and 
exhilarating communitas generated during the struggle. As in past uprisings, 
like the Iranian revolution, the ‘collected will’14 of the revolutionary event 
often crumbles into pre-existing competing movements and ideological camps. 
After the revolution in Tunisia achieved its aim of deposing Ben-Ali, the frag-
mentation was signalled by Islamist waving of the black flag of Salafi Islam to 
oppose the unifying national flag. Against the Islamists, young secularists then 
adopted the Harlem Shake, much to the condemnation of the newly elected 
Islamic regime.15 By the time of Egypt’s ‘second revolution’, in July 2013, the 
‘people’ had also divided into two polarised mass movements, the Islamists and 
the secularists, and the chasm between them seemed unbridgeable. ‘How is it 
even conceivable,’ Hanan Sabea asks, ‘that the “summoning of ALL”, as Badiou 
elaborated in his writings on the political and the event … has swiftly become 
“we are a people and you are a people”?’ 
The boundaries of the ‘people’ are thus ‘fluid and contingent’, she remarks, 
but for a people to emerge out of their prior differences, they need first to create 
a sense of equality or equivalence16 between them. This was evident in the new 
egalitarianism forged across classes in Botswana, for example, during the public 
union strike described by Werbner, and which emerged everywhere through 
shared celebratory practices and shared suffering. Mourning of the dead in 
the Arab Spring uprisings became key moments of solidarity. In Egypt, Dalia 
Wahdan tells us, the group We Are All Khaled Saeed was formed immediately 
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after the young man’s brutal killing by the security police was confirmed through 
satellite TV. ‘Members were innovative and non-violent,’ she reports. ‘They 
started a weekly ritual of dressing up in black and standing silently on the streets 
drawing attention and raising the curiosity of passers-by. The group was the first 
one to announce on their Facebook page the start of the march towards the 
main squares on 25 January.’
Not only joyfulness, camaraderie and intellectual ferment, but anguish, fear, 
anger and suffering were experienced in the encampments that arose throughout 
the Arab world and beyond it. These were deeply felt and shared emotions, 
beyond the media and beyond spectacle.
Spectacle, Aesthetics and Performing the Political 
Participation and embodied presence played a key role in making the protests 
aesthetic performances on a massive scale. The demonstrations were remarkable 
for their huge mobilisations of real bodies in space. This was particularly striking 
in the Arab Spring uprisings. The political aesthetic defining the 2011 uprisings 
and protests went far beyond the familiar deployment in earlier protest move-
ments of verbal texts, chants or visual placards and slogans. The twenty-first-
century revolts invoked a much richer and more inventive archive of evocative 
signs and bodily gestures, used in participatory performance, and this was true 
even beyond the Middle East. Indeed, most remarkable was the prominent 
presence of artistic and pictorial images, songs, poetry, humour, satire and 
dramatic performances. 
The salience of performative aesthetics in constituting a politics of revolt, 
the spontaneous, experimental, improvisational use of material, visual, auditory, 
theatrical and sensual expressions, was not simply a matter of creating mass 
‘spectacles’ in the sense theorised by Guy Debord. For Debord late capitalist 
society was an ‘immense accumulation of spectacles’,17 inescapably and intrin-
sically inauthentic, illusory and ‘unreal’, ‘a negation of life’,18 a ‘sun that never 
sets over the empire of modern passivity’,19 ‘the opposite of dialogue’,20 a ‘bad 
dream’21 produced and imposed by the overwhelming hierarchical power of 
commodity capitalism. Against that negative vision of inauthenticity, we argue 
here that while the protests may have been interludes that interrupted the flow 
of time, they were nevertheless moments of intense effervescence in which 
aesthetic production became an energising force, providing substantive meaning 
and creative expression to the massive mobilisations of young people, the disaf-
fected, the middle classes and the apolitical silent majority. Aesthetic inven-
tiveness, humour and celebration were the medium enabling solidarities and 
alliances among democrats, workers, trade unionists, civil rights activists and 
opposition parties. Thus Livio and Katriel, referring to Victor Turner,22 suggest 
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that the Israeli protest culture of summer 2011 was ‘a liminoid sphere in which 
individuals voluntarily and playfully enter[ed] a space where traditional social 
relationships and hierarchies [were] temporarily suspended and replaced by the 
unity and heightened emotionality of shared purpose and solidarity’. But the 
authors, nevertheless, also point to the ‘limits of communitas’, which emerged 
over time. Postill speaks of the strategic use of humour in media technologies.
The Tunisian ‘Jasmine’ Revolution, which began in December 2010 and 
sparked the chain of North African and global uprisings that followed it, began 
with the spectacle of stone-throwing youth against the police, but evolved into 
a more peaceful, non-violent and inclusive movement, as happened later in 
Spain.23 Against mere nationalist spectacle, in the United Kingdom, the anti-
capitalist activist groups studied by Serafini attempted to draw on performance 
art − a live artistic practice which focuses on the body of the performer in action, 
in time and space, and in active interaction with an audience. In their inventive, 
dramatic and often carnivalesque stunts, the activists’ aim of drawing audiences 
into their performance, was often, however, unachievable in practice, partly 
because the groups were small and passers-by apathetic. This led to the paradox 
described by Serafini that ‘although their artistic performances were in most cases 
intended to be participatory, they could only (potentially) reach wider audiences 
through the media and online, rather than at the site of the performance action’. 
Yet the media could not substitute in the final analysis, as Butler has argued,24 
for ‘real bodies occupying real spaces’. This is where the truly huge crowds that 
assembled, from Tahrir Square in Cairo to Change Square in Sana’a, from the Ram 
Lila grounds in Delhi to Puerta del Sol in Madrid and elsewhere, went beyond 
mere spectacle, and thus beyond the paradox of activists’ fixing the ephemera 
of ‘participation’ on YouTube. Indeed, most contributors to this volume agree 
that nothing substitutes for the huge numbers of bodies that packed into the 
revolutionary squares during the Arab Spring and other protests worldwide. The 
spectacular visibility of numbers did, however, also create its own illusory reality, 
with major political consequences for the outcome of the uprisings in some 
countries. Invoking twenty and even thirty million-strong crowds of protesters 
gathered in Egyptian squares in 2012, army generals, opposition politicians and 
young Egyptian tamarrud revolutionaries justified the call to rescue the stolen 
revolution by removing President Morsi and clamping down on the Muslim 
Brotherhood. These figures have been challenged, however, by crowd-counting 
experts who say there were 500,000, or at most a million protesters in Tahrir 
Square at any one time (possibly even less), a number which may be set against 
the thirteen million voters, some half of those voting, who voted for Mohamed 
Morsi in the 2012 presidential election. Voting lacks the spectacular aspects 
of packed bodies in the square.25 The meaning of ‘democracy’, the ‘will of the 
people’ and ‘freedom’ was being questioned in more than one sense, then, during 
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the uprisings, as became evident in Egypt’s ‘second revolution’.
Dalia Wahdan speaks of the aesthetics of brutality that emerged in Egypt 
during the periods of army and security service clampdown. These periods, 
loaded with contradictions and conflicts, generated a tremendous outpouring of 
artistic responses. Through videoed songs of defiance and martyrdom, protesters 
exposed acts of brutality and death while celebrating dignity and immortality. 
Graffiti, street performances and art flourished, Wahdan says, articulating a 
mocking humour that refuses to submit to brute shows of force.
Within an emergent anthropology of protest movements, the salience of 
humorous satire, the carnivalesque and embodied performance has been increas-
ingly noted.26 In a vivid description of the earlier Global Justice movement’s 
protest tactics, Juris proposes that these ‘image events’ communicate to wider 
audiences by ‘hijacking’ the global media, while at the same time creating 
affective solidarity through performance.27 Thus, if carnival and the carni-
valesque are without doubt ‘spectacular’, they go beyond spectacle. We need to 
recognise, as contributors demonstrate in this volume, their critical impact on 
genuine, transformative political processes of mobilisation. 
Carnival, Masquerade, Subversive Humour and Heteroglossia
Opening her essay, Claire Tancons insists that while some commentators and 
journalists may have 
dismissed Occupy Wall Street as carnival, lawmakers and police officers did 
not miss the point. They reached back to a mid-nineteenth-century ban 
on masking to arrest occupiers wearing as little as a folded bandana on the 
forehead, leaving little doubt about their fear of Carnival as a potent form of 
political protest.
The heteroglossia of carnival, the multiplicity of voices, images and artistic 
performances that sprang up in each of the different protest sites analysed 
here was − as Bakhtin argued for the medieval carnival − an expression of 
the diversity of participants and their concerns. For Bakhtin, the polyphony 
of carnival is a counter to the monologic − ‘there is no center that dictates 
meaning, but rather meaning arises only out of the exchanges among all the 
singularities in dialogue,’ as Hardt and Negri comment.28 
Tancons proposes that distinctively in the New World, carnival was not 
merely an anti-feudal, anti-clerical demonstration against official discourse, 
but an economic protest, a ‘war’ waged against ‘the extreme disparity between 
masters, their subjects, or slaves’, or − in its current Occupy Wall Street 
discourse – against extreme inequalities of wealth, of capitalism run wild. In the 
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Caribbean and the American South the ‘role reversals’ of carnival ‘alleviated,’ 
she says, ‘a brutally divisive social system by crowning servants and slaves 
king for a day’. Thus, in one Occupy Wall Street performance, a purple-and-
golden bull-shaped piñata named Wally, ‘the spirit of Wall Street at NYU’, was 
castrated in front of New York University’s Stern School of Business, bashed open 
by the student body, aka the 99 per cent. From its bulging belly fell ‘Wall Street 
Campus Cash’, fake banknotes featuring pictures and financial data about NYU 
President John Sexton.
Humour, satire, caricature and masquerade are distinctive in drawing on 
vernacular local figures, events, objects, jokes, puns, images and a shared history, 
to enact a universal morality that transcends the local. Humour cannot be under-
stood outside its context of production unless it is ‘explained’ to outsiders, yet 
paradoxically, it transcends its place and the moment of its production. Thus, 
Haugerud’s Billionaires for Bush imitate well-known American billionaires rarely 
heard of outside the USA.29 The humorous songs of rebellion that Batswana 
workers sang, witnessed by Werbner, mocked local politicians and civil servants. 
Livio and Katriel speak of ‘tactical frivolity’ and the ‘ludic spirit’ that dominated 
‘the semiotic landscape’ of the dwelling protest in Israel, dependent on local 
knowledge, puns and songs. Striking in the protests was the youthfulness of many 
of the participants, who drew on youth culture, playful, ludic elements and 
humour, as well as the centrality of middle-class participation. In Libya, Igor 
Cherstich tells us, the caricatures of Gaddafi ‘expressed, affirmed and mocked’ 
‘the bodily nature of the Colonel, once only a potential reality’. Depicted as a 
transvestite, an animal, a rat, Satan and a Mossad agent, he was ‘pure body: a 
fleshy ensemble of frizzy hair, moles and beard’, the very antithesis of his earlier 
claimed immortality. In Wisconsin, Raging Grannies sang old labour songs to 
new lyrics alongside the float of a giant puppet of Governor Walker, tied to 
strings pulled by two Koch brother puppeteers. These were pitched against the 
multiple signs and drawings adorning the statue of Wisconsin workers’ epon-
ymous hero, ‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette, who fought a war against big business. 
Even if, as Bakhtin showed for the medieval carnival,30 carnivals are contained 
moments of ‘rebellion’, or run the danger of being misinterpreted or trivialised 
by the media,31 conceived of as rituals, the protests generated and amplified 
powerful feelings of joy and terror, and fashioned new subjectivities in lived 
moments of mass action that demonstrated the centrality of experience in the 
constitution of political subjects. They were bodily, earthy, expressive moments 
of ‘freedom’ and collective effervescence, creating a sense of suspended ‘tempo-
rality’, ‘newness’ and ‘becoming’.32 Performance art and spatial occupation have 
thus become, as Mouffe argues, key tools of protest.33 Low-tech performance 
in an age of high-tech media, they nevertheless embody and generate a post-
modern self-consciousness of being a political subject, player and agent, not an 
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individual alone but a member of a solidary collectivity. 
In India, ‘spectacular’ protests have, of course, long been a feature of social 
movements, from Gandhi’s 1930 Salt March, which attracted world media 
attention, to the women’s tree-hugging Chipko movement,34 to violently 
suppressed protests against the development of Special Economic Zones such as 
that in Nandigram, West Bengal in 2007, but their impact has been amplified in 
the twenty-first century by global media and social networking. Anna Hazare’s 
massive campaign staged against corruption in high places was marked, Pinney 
tells us, by an ‘extraordinary profusion of hand-made images and texts’, and a 
complex, ‘hot’ bricolage of voices, groups, mythic associations and historical 
invocations: ‘a messy zone of citational creativity’. Ironically, however, for more 
staid Indian activists against corruption, Martin Webb reports, ‘the noisy spec-
tacle in which abuse and accusations were hurled back and forth, and slogans 
chanted … (was) not satyagraha (truth force) or tapasya (penance), but tamasha 
(spectacle)’. They rejected the noisy, commercialised, mediatised and carni-
valesque atmosphere of the protest because ‘the aesthetics and poetics of the 
Anna Hazare fasts did not prefigure a world that (they) wanted to see’.
In many parts of the world the protests thus fabricated, emotionally and 
bodily, in carnivalesque moments when ‘time stands still’, a bridge across the 
differences among participants.35 Jane Collins was led to wonder, in the face 
of the wide range of social actors with diverse economic and political stakes in 
Wisconsin − public and private-sector trade unions, community-action, anti-
racist and anti-poverty groups, the gay movement, the interfaith coalition for 
social justice, and ‘massive numbers of non-union community members’, ‘what 
kind of alliance or amalgamated movement was emerging in this snowy square 
in the upper Mid-West’ to occupy the Wisconsin State Capitol building?36 As 
Livio and Katriel in their chapter on Israel, Theodossopoulos writing on indig-
nation in Greece or Webb, writing on the ‘strange bedfellows’ to be found in 
the anti-corruption scene in India, note, the bringing together of experienced 
political activists with people who do not consider themselves activists at all 
and yet take to the streets in protest, is a key feature of many of the move-
ments analysed in this volume. Such diversity highlights the futility of previous 
singular theoretical approaches to the rise of social movements that stress, for 
example, ‘post-materialist’ identity politics,37 resource mobilisation in economic 
and political protest, or citizen rights mobilisations against the state.38 
The aesthetics of revolt that emerged during the protests of 2010−12 in 
North Africa and beyond are thus not concerned with the trivial ‘decoration’ 
of serious politics, the ‘icing on the cake’, so to speak. The critical need is to 
recognise a radical shift in modes of mobilisation and political activism that the 
uprisings and protests signalled, one not yet fully incorporated into the scholarly 
literature; a new embodied and aesthetic way of doing politics worldwide.
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Citational Travel and Vernacular Cosmopolitanism: 
Beyond the Arab Spring 
Writing about the emergence of the ‘common’ in 2004, Hardt and Negri note 
that ‘the geographical expansion of movements takes the form of an international 
cycle of struggles in which revolts spread from one local context to another like 
a contagious disease through the communication of common practices and 
desires’.39 None of the uprisings discussed in this book, and others that followed 
them in 2012−13, were isolated events. Even when they began in response 
to local grievances, as in Botswana, India or Israel, they invariably linked 
themselves explicitly to protests elsewhere. They ‘spread’ contagiously and 
infected other protests. They were connected, most saliently through tangible 
aesthetic allusions and inter-textual citations, despite being locally concerned 
in each country with a range of specific issues: regime change (the Arab world), 
corruption (India), the demise of the welfare state, tycoonery (Spain, Israel, 
Greece), a living wage (Botswana, Wisconsin), the financial crisis and corporate 
greed (Occupy in the USA, Canada and Britain). Several themes travelled 
widely, animating protests transnationally, across borders. 
It is not simply that social networks have spread transnationally even as they 
‘aggregated’ massive numbers of individuals from diverse backgrounds within 
physical national spaces, using modern means of communication;40 it is that 
non-verbal images, music and bodily gestures too have travelled across borders 
and been incorporated into local vernaculars. Writing about the Green revo-
lution in Iran in 2009, Manoukian argues perceptively that ‘citation’ is both 
geographical, across borders, and historical, across time, recalling earlier protests.41 
The spread of protests across the world since 2011 has infected peoples in 
many different, widely separated countries. It has, of course, been associated 
with terrible violence and civil war in some places, most prominently in Syria. 
But it is equally important to recognise that it inaugurated a new generation 
into mass forms of peaceful people’s political participation. Undoubtedly, the 
rebellions of Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt, epitomised in the giant gatherings in 
Tahrir Square, became a global symbol of protest against the odds and of courage 
in the face of brute tyranny. They inspired a series of subsequent rebellions − in 
Bahrain, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the Arabic world. Khatib speaks of ‘trav-
elling images’ creating a ‘domino effect’ and links these to the rise of the global 
media and World Wide Web.42 She sees this as creating a regional civil society 
and ‘terrain of resistance’.43 What is equally important to recognise, however, 
was that huge protests beyond the Arab world also followed − in India, Israel, 
Botswana, Spain, Greece, the USA, Canada, the UK and, more recently, in 
Russia and, in 2013, spectacularly in Turkey and Brazil. In Spain, the Indignados 
filled Spanish city squares in a move described here by John Postill. In Botswana, 
Introduction
— 15 —
Werbner witnessed almost 100,000 public service trade unionists singing songs 
of rebellion as they gathered daily for over two months under giant Morula 
trees in the capital and in other towns. In Israel, Livio and Katriel describe the 
thousands of tents filling city boulevards and parks in a ‘dwelling’ protest against 
the unbearable economic burden of spiralling prices and the undermining of the 
welfare state. In Greece, the 2011 Indignados movement described by Theodos-
sopoulos encamped for over a month in Syntagma Square in Athens, with rallies 
of 500,000 people out of a population of ten million. 
General strikes and major protests have taken other European debt-ridden 
countries by storm since May 2011. In India, mass protests, media attention and 
public debate about the economic and social direction of the country coalesced 
around a public fast by the social activist Anna Hazare. Its purpose was to put 
pressure on the government to institute a ‘people’s draft’ of the Lokpal bill, a 
piece of anti-corruption legislation intended to hold politicians and bureau-
crats to account, which had been stalled by successive parliaments for forty-
two years. In Chile, students took to the streets against the post-dictatorial 
state’s policies in education, particularly its neoliberalist agenda, and against the 
police. Protests by the workers of Wisconsin erupted even before Occupy Wall 
Street, drawing attention to the beleaguered labour movement in the USA.44 
In Russia, mass protests sparked by the suspicion of fraud in the 2011 election 
articulated a challenge to the authority and political dominance of Vladimir 
Putin. Mass protests in Istanbul and Ankara in May 2013 against the autocratic 
style of a democratically elected leader have been followed by huge protests in 
Brazil against corruption, mismanagement and poor public services. 
Discourses as well as images travelled. From Egypt to India and from Botswana 
to London, all these countries have witnessed worker, youth and middle-class 
rebellions against the political and bureaucratic status quo and the privilege 
of small, wealthy and often corrupt elites at a time when the majority can no 
longer earn a decent wage. The protests encountered criticism − in the case 
of India, Israel, Greece, Botswana and the USA, for being apolitical and not 
attending to the plight of the most underprivileged or excluded groups (the 
unemployed, Palestinians, and so on). Without depoliticising or undermining 
the political objectives of the protests, however, we need as comparative cultural 
and social anthropologists and sociologists to approach the uniqueness of these 
protest movements as innovative aesthetic and poetic articulations in an age of 
global media and social networking.45 
But beyond discourse, a key element central to the spread of the protests 
worldwide was their use of visual and audio citation and intertextuality. This was 
both historical and spatial, fusing past images, tropes, slogans, musical refrains or 
images reproduced from events elsewhere with current images in new bricolages 
and assemblages. These invoked, often as subtext, the past or other places in the 
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present, as we saw in the spread of ‘the People’ slogan, or in Botswana where the 
gesture of rolling hands echoed the gestures of the Indignados in Spain, although 
with a difference.46 As critical scholars we need to interrogate the role of such 
(re)iterative performances,47 the use of mimesis,48 the ‘doubling up’ of signs49 and 
their displacement, in revitalising and (re)inventing the ‘political’. Such citations 
spreading globally to different local contexts have led, Werbner argues, to a newly 
forged ‘vernacular cosmopolitanism’ − a widely shared invented language across 
countries and divisions of class, ethnicity, religion, religiosity, race and gender, 
which is nevertheless also inflected by local forms of popular aesthetics, power 
relations and politicised understandings of inequality and injustice. 
Another key feature of the protests as they travelled from one country to 
another was their peacefulness, even as they embodied powerfully, through 
popular culture and performance, new, transcendent solidarities and aspira-
tions. They only became violent in the face of repression, often after months 
of peaceful protests. Where violence did occur, usually in the form of attacks 
by the repressive forces of the state, it was followed by the aestheticisation of 
violence, including of martyrdom. This was true especially in the Middle East as 
more and more peaceful activists lost their lives, expressed in widely broadcast 
poetry and songs of martyrdom on social media sites, as Dalia Wahdan shows in 
this volume. The aestheticisation of sheer courage and heroism in the face of 
adversity and its impact still needs to be theorised.50 As the chapter on India by 
Webb demonstrates, the iconography of martyrdom also emerged as a means to 
demonstrate the longevity and continuity of movements, as a means of citing 
earlier struggles and as evidence of the everyday existence of the movement 
amongst ordinary people. 
The 2010–12 worldwide uprisings and protests thus raise broader questions 
related to political activism in these social movements. Mass mobilisations 
were often grounded in years of less visible activism. The protests incorporated 
histories of anti-colonialism, past civil rights movements and anti-authoritarian 
‘rebellions’ anew. Hence, the political aesthetics of citational intertextuality 
travelled as much in time as across borders.
Citational Time: The Vernacular and Historical Roots 
of the Protests
In being imaginative and creative, protesters everywhere drew upon locally 
shared aesthetic traditions, vernacular popular media, and visual, material and 
artistic histories, narratives and myths. They wove these intertextually into 
their protests, reiterating, inverting, reproducing and parodying past national 
events, performance traditions and filmic or theatrical histories, to convey a 
contemporary message. They traced local genealogies of protest from here to 
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elsewhere, at other times and places. Indeed, many protests emerged out of 
more hidden activism against corruption and authoritarianism over many years, 
as in the case of Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen which had witnessed earlier activist 
and trade union mobilisations.51 In Yemen, historically, ‘throughout it all, tribal 
poetry was composed to analyse the societal problems facing the country,’ Caton 
et al. say. In India, the campaign against corruption had been fought by activists 
for many years, as Martin Webb shows in this volume.52 
Aestheticised props were significant. In India protesters wore ‘Anna caps’ 
mimicking the headwear of the movement figurehead, Anna Hazare, who in 
turn referenced the ‘Gandhi cap’ worn by activists in the anti-colonial struggle 
for independence. Place too was significant. In Israel 
protesters standing in front of Independence Hall staged a re-reading of Israel’s 
Declaration of Independence at precisely the same day of the week and time 
of the day in which it was originally read, delivering the clear message that 
a renewed contract between the State and its citizens must be established.53
Some months later in New York City, Occupy Wall Street protesters congre-
gated on the steps of the Federal Hall to reflect on the constitutional rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Founding Fathers.54 Occupy protesters traced 
the roots of their tradition of popular General Assemblies and direct action to 
the Zapatista revolt in Mexico’s Chiapas in 1994, and to the anti-globalisation 
protests in Seattle in 1999.55 But Occupy Wall Street also had its antecedents, 
Tancons argues, in the Global Carnival Against Capitalism (or ‘J18’), organised 
by the activist group Reclaim the Streets. At the same time it was a counterpart 
of the huge ultra-right mobilisations of the Tea Party in the USA.
Theorising the anchoring of present-day mass protests in a past archive of 
popular visual culture, Christopher Pinney describes the protests in India as 
an example of ‘recurrent citationality’ in which political events are, perhaps 
somewhat mystically, always ‘half-seen in advance’. Referring to Deleuze, he 
describes the process as one of (re)iteration, in which signifier and signified are 
redoubled into ‘“media-folds” of origami-like complexity’. With Anna Hazare 
fashioned as a present-day Gandhi or Krishna to re-enact a messianic iconog-
raphy, the Anna Hazare agitation ‘folded’ itself into a past which it remade 
anew. With ‘a kind of deformative iteration (“second Gandhi” or aj ke Krishna 
– Krishna for today),’ Pinney argues, ‘the campaign also oriented itself around 
a host of popular media iterations of the national history which empowered the 
movement’ – drawing on hit Bollywood film musicals about Gandhian activism 
and the freedom struggle, an ‘echo chamber’ of past and cinematic images as 
protesters donned Gandhi caps and waistcoats, while carrying a host of flags, 
banners, humorous posters and maps of India.
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In Botswana protesters drew on traditionally licensed ‘songs of rebellion’ 
against chiefs to mock current politicians. In Wisconsin old labour and folk songs 
were rewritten and performed. Carnivalesque themes in Occupy Wall Street 
echoed Caribbean carnivals, while in Greece rhetorical tropes were anchored 
in Greek traditions of oratory. In all this a clear division emerged between self-
declared apolitical (in the sense of anti-government) protests, prefiguring the 
just society, and the majority of the uprisings with clear political agendas, openly 
directed against regimes and demanding democratic, legal and economic reform 
and/or the removal of rulers, even when – as in the anarchist-inspired protests 
– they also enacted a utopian society.
Politics and Anti-politics Ethics
Comic and satirical representations of autocratic, dictatorial, anti-democratic, 
neoliberal or corrupt governments, along with the mocking and lampooning of 
corrupt politicians, greedy bankers or so-called ‘tycoons’, were signature features 
of many of the uprisings. These aesthetically embellished targets of the protests 
were pitched against countervailing values of ethical governance. At stake was 
a renewal of the same ethical values that informed anti-colonial freedom move-
ments, the welfare state, the right to a living wage, transparency and the egali-
tarian ethos of democracy. This was true as much in Botswana, where strikers 
constructed an authoritarian image of their president, Ian Khama, as it was 
in Libya, Wisconsin, Egypt, Syria or India. In all these countries, caricatures 
of politicians and corrupt bureaucrats, some of them scatological and sexually 
explicit like those of the Indian anti-corruption cartoonist Aseem Trivedi,56 were 
held up for ridicule. His cartoons depicted rapacious, bestial politicians who use 
parliament as a toilet. The nation-state, by contrast, was represented as a sublime 
entity57 which had been sullied by the profanity of weak and corrupt individuals. 
In some cases, as among some protesters in the Occupy movement in New 
York City, protesters appealed to anarchist values.58 Without directing their 
demands to the state, they dramatised in carnivalesque acts the yawning pay gap 
and huge wealth differentials between workers and so-called tycoons, oligarchs 
or bankers, set against the cutbacks and retrenchment of public services. Prefigu-
rations of the just society took different forms. Among some streams in the 
Occupy movement, ‘Direct democracy’ was a particular philosophy that aimed 
to claim sovereignty by avoiding directing its demands to the state.59 
The majority of the uprisings and protest movements seemed, however, more 
explicitly ‘political’, directed against the state and its rulers, and at the very least 
seeking to reform the iniquities of present governance. Regime change, freedom 
and multi-party democracy were the central rallying call of the Arab Spring. The 
second Egyptian revolution, however, highlighted some commonalities shared 
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with the Occupy movement: free and fair elections did not alone, in them-
selves, define democracy. Young protesters in 2013 rejected rule by majority and 
demanded participation, recognition, a share in governing the nation. In India, 
a nation feted for its democracy, protesters called for Parliament to institute an 
anti-corruption ombudsman with sweeping powers, who many, however, feared 
would be anti-democratic. The unintended consequences of regime change, 
democracy and radical reform were often unpredictable, as has become evident 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings in some countries. The Occupy 
movements seem to have fizzled out everywhere, occupiers cleared by the police 
using force, and many now question what they have achieved.60 Reflecting on 
the protests and uprisings once they were over, what long-term role have they 
played in the achievement of democracy and social justice? What new forms, 
political entities and configurations have emerged from these movements?
Both political and anti-political rebellions seem, then, to have fallen short 
of their aims, at least temporarily. Some protests were simply squashed by the 
state, as in Botswana or Wisconsin. Against that, however, what has clearly 
been achieved in all of the mass insurrections worldwide from 2010 onwards 
has been a profound experiential moment of the ‘political’; a moment in which 
the collective fashioning of political subjects alongside the individual self-fash-
ioning of political subjectivities emerged historically, to massively affect a whole 
new generation.
Media Networks: Travelling Memes and Viral Infections
In the autumn of 2011, John Postill reports, Spain’s Indignados aligned them-
selves with related movements in Portugal, Greece, the USA and other coun-
tries, setting off simultaneous demonstrations in over 1,000 cities around the 
globe on 15 October. For many critics, most salient in the spread of the protests 
and their escalation was the role of the media, social networking, communi-
cation in cyberspace and postings on YouTube. Whether or not social and digital 
media actually caused the uprisings has been a topic of much debate in both 
popular and academic discourses. The question of what difference, if any, the 
new media technologies have made to the recent waves of non-violent protest 
in 2011 and 2013 is addressed here by Postill. In what sense were these media 
critically central to staging non-violent movements, and how may their impact 
be weighed against the mass mobilisation on the ground? Arguing against 
simplistic and monocausal explanations, we propose here that the protests were 
not just the result of new social media and the impact of the internet. Aouragh 
and Alexander stress the need to make a distinction between the use of the 
internet as a tool to challenge and topple political elites and the internet’s role 
as a space to articulate collective discord.61 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 20 —
In his chapter on the mediated aesthetics of non-violence, John Postill asks 
what part, if any, the wide availability of new social and mobile media played 
in the emergence and stabilisation of a distinctive non-violent aesthetics in 
Spain. His argument is that this new aesthetics was indeed complexly mediated, 
both by ‘traditional’ mainstream media and by new platforms and technologies 
such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and smartphones. He identifies five main 
 characteristics of the new protest aesthetics: an embodied rejection of the 
‘diverse tactics’ of earlier mobilisations (which included violence); a strategic 
use of ‘jocose emotivity’;62 sophisticated social and mobile media practices; a 
transposition of hacker ethics and aesthetics to occupied public spaces; and 
a perpetually transient, open-ended temporality. This powerful new aesthetic 
synthesis, he concludes, has positioned Spain − until recently a technological 
laggard with a dormant civil society − at the global forefront of techno-political 
innovation and social change. 
Reaching the mainstream media is often a challenge, given their pref-
erence for reporting on violent confrontations, which push out the messages of 
mass peaceful protests. Postill shows how the stress on non-violence attracted 
favourable mass media support. Another example of sophisticated media 
practice is presented in Haugerud’s study of the media-savvy satirical street 
theatre group, Billionaires for Bush, in which she shows how the group enticed 
the mainstream media with their humour and sophistication. Columnists and 
reporters compared them favourably with grungy, placard-bearing protesters, but 
the author wonders whether, beyond the entertainment value of their humour, 
their serious message came across. This is the ‘ambiguous gift’ of successful media 
visibility, Haugerud suggests.63 
Focusing on the Egyptian 2011 uprising, Aouragh and Alexander argue 
for ‘transcending the debate between utopian and dystopian perspectives 
on the role of the internet in political change’.64 They propose ‘a shift away 
from perspectives that isolate the internet from other media by examining 
the powerful synergy between social media and satellite broadcasters during 
the January 25 uprising’, and call for ‘an understanding of the dialectical rela-
tionship between online and offline political action’,65 much as proposed by 
Hawkins and several other authors in this volume. Postill, for example, in his 
analysis of Spain’s #15M movement, argues that media forms must be examined 
processually in relation to the various stages of political protest. He proposes 
that in the ‘contemporary era when political actors (rulers, politicians, activists, 
journalists, citizens, and so on) have access to multiple media, it is crucial when 
analysing a struggle that we establish which media ensembles – or media mixes 
– came to the fore at which particular stages of the conflict’. Werbner’s chapter 
describes how the various stages of the Botswana strikers’ rebellion were fuelled 
and supported by global and private media, and blacked out by the state media, 
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which was in turn satirised by the private press. The recent protests in Turkey 
in 2013 were similarly blacked out by state media. Theodossopoulos shows how 
within the Greek Indignados movement, internet-based social networks, from 
left to right wing, young and old, played a significant role in the mobilisation 
of the protests. 
Diasporic communities also played a role in creating and disseminating 
political discourses and aesthetics through wide-ranging media channels. The 
various revolts in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, inspired a 
proliferation of online activity taking place on networking sites and media 
forums. Facebook pages were set up, tweets were exchanged, YouTube postings 
were circulated, petitions were drafted and signed. The battle of symbols and 
images at the heart of the political struggles, as well as the visibility of the political 
struggles, extended to and was transmitted by those living in diasporas. In the 
Indian anti-corruption protests the online diaspora played an important role in 
taking the protests to multiple cities around the world through an internationally 
organised volunteer campaign. Protesters wearing the signature Anna topi (Anna 
hat) with the slogan ‘main anna hun’ (I am Anna) were photographed worldwide 
and pictures and videos shared through social media. As Webb describes in this 
volume, protest posters and slogans produced by volunteer advertising profes-
sionals in India were available for download from a central campaign website, 
helping to produce a coherent brand across widely dispersed protests. Offline, 
diasporic networks organised protests at various embassies around the globe and 
made concerted efforts to raise money and collect food items for those badly 
affected in the various revolts and the aftermath. Many, however, yearned to be 
present with their cohorts and participate in the collective experience of the 
protests in their home countries. Many reported that diasporic activities were 
not a substitute for actually being there in the flesh.
Conclusion: Culture, Anthropology, Politics
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, 
It was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, 
It was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, 
It was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, 
It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.66
So wrote Charles Dickens, reflecting on the contradictions that emerged in 
the aftermath of the French Revolution. Beyond genocide, some massacres live 
on in the public imagination: Sharpeville, Tiananmen Square, Srebrenica. To 
these must now, perhaps, be added the events of August 2013 in Cairo at Rabaa 
al-Adaweya which many describe as a massacre, led by the army and security 
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forces against unarmed Egyptian civilians, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
in Egypt. These are described poignantly by Hanan Sabea in the song,
We are a people, and you are a people,
What moved our hearts, never moved yours.
God is one; but we have our God, and you have your God.
After the massacre and other mass killings that followed it, protesters replaced 
President Morsi’s picture with placards and hand signals of the yellow four-finger 
hand salute, R4BIA (see Fig. 1.1), signifying the word rabaa (fourth), which 
alluded to the square where the massacre took place.67 This newly invented 
symbol travelled beyond Egypt, to Turkey, where it was used by the Turkish 
Prime Minister and Turkish national footballers. It has been used ‘to turn 
Facebook yellow’.68
The killings were preceded and followed, 
Sabea tells us, by a period during the first year 
of the revolution which was ‘checkered with 
almost monthly “spectacles” of violence that 
targeted the bodies of men, women, Copts, the 
poor and unemployed’. It resulted in the current 
impasse in which Egyptians are ‘entrapped by 
violence, threats, uncertainty, confusion and a 
deep feeling of disappearing possibilities, mate-
rially embodied in the silence and darkness 
that envelops the city with the onset of curfew 
hours’. Nevertheless, although the army and ‘deep state’ in Egypt appear for the 
present to have regained total control, the Arab Spring, that ‘time of euphoria’ 
of the mass 2011 Egyptian uprisings, as Wahdan calls it, cannot be erased, we 
suggest. That moment lives on in the collective imagination and in its political 
aesthetics as a future historical promise of return to a time when the ‘people’, 
united, will once again dream of ruling themselves. 
The contributors to this book, whether anthropologists or other cultural 
analysts, witnessed the uprisings and protests first hand. They were ‘there’. But 
did this make them in any sense privileged analysts in an era in which the 
whole world was ‘there’, seated in front of TV screens in their living rooms 
or before computers and tablets? The answer is yes and no. Livio and Katriel 
argue that being on the ground allows an appreciation of the complex relation 
between abstractness and specificity, the oneness in the many and, conversely, 
the many in the oneness; communitas and fragmentation. We were witness 
to the protests’ mixture everywhere of reflexivity, deliberation, performance, 
creativity and emotion: the moments of joyousness, fear and sadness. Perhaps it 
Figure 1.1 R4BIA Four Finger 
Salute (Source: Facebook).
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is in this very act of witnessing, as in much other anthropology of human rights, 
that the importance of our contribution will remain. Along with that is our 
ability, demonstrated in the various chapters included here, to think through the 
relationship between cultural creativity, morality, politics and the emergence of 
collective boundaries and identities. 
We are also specialists at understanding the power of myth, memory and 
history. The global financial crisis and revelations about bankers’ and CEOs’ exor-
bitant bonuses, alongside neoliberal policies in which governments worldwide 
are divesting themselves of their responsibilities for vulnerable citizens, have 
been at the heart of many of the protests, alongside the huge pay gaps and 
spectacular political corruption in some countries, often associated with unre-
sponsive, undemocratic regimes. The rebellions aimed for change, toppling 
regimes and increasing pressure on governments to effect reforms, including 
democratic reforms. But what was left when the protests died out? How can 
‘failure’ in the aims, sometimes utopian, of the protests, be understood and 
analysed? Who were excluded from the protests? What impact have the protests 
had? What is their lasting legacy, if any? Centrally important to the debate is 
the aftermath of protest: the sediments, memory and openings up to the future. 
There is evidence in the UK of a shareholders’ revolt (dubbed by the media 
the ‘Shareholders’ Spring’). Conservative governments have toppled in France 
and Greece. Were these energised and empowered by the popular protests? 
Can Pussy Riot, in revitalising Russian protests with a spectacular aesthetic 
demonstration that was screened across the world, make a difference to Russian 
politics? How will the aftermath of the Indian anti-corruption protests affect the 
success of anti-corruption candidates and parties standing in forthcoming local 
and national elections?
While books have already been written on the Arab Spring,69 there is still 
a need to examine the uprisings comparatively, from an anthropological and 
popular cultural perspective, as they are integrally related to protests elsewhere. 
A remarkable point of comparison, we have proposed in this volume − one 
which anthropologists are particularly well equipped to interrogate − has been 
the performative aesthetics so central to the protests. These, we contend, illu-
minate the protests from a wide array of anthropological perspectives: political, 
media, visual, economic and linguistic, the anthropology of work, art, social 
organisation and social movements, virtual social networking and new media 
technologies. 
The project of documenting and analysing these protests is ongoing. In 2013 
large-scale peaceful protests in Turkey against the privatisation of public space 
were met with violent repression by the government. Centred on an occu-
pation of Taksim Square in Istanbul, the protesters’ initial aim was to prevent 
the conversion of a public park in the square into a retail development, but the 
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protests took a wider anti-authoritarian stance as battles with the authorities 
continued and spread. The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Erdog˘an justified 
violence against the protesters claiming that they were ‘terrorists’ and promised 
curbs on social media in the country, asserting it is a ‘menace to society’.70 
Then came the news that protesters had won their case against Gezi Park’s 
redevelopment in court. In Brazil hundreds of thousands of protesters took to 
the streets in 2013 and clashed violently with police in cities across the country 
after a protest against fare increases in public transport snowballed into mass 
demonstrations against high taxes, a lack of political accountability and, once 
again, bureaucratic and political corruption. Again, protesters won concessions 
from their democratically elected government. In Egypt in 2013, in a ‘second 
revolution’ against a democratically elected President whose Islamist policies 
and economic inefficiencies angered Egyptian citizens, millions took to the 
streets to demand his resignation, only to bring back the army with dire conse-
quences for the fate of Egyptian democracy as matters spiralled out of control. 
There will be other iterations of these protests, in other places, as the echoes 
of the Arab Spring and Occupy roll on. As the cosmopolitan character of the 
protests connects places and people through repetition, mimesis, citation and 
performance we will continue to focus ethnographically on how these play out 
in the vernacular through a continuing call for critical, analytical and engaged 
work on the aesthetics of popular protest and revolt. 
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Teargas, Flags and the Harlem Shake: 
Images of and for Revolution in Tunisia 
and the Dialectics of the Local in the Global
Simon Hawkins
Chapter 2
The outlines of the story are well known. On 17 December 2010 Mohamed 
Bouazizi, a young, underemployed produce merchant in the rural Tunisian city 
of Sidi Bouzid, had a run-in with civil authorities, who confiscated his wares. 
Upset and humiliated, later that day he went to the town square, doused himself 
with gasoline and set himself on fire. That act triggered protests that spread 
across the nation, the region and the world. But the details are less well known. 
In hindsight, the events have an appearance of inevitability, which detracts 
from understanding how the movement spread across the country, unifying a 
nation with disparate visions and experiences of the nation. Crucial to this 
spread was the use of powerful imagery that helped define and contextualise the 
protests themselves and the protesters. Over time an increasingly nationalist 
aesthetic created an ideological underpinning for the movement that allowed 
the participation of actors from different ideological backgrounds. The power 
of the images was bound up in the context and the mediating institutions, and 
following the revolution they lost their unifying power. 
As the revolution grew from the isolated individual Bouazizi to the mass 
protests that brought down the government, it moved through three roughly 
recognisable phases that were marked and defined by their own distinctive 
aesthetics. In the initial phase of the movement, in December 2010, increas-
ingly large protests broke out in primarily rural cities and towns. Although 
starting as peaceful marches with fairly broad participation, these often devolved 
into violent clashes between heavily armed security forces and stone-throwing 
youths. As the state tried to clamp down and prevent these protests from 
becoming more serious, it used increasingly lethal force, and dozens of protesters 
were killed. During this initial phase, the images that circulated were essentially 
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journalistic photographs of stone-throwing youths and the victims of police 
gunfire. These images were taken by Tunisians, uploaded by news organisations 
and other websites, and then transmitted back to Tunisia. The reflection and 
transmission of these locally taken images by global media institutions recon-
textualised them, visually linking them generally to other protesters who were 
regarded as freedom fighters, and particularly to Palestinians in the Intifada, 
rather than riotous thugs. The distribution of images after each event helped 
prompt subsequent protests, establishing patterns that spread across the nation. 
The second phase, beginning in early January, was one of increasing nation-
alisation of the protests, both in marches and demonstrations, and in social 
media. Some of the emotional motivation for the increasing participation was 
outrage at the many killed in the earlier clashes. At this time, there still was 
no shared sense that this was a revolutionary movement. Even the most ardent 
organisers thought of themselves as championing reform and did not expect the 
government to fall. While the journalistic recording of events continued, the 
aesthetics of the protests began to change as more and more Tunisians began 
creating (rather than merely recording) images for broader distribution. Tunisian 
flags featured prominently in these images, as the population reappropriated the 
image of the flag from state domination. The use of these images on Facebook 
constituted a form of virtual protest that itself helped generate a sense of unity.
That unity led to the triumphalist third phase, beginning around 12 January 
2011, when Tunisians began to realise that the movement was so powerful 
that it would topple the regime. With the end in sight, there was the rise of 
a celebratory aesthetic that pointed with pride to the local control over the 
revolution, but also a clear acknowledgement of the global audience and the 
various media distribution networks. The flag continued to predominate, but its 
context shifted from one of shame and outrage to pride and celebration. While 
the interaction with global media sources and, eventually, a global audience 
was important to the movement, its ideology was nationalist, and the imagery 
emphasised unifying themes. 
After the revolution, public sentiment fractured. Initial elections resulted 
in a coalition government led by Ennahda, an Islamist party whose leaders had 
been exiled and imprisoned by the state, and who thus had great credibility with 
much of the populace. Increasingly, large divisions grew between those who 
supported an assertively religious form of government and those who sought to 
keep religion and politics separated. Extremist groups began flying the black flag 
of Jihad, while students made Harlem Shake videos that featured the Tunisian 
flag. The power and meaning of the imagery had become fractured. 
There had been large claims made regarding the role social media played 
in enabling the Tunisian revolution.1 Like similar claims regarding previous 
uprisings in other areas, these were shown to be exaggerated at best.2 Less 
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discussed has been the nature of the interactions in which the social media 
participated. It is easy to conceptualise the internet as a Habermasian public 
sphere in which reasoned discourse and the dissemination of information 
plays out for a generic audience. The internet is, however, as Warner notes, 
‘a space of discourse organised by nothing other than discourse itself ’.3 A key 
component of the circulation of material in the Tunisian case (whatever the 
means of transmission) was the constitution of a public that considered this 
information relevant to it. Further, there was a bias towards ignoring the poetic 
and emotional contents of the material circulated, seeing it instead as part of 
a rational discussion.4 While Tunisian activists did use social media for coordi-
nating their efforts, and the broader Tunisian public did share (sometimes erro-
neous) information through these same channels, the success of the revolution 
depended not on rational persuasion, but the unification of large segments of 
the Tunisian population and the bodily spatial participation of this newly self-
conscious group. The spaces of protest became reconfigured as public spaces 
available to this emerging public.5 In order to understand this process, in which 
Tunisians saw themselves as constituting a coherent and real public, one needs 
to understand the revolution aesthetically. 
While this chapter primarily addresses imagery generated during the Tunisian 
revolution, it also draws on years of fieldwork in and engagement with Tunisia. I 
began in 1988, doing volunteer development work with the Peace Corps in rural 
Tunisia (in a region near Sidi Bouzid), subsequently returning multiple times 
for anthropological fieldwork, most recently in the summer of 2012. Different 
aspects of that fieldwork involved a wide range of participants. My most recent 
project has focused on the male community of salesmen in a plaza of Tunis’s old 
city, the medina, who mainly cater to tourists. Most of my conversations (with 
the exception of discussions with some Tunisians practising their English) were 
in Tunisian Arabic. 
Teargas
While press accounts in the west focused on Bouazizi’s humiliation, the touch-
stone for Tunisian viewers was the implicit corruption of the civil authorities. If 
they confiscated his wares because of a lack of proper paperwork, the assumption 
in Tunisia was that this was because he had not paid the proper bribes. Tunisians 
from all walks of life had complained to me of rampant corruption that made 
success more dependent on who one knew and what bribes one distributed than 
on hard work or intelligence. While this corruption was endemic, it was person-
ified in President Zine al-Abidin Ben-Ali and his family. The young men on the 
streets of Tunis knew quite a bit about the family’s lavish lifestyle, describing 
to me the fancy cars they drove, down to the specific colour of each model. 
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The anger was not simply that the president’s family lived so well, or that their 
money was ill-gotten, but that the corruption that created this wealth prevented 
hard-working Tunisians from making a decent living. Bouazizi’s predicament, 
of being thwarted in his attempts to work by a dishonest system, was one that 
Tunisians of all classes could empathise with.
Late on the day of Bouazizi’s self-immolation, his mother led a protest group 
in front of the municipal hall where he had burned himself. A cousin posted 
a video of the protest online, where researchers from Al Jazeera, who actively 
pursue such videos, found it, and broadcast it that same evening.6 The next 
day, spurred on by the video, by rumours spread by word of mouth and with the 
help of local union officials, a much, much bigger protest was held in the same 
location. Although some rocks were thrown, it was initially peaceful, until large 
groups of police tried to break up the demonstration with teargas. At this point 
it devolved into a riot, leaving two people dead from police bullets. Images and 
videos from this encounter were again placed online, where they were widely 
distributed.7 
Several themes stand out from these first days of the movement. While dissat-
isfaction with the regime was widespread and deep, images played a crucial role 
in converting that dissatisfaction to political action. Equally importantly, these 
were images disseminated online and through global television networks, as 
well as through other avenues. While the movement was fiercely local, it was 
plugged into the media stream of a watching world that turned the ephemeral 
events of protest into concrete texts that could be circulated and read by a global 
audience. With its origin in the rural hinterland rather than the cosmopolitan 
city, and the elevation of a victim with a very specific story, the ideology and 
aesthetics focused on the local ‘Tunisianness’ of the movement, rather than 
linking itself to global ideological movements. 
The images and videos taken by Tunisians − some with mobile phones − 
that began to circulate in the first days of the revolution are hardly unusual 
in themselves (see Fig. 2.1). An observer who pays attention to world news 
might be excused for finding these images − young men with scarves over their 
faces throwing stones at well-equipped, black-uniformed riot police amidst 
billowing teargas − effectively indistinguishable from similar photographs that 
emerge from time to time from the latest global hot spot. Even the method of 
transmission of these images heightened this sense of generic unrest, for while 
many circulated through social media or individualised peer networks, Arab 
cable news channels, particularly Al Jazeera, were also a prime source. So many 
urban Tunisians received these photographs through the same means that they 
received similar images from around the world. The power of photojournalist 
images lies not in any unconventionality, but in their ability to stimulate public 
consciousness.8 The very generic nature of the images helped contextualise the 
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events in the frame of an oppressed population struggling against an authori-
tarian regime. As Butler has argued,9 the globalising media establishes local 
protests as local events per se, creating the potential for something to ‘really 
happen there’.
This is an important step, as such a reading of the events is not inevitable. 
Over the decades, there have been many flashes of populist violence and 
demonstration in Tunisia, but they never captured the public imagination. As a 
general rule, the government tried to suppress information about such outbursts, 
but in a comparatively small country such as Tunisia, these efforts had little 
success. More significantly, however, the government could control the frame 
and narrative of the events. For example, an outburst at a football stadium 
in 1998 was described by the official (and only) media as having been caused 
by violent hooligans. Given the broad concern in Europe and beyond with 
football hooligans, and the strong antipathy between the supporters of various 
teams in Tunisia, this was a plausible explanation. When Tunisian television 
and newspapers showed images of the destruction caused by the rioting groups, 
it solidified the narrative frame of unruly and undisciplined mobs, clearly groups 
that needed to be better controlled by the government. Although counter narra-
tives also circulated − students with family in the area told me that the unrest 
stemmed from political and economic concerns − these narratives had compara-
tively little impact. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia did not have a ‘culture of protest’.10 
Figure 2.1 Tunisian protestors confront police (Photo: Getty Images).
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The images and their forms of transmission in late 2010, however, allowed 
for the construction of a different narrative. Their aesthetic was that of jour-
nalism, asserting the verisimilitude of images captured, amidst streaming chaos, 
of grainy mobile phone photos of dead bodies. They carry the authenticity 
and power of global news and its well understood genre of similar images from 
around the world. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006 had focused Tunisian 
public attention on the genre of international cable news. Its ubiquity arose 
one day in the summer of 2006, when one of the young salesmen I worked 
with teased me about my Arabic accent, saying that I sounded just like the 
US State Department Arabic-speaking spokesman that they saw on al- Jazeera. 
Upon hearing this, others chimed in, saying that yes, that was exactly who I 
sounded like. Similarly, I met elderly uneducated Tunisian women who could 
hold forth at great length about the inadequacies of Condoleezza Rice, then the 
US Secretary of State. Certainly the amount of close attention that Tunisians 
paid to the news varied, but the general patterns of news coverage had become 
a widespread cultural referent. This contextualisation helps explain some of 
the power of the circulated Tunisian photos. The sight of clashes between 
rock-throwing youths and well-armed state forces made them more than just 
generic images. They also invoked the very specific context of the Intifada, the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and were broadcast by Al Jazeera, which was one 
of the first sources that Tunisians turned to in seeking information about the 
Intifada. While it would be difficult to find strong ideological parallels between 
the Intifada and the Tunisian revolution, the resemblance of the imagery is 
inescapable and helped created a moral landscape for evaluating the events in 
Tunisia.
Invoking the context of the Intifada and the genre of photos of insurrection 
also suggests that the pictures of revolution were also pictures for revolution. 
They became a model to be replicated. As much as they defined the actions 
that had occurred, they also created meaning and expectations for what was 
going to occur. While this was not as clear a ‘citation’ as Manoukian’s example 
of the Iranian 2009 protesters chanting ‘Allah Akbar’ in invocation of the 1979 
revolution11, it still functioned as a citation, insofar as past practices helped 
define contemporary activities and provided a framework for future actions. The 
distinction is that in the Iranian case the citation was of an explicit slogan, 
while in the Tunisian example it was the form of protest itself and the aesthetics 
of representing it that were being cited. It is important to note that in this 
context citation is more than an evocative reference, but also, as Werbner puts 
it (in this volume), a form of contagion, a method for replicating the protests in 
other places. While a great deal of attention, including in this volume, is paid 
to the process of transmission across the globe, it is also important to see this 
process of transmission at work on the local scale. 
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While the actions of Bouazizi provided the catalyst for the first protests 
and remained a touchstone throughout the movement, the individual protests 
created the impetus for the protests that followed. In particular it is the images 
from those protests that provided the emotional and contextual framework 
for the later events. The protests provided a format for expressing ideas and 
emotions that were culturally resonant. However, there is more to the images 
of protest than that, for while they helped define the form of protest, they also 
helped generate its emotional power. They did not simply supply an activist 
vocabulary for a population that had no voice. The emotional power of the 
images helped create the outrage, which then had to be channelled in the form 
of protests. It created a self-perpetuating cycle. The common metaphor used by 
global media in describing the spread of the revolution was that of a spark that 
ignited a fire that spread across the land (and eventually the world). A difficulty 
with such a metaphor is that it leaves little room for analysing the paths and 
means of transmission. The spread of a fire appears inevitable and disconnected 
from human actions. A more useful model might be that of viral spread, as it 
draws attention to the mechanisms by which the ideas, attitudes, emotions and 
behaviours spread and perhaps mutate over time.12 
The model of a virus also provides a helpful format for understanding the role 
of channels of media distribution. Many early commentators on the Tunisian 
uprising labelled it the Facebook revolution, the Twitter revolution or the Al 
Jazeera revolution, and so on. On reflection, analysts backed away from these 
overstated claims and the consensus seems to be that none of the media channels 
caused the revolution; indeed, there is plenty of evidence from earlier eras of 
revolutionary messages spreading without the benefit of the internet. While it 
is undoubtedly true that the media did not create the revolution, however, they 
certainly played a role in how it unfolded. Using a viral epidemiological model, 
one can view the media as vectors of transmission that play a role in where 
and how the viral outbreak of protest spreads. By providing the legitimacy of 
contextual associations, at the same time they provide a medium in which the 
virus could flourish and grow. As Postill (in this volume) notes, different media 
forms have different identities that create different possibilities. For example, 
the broadcast of images and videos by television news channels creates a sense 
of ‘veracity, [of] history-in-the-making’, something that Facebook and Twitter 
lack; but they, in turn, can supply a decentralised mechanism for spontaneously 
sharing images and information and building connections among potential 
activists. 
One must be very careful in using the viral metaphor, however, as there is 
the ever-present danger that the revolutionary sentiment will appear as an inde-
pendent actor with an agency of its own. In the case of Tunisia, this viral model 
works particularly well for the first stages of the revolution, when the dominant 
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aesthetic was the verisimilitude between the journalistic images and the protest 
itself. The images appeared as mere reflections of a reality that was spreading 
beyond any one group’s control.13 However, as the uprising continued, a new 
aesthetic element arose, that of the images consciously created for consumption, 
both locally and beyond. If the power of the journalistic images partly rested on 
their generic links to similar images and movements around the world, the new 
aesthetic emphasised the localness of the uprising. While the early images cast 
protesters as the objects of a journalistic gaze, the new images featured protesters 
as creative subjects speaking to other Tunisians and the world directly. 
Not surprisingly, the change in aesthetics was linked to a change in the 
nature of the actual protests. The earliest protests followed the model of young, 
usually male Tunisians taking to the streets and fighting running battles with 
security forces. Certainly, other groups also became involved. Most notably male 
and female secondary school students held demonstrations and were met with 
teargas, but the images and videos that circulated from these events still fitted 
the general model. While the state forces had used violence from the very first 
days of protest, the level of that violence began to escalate over time, and more 
images of dead Tunisians began to circulate. These disturbing images proved 
something of a tipping point, as Tunisians who had, whatever their personal 
thoughts, stayed on the sidelines, began to be pulled into the movement. The 
movement became more truly national and, not coincidentally, the national 
flag began to take on a much more prominent position, particularly as Tunisians 
began to create images for broader distribution.
Flags
The use of a flag in protests is not in itself unusual. As with stone-throwing 
youths, flags are an almost ubiquitous object in the depiction of populist uprisings. 
They differ, however, in that while stone-throwing youths are generic, and may 
be found in many different parts of the world, the flag renders a protest far more 
specific. It locates the movement within a national, or religious, or ideological 
geography. It is a symbol for the protesters and for those they are in conflict 
with, but also for a presumed audience. As a symbol it must, by its very nature, 
represent something, although it may also have a fair degree of ambiguity and 
is often a polysemic symbol. The use of the Tunisian flag marked the shift of 
the protest movement from a localised phenomenon to a national one. It also 
highlighted the nationalist element of the uprising as opposed, for example, to 
it being a religious uprising. 
With the change of aesthetics came an increased prominence for the inclusion 
of girls and women in the circulated imagery. While women had been involved 
from the very beginning (Bouazizi’s mother had organised the first protest, and 
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male and female students had protested at their schools together), the jour-
nalistic aesthetic epitomised by stone-throwing youths was highly gendered as 
male. In the new images constructed by participants for mass consumption, 
there was a much larger role for women. Similarly, as the protests became more 
massive, they became more focused on demonstrations of popular unity rather 
than running conflict. The participation of women and girls from different social 
positions marked the movement’s inclusiveness. If stone throwing in Tunisia was 
the preserve of young men, all could wave the flag. 
As banal as flying a flag might seem, using the Tunisian flag in a protest 
movement was not as obvious as it might appear. In a nation with a minor cult 
of personality for President Ben-Ali,14 the Tunisian flag had been deeply linked 
to the state in general, and Ben-Ali in particular. Flying the flag became an act 
of reappropriation, claiming the flag − and the moral and political legitimacy 
that went with it − for the people. As will be shown below, the usages of the 
flag established a clear connection between it and the people. In so doing, the 
portrayal of the flag was also a statement about national identity and its relation 
to global forces. 
As the protests became more massive in January 2011, protesters began to 
carry the flag everywhere, and its presence dominated all other symbols. Most 
notable, however, were the images of Tunisians embodying the flag. For example, 
in a set of images taken at a secondary school, students dressed in red and white 
Figure 2.2 Tunisian flag projected on child’s face (Source: M. Abdelaziz, ‘Un 
tunisien??’, Partager avec l’autre).
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literally became the flag. On Facebook and other social media sites there were 
many constructed images that merged flags and bodies. To pick two examples 
from the many available, one popular image featured the flag projected onto the 
face of young child (see Fig. 2.2). Another was a line drawing of an eye crying 
a tear that was the flag. Although the messages of these images were different 
(the child and the tear serve very different purposes, with one suggesting hope 
for the future and the other sorrow over the past), they both created a corre-
spondence between the people and the flag. This stands in distinction to people 
who might paint the flag upon their faces or who might drape the flag over 
their shoulders. Wearing the flag asserts an affiliation with it, becoming the flag 
asserts the inseparability of the flag from the people. Such an assertion fuses the 
nation and the people, highlighting the salience of this particular identity, while 
rendering others less significant.
Displaying a flag must always be a form of citation, but the content can vary, 
and indeed there can be contestation over its meaning.15 As will be shown below, 
the use and understanding of the Tunisian flag changed after the revolution. 
During the protests the flag invoked the nationalism available, condensing 
different meanings within an imagined homogeneity.16 Linking the flag to the 
people, particularly in the days of populist uprising, invokes an ahistorical, 
almost timeless nation. In this instance, it roots the nation in the people, rather 
than in any political or religious ideology or licensing historical moment.17 A 
flag is, in Ortner’s terms, a ‘summarizing symbol’ that is more relevant to atti-
tudes, commitment and orientation than to thought and analysis.18 Clearly this 
confers legitimacy on the people’s actions, but also neatly sidesteps the question 
of the ideological nature of revolution. All Tunisians, whatever their political or 
religious perspective, could look to the flag as a symbol of their unified nation. It 
included them all and excluded none. While such inclusiveness is the hallmark 
of nationalism, it had added relevance in the Tunisian case, as flying the flag 
emphasised the localness and indigenous roots of the revolution, and rejected 
roles for outside actors. The chant heard in the mass rallies, ‘Ash-sha’b yurid isqat 
an-nizam’ (‘the people want the fall of the regime’), highlighted the rising sense 
of the power of popular sovereignty.
Asserting the people’s sovereignty in the nation not only drove out the existing 
political leadership; it also took a stand in relation to the many international 
and global groups that had taken active roles in trying to define and construct 
the Arab world in particular images, many of these rooted in stereotypical orien-
talist constructions. Prior to the revolution, various Tunisians had expressed 
scepticism to me regarding democracy, not because they had any principled 
objection to it, but because the United States had taken such a strong stance in 
promoting democracy in Iraq. It was not that they had any particular sympathy 
for groups that were perceived to stand in opposition to the United States, such 
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as the Muslim Brotherhood or al-Qaeda. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that 
although the images of the early protests invoked broad resistance movements, 
there were no citations invoking specific connections to earlier revolutions. 
Nor were there invocations of leaders or events from Tunisia’s own history. 
The emphasis was on the new and unprecedented nature of the movement. This 
freedom from association with other movements gave the Tunisian uprising a 
sense of purity that was emphasised by its lack of formal leadership. Any leaders 
would have had ideological associations that would have made the movement 
just another political grouping, with all the potential corruption associated with 
that. 
At first glance, this intense focus on the unprecedented and local nature of 
the movement seems to have an uncomfortable fit with the extensive use of 
global media forms, whether through television or the internet. At one level, 
the use of these media may have been pragmatic. Facebook and Al Jazeera were 
important not so much for their global reach, but because they represented a 
means of transmitting information throughout Tunisia. Certainly there is some 
truth to this, yet there was also much more to it. As the protests became a 
revolution, the messages and symbols shifted, invoking both global audiences 
and global symbols and language. The proud assertion of the indigenous nature 
of the revolution was accompanied by a conscious engagement with a watching 
world. Images shifted from attempts to capture the power of populist protests on 
the street to examples and embodiments of the protest. Rather than recording 
the protests, the images became the protests, and the audience became all those 
who had access to digital transmission. While signs or flags displayed at demon-
strations have the potential audience of both those physically present and those 
seeing the digital record, the new class of images could only be viewed via some 
digital medium. 
Not that the images themselves were virtual. There were multiple examples 
of students forming images with their bodies that only took on meaning when 
viewed from above. For example, students in a schoolyard spelled out, in Arabic, 
the phrases ‘Tunisia is free’ (see Fig. 2.3) and ‘No killing’. Similarly, in the 
example cited previously, students formed a human flag. Those present were 
aware of what was being generated, but did not constitute the audience. There 
was a presumption of a waiting audience who would examine these photos and 
extract meaning from them. In addition to these photographs taken for broad 
distribution are the many images generated for, and circulated on, Facebook. 
Facebook and Twitter were conduits for distributing information, but they were 
also used to construct a representation of united Tunisians. 
The use of profile pictures on Facebook exemplified these patterns. Starting 
in early January, many Tunisians began changing their profile pictures from 
individualised images to increasingly standardised versions of the Tunisian flag. 
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Figure 2.3 (left) Protestors spelling out ‘Tunisia is free’ (Source: Facebook); 
Figure 2.4 (right) Facebook profile picture of blood-spattered Tunisian flag 
(Source: B. Whittaker, ‘The fall of President Ben Ali’, al-bab.com).
The progression of images mirrored the changing sentiments as the movement 
unfolded.19 Around 10 January, many adopted the photo of a Tunisian flag in 
which the red field ran like blood down the image and the upper-right corner 
featured a diagonal black slash (see Fig. 2.4). It was a flag of mourning and 
outrage at the government’s brutal suppression of the demonstrations. A few 
days later, as it appeared that the protests might actually drive the regime from 
power, people replaced the flag of mourning with a simple, unadorned Tunisian 
flag, reflecting a pride and optimism in what was about to happen. On 15 January, 
one day after Ben-Ali fled, the final flag in the progression appeared − a Tunisian 
flag ringed with clasped hands. This celebrated the unity that had prevailed in 
driving the President from power and the joint effort that would be required to 
rebuild the nation.
Both the schoolyard photos and the Facebook profile pictures were meant 
for mediated audiences. The images were meant to be viewed by others and 
to represent public engagement in the uprising, but the nature of the audience 
imagined varied. In the schoolyard photos, the choice of Arabic is telling and 
significant. While Tunisia is an Arabic-speaking nation, the use of Arabic in 
such instances is not as obvious as that might suggest. French still carries an 
association with education, social prestige and sophistication. Paradoxically, 
French also shows up frequently in graffiti (although it does not dominate), 
marking either the fans of particular football clubs or progressive politics. The 
use of Arabic, then, is not an unmarked default choice, but one that carries 
some significance. In this instance, it highlighted the indigenous nature of the 
group, but more importantly (particularly given that many signs would even-
tually appear in French and even English), the nature of the imagined audience. 
Theirs was an Arab audience. 
Were the imagined audiences of the Facebook posters any different? This 
was not entirely clear, in part because the very construction of the audience on 
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Facebook followed a different pattern. If the schoolyard images were dissemi-
nated through digital media, the actual relationship of producer and consumer 
was still fairly standard. The creators of an original image disseminated it to 
a viewing audience. Others may then have passed that image on, but it was 
ultimately traceable to a single, originating creator. Facebook profile pictures 
are more complicated. While in normal or unmarked times, individuals choose 
images that are either photographs of themselves or images that express some-
thing of their specific individuality, in some marked periods, individuals select 
images that replicate what others have done. The individual creator of the 
image is not merely lost, but becomes unimportant, as the emphasis is on the 
mass adoption of the image. 
The pictures of protesters were powerful in themselves. While they may have 
been bundled with similar images, they were viewed individually. By contrast, 
the power of the Facebook profile pictures was in their replication. During the 
revolution, there were periods in which one Tunisian Facebook profile after 
another used the same image. The power lay not in the individual images, but in 
their mass replication. While the ideal vision of the internet is of a global, undif-
ferentiated public sphere, in many instances it can be extremely localised.20 
The mass duplication of flags transformed Facebook for some members into a 
Tunisian space. Further, this use of profile pictures did not differentiate between 
image creator and audience, or even image poster and audience, as those posting 
the image for themselves were also an audience for the images posted by others. 
In this regard, the images posted were similar to public demonstrations in which 
the sight of other demonstrators created a sense of strength and collective effer-
vescence. It allowed for the participation of many who could not otherwise 
take to the streets, such as Tunisians living abroad, those with responsibilities 
or obligations that kept them away, or those who were too afraid. It was a visual 
representation for even the casual observer of the broad unity of the populace. 
The importance of social media in this instance was not as a debating forum for 
coordinating, discussing and defining protests that occur in physical space,21 but 
as means of creating a sense of unity and commonality. 
If the multiplying images created a sense of Facebook as a Tunisian or Arab 
space, however, it is also true that Facebook and the other media through which 
these images were circulated were global, and that this larger sphere was never 
entirely absent. This sense of a global audience became increasingly important 
as the movement gathered momentum. The recognition by the global audience 
helped confer legitimacy on the movement. The images that Tunisians created, 
or were created of them, were uploaded to global networks, only to be down-
loaded back into Tunisia from them. The media became a mirror, in which 
Tunisians saw their movement reflected back at them. They were both local 
actors and members of the global audience. The engagement with a worldwide 
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audience helped mark the transition point from general protest to possible revo-
lution. The world’s focus on this small nation marked the importance of the 
events, and as Tunisians, in their signs, began speaking not only to each other 
and their government but to the much larger audience, the message became 
not one of mere outrage, but of recognition of what they were about to achieve. 
The classic example of this triumphalist invocation of the global audience 
was the sign held outside the Ministry of the Interior headquarters22 on 14 
January that simply read ‘Game Over’. Rather than calling for Ben-Ali to 
leave, it acknowledged to a global audience what was abundantly clear, that the 
government was effectively finished. However, the significance of ‘Game Over’ 
is more than just the fact that it is in English. The phrase is a staple of video 
and computer games, themselves a form of global media. Its playfulness contrasts 
with the earlier, brutal imagery, but it also invokes Tunisians as participants 
in the global discourse of video games. If the revolution began in the remote 
marginal areas of Tunisia, its end was marked by urban sophisticates invoking 
phrases shared by young people around the world. The sign was one of many that 
began to connect the events in Tunisia to other, much larger networks. Another, 
for example, read ‘USA=Yes we can/TN=Yes we did’, linking the Tunisian revo-
lution to the historic victory of Barack Obama, and then topping it. In addition 
to these signs that were internationalist in content there was a wide range of 
signs in English that echoed the sentiment of the signs in Arabic or French, 
calling for freedom and for Ben-Ali to leave.
The ideology of the revolution, to the extent that there was one, was nation-
alist, rejecting the influences of all outside forces and celebrating the fact that 
the movement was a purely home-grown phenomenon, not beholden to any 
group. An often-heard comment was that Tunisian democracy, unlike its Iraqi 
Figure 2.5 The final day of protests and the famous 
‘Game Over’ sign (Photo: H. Ben Youssef).
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counterpart, was not won by foreign forces. It might seem somewhat contra-
dictory, then, that the movement was so engaged with global media and insti-
tutions. As has been noted, in part these global media were used as a means of 
transmitting information among Tunisians, but it was clearly more than that, 
as the increasing number of signs oriented towards a non-Tunisian audience 
indicates. The global media’s gaze invoked a massive audience that in itself 
bestowed on the events the mantle of global importance. A joke my daughter 
told at the time was passed around my Tunisian friends. She said, ‘My father 
Figure 2.6 A sign for the foreign audience, from the final days of protest 
(Photo: Christophe Ena/AP/Press Association Images).
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studies Tunisia. It used to be that no one had heard of Tunisia. Now everyone 
knows about Tunisia.’ Tunisians knew that the world was watching. As the 
protests reached their peak and the impossible became possible, the display and 
invocation of flags was ubiquitous. In some ways the closest analogy to crowds 
of people ecstatically waving flags, draping themselves in flags, painting flags on 
their faces and the like, are international sporting events, such as the Olympics 
or the World Cup. The revolution, at its finale, shared with those events the 
sense of being on a world stage, a performance that marked the nation’s signifi-
cance and status. This is not to say that, in the main, Tunisians were performing 
for a global audience (although some, such as the makers of the Obama-oriented 
sign, may have been). It was a performance for Tunisians, but with the full 
awareness and appreciation of the world’s gaze. The global audience was, in 
Goffman’s terms, ‘ratified overhearers’.23 
While ‘Game Over’ is clearly an allusion to the world of video games, it 
became a citation in itself. At a reception in Tunis in the summer of 2012, 
the coffee ran out too quickly, and a young, self-styled sophisticated Tunisian 
remarked, ‘It’s “Game Over” for the coffee,’ producing a general amused chuckle. 
The sign had taken on an iconic status, not through direct viewing, but through 
images taken of it and later widely circulated.24 If his invocation was meant for 
humour, other imagery has been more serious. At various times of crisis over 
the past few years, individual Tunisians have changed their Facebook profiles 
to the image of the flag with clasped hands, trying to invoke the sense of unity 
and commitment to rebuilding that had marked the revolution. But the unity 
no longer exists, and the images have comparatively little power when they are 
no longer ubiquitous. If anything, the sight of such images, popping up in ones 
and twos from time to time, highlights the changes since the revolution. The 
aesthetics of protest have changed, becoming more assertively partisan and ideo-
logical. While nationalism is invoked it has taken on a narrower meaning. The 
contrast between the aesthetics of the revolutionary and the post-revolutionary 
era helps illustrate the significance of each.
While the use of a national flag in a revolutionary movement is hardly 
unusual, post-revolutionary flag use suggests that the choice is not as unmarked 
as it might initially appear. To embrace the flag is to embrace the vision of the 
nation with which it is associated. While the Egyptian flag featured prominently 
in the Egyptian uprising, both the Syrian and Libyan revolutionary movements 
adopted flags different from the ones flown by the state prior to the revolution. 
In those instances, in the eyes of the revolutionaries, the flag no longer repre-
sented the nation, but had been corrupted by the regime. In 2004, the Interim 
Governing Council in Iraq adopted a new flag, but it was rejected by the 
population as an American imposition. Instead, the previous flag was restored, 
but modified to eliminate any associations with Saddam Hussein.25 To fly the 
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existing flag is to accept the basic nature of the nation that has been associated 
with it. Flying the existing flag does not demand a reimagining of the nation. 
The nation continues the path that nationalist sentiment had laid out for it. 
At some level, one might even argue that the government and rebels share a 
symbolic vocabulary, insofar as the struggle is over which group best represents 
the flag and the nation, rather than over the nature of the nation.
The use of the flag by the Tunisian state fits Billig’s vision of banal nation-
alism, in which the markers of nationalism, such as flags, are so widespread and 
taken for granted that they are hardly noticed or acknowledged.26 However 
the protesters’ adoption of the flag suggests different possibilities. As Werbner 
noted for the Olympics,27 banal nationalism can create the framework for 
unifying and, indeed, effervescent experiences. While the daily ubiquity of the 
Tunisian flag rendered it seemingly banal, it clearly had the potential to signify 
much more than just modern statehood. Indeed, that ubiquity made it a potent 
symbol for revolution. To the extent that the flag had become a metonym for 
the nation-state, then seizing the flag represented a seizure of sovereignty. As 
individuals flew and even embodied the flag, it became the people’s flag, rather 
than the regime’s. 
Dance (and More Flags)
This shared vocabulary appears more clearly when contrasted with protests that 
broke out in Tunisia months after the revolution − in particular the adoption 
of the black flag of Salafi Islam by some religious extremists. This flag carries 
linkages to other movements around the world that fly the same flag and is anti-
nationalist, insofar as it questions both the primacy of the nation-state and its 
character. An examination of the specific ideology of the Salafi movement is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but suffice it to say that it imagines an organ-
isation of the world into religious categories that supersede the contemporary 
global order of nation-states. Further, the movement carries its own aesthetics 
of dress, which are read by many Tunisians as inherently political. While the 
west has long focused on the wearing of hijab as a marker of political Islam, in 
conversation on the streets of Tunis in 2012 people focused on beards. When 
talking about Salafis, the community in the centre of the medina (which incor-
porated both middle-class men and struggling working-class youths) referred to 
them as ‘beards’, sometimes just pulling their hands down from their chins as a 
sign that mimed the beards.28 
So important was this marker that a rumour circulated in Tunis in 2012 that 
the police had pulled over a car that was found to have a load of false beards in 
the trunk. People explained the story to me as demonstrating that many of those 
who claimed a Salafi identity were not ‘real’ Salafis and that the movement in 
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Tunisia was not actually driven by religious faith. The symbol of the movement 
was a deceit. Following this line, many argued that the Salafis who were stirring 
up trouble were not really Tunisian. For many, this meant that foreigners were 
agitating the population. A few, though, argued that the rural regions that were 
strongholds of the movement had never really been Tunisian, that they just had 
a different mentality. Not only had the unity of the initial revolution been shat-
tered, but so had the vision of the nation. Instead of a neutral symbol that all 
could rally behind, the Tunisian flag began to stand in opposition to the Jihadist 
flag, as they represented conflicting visions of the nation. 
The Tunisian flag featured prominently by the group at the other end of the 
spectrum from the Salafists, the (largely urban) students who generated Harlem 
Shake videos. While these videos often carried strong nationalist overtones, 
they also drew on an international symbol to do so. The videos were part of a 
global internet fad that peaked in February 2013. Their structure was simple 
and easily replicable, allowing groups around the world to tailor it to their own 
identities. While a group of people went about their business in the background, 
a figure in the foreground − often in a helmet or other head covering − danced 
maniacally. After fifteen seconds, the videos jump-cut to all the people dancing 
frenetically, usually in outlandish costumes. The dancing did not feature any 
particular movements or steps. The emphasis was on uncontrolled chaos rather 
than synchronisation. Many dancers mimed a variety of sexual acts, although 
not so much in an erotic manner as in a carnivalesque inversion of accepted 
Figure 2.7 A screen capture from the first Tunisian Harlem Shake 
(Source: LifeIsMine7, ‘Gangnam style vs Harlem Shake’, YouTube).
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norms. On the global stage, the videos were not associated with politics. It 
became a thing for schools, universities or groups to have fun with and to 
 participate in the global craze.
In Tunisia, however, the videos were seen by the creators and conservative 
Muslims as an attack on the values of political Islam. The first such video that 
appeared,29 while ostensibly just an attempt to participate in this phenomenon 
of global youth culture, did feature two students in the background waving a 
Tunisian flag. On the one hand, it simply signalled that Tunisia had joined the 
trend, but it also took a stand that such an act was consistent with a Tunisian 
identity. The Islamist-led government quickly condemned the video, while 
simultaneously students at secondary schools and universities (there were also 
versions in apartments, the zoo, on rooftops and in other locations)30 across the 
country began making their own versions. Some of these videos also featured 
the Tunisian flag, and the videos were broadly understood as representing the 
students’ vision of a Tunisian − and Muslim − identity that permitted public 
displays of chaotic exuberance.31 Just as the Salafi flag carried a bodily aesthetic 
of covered women and bearded men, the Harlem Shake and other dance videos 
had their own aesthetics of the body, the casual jeans and sweaters of global youth 
during the first, unmarked section, and the flamboyant, exuberant costumes of 
the dancing section. 
Unlike the imagery during the revolution, post-revolutionary symbolism took 
ideological stances about the nature of the nation itself and its relation to the 
rest of the world by explicitly invoking symbolism from the global stage. Within 
this context, the use and understanding of the Tunisian flag has shifted. Its 
prominence in the dance videos positions it not as a non-ideological symbol for 
all, but as an assertion against the Salafi flag. It is used to advocate a particular 
vision of the nation. In so doing, it has become different from the national 
flags discussed by Billig that contained no particular content other than support 
for the nation.32 Indeed, as the nature of the nation is debated, history has 
become prominent. Following the revolution, there has been a rise in public 
(although not state-sanctioned) prominence and support for Habib Bourguiba, 
the founding president of Tunisia, who had been replaced in a constitutional 
putsch by Ben-Ali. His specific history, of championing the Tunisian people 
while rejecting political Islam, has become a touchstone for many Tunisians who 
opposed the Islamist-led government. 
While the struggles in Tunisia in the years following the revolution caused 
great distress in Tunisia, with people from all social classes complaining about 
increased general insecurity and a lack of safety, they also believed that they 
were doing much better than the other states that had undergone revolution. 
This comparative success took away some of the sting of being forgotten as 
the vanguard of the Arab Spring. I had noticed this amnesia in western press 
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accounts, and Tunisians were also keenly aware of their fall from international 
attention. While many were insulted by this, many Tunisians also suggested that 
this neglect may have had benign consequences. A theme I heard often was 
that Tunisia was doing better because of, not in spite of, the global forgetting. 
The reasoning, echoing the nationalism of the revolution, asserted that the 
intervention of outside actors would distort the process and lead to policies not 
rooted in Tunisian culture. They particularly drew attention to the ongoing 
violence in Egypt, suggesting that in part this was due to Egypt’s longstanding 
prominence on the global stage, making it attractive to ideologues of all persua-
sions. It was galling for Tunisians not to be acknowledged as the catalyst of the 
Arab Spring, but perhaps it was better to reform one’s political system outside 
of the media spotlight. 
Local and Global Publics
Running through these shifting uses of images and symbols is a tension between 
global and local forces, between specific and broad forms of identity. The use 
of global media institutions played an important role in the revolution, not so 
much as amplifiers or connectors that allowed information to be shared more 
broadly, but as contextualising mediators that helped define the material that 
was transmitted and establish emotional connections to it. This revolution, like 
all others, was mediated and represented. The aesthetic representations of the 
various stages of the movement both reflected the experiences of participants 
and guided observers, both in Tunisia and beyond, in their understanding of the 
movement and their sense of connection to it. These representations turned 
the active events of protests into texts that generated publics. Certainly much 
of the aesthetic emphasis focused on nationalism, but it did not merely tap into 
existing sentiments, drawing on an already cohesive national identity. Rather, 
the viewing publics constituted through the various entextualised forms of 
protest became inextricably intertwined with national identity. 
The nationality conjured by the images and texts was entirely self-referential. 
Invoking the nation did not elicit any sense of characteristic traits, beliefs or 
history. Rather, the members of the nation represented themselves as such to 
the nation. Tunisia became the creator and audience for these shared images. 
At the same time, having summoned itself into being and asserted its own 
 existence, this national public created an audience of worldwide observers. 
The revolution became a performance on the global stage. However, while 
 entextualisation rendered the ephemeral into fixed texts, the reading of those 
texts itself changed and they created different audiences. The very fact of the 
general public summoning itself into existence created, then, possibilities for 
new publics in the future, as the dynamic process continues to play out.
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Singing the Revolt in Tahrir Square:
Euphoria, Utopia and Revolution
Dalia Wahdan
Chapter 3
The Utopian Tahrir Moment!
The uprising for eighteen days in Tahrir Square was a collective act of transcen-
dence by individuals and groups subjected to years of oppression and despair. It 
was an act of crossing the imaginary thresholds of fear orchestrated and enforced 
by a brutal security regime that had inflicted a state of emergency for more than 
thirty years. What started as a march against police brutalities on Police Day 
(25 January 2011) snowballed into a unified demand for ‘Bread, Freedom, Social 
Justice and hu Human Dignity’. The physical presence in space-time, the close 
interactions and the collective responses to police brutality and state violence 
glued protesters together to emerge as the concretisation of the sensorial expe-
rience of ‘We the People’.
Gripped by the euphoria of stepping out of the comfort zones of their homes, 
their blogospheres and the virtual spaces on Facebook or Twitter, many demon-
strators temporarily forgot that Egyptian society was rife with contradictions 
and strife.1 They behaved as one and, over time, displayed a sort of political 
sensibility that transcended the religious-secular binary opposition lurking 
beneath the surface. The scenes of mass prayers in Tahrir Square reflected this 
political sensibility, especially when Copts and Muslims of all hues spontane-
ously protected each other in relay at prayer times during the uprising.2 This 
sensibility became a positive force during the first and subsequent mass demon-
strations, defying any attempt to understand it as a mere ‘instance of imagined 
solidarity’, which – some scholars argue – results from successive ‘protest cycles’ 
and eventually contributes to those cycles.3 
This momentary utopian unity was translated by some commentators as one 
manifestation of ‘modernity as crisis’; that is to say, a period that possessed an 
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equal potential for the emergence and the death 
of democracy. On the one hand, the uprising was 
an instance of the release of ‘socially immanent, 
creative forces of social and political change, 
and on the other, the reactionary powers of 
order’.4 This crisis situation would continue 
after the uprising and produce deep changes in 
how Egyptians conceptualised and re-conceptu-
alised democracy, participation, citizenship and 
identity. Although the uprising must be seen in 
light of decades of protracted political and social 
activism, during the days in Tahrir Square there was no declared, premeditated, 
anticipatory substitute for the deposed regime. The absence of formal leaders 
led some analysts to claim that the situation during and immediately after the 
uprising possessed the potential for an anarcho-democracy where the state was 
rejected as a frame of reference and ‘the People’ were able to organise and self-
rule, even innovate alternative structures altogether. 
The question of whether the uprising was a veritable revolution or not still 
haunts many social scientists, commentators and politicians.5 Nevertheless, one 
of many palpable references and signs of deep change was the singular manifes-
tation of ‘the Will of the People’. For years analysts stigmatised the Arab and 
Muslim majority societies as essentially unique6 in the sense that ‘their’ politics 
was either a matter of ‘a culture of rioting’ or a ‘culture of deference’.7 So the spec-
tacular scenes of unity and solidarity, and particularly of the masses that refused to 
budge until the regime stepped down, caught many by surprise.8 Equally palpable 
was people’s readiness to sacrifice their lives and to die for a dignified life, a life 
beyond oppression. Many protesters left their homes convinced that they might 
not return. Once in the square, protesters simply forgot about food or meals. They 
were deliberately seeking satiation through collective hunger – a state of mind 
that drastically contrasted with the familiar scenes of long obsequious queues of 
citizens waiting for their daily bread rations under the deposed regime.9
 One of the most powerful factors that incited and sustained the state of 
unity, political sensibility and readiness was music, in the form of songs written, 
composed and performed or recorded before, during and after the eighteen days. 
Those songs emerged as sites of revolution in at least two senses. Their lyrics, 
compositions and performances sought to break away from the consumer-driven 
music industry and, more importantly, they reflected the spirit of revolution 
and uncertainty as they conveyed messages carrying meanings of how ‘We the 
People’ could conceive of ourselves and of ‘Our’ capacity to transform statehood, 
society and citizenship – not only during the days of the uprising but in the long 
term. The music, lyrics and performances of those songs emerged as the loci of 
Figure 3.1 Prayer in Tahrir 
Square (Photo: J. Winegar).
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the seemingly paradoxical phenomena of unity against societal divisions, selfless 
sensibility against religious divides and sacrifice of life for dignity. By narrating 
and presenting a selection of these songs here, I propose to show that they 
were organic to the revolution, and not sheer tactics of revolt. My intention 
is to analyse these songs in order to reach an expanded understanding of what 
constitutes a ‘revolution’ in the anthropological sense. 
Songs of Revolt: Songs that Revolt!
Some of the songs sung during the uprising predated it and had inspired me while 
I was growing up, like other Egyptians, under consistent structural injustices of 
emergency and dictatorship over at least forty years. Other songs emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of the Tunisian revolt, while others sprang out of Tahrir 
Square while people were being killed and maimed by Mubarak’s security forces. 
I have selected and arranged the songs in chronological order with the intention 
of drawing inferences about the nature of the revolution and its trajectory. 
Anthropologists usually analyse music and songs with regard to three dynamics: 
(1) the composition of notes, rhythm, syncopation, instruments, orchestration 
and other constituent elements; (2) the dynamics of the ‘people’ behind the 
song or music – that is, musicians, singers or composers as individuals and groups 
interacting with each other and within larger social and economic ecosystems; 
and, finally, (3) the audience reception of the music or song and the meanings 
attached to it. 
I will address here the first two dynamics – of composition and composers, 
and of art form and artists. My intention is to uncover what is ‘revolutionary’ 
about these songs and to highlight how art forms that spring up in times of 
turbulence are not sheer knee-jerk reactions or forms that cannot transcend the 
function of inciting mass psychologies of trauma, tears and patriotism. Instead, 
these songs are forms of art that express and invite the audience to question 
the status quo and to move towards changing it. On a deeper theoretical level, 
they are art forms that represent a deviation from the salient conception of 
revolution as premeditated change. They express an ‘aesthetic’ of uncertainty, 
death, hunger and dignity. I seek to recover and spell out such an aesthetic not 
as an end in itself but as a means to understand the deep change underway and 
to possibly redefine revolution. 
Heuristically, I assume that the uprising fell short of becoming a revolution. I 
thus seek to answer a proverbial ‘what if ’ question. In simple terms, I ask, what if 
there was no other empirical evidence of deep change in Egyptian society except 
those songs? What if there were no tangible indicators of deep transformation 
of the social and the political? Would these songs stand out as manifestations of 
such change? If lined up chronologically, could they be read as a history of the 
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transformations underway in Egypt and, as such, would such transformations 
qualify as revolutionary? 
I argue that they do. They are transformative and revolutionary in the 
messages they carry and the meanings they seek to convey. Both the messages 
and the meanings are not only associated with emerging events but are also 
reflective of deeper understandings of the power relations that shape individual, 
national and regional dynamics. Those are messages and meanings organic to 
the political, the social and the cultural dimensions of Egyptian society as it 
transforms itself within structurally uneven power relations. 
Similarly, they are revolutionary in form. By way of an example, in the 
1990s audiences in Egypt had grown accustomed to the format of a video clip 
where the artist is omnipresent. During the uprising, the artists associated with 
these songs were either absent from many of the visuals or blended with other 
 characters and depictions. Similarly, solo performances were freely re-performed 
and recorded by groups of amateur or professional artists and often by laypersons, 
then uploaded on YouTube for wider circulation and communication. The 
videos that were superimposed were usually organic to the aesthetics of those 
songs, as shown in songs recorded during the interim periods of transition under 
the Supreme Council of Armed Forces in 2011, in which the identities of the 
artists were replaced with existentially immediate conditions and events. Many 
of these songs do not urge the audience to revolt but they seek to highlight, 
establish and perpetuate a condition of turbulence and rejection of any form of 
oppression. As such they emerge as media of revolution and change.
The ultimate argument I make is that those songs are not simply reactions 
to the January uprising or subsequent revolts, but rather the immediate, inten-
tional and articulate expressions of the thoughts, meanings and ideas that 
emerge during years of living under oppression and violence while simultane-
ously rejecting both. They are organic manifestations of the coming of age of 
‘We the People’ who understand and carry out deeper, more pervasive change. 
In Ted Swedenburg’s words, ‘The protest music at Tahrir was not a soundtrack, 
not a reflection, not a commentary or a report on events, but something inte-
grally tied to and embedded within the social movement’.10 
As with any art form, the aesthetics of those songs are inseparable from the 
political; they are not only the products of the ‘constellation’ of forces that 
constitute political and societal forces, but also a constituent force of these 
constellations.11 Some videos attempt to present a concise glimpse of the story 
of brutalities that forced the masses to gather determination and momentum 
before and during the early days of the uprising in 2011. The Egyptian Revolution: 
The Full Story12 is a collage of live footage and snaps of recordings before and 
during the uprising; the succession of events is presented against a backdrop of 
rather funerary-like tunes.
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Figure 3.2 Sheikh Imam with Ahmed Fouad 
Negm (Source: M. Arawa, Fragments of Insanity 
Meant to Guide the Sane).
I downloaded an earlier version of this video in February 2012. The version 
downloaded then was not subtitled. A later version was duly subtitled and 
uploaded some time in the latter part of 2012. The conscious efforts by the 
producers of this video to collage footage chronologically, to juxtapose the footage 
with recordings of intimidating speeches delivered by the deposed dictator and 
his son, and to insert caricature depictions of crony members of Parliament are 
all signs of change not witnessed during the days under the deposed regime when 
bloggers and their virtual activities were monitored and tracked. 
The Days Immediately before Tahrir
Although it is not part of this chapter’s arguments, poetry was a forceful art form 
at the junction between the Tunisian and the Egyptian revolution: 
If, one day, a people desire to live, then fate will answer their call
And their night will then begin to fade, and their chains break and fall.
The two most famous lines by Abu Al-Qasim Al-Shabbi (1909–34), a twen-
tieth-century Tunisian poet, translated by Reem Saad,13 were repeatedly recited 
in both the Tunisian and Egyptian contexts and inspired protesters and activists 
alike.
Chronologically, not long before Bouazizi, the Tunisian street vendor, 
immolated himself, triggering mass uprisings across Tunisia,14 a group of young 
activists (nationality undeclared) had started a Facebook page called ‘Sheikh 
Imam’. Imam Eissa (1918−95) was a blind Egyptian composer and singer who 
collaborated with another revolutionary Egyptian vernacular poet, Ahmed 
Fouad Negm (1929–2013), to produce what might be called ‘impossibly simple’ 
songs that have inspired generations across the Arab world since the days of 
independence during the 1950s and 60s. Imam and Negm spent most of their 
adult lives as political prisoners in the jails of consecutive Egyptian despots. Out 
of jail, they lived frugal yet vibrant lives.
Because their songs were not allowed the ‘benefits’ of mainstream, commercial 
cultural production, they operated mostly underground. Nevertheless, they 
appealed to the masses for their seemingly simple but incisive lyrics. A cult 
has always surrounded the works of Imam and Negm and their songs, banned 
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from the mainstream under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak and first aired on state-
controlled media after 25 January 2011.
While they produced several songs, the one that was repeatedly taken to 
the streets immediately after the Tunisian revolution was entitled ‘Thawra’ or 
‘Revolution’:
Tonight is revolution,
Tomorrow is revolution,
The day to follow and victory is ours.
Revolution is our goal,
It is the beginning and Egypt is our aim,
The people of Egypt will have victory.
Revolution is light,
People are roses.
For our children,
The revolution of our country will continue.
People of my country, tie your hands together,
Dawn is rising and the sun brings us hope.
Revolution is a generation, free and beautiful,
There is no ‘impossible’ when there is life and labour, 
Tonight is revolution,
Tomorrow is revolution,
The day to follow and victory is ours,
Long live Egypt!15
While Sheikh Imam and Negm used traditional tunes and instruments – mainly 
the oud – this version was delivered by a chorus made up of a group of young 
amateur artists who formed a troupe, an Iskinderilla. What is interesting about 
this group is that Salma Jaheen and Ahmed Hadad, the two initiators, are 
the daughter and grandson of two late revolutionary vernacular poets of the 
1950s and 60s who still hold sway over the non-mainstream cultural scene in 
Egypt and the Arab world, namely Salah Jaheen (1930−86) and Fouad Haddad 
(1927−85). 
During the Eighteen Days
Besides songs, several art forms have been partially responsible for inspiring the 
masses and their impacts have largely been harnessed by online and on-the-
ground activities of young women and men, such as members of the famous 
Facebook group Kollina Khaled Saeed (We are all Khaled Saeed). Khaled Saeed 
was a young man in his mid-twenties who ran an internet café and was brutally 
beaten to death in front of his shop by security police. He was later declared dead 
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due to asphyxiation caused by swallowing marijuana. To highlight brutalities, 
the group We are all Khaled Saeed was formed immediately after the case was 
broadcast through opposition satellite channels. Members were innovative and 
declared themselves non-violent. They started a weekly ritual of dressing up in 
black and standing silently on the streets to draw attention and raise the curi-
osity of passers-by. The group was the first to announce on their Facebook page 
the start of the march towards main squares on 25 January 2011.
The march to and occupation of Tahrir Square provided moments of euphoria. 
While indiscriminate violence and brutality by the deposed regime’s security 
forces glued protesters together, singing, stand-up comedy, chanting slogans, and 
designing and circulating illustrative pamphlets harnessed their energies and 
sustained their defiant spirits. As confrontations with security forces continued 
and intimidations from state-run radio and television increased, artistic forms 
in Tahrir Square transcended their functionality and emerged from being mere 
expressions of emotion into acts of revolt.
One of the songs was written much before 2011 but was banned by the 
central censorship authority. It was released during the days of the uprising and 
set against a backdrop of footage from Tahrir Square. Muhammed Mounir, the 
singer-songwriter, is another opposition artist who has managed to incorporate 
his work into the mainstream cultural industry while preserving revolutionary 
tonalities. Several factors contributed to his success. Principal among them were 
his fusions and the combinations of ethnic instruments and tunes. Other factors 
include his Nubian origins,16 which place him among the marginalised and thus 
closer to the hearts of the downtrodden. 
As seen in the video, the lyrics emotionalise the relationship between 
protesters/lovers and Egypt/the beloved. The lead singer and the chorus plead 
with the feminised image of Egypt to heed their love and longing to cleanse 
Figure 3.3 ‘We are all Khaled Saeed’ (Photo: Ikhwanweb).
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her. They ask, ‘How? How does she not see their suffering? How does she accept 
their oppression and misery?’ The lyrics narrate the emotional and metaphorical 
suffering of the lover who sleeps bare while struggling to cover the body of 
his beloved, whereas the footage portrays the threat and dangers arising from 
military and police brutalities. The unanswered and desperate questions inter-
mingle with determination to continue the fight against a backdrop of dwin-
dling hope and increasing uncertainty. Visuals aside, the lyrics touch a state of 
mind and emotional disposition that is shared among the oppressed peoples of 
Egypt. It is a state that Anne Bogart succinctly expressed in her words, ‘[T]he 
spirit of liberty is the spirit that is not too certain that it is right’.17 This can 
partly explain why the song gained popularity and was repeatedly performed 
in Tahrir Square during the uprising, both on the makeshift stage and on the 
ground, in front of huge audiences. 
Post-uprising Euphoria 
The song below, Sut al-Hurriyya (The Sound of Freedom), was recorded imme-
diately after the celebrations that followed the ousting of the regime. It gained 
worldwide publicity and the band Cairokee were interviewed by news channels 
such as CNN. It has lively, hopeful lyrics and music, even though it starts off 
with the same state of mind that characterised many demonstrators − 
The Sound of Freedom
I stepped out and said I will not return
Wrote with my blood on every street
For our rights,
Hunger no longer bothers us
In every street in my country
The voice of freedom is calling.18
The members of the band claim that the words of this song were a product of 
the moment of euphoria and hope that gripped protesters immediately after the 
regime stepped down. While some may take this as a reactionary response, if 
we take a closer look at the lyrics we can immediately see that they are built 
upon a contradiction of sorts. One of the lines is a declaration that ‘hunger is 
no longer an issue’. However, ‘bread’ was the first demand of protesters. Within 
this seeming contradiction lies the power to explain the dynamics of activism 
in Tahrir and beyond. When ‘We the People’ seek bread, it is not a reaction to 
hunger. Ours is not the ‘revolt of the hungry’ that many neoliberals proclaim. 
‘We the People’ seek dignity in life, even as we remain subdued and humiliated. 
Hunger and humiliation are turned inside out. I seek to live through martyrdom 
and seek satiation through starvation and hunger strikes. 
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The Aesthetics of Brutality
The Tahrir utopia faded beyond the physical space-time of the square, especially 
as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), headed by Mubarak’s Minister 
of Defence, General Hussein Tantawi, took over the interim government and 
preserved the state of emergency. The developments that ensued were largely 
disappointing to the majority of Egyptians from both pro- and anti-revolu-
tionary camps. The national referendum on amendments of the 1971 Egyptian 
constitution in March 2011, for instance, divided the electorate and the 
majority of the population into two camps based on religious identification.19 
Mobilisations for the referendum, and those for the parliamentary elections 
that followed in November 2012, were drawn along the divisive lines of heaven 
or hell, metaphorically speaking. Campaigners urged the ‘pious’ to accept the 
suggested amendments and get to heaven. Absurdity aside, the results of both 
rounds of ostensible ‘democracy’ resulted in the ascendance to power of what is 
generally known as political Islam. In Egypt in 2011, this consisted of members 
and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, a conservative Islamist party that 
had operated underground for most of the post-Nassarist period. Its candidate, 
Mohamed Morsi, who had been incarcerated in jail before the uprising, even-
tually emerged as the first elected civil president in the history of modern Egypt. 
Others within the Islamist camp include the Salafis (scripturalists) along with 
smaller yet even more fundamentalist groups of Jihadi returnees from Afghan-
istan, as well as the severed militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
All the while, the trial of the deposed Mubarak and his accomplices continued 
at a snail’s pace, with a ban on broadcasting or publication of court proceedings. 
Simultaneously, state-run television and radio authorities reorganised along 
pre-existing ideological divisions and lines of allegiance, some siding with 
the age-old security apparatuses. The latter seemed to have undergone mere 
cosmetic changes. For instance, the State Security Authority acquired a new 
name, the National Security Agency. The military police and security forces, 
now under the control of ultra-conservative members of Parliament, meted 
out all sorts of brutalities on protesters, including the deployment of snipers 
to target activists and protesters’ eyes, ‘virginity tests’ and sexual harassment of 
female protesters. 
The polarised moral discourses that pervaded the period between the first 
wave of the revolution on 25 January 2011 and the second, post-election, 
massive wave on 30 June 2013 were consolidated, on the one side, by the new 
constitution drafted by the Islamic ultra-conservatives in 2012; on the other 
side, a growing oppositional discourse emerged, articulated by many of the 
original protesters, now in the opposition, on the streets and in other contexts. 
A spate of ethnic clashes and mob violence erupted, allegedly incited by reli-
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gious sermons and through internet and satellite media. While ‘foreign agendas’ 
and ‘third parties’ have repeatedly been accused of inciting social division, the 
SCAF kept the message that the army protected the revolution and ensured 
freedom of elections and self-expression.
This was a period loaded with contradictions and conflicts, which also 
generated a tremendous outpouring of artistic responses. Graffiti and street 
performances and art flourished.20 The Mask of Freedom (see Fig. 3.4) is one 
example of responses to SCAF brutalities. Art works emerged as at once modes 
and states of resistance. One of the most powerful renditions of the period was 
the campaign entitled ‘Askar Kathibun (Soldiers are Liars) initiated by a group 
of activists who travelled across several governorates to screen films and songs 
that accused the SCAF of untruth and brutality. 
In one of the songs, the subtitles and the visuals are powerfully blunt and lack 
any metaphorical allusions. The footage is of a veiled young woman stripped 
and kicked by riot police, an act heightened by heavy beats and the voice of an 
angry rapper delivering the message: ‘We are defiant of SCAF’s authority and 
aware of the soldiers’ lies.’ The words, the beats and the singers’ voices reflect 
the willingness of ‘the People’ to face brutal death on the streets in the fight for 
their freedom and dignity. The message of the song diverts from the ‘traditional, 
patriarchal’ discourse of honour. Instead, the words refer to the act of stripping 
‘our’ bodies. 
The same line is repeated, albeit differently, in Ithbat Makanak (Stand Your 
Ground), the song below that was sponsored and distributed for free by the 
private-owned satellite channel ONtv:
Stand Your Ground
Stand your ground −
Here is your address.
Fear fears you
And your conscious have never failed you.
Sunlight is returning,
Die dignified or live obsequious,
Your eyes see the sign,
Keep away from them and leave the wall to crush them,
The heart of the land is wounded,
And the sound of freedom has cracked.21
Figure 3.4 Mask of Freedom (distributed and posted on 
walls in Tahrir Square in May 2011 by a blogger using the 
pseudonym Ganzeer).
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Both songs represent an aesthetic of brutality and death. The latter, Stand Your 
Ground, has a generally soft rhythm with the visuals restricted to in-studio 
footage of the band members hanging hundreds of photographic stills of martyrs 
and demonstrators on a wall. The story – in words and visuals − invites hope 
through the eyes of the daughter of one of Al-Azhar’s scholars who was killed 
in Tahrir Square. Similarly, it invokes a breakaway from the hegemony of the 
‘old’ media regime by showing a number of journalists and media representatives 
known for their pro-revolution activism. The scene in which Bassem Youssef, the 
surgeon-turned-satirist, caustically mocks the regime as he breaks an old TV set, is 
particularly emblematic. The television set represents the ‘old’ paradigm of state-
run media, and Youssef the youthful hands of the ‘new’ disillusioned generation.
On the other hand, ‘Askar Kathibun (Liars), is more explicitly confronta-
tional. The footage of the brutalities committed by special forces and riot police 
during the SCAF-led interim government leave nothing for mediated analysis. 
The lyrics are violent and the rappers angry. ‘Askar Kathibun marks a turning 
point in the relationship between ‘the army’ and ‘the People’. For a long while, 
the armed forces represented themselves as organic to Egyptian society, the 
protectors of the people’s honour and demands. They repeatedly announced 
that the ‘Egyptian Army was the protector of the People’s Revolution’. It is 
exactly these and similar patriarchal discourse that the revolutionary artists 
directly attacked. The lyrics of this song, ‘Death is not to be Mourned’, are a 
celebration of the path to dignity and immortality. Brutality was the means for 
their defiance and sense of power over the hollow claims of the army and other 
institutions of patriarchy.
The above two songs have a lot more in common; they are both cases of 
‘the political as antagonism’.22 By uncovering the oppressive nature of pater-
nalistic army ‘care’ and juxtaposing it with the brutal stripping of the ‘veil’ off 
the young woman by the very police force that claims to be her protector, and 
by showing how peaceful protesters such as the Al-Azhar scholar were targeted, 
those songs bring into relief the antagonism inherent in established deference 
to the army, and expose the brittle connection between the revolutionary tide 
and the state’s instruments of authority and repression, wielded in turn against 
different Egyptian ‘people’, construed as ‘the enemy’.
Revolution-as-Song!
In conclusion, my selection of songs is by no means comprehensive or objective. 
Rather, it is intended to highlight certain features of art forms that forcefully 
depict the spirit of ‘We the People’. As such, the selection is definitively different 
from examples of nationalistic art forms; that is, forms of art that serve the 
purposes and programmes of the regime. 
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In contrast to a nationalism that rests on the nostalgia for and glorification 
of the past that ‘can easily be converted into a product in itself or ... be used to 
promote other products’,23 the songs selected above represent an art form that 
attempts to reclaim specific historical experiences ‘that may have been lost or 
suppressed during the period of exploitation and repression’.24 Conjuring the 
songs of Sheikh Imam was part of raising the phoenix of ‘the People’ from the 
ashes. Invoking the poetry of Abu al-Qassim al-Shabbi was meant to ignite ‘the 
spirit of the People’. The exhortations in the songs are from the People to the 
People. 
Similarly, the songs are built around a spirit of defiance. Artists and their 
performances insist on defying oppression, patriarchy, hierarchy and institutions 
associated with the old regime. Nevertheless, none of the songs seems sure of an 
alternative to the old regime. And yet they represent a non-hierarchical form of 
art, expressed especially in how band members organise and share ideas, and in 
their collective performances through media that do not fit into any form of the 
commercial art industry. Moreover, the songs exude energy, the kind of energy 
that is difficult to channel through ‘classical’ marches and protests, yet finds its 
way out through forms of collective art, music and songs.
The songs are diverse in rhythm and genre. If looked upon as forms of 
collective action, they would easily constitute a repertoire of experiences. For 
instance, superimposing new visuals on old music and lyrics, or using old notes 
with new lyrics are two ways of connecting past forms of defiance to contem-
porary forms of revolutionary change. The intentional juxtaposition of old and 
new elements in each song is indicative. They reflect a deeper questioning of the 
‘imaginary figures’ that members of the Egyptian society have taken for granted 
as their reference points for ‘self-understanding’.25 
The songs are articulate, specific in their lyrics and sharp in tone, even when 
no rhythm is discernible. Such articulateness and specificity is what makes 
them historical. Theodor Adorno stressed how specificity and uniqueness 
make history by reminding us how focusing on the specific does not dismiss 
the contexts or eschew the so-called bigger picture. Instead, they allow us to 
notice ‘the particular forces at work in the abstract unities of “history” and 
“society”’.26 Even though most songs do not offer a clear trajectory for social 
transformation, and almost all their messages do not seem to ‘know what they 
want’, they nonetheless seek direct action in response to and against the tools 
of corrupt, oppressive institutions. 
They are also relentless in their position of ‘No dialogue with oppressors’. 
None of the songs implores peaceful resolution of conflicts. While there have 
been satirical works of art and songs which appeared after writing this paper, 
fatalism and submission were not part of their messages or of their forms of 
expression. One of the most powerful statements that depicts the spirit of the 
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times was made by Alaa Abdelfattah, a young activist who wrote a short article 
in an Opposition newspaper on 24 June 2012. Again I am quoting from the 
translation in American Ethnologist:
Get rid of the experts and listen to the poets – we are in a revolution. Ignore 
reason and hang on to the dream for we are in a revolution. Beware of caution 
and embrace the unknown for we are in a revolution. Celebrate your martyrs. 
In the midst of the ideas, the symbols, the stories, the performances and the 
dreams; nothing is real except their blood, and nothing is certain except their 
immortality.27
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‘I Dreamed of Being a People’: 
Egypt’s Revolution, the People 
and Critical Imagination
Hanan Sabea
Chapter 4
Caught in the thrill and euphoria of the revolution of 25 January, later, in March 
2011, Alain Badiou reflected on Egypt, writing:
The People, and only the people, are the creators of universal history … 
Once a threshold of determination, obstinacy and courage has been passed, 
a people can indeed concentrate its existence in one square, one avenue, a 
few factories, a university … The whole world will be witness to this courage, 
and especially to the amazing creations that accompany it. These creations 
will stand as proof that a people is represented here.1 
Almost two and a half years later, in August 2013, Ali Al-Haggar, a famous 
Egyptian singer, appeared on several TV stations performing a new song. The 
lyrics address an unnamed group, interpreted by most people as alluding to 
Islamists, Muslim Brothers, Salafis and supporters of former president Mohamed 
Morsi, symbolised by the protesters at the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins.2 The song 
is entitled ‘We are a people and you are a people’ (Ihna sha’b wa intu sha’b).3 
Its opening lines embody the distance that Egypt and the ‘people’ travelled 
between January 2011 and August 2013:
We are a people, and you are a people.
What moved our hearts never moved yours.
God is one; but we have our God, and you have your God
[…]
And because pious Egypt runs through our blood since the dawn of history 
We will never become you, and you will never become us.
Gather your tribe, your kin and your tents.
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Amass your shouts and screams, amass your edicts and chains
And go far away from our land because you are not us. You are a people and
 we are a people.
Encapsulated in the words above is a long process of struggle over the meaning, 
experiences and imagination of the category of ‘the people’, articulated in 
Arabic as ‘al-sha’b’. ‘The people’ was emblematically reflected in the famous 
chant ‘al-sha’b yurid’ (‘the people want’) that shook the squares of liberation 
in Egypt from 25 January 2011 in echoes that reverberated way beyond the 
 physicality of space, demanding freedom, justice and equity. Yet what happened 
to ‘the people, its imaginations, and its deployments? How is it even conceivable 
that the ‘summoning of ALL’, as Badiou elaborated in his writings on the 
political and the event,4 has swiftly become ‘we are a people and you are a 
people’? Who and how are ‘the people’ invoked in such varied and oft contra-
dictory pronouncements, to the extent that a loudspeaker placed on a security 
forces tank was announcing the legitimacy and the mandate of and by ‘the 
people’ – and the rule of law – while killing, maiming and dispersing mercilessly 
the protesters at the Rabaa sit-in on 14 August 2013?5 Even corpses, hurriedly 
wrapped in white cloth, stained with blood and with the names of those killed 
hand-written on them, did not escape the violence of removal, while the name 
of ‘the people’ and the sanctity of the law were being relentlessly recited. Are 
the dead of Rabaa among ‘the people’ or are ‘the people’ dead?
How can one write about ‘the people’ while having been witness (and one 
Figure 4.1 Bodies of Morsi supporters killed in clashes with security forces in a 
makeshift morgue in Cairo, 27 July 2013 (Photo: E. Arrott/VOA).
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cannot help but feel an accomplice) to the murder of hundreds of people in the 
name of the people? In fact, 26 July 2013 witnessed the massing of ‘the people’ 
in Tahrir – in response to demands by the army – to confer on the military 
the mandate and the order to fight terrorism in Egypt, a euphemism signifying 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since then a small icon stating ‘Egypt 
fighting terrorism’ has appeared in the left-hand corner of TV screens during the 
airing of programmes on many stations, while the whole machinery of state and 
private media aggressively sell this war against terrorism to the wider audience. 
How can one write the shift from emancipatory imagination and struggle to 
a regulatory apparatus – labelled by some as the onset of a fascist order – that 
justifies all controls and scrapping of rights in the name of the war on terror? 
The difficulties of writing about the revolution have bewildered scholars since 
its beginnings, especially those who were witness to and participants in the 
unfolding events.6 But now, more than then, the difficulties are compounded.
Although the revolution was branded as ‘non-violent and peaceful’, since 25 
January 2011 thousands have died in confrontations between the security state 
apparatus and ‘the people’, including by the hands of militias of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during December 2012. In some instances (such as the Abbasiyya 
events during protests at the Ministry of Defence) residents of the neighbour-
hoods also had violent skirmishes with protesters. The nomenclature of violence 
was not foreign to the revolution. In fact, as Bogaert reminds us: ‘non-violent 
political action often only becomes effective when it provokes violence, when 
it obliges the powerful to expose the violence that underlies the maintenance 
of a particular political order’.7 The interpretation of the January revolution as 
non-violent fits within a frame of reference and an interpretive paradigm that 
cannot envisage militant struggle as legitimate within a global world order of 
neoliberal governance.8
Nonetheless, there was something ‘different’ about the summer of 2013: not 
only the violence but, more fundamentally, the deep onset of despair. While 
the violence that occasioned the dispersal of the sit-ins represented one façade 
of the mayhem that grabbed the city, another was outbursts of killings, the 
torching of churches, kidnappings and the mutilation of bodies that did not 
spare many villages and cities in Egypt. Reports of churches being attacked, 
particularly in the south, dead bodies of police officers and soldiers in Giza and 
Sinai being mutilated, museums being looted, arbitrary shootings, exhortations 
to kill in retaliation for lost ones and scenes of people killing people engulfed 
the landscape. The sounds of screaming, shouting, fighting, gunfire, speeding 
ambulances, whistles announcing the beginning of attacks and calling on neigh-
bours to gather together to fight back and protect themselves, and helicopters 
flying over the cities and towns filled the air. The smell of teargas, of shots and, 
worst of all, according to a friend who was at the Imam Mosque on the night 
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of 14 August after the dispersal of Rabaa, of burning blood remain engraved in 
the corporeal experiences that many carry. So how to write while entrapped 
by violence, threats, uncertainty, confusion and a deep feeling of disappearing 
possibilities, materially embodied in the silence and darkness that envelops the 
city with the onset of curfew hours? 
I started writing this chapter in March 2013 and presented the first version 
as a paper at the Wenner-Gren workshop ‘Beyond Arab Revolutions’, held 
at the Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations 
in March 2012. Even at that time, the construct of ‘the people’ had been 
undergoing radical shifts, a process that I detail below. Yet when the time for 
 revisions came, Egypt and ‘the people’ were in very different places. What the 
paper addressed then seems so distant from and at variance with the present, 
that any attempt to speak about it or analyse it appears not only superfluous 
and meaningless, but downright banal. Is it possible to make sense? What 
follows is one attempt that gestures at an exploration of a universe of contra-
dictory meanings and  experiences, of uncertainty and contingency. I premise 
the paper on personal experiences and encounters during the last two and a 
half years, and the knowledge gained from a collaborative research project, 
‘Imagining the Political’, that started in September 2010,9 a few months before 
the onset of the revolution. I complement my reflections with accounts that 
appeared mostly in local circuits of knowledge production and exchange, 
which I read in the light of experiences of what Asef Bayat referred to as ‘new 
global  revolutions’.10 In what follows I thus explore the tumultuous trajectory 
of the category of ‘the people’ and the contradictory meanings and experi-
ences thereof. While focusing on ‘events’ to reveal the contentious universe 
of meaning associated with ‘the people’, I also locate these ‘visible episodes’ 
within the context of unfolding processes. My aim is to challenge the facility 
with which events – once named, packaged and rendered significant – become 
metonyms for more complex processes that remain obscure in relation to the 
spectacle of events. 
The Public and the People: Once Upon a Time a Revolution 
Happened Here
In her ‘Bodies in alliance and politics of the street’, Judith Butler argued:
Those who are excluded from existing polities … may be unreal only to those 
who seek to monopolize the terms of the reality. And yet even when the public 
sphere is defined through their exclusion, they act. Whether abandoned to 
precarity or left to die through systematic negligence, concerted action still 
emerges from such sites. And this is what we see … when populations amass 
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without the protection of the law, and without permits to demonstrate, to 
bring down an unjust or criminal regime of law.11 
And this is what we saw in Tahrir and the many other squares in Egypt from 
25 January 2011. Within eighteen short days, Tahrir Square became an icon 
for struggle, freedom and liberation. Tahrir – and the diverse, multi-layered 
and, more recently, contradictory meanings for which it stands – emerged as a 
‘moment in time’ that was spatially grounded in the experiences of the multi-
tudes in and away from the squares and many other public spaces. Within and 
constituting these public spaces, the category ‘the people’ – ‘al-sha’b’ – or ‘the 
street’ – al-sharia – emerges as the collective that speaks and acts together, and in 
the process of speaking and acting defines an emerging politics. Just before 1 pm 
on Friday, 28 January – also named and marked in historical imagination as the 
Friday of Rage – as the imam ended the prayer, ‘the people’ rose in unison at the 
many mosques and squares of Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, Port Said, Mansoura and 
many other cities and towns in Egypt to chant one slogan: ‘al-sha’b yurid isqat 
al-nizam’ (the people want to dismantle the system). But who were ‘the people’ 
and how are they constituted as a collective articulating a revolutionary demand 
of change? How can we envisage the meaning of revolution and change? And 
what is the system to be dismantled?
The ‘system’ and the people who rose to dismantle it are two sides of the 
same coin; the making of one was premised on the destruction of the other 
through a process of radical change and transformation. Hence I argue that an 
inseparable part of the struggle over the meaning of the category ‘the people’ 
is the struggle on the ground over power, order and the reconfiguration of the 
political, translated metaphorically in the demand for dismantling the system 
writ large. The system for many comprised the security apparatus of the state, 
which has for many years loomed large over even the smallest details of citizens’ 
everyday lives. This security apparatus is intimately linked to and intersects 
with the economic order that is premised on what Marx pronounced more than 
a century ago, namely accumulation by dispossession, now translated into the 
aggressive machinery of neoliberal practices. These elements shape and define 
the very constitution of the social, its ethos, practices and categories.
The machinations to reproduce the system with only manicured reforms on 
its surface – deserving the label of ‘Refo-lutions’, as Bayat called it12 – underlie 
the most recent events of violence in the name of ‘the people’. As Colla argued: 
There is no political claim that is not made in the name of some image of the 
people and its revolution. Even counter-revolutionaries − such as the Muslim 
Brothers, business elites, Salafis and the army − understand this game and 
play by its rules.13 
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And play they did: the security state apparatus, the Muslim Brothers, Salafis and 
the remnants of the old Mubarak regime, popularly known as the Felul. Hence 
the radically shifting meanings of ‘the people’ over 2012−13. Most disturbing has 
been the struggle for power between the security state and the business elite on 
the one hand, and the Muslim Brothers and Salafis on the other, over the dead 
bodies of ‘the people’. No matter how tight the grip and how vicious the battle, 
one wonders: are the people dead, understood in Badiou’s terms as those who 
have embarked despite all odds and oppression on ‘the organized fidelity to the 
communism as movement’?14 The latter, of which the revolution in Egypt has 
been but one instance among many spreading from Tunisia, to Yemen, Spain, 
Greece, Chile and the US, among others, is defined as the ‘common creation of 
a collective destiny’,15 with two distinctive characteristics.
First, it is generic, representing in one place humanity in its entirety. In this 
place there are people of all the kinds [that] a population is usually made up 
of, all words are heard, all propositions examined, all difficulty taken for what 
it is. Second, it overcomes the great contradictions that the state pretends to 
be the only one capable of surmounting: between intellectuals and manual 
workers, between men and women, between rich and poor, between Muslims 
and Copts, between people living in the province and those living in the 
capital …16
This sense of being ‘a people’ is translated in the words of the poem which I used 
as a title for this paper. ‘I dreamed of being a people’ is part of Ahmed Fouad 
Negm’s poem ‘As if You are Nothing’, composed in October 2010 and embodies 
glimpses of a different imaginary which has been born of decades of precarity 
that marked the consolidation of the neoliberal sociopolitical and moral order 
in Egypt. This imaginary has seen its contingent, sometimes contradictory and 
still emerging enunciation in the processes that unfolded since 25 January as 
well as the years of struggle that preceded it.17
I propose that the fluid and contingent boundaries of ‘the people’, and the 
many contradictory trajectories that they have come to manifest, are related to 
the disruption of what constituted the politically and socially familiar (i.e. the 
system writ large, or the nizam). The system is not only limited to the state and 
its organs, but also to structures and social categories (such as gender, religion, 
ownership, market, communal, neighbourhood) that constitute the very realm 
of the social. Such disruptions, which at present appear dispersed, ephemeral and 
scattered, are key nodes, sites or moments in a radical process of change. Such 
sites and moments of disruption of the political and social familiar – which for 
instance emerged during the eighteen days in Tahrir – also made an ‘appearance’ 
at Port Said, Mansoura and Suez during spring 2013, and were ‘present’ at the 
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train station on the night of 2 February 2012 when the ultras gathered at Cairo 
Central to meet the fans returning with the bodies of the dead after the Port 
Said massacre; at Kasr Nil bridge on 25 January 2012 in a confrontation with 
the Muslim Brotherhood; at the Ittihadiya presidential palace in reaction to the 
constitutional declaration; at the Constitutional Court and the Media Complex 
on 6 October; as well as at the Mahalla textile workers’ strike of 2008, to name 
only a few. These moments and spaces are key nodes in enabling the emergence 
of a critical imaginary that assembles a different possibility of ‘a people’ and 
a polis. These moments and sites approximate what Butler referred to as ‘the 
interval’. The latter is defined as 
the time of the popular will, not a single will, not a unitary will, but one that 
is characterised by an alliance with the performative power to lay claim to 
the public in a way that is not codified into law, and that can never be fully 
codified into law.18
I would add that they can never be fully codified into law because they are 
in excess of the system of law as it exists; this excess – that is yet momentary, 
dispersed and ephemeral − escapes possibilities of ready containment because 
what it presents is outside of and not yet classifiable within the codes of law and 
Figure 4.2 Eighteen short days: The emergence of a people, Tahrir Square, 
25  November 2012 (Photo: H. Sabea).
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the known rituals and technologies of power. It is precisely this excess that has 
the potential of effecting cracks in neoliberal governance, which comprises the 
condition against which a collective notion of ‘a people’ was rendered possible. 
And it is also this excess that has come under attack during the struggle for power 
and over the dead bodies of the people. Finally, while visibility or appearance are 
important domains in the making of ‘the people’ (as Arendt has argued, seeing 
and being seen by others), in the case of Egypt, what is equally important is what 
happens in the invisible of the everyday, Veena Das’s ‘recesses’19 in terms of daily 
practices, negotiations of meaning, thinking and relating to alternatives, and so 
on that make the ‘public’ appearance possible.
What were the eighteen days about and how did they become, in the language 
of many, a time out of time, excised from the everyday, yet simultaneously consti-
tuting the ordinariness of another world that was imagined as possible? It was 
the ordinariness of Tahrir time (its rhythms and routines, its forms of aesthetics 
and sociality, and its possibilities and potentials) that became the very basis for 
the ‘extraordinariness’ (or the time out of time) of Tahrir.20 This ordinariness/
extraordinariness constitutes also the potential for rethinking and reconfiguring 
the political. Indeed, as Mouffe has argued: ‘The frontier between the social 
and the political is essentially unstable and requires constant displacements and 
renegotiations between social agents. Things could always be otherwise …’21 
And Tahrir’s eighteen days were but one moment in a long struggle that is still 
unfolding and which rendered visible this possibility of the ‘otherwise’.
On 26 February 2011 (just fifteen days after the removal of Mubarak), the 
Choir Project22 performed their ‘The People Want the Life of the Square’ (‘al-
sha’b yurid hayat al-midan’).23 The performance, composed lyrically from the 
chants and slogans that echoed all over Egypt during the eighteen days, was 
an attempt to memorialise and talk about what constituted ‘Tahrir’.24 But what 
were the eighteen days about? How did ‘the people’ emerge in its context and 
with what meanings?
Tahrir is marked by the openness, fluidity and contingency of its temporal 
boundaries (When did it start? What were its beginnings? Where should we locate 
them? When does it end?). This fluidity relates to the histories of struggle that 
preceded the revolution and made it possible. Prime among these has been the 
Kefaya movement, which made protesting in the streets again a possibility after 
the years of containment since the 1970s and 1980s. The 6 April movement and 
the National Association for Change, among others, contributed significantly to 
a rethinking and an eventual emergence of ‘the people’ through the visibility of 
protest in the ‘public’.25 Similarly, there were student and worker protests, most 
exemplified in the Mehala struggles of 2008 which also witnessed the takeover 
of the main square and the besieging of the city for forty-five days.26 In addition 
to these ‘visible’ protests and contestations, what Bayat called non-movements, 
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or the daily encroachments and everyday struggles by the marginalised, have 
been simmering for years.27 
Second, the temporal ambiguity of Tahrir relates to the disruption of the 
political and social familiar, most exemplified in the daily rhythms that were 
routinised in Tahrir Square after its takeover on the evening of Friday, 28 January 
2011.. Depending on one’s spatial lens, the capture of the square followed the 
‘battle of the bridges’, as some participants named the confrontations at the 
Galaa and Qasr al-Nil bridges leading to Tahrir. The marching from all corners 
of Cairo had started right after Friday prayers on 28 January. As images and 
narratives relay, protesters and those who amassed ultimately at Tahrir repre-
sented people from all walks of life: old and young, men and women, rich and 
poor, Cairenes and people from the governorates, veiled women and bearded 
men, workers, students, housewives, retirees, the unemployed and many, many 
others. For those who did not march to the square and fought for ‘bread, freedom 
and justice’ within the neighbourhoods, a similar heterogeneity prevailed that 
reflected more the social make-up of those areas. Their confrontations with the 
police (mainly at police stations) also reflected this melange of ‘the people’. 
Then the struggle was articulated as ‘the people’ against the state, more specifi-
cally its security apparatus and its alliance with the business elite.
I joined the march from Mohamed Mahmoud Mosque that moved through 
the affluent neighbourhoods of Mohandeseen and then Dokki. Masses marched 
down the streets, reciting one slogan after another denouncing the brutality of 
the police force, demanding the dismantling of the regime, inviting Egyptians 
to come down and join them (inzil ya Masri), and making the three demands 
of ‘bread, freedom and social justice’ (‘aish, hurriyya, ‘adala ijtema’iyya). Colla 
collected a substantial number of slogans that were inextricably linked to the 
marching and subsequent presence in Tahrir.28
In the streets themselves, there are scores of other verses, ranging from the 
caustic Shurtat Masr, yâ shurtat Masr, intû ba’aytû kilâb al-’asr (‘Egypt’s Police, 
Egypt’s Police, You’ve become nothing but Palace dogs’), to the defiant ‘Idrab 
idrab yâ Habîb, mahma tadrab mish hansîb!’ (Hit us, beat us, O Habib [al-Adly, 
now former Minister of the Interior], hit all you want − we’re not going to 
leave!) … This poetry is not an ornament to the uprising − it is its soundtrack 
and also composes a significant part of the action itself.29
Police and security forces surrounded the protesters, and each time the tension 
of possible violence rose, the speed of the chant ‘silmiyya’ (peaceful) and the 
intensity of the steps of the march escalated. Violent confrontations then 
ensued at the first bridge (Galaa), with teargas and water cannons descending 
from every direction, while police tanks blocked the entry to the bridge. By 
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5  pm, more and more people were collapsing to the ground with the intensity 
of the fighting. Then, suddenly, a different sound reverberated through the air: 
the stomping and chanting of a mass of people approaching at a distance. As 
they came closer, the figures of more protesters became visible. Turning to the 
bridge, yet with vision blurred from the teargas, one could barely identify five 
figures on top of the tank. The first thought that came to mind was: Aha! Now 
the shooting with live bullets will start. But, alas, it was radically different. The 
first line of protesters managed to capture the tanks, pushing the security forces 
to the second bridge and yet another battle. This scene of disappearing security 
forces – as if they were melting into thin air – was observed at different spots 
that evening. Ultimately, after much blood had been spilled, Tahrir became 
the stronghold of the protesters. We captured Tahrir! ‘The people’ made their 
presence visible in the square. 
The takeover of Tahrir has been symbolically critical to many protest move-
ments for decades. Tahrir has historically been the centre of the city, with the 
Mujamma’ building – iconic of state bureaucratic apparatus – overlooking one 
of its borders. Entry points to the square are pathways to central locations in 
the city: from the downtown commercial and entertainment district, to the 
parliament, one of the main government hospitals, ministries (especially 
Interior and Social Welfare), Abdeen presidential palace, the Arab League, 
the Egyptian Museum, Omar Makram Mosque, Kasr el-Dobara Church, the 
downtown campus of the American University in Cairo, the old Nile Hilton 
(now renovated as the new Ritz Hotel), the Korniche, and bridges connecting 
to other parts of the city. Tahrir, therefore, is practically the hub of mobility, 
power, business and bureaucracy, art and, equally significantly, of protest. More 
important still, as Roger Owen describes it, ‘Created in the early 1950s out 
of an old military parade-ground, the square was meant to be the site for an 
annual celebration of Egypt’s independence’.30 In short, then, Tahrir has been 
simultaneously the site of spectacles of power and contestations against power. 
Yet it also bore signs of the times: decaying and old buildings next to flashy 
tourist hotels and establishments, metro stations and bus stops, shopping areas, 
cafes, fast-food chains and street vendors on the sidewalks. All of this surrounds 
the square that barely displays any green grass but which is enveloped in the 
flow of honking cars, pedestrians, traffic police, and many a time also security 
forces, all signalling the centrality of the space in the life of the city. Tahrir 
visually captured the meanings of neoliberal capitalism, of the simultaneity of 
the precarity and power that have engulfed the lives of Egyptians for years.
The evening of Friday, 28 January, all of this vanished in the presence of ‘the 
people’ who stormed and took over the square, setting up tents in the circle and 
at various side islands, and barricading entrances with barbed wire, stones, traffic 
lights and poles guarded by volunteer men and women.31 To enter, one had to 
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show an ID card and be subjected to searches in long lines that were separated 
by gender. The intensity of the searches varied according to the possibilities of 
violent eruptions, the most aggressive and bloody occurring on 2 February, also 
known as the ‘battle of the camel’.
‘The Life of the Midan [square]’, memorialised in the Choir Project perfor-
mance, encapsulates what observers have documented as integral aspects of the 
‘revolutions of the commons’ or the ‘new global revolutions’ that spread to many 
squares around the world.
Much could be said about what these new activisms have in common. They 
are all about appropriating real places, about a struggle against precarization, 
against extreme competition and against the drivenness of contemporary 
production, largely dispensing with representation and weaving a transna-
tional concatenation of social movements. There are, however, three specific 
vectors, on which these activisms enter new territory: in their search for new 
forms of living, in their organizational forms of radical inclusion, and in their 
insistence on re-appropriating time.32
These three vectors found expression in the everyday practices that consti-
tuted the life of Tahrir. Morning hours were filled with the ‘normal’ practices 
of cooking, cleaning, making tea and watching over the injured. Field hospitals 
at various locations in the square were filled with volunteers, donations of 
medicine and makeshift stations manned by doctors and nurses, each with a 
name marking their presence. Sites for cooking and tea sprang up, and gradually 
large numbers of people who sold ready-made foods and beverages began to 
flock into the square. Newspapers were laid on the ground, with stones on the 
corners to keep them from flying away, and some gathered at these spots to 
glance at the recent developments, while others sat in corners reading quietly 
and then engaging in endless conversations. If anything, talking, listening and 
debating were one of the most common features that marked the passing of the 
day, usually starting among two, then slowly developing into circles, marked 
by the diversity of those present. Those who had access to their laptops and 
smartphones sat in tents sending and receiving messages, tweeting and posting 
on social media sites. Spaces for artists, ‘revolution radio’ (radio al-thawra) and 
compiling live history books appeared at other corners of the square. Cartoons 
and caricatures, sometimes ending up in the form of posters that were on display 
on consecutive Fridays (the ‘million people days’, such as the Friday of Departure 
on 11 February, when there were calls made for millions to congregate in the 
squares) or around the walls of the square buildings, evoked laughs as much as 
they did tears.33 Many of the entrances were also packed with vendors selling 
flags and revolution knick-knacks, such as badges, caps and T-shirts bearing the 
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pictures of martyrs, or calendars and signs with 25 January engraved on them. 
As people settled into the evenings, poetry and songs, drama performances, 
satire and joke-telling circles both entertained and mobilised the protesters, 
and, more practically, reproduced the energy of emotions that filled the space. 
In some tents, strategising for the next day, the next Friday, the next move, 
continued until midnight. In short, the everyday of the eighteen days in Tahrir 
is part of a much larger geography of protest ethics and aesthetics, or what 
Ruanig referred to as a ‘new ethico-aesthetic paradigm’34 that spread from Cairo 
to Tunis, New York, Seattle and Delhi, to Zuccotti Park, Syntagma Square and 
Puerta del Sol. 
This new art of living together, of experimenting with different forms of 
politics, sociality and being, exemplifies what Greene termed ‘accents of protest’ 
in relation to viewing places themselves as ‘rhetorical tactics in movement 
towards social change’.35 Much as routinisation was setting in to define the 
sociality of Tahrir, contingency and uncertainty on the one hand and waiting 
on the other, with time going fast, yet not fast enough, shaped the temporal 
unfolding of the eighteen days. Though many were already certain, especially 
after the battle of the camel of the ability to not only sustain presence but also 
claim victory (although that victory was ambiguously defined), waiting and the 
tension that ensued after the Mubarak speeches maintained the edginess of 
the collective. Even more so, the flocking of thousands of residents to watch 
and take a picture on their mobile phones to prove their presence at ‘Tahrir’ 
compounded the carnivalesque feeling that descended on the space, particularly 
during daylight hours, producing among Tahrir occupiers the new nomenclature 
of ‘tourist participant’. Yet Tahrir was more than a place of tourists, joy, laughter 
and emerging hope; it was also steeped in fear, rage, trepidation, exhaustion, 
exuberance and sadness, all at once, all defining a collective or a ‘people’ that 
shared the action of struggle, of presence, of defiance and refusal. Indeed, as Juris 
contends: ‘Mass actions, in particular, are shot through with liminoid moments 
of terror, panic, and play, generating high levels of affective solidarity’.36 
This affective solidarity, the reorganisation of time, forms of living and modal-
ities of interaction, the horizontal network, the collective without a leader, in 
their complex coming together – though not without their own conflicts and 
contradictions – signal in action rather than words that ‘a people is here’. As 
Badiou reflected: 
In the midst of an event, the people is made up of those who know how to 
solve the problems that the event imposes on them… so that the place where 
everything is happening, that place that has become a symbol, may stay with 
the people at all costs.37
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The collective invoked in the category ‘the people’ was not about negating the 
social constructs that comprised society, such as gender, class, region, religion, 
age, education and profession, among others. Rather, the presence of an acting 
mass defining itself and being defined as ‘the people’ signalled the possibility 
of transcending the familiar content and performative subtexts that set the 
contours of how these categories inhabit the public and private. Accounts by 
many participants of reworked relationships at home – of different modes of 
negotiating power among parents and children, siblings, of different lines of 
fissures around political positions, and novel alliances or disconnections among 
friends and family – attest to how the collective was reworking the very premise 
and terms of reference of organising social worlds. Temporary as it may have 
been, the emergence of possibilities enveloped the very making of the category 
‘the people’. This was not limited to those who made an appearance at Tahrir, but 
was also the case even for those who never set foot in the square but saluted the 
demonstrators while they passed through their neighbourhoods or contributed 
food and medicine to Tahrir and its inhabitants.38
A plethora of new social categories emerged to articulate the large spectrum 
of sociopolitical relations and positions encountered during the course of 
the eighteen days. These ranged from ‘thuwar’ (revolutionaries) and ‘shabab 
al-thawra’ (youth of the revolution), to ‘baltajiyya’ (thugs),39 ‘hizb al-kanaba’ 
(‘couch party’, in reference to those who remained inactive at home watching 
TV), ‘qilla mundassa’ (the ‘infiltrating few’, in reference to allegations about 
foreign agendas and perpetrators instigating the revolution), ‘al-aydi al-khafiyya’ 
(‘invisible hands’ – perpetrators, or those who killed protesters, who were not 
identified), ‘al-muwatin al-sharif’ (‘the honourable citizen’ who responded to state 
calls to quell the revolutionaries or report on ‘suspicious’ acts) and ‘al-aghlabiyya 
al-samita’ (‘the silent majority’). These and many others populated the social 
fields that defined the eighteen days and their aftermath. They speak of attempts 
to break the power of the collective that demanded the toppling of the regime. 
That such attempts would gain ground soon after the end of the eighteen days 
was still unimaginable within the bounds of the space of Tahrir. Rather – and 
despite many instances that comprised rift, dissonance and conflict within the 
square – the power of the category had its grip over ‘the people’.
As revolutionaries have testified, the feeling of belonging to a collective was 
regularly instantiated through this language about the people and its demands 
− it was the collective act of stating that the people wanted something that 
created the sense there was a social actor by that name. For many Egyptian 
activists, it was this locutionary event that proved there was an Egyptian 
people capable of revolutionary action in the first place.40
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Processes and Moments: Paradoxes of the People 
in Unfolding Processes
But is ‘Tahrir’ the revolution and are the eighteen days the manifestation of the 
people? Certainly there have been several scholarly and popular productions 
that claimed as much. Yet without undermining either Tahrir or the eighteen 
days, it is equally critical to remember that what both represented, and their 
power, lies in the possibilities they created. The latter – namely possibilities 
for a different kind of politics, a different kind of social living and a different 
kind of order – are not to be limited or confined to a single place and time. 
Indeed, the revolution moved way outside of Tahrir and the eighteen days both 
spatially and temporally. ‘The people’ also moved with the revolution to signify, 
as time unfolded, contradictory meanings and trajectories, while reflecting and 
embodying struggles on the ground over power. It did not take long after the 
eighteen days for such struggles to make a violent appearance on the scene. On 
8 and 9 March, one of the earliest attempts by the ruling elite (then symbolised 
by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and their alliances with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the old business elite) to crack down on protesters 
in the square took place, as did the first murder after Tahrir in a ‘cleansing’ 
effort by the state to ‘restore order’ and claim the midan. Then, too, the familiar 
construction of gender, magnified in physical assaults on women protesters, and 
culminating in virginity tests for those held and detained by the army, made 
its ugly appearance. By then the preparations for the first constitutional refer-
endum, held on 19 March 2011, signalled the re-emergence of religion as a 
category of signification for dividing ‘the people’. The ‘yes’ and ‘no’ campaigns 
that occasioned the propaganda for the referendum reduced the debate about 
the constitution to a sociopolitical divide between those voting yes articulated 
as ‘for religion’ versus those for no, who were collapsed into the figure of the 
secularist. This binary of religious vs secularist not only reduced religion to 
Islam, but also subsumed the fundamental sociopolitical debates and demands 
for change, as pronounced in the squares a few weeks earlier.
Marked by the display of the ‘pink finger’, connoting the ink used to identify 
those who had already voted, the highest participation in electoral politics since 
January 2011 took place on 19 March 2011. The yes vote got the majority (more 
than 70 per cent – on a turnout of 41.2 per cent of eligible voters), and with 
it indicated a firmer alliance between those identified as the Islamists (that is, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis, Jama’a Islamiyya and Jihadis), the 
military ruling SCAF and the old business elite which continued its attempts to 
struggle for power and became euphemistically known as al-felul (the remnants). 
With the passing of the constitutional amendments (the final product was quite 
different from what the electorate voted on), the attempt by those in power 
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to strengthen their grip over the people, to quell demands for real change and 
to physically eliminate revolutionaries and the remains of revolutionary spirit 
escalated, peaking in specific events that also captured the gaze of international 
and local media. These ranged from the 8 July attacks to the 9 October massacre 
of twenty-seven Copts, to events taking place in Mohamed Mahmoud Street 
in November and the cabinet killings in December. In short, the calendar of 
the first year of the revolution was chequered with almost monthly ‘spectacles’ 
of violence that targeted men, women, Copts, the poor and unemployed. The 
murals and graffiti that enveloped the cities of Egypt created a living museum 
of events as they unfolded. Graffiti of Mohamed Mahmoud was painted on the 
walls of the street that witnessed the fierce sniping of protesters attempting 
to kill or maim, most specifically blind their targets by aiming for the eyes. 
Renamed by protesters as the ‘Eyes of Freedom’ (‘uyun al-hurriyya), Mohamed 
Mahmoud Street and its graffiti stood as testimony to unfolding struggles for 
freedom.41 With the many events and the recurrent creation of new martyrs, 
the artists at Mohamed Mahmoud, much like those in other cities and towns, 
refused to preserve their artwork. ‘Why would you ever preserve graffiti?’ asked 
Abo Bakr, one of the graffiti artists. He referred to the paintings as ‘a product of 
this moment, anticipating new martyrs and new struggles would be painted in 
Figure 4.3 Walls erected by the security forces around Tahrir Square in an 
attempt to prevent further protests with graffiti that rendered them ‘passable’ 
and invisible to viewers (Photo: M. El-Shamy, Al-Akbhar English).
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their stead’.42 Indeed there were more martyrs, more events and more struggle, 
in turn producing more paintings and more graffiti.
The year following January 2011 was thus filled with attacks and violence 
to tame the revolutionary spirit and bodies of ‘the people’. Yet no matter how 
violent and aggressive the attacks (physical and otherwise) were, the more 
relentless the struggle against containment became. In fact, the more blood was 
spilled and the more protesters were demonised on TV screens, the more power 
the revolutionary process acquired. By slicing out al-thuwar (the revolutionaries) 
from the construct of ‘the people’ the ruling elites hoped not only to demonise 
the revolutionaries but to contain them. Equally important was dislodging the 
power of the very category of ‘the people’, and rendering the bodies of those 
identified as upholding the principles of revolution analogous to what Calderia 
referred to as the ‘unbounded body’. The latter signifies ‘a permeable body, 
open to intervention, on which manipulations by others are not considered 
 problematic. On the other hand, the unbounded body is unprotected by indi-
vidual rights, and indeed, results historically from their absence’.43
Demonising the revolution had already started in the square during the 
eighteen days, through rumours of espionage and alleged foreign funding in 
instigating instability, both of which crystallised in the figure of the al-qilla 
al-mundassa (the infiltrating few) construct. In the months that followed, this 
same trope continued, yet it was coupled with the identification of demon-
strators who continued to flock the streets as those who aim to destabilise the 
country, refuse to let the ‘wheel of production’ move forward or obstruct the 
‘political roadmap’ of the ‘transition period’. In this scenario the ballot box, 
elections and constitutional assemblies represented nodes along the ‘political’ 
path that the revolution had to pass through in order to claim ‘success’, defined 
primarily in terms set by ruling elites and sanctioned by global powers, keen 
on maintaining the façade of the efficacy, sanctity and normality of liberal 
democracy. The latter is constituted in this naturalised frame of reference as 
the only possibility for political order and its appendage of economic growth. 
And since the Friday marches and demonstrations rarely ceased, demanding 
the fulfilment of the revolutionary principles, the attacks on demonstrators also 
became a routine part of the landscape. Workers, students, the unemployed, 
women and Copts came to the forefront of the struggle yet also became subject 
to the most ruthless campaigns of attack. From ‘fe’awiyya’ allegations (that is, of 
representing narrow individual interests), to dismissive comments of ‘what were 
they doing there anyway’ primarily in reference to women, their being there 
thus making them deserving of the violence waged against them, to massive 
removals of street vendors and of residents of slum areas (‘ashwa’iyyat), and 
detention and military trials of thousands of protesters and activists. Defaming 
those who refused to acquiesce with the new order even extended to alleging 
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they constituted the forces of the thawra mudadda (counter-revolution), a term 
that was initially deployed by revolutionary groups. With this intensity of 
struggles the very meaning of ‘the people’ and ‘revolution’ became more and 
more contentious, contradictory and ambiguous, deployed with ease by all 
sorts of groups contending for ownership and control over ‘the people’ and the 
 revolution.
Struggles were waged over not only categories but also space and squares, 
producing a shifting geography of protest that extended beyond Tahrir to a 
more expansive topography that was no longer contained in the singularity of a 
square. Much as the security apparatus attempted to cleanse Tahrir (literally of 
protesters, slogans, paintings and graffiti) and wall it off, protesters moved into 
many more new directions and spaces. And with every new wall that was erected 
around Tahrir, literally closing off the points of entry into the square through 
large cement blocks, creative cultural resistance intensified. Painting the blocks 
that walled off Tahrir, playing soccer in front of security buildings, establishing 
an open art square on the first Saturday of every month under the slogan of 
fan al-midan (square art) complemented more systematic campaigns demanding 
justice, freedom and change. These ranged from the kathibun (liars) campaign 
comprising documentary films that recounted episodes of military violence, 
screened in public spaces in neighbourhoods in major cities and towns, through 
the ‘No to Military Trials’ campaign to Shaifinkum (We see you), a campaign 
whose followers  aimed to trace, record and render visible public violations 
by the military. The former lijan sha’biyya (neighbourhood watches) that were 
established on the night of Friday, 28 January to protect and defend localities 
also participated in the struggle against the sedimentation of old structures of 
power.44 For instance, the Imbaba Neighbourhood Committee initiated the 
‘garbage campaign’, which deposited waste from the neighbourhood every Friday 
in front of the local council and the governorate buildings, thus confronting the 
state with its failed obligations towards the people. Others started ‘We are not 
Paying’ campaigns, calling on neighbours not to pay their electricity and gas 
bills because of the poor services they received. At many workplaces, inde-
pendent syndicates that were inaugurated in May 2011 started popping up at 
factories, small shops and whole transport and textile sectors, as well as among 
female daily agrarian workers.
The first year of the revolution thus witnessed fundamental shifts. First, from 
a more concentrated geography of protest to dispersal over spaces and a variety 
of sites marking processes of protest and contestation. Second, along with the 
spatial dispersal, the singular face associated with the mass in Tahrir articulating 
‘the people want’, a multitude of faces made their presence visible. Third, the 
gap between the formal political process of the ‘transition period’ and its agents, 
established in the events leading to 28 January, prevailed at a distance from 
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what was then also articulated as the collective singular of ‘the people’ or ‘the 
street’. This not only included members of the ruling elite in power (SCAF, the 
business elite, the Muslim Brothers and their Islamist allies), but also public 
opposition figures and emerging political parties. In the name of rule of law and 
orderly process, the latter also played by the rules of the game rather than chal-
lenging and defying them. Violent episodes occasioning the acquittal of security 
forces in long legal battles regarding the murder of protesters, or the refusal to 
initiate any plans to address the economic suffering and injustice, widened the 
distance between the imagination and possibilities that emerged in Tahrir and 
what was transpiring on the ground in daily struggles. The formal end of SCAF 
rule with the presidential elections of June 2012 and the onset of what was 
referred to as the ‘year of the Ikhwan’ (Muslim Brothers) if anything produced 
more confrontations and violence. I emphasise the ‘formal end’ of military rule 
to underscore the mutuality of the presence of the security apparatus with the 
elected president of the Ikhwan, much as the presence of the Ikhwan marked the 
year of SCAF rule.
The commemoration of the first anniversary of the revolution on 25 January 
2012 brought out this mutuality in glaring relief. Supporters of the Muslim 
Brothers entered Tahrir the night before and fights ensued regarding the placing 
of the ‘central stage’ and the kind of banners to be hung around the square. 
Ikhwan supporters wanted a centre stage, to the exclusion of all other groups 
that fought over space in the square. Additionally, they articulated a celebratory 
agenda (having just won majority seats in parliament and the Shura council 
in elections that were dubious, to say the least) while other groups insisted on 
reiterating the demands of the revolution that were yet to be actualised, namely 
justice (especially for those killed and injured), freedom and socioeconomic 
restructuring. A map with images of martyrs signifying the different starting 
points and routes to Tahrir circulated in the days before.
Entering the square from the Qasr al-Nil bridge side, many relived the 
moments that had occasioned the capture of the square a year earlier, remem-
bering those who had fallen or who were missing due to detention. Everyone 
stopped for a moment of silence in memory of the dead. Silence literally engulfed 
the thousands that stood there over the bridge. Seconds later an outburst of 
celebratory songs broke the silence, coming from the Ikhwan stage, sited at the 
entrance to the square. Those marching towards Tahrir responded in shock and 
anger with a new slogan: ‘bi’ bi’ bi’ al-thawra ya Badi’’ (‘sell the revolution, oh 
Badi’’, in reference to the spiritual guide of the Muslim Brothers, Mohammed 
Badi’). As the two groups came closer to each other, each side intensified its 
chants or raised the volume of the loudspeaker airing the songs higher. Then, 
in an act to command silence on the part of the protesters, those on the Ikhwan 
stage started playing tapes of Qur’an recitals. A second of silence was followed 
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by even louder chants against the Ikhwan and the betrayal of the revolution. 
This confrontation continued for a while, with each group standing its ground 
more firmly, one relying on the sound and power of religion, and the other on 
the sound and power of the people. The skirmish continued until eventually 
the Ikhwan shut down their speakers and were physically removed from the 
stage. Cheering erupted all over the square, as the victory of ‘the people’ was 
announced. The second capture of Tahrir was over.
This confrontation at the bridge on 25 January 2012 was a spectacular 
beginning to a long string of clashes between ‘a people’ and ‘another people’, 
each claiming legitimacy and power to speak in the totalising terms of the all. 
And within another six short months Mohamed Morsi was elected as pres-
ident with thirteen million votes to his name (out of fifty-two million eligible 
voters).45 These six months and the year that followed his election and which 
culminated in the events of 30 June 2013, with which I started this chapter, 
witnessed yet more violence and attacks on ‘the people’ in the name of ‘the 
people’. Yet they also occasioned the intensity of forms of dispersed struggles 
against the departure and systematic erasure by those in power of revolutionary 
principles, ethos and demands. The episodes are many: suffice to mention 
the Port Said massacre of seventy-four football fans, the killing of protesters 
at the Ittihadiya presidential palace in the wake of the constitutional amend-
ments decreed by Morsi in December 2012, the second Mohammed Mahmoud 
massacres while commemorating the killings of the first Mohamed Mohmoud 
a year earlier, the murder of protesters in Muqattam at the headquarters of 
the Muslim Brotherhood Guidance Bureau, and the killing of thirty people 
in Port Said who contested the capital punishment sentence that targeted 
many of their football fans, while acquitting the security forces who made the 
massacre possible. Many more events dotted the unfolding of the year 2012, 
thus cementing the feeling that little has changed, though the faces have. Yet 
in the midst of this crackdown there were also many struggles that made their 
mark on the scene. Prime among these were in the Suez canal cities of Port 
Said, Suez and Ismailia, which declared their civil disobedience and later their 
‘independence’ in the wake of the massacres in the city in January 2012 by 
police forces against protesters who were enraged by the court ruling of capital 
punishment. For almost three weeks and despite the declaration of a state of 
emergency and curfew, soccer games were played at 9 pm every evening, in 
defiance of the onset of curfew, in all the public squares of Port Said city. Police 
stations were closed down, and in their stead citizens took over a building and 
announced the ushering in of the ‘Popular Police Force’ with a large placard 
placed on top of the building. A car placed in front of the popular police station 
also carried a large white banner announcing its mission in the service of the 
people. The independence of Port Said was shortlived, yet it signalled the 
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 resilience of defiance. Equally powerful were more satirical attempts to chal-
lenge power. These ranged from the holding of a Harlem Shake Dance at the 
gates of the Brotherhood Guidance Bureau, to soccer games parodying the 
figures of the players, political public personas. Cartoons, caricatures and, most 
popular, the satirical TV programme Al-Bernameg (The Programme) hosted by 
Bassem Youssef (similar to the CNN Jon Stewart show that aired live every 
Friday evening and was watched by millions of viewers).
In the midst of these tumultuous times, the continued hailing of a political 
process at the expense of socioeconomic justice, or as Abdelrahman has argued, 
‘the hierarchy of demands and struggles’,46 increased the gap between the 
then and the now and how a possible future was envisaged. The banality of 
the discourse of elections, ballot boxes or the ambiguous Nahda (Renaissance) 
project of the Ikhwan and the grip of the security apparatus only intensified 
the desire to defy the system of power, or al-nizam. The greater the violence 
by state security and Ikhwan militias – identified by the Brotherhood as ‘the 
people’ – which filled the streets of cities and towns, the greater the defiance 
from those also identified as ‘the people’ who were refusing to be contained by 
the Ikhwan and their allies. The aggressive economic monopoly that started to 
take shape in yet another alliance between the old business elites and Muslim 
Brotherhood figures, the failures of the regime to effect any modicum of change 
in the daily lives of residents in cities, towns and villages, the speed with which 
the constitutional assembly passed the constitution in an exclusionary process 
and the spate of litigations that were brought against journalists, media members 
and activists who contested aspects of the regime, all rendered the sustainability 
of the ‘year of the Ikhwan’ practically impossible. Hence the exuberance with 
which people signed petitions supporting the tamarrud campaign (initiated by a 
group of young men who travelled across different cities, towns and villages in 
Egypt to collect the signatures of people who objected to the rule of the Broth-
erhood, demanding early elections) and took to the streets on 30 June 2012. 
Signing tamarrud was another way of rendering oneself, one’s signature and one’s 
ID card visible, announcing a presence and a refusal to acquiesce. It yet again 
announced a presence of ‘the people’ against oppressive and exclusionary power.
The line of the story that followed opens this chapter: 30 June protests, 3 July 
takeover by the army and announcement of the deposing of Morsi, a forty-seven-
day-long sit-in at Rabaa and Nahda Squares by Morsi supporters, interrupted 
by scenes of violence erupting in many parts of Cairo, by Ikhwan supporters, 
by police forces, by residents and by the army, seemingly all against all.47 The 
culmination was the dispersal of the Rabaa and Nahda sit-ins on 14 August, 
where the number of dead could not be even ascertained, yet the violence by 
security forces and the collective punishment that ensued was only countered 
by more violence on the part of Morsi and Ikhwan supporters against security 
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forces and ‘the people’ at large. Shortly thereafter, the ‘war on terror’ propaganda 
took grip of the place, bringing in its wake more dead bodies, blood, torching of 
buildings and a declaration of a state of emergency, with curfew hours literally 
confining people to their homes every evening. Cairo, the city that never slept, 
turned dark, silent and empty, as if abandoned by ‘the people’.
As I was writing the conclusion to these reflections, the first administrative 
court in Cairo disbanded the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities and placed 
its properties under receivership of the state. Detentions of Ikhwan members in 
the name of securing the country against the reign of terror are reported daily. 
Yet whose reign of terror is descending on the place and people? Whose bodies 
are the unfettered bodies of the now and what comes next? We are witness to a 
‘horror’ campaign on TV and radio with mutilated bodies on display every single 
day, redisplayed morning and evening, lest anyone doubt or forget the preva-
lence of violence and the urgency of ‘security’. We are also witness to bombings, 
random (or not so random) violent shootings in local neighbourhoods and an 
intensified feeling of rage and calls for revenge. Police and military campaigns to 
‘liberate’ villages under siege of the Ikhwan (such as Kerdasa, Nahya and Delga) 
erase complex histories of conflict between the people and the security state 
apparatus, the people and ruthless business elite, the people and the local power 
brokers. The new demons are the Ikhwan; indeed their violence against the 
people and against the revolutionary processes of radical change are engraved 
in the memories of many, thus rendering the demonisation effective if not more 
violent. But which Ikhwan, and can we collapse power dynamics and struggles 
over power into a singular corporeal figure inhabited by the body of so-called 
Ikhwani? Can you even know one if you see one? And does it actually matter; 
since in the sweep to cleanse the social and political landscape of the so-called 
Ikhwan, what actually is being swept and cleansed away are any traces of contes-
tation or protest against power of an order that is cementing itself aggressively 
in the recesses of the everyday lives of the people.
The cartoon that appeared on the Facebook page of the 6 April Youth 
Movement, Democratic Front, Alexandria, on 10 September 2013, captures 
the paradox of the present. Its caption reads: 
They are all liars. The ones who want us to believe it is a war on Islam, and 
the others who want us to believe it is a war against the nation. But in the 
end it is only one war: against the POOR.48
Is it over? To view the present as anything but yet another episode in a long 
process of struggle is to deny the possibility that emerged in Tahrir. The one 
hope is that:
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Each revolt, of course, may fail: tyrants may unleash bloody repression, 
military juntas may try to remain in power; traditional opposition groups 
may attempt to hijack movements; and religious hierarchies may jockey to 
take control. But what will not die are the political demands and desires that 
have been unleashed … As long as those demands and desires live, the cycle 
of struggles will continue.49
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The Body of the Colonel: Caricature and 
 Incarnation in the Libyan Revolution
Igor Cherstich
Chapter 5
‘To murder somebody, bury his body, then grow flowers over the body to 
conceal it.’ 
Persian proverb1
‘The people who say Hitler is Antichrist, or alternatively, the Holy Ghost, 
are nearer an understanding of the truth than the intellectuals who for ten 
dreadful years have kept it up that he is merely a figure out of comic opera, 
not worth taking seriously.’ 
George Orwell2 
Of Ghosts, Men and Things
Regardless of what some cunning posthumous analysts might say, the truth is that 
the Arab Spring caught everyone by surprise. Until two years ago the chance that 
the pluri-decennial dictatorial regimes of North Africa might crumble seemed 
to be most unlikely. Many observers felt this way, and so did − I believe – even 
some of those who took part in the uprisings. Impossible events, however, are not 
necessarily unimaginable. ‘Unrealistic’ is not synonymous with ‘inconceivable’, 
and even though tracing a difference between the two might seem pedantic, 
it is necessary if one wants to understand the dynamics of popular revolt in 
Libya. In this chapter, I attempt to demonstrate that the seeds of revolution were 
somehow present as a possibility – unrealistic, but a possibility nevertheless – in 
the perception of Libyans even before the Arab Spring. In particular, I concen-
trate on one specific aspect of the revolt: the understanding (and, consequently, 
the representation) of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi as a political figure that could 
be openly criticised, ridiculed and physically removed from power. A superficial 
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analysis of pre-revolutionary Libya might suggest that Gaddafi was perceived 
by Libyans as a sort of powerful supernatural figure, an ‘unremovable ghost’ 
rather than a flesh-and-blood dictator who could potentially be dethroned. It 
is my contention, however, that prior to the Arab Spring, the Colonel was 
seen as both ‘man’ and ‘ghost’ (with people often oscillating between the two 
options, occasionally jokingly), and that the Libyan revolution has ‘actualised’ 
one of the two possibilities.3 Libyans related to the mortality of the Colonel as 
a potentiality, and the uprising gave them the chance to verify this potentiality. 
If, before the revolution, Gaddafi might have had a body, after the revolution he 
gained a body: one that could be represented, touched and eventually destroyed. 
In order to better explain my argument, let me start with a brief clarification: 
according to some commentators of the Libyan case, prior to the uprising Gaddafi 
was a ‘super-human’, and after the revolution he became a ‘thing’. Lina Khatib, 
in particular, has argued that during the years of the regime Gaddafi had built up 
a sophisticated propaganda machine aimed at transcending his own humanity, 
and that the opponents of the regime had ‘reversed’ this process carrying out 
an objectification of him. Khatib explains that when Gaddafi was in power he 
depicted himself in posters and pictures as having a divine status ‘not attainable 
by others’.4 The Colonel portrayed himself as an omnipresent spirit watching 
over his people, as a sun-god and as an intangible father of the nation. He fash-
ioned himself into a disembodied symbol of Libya – or to be more precise, of the 
Jamahiriya5 – blurring the line between himself and the state so that, according 
to Khatib, ‘the popular equation in Libya was “Gaddafi is Libya, and Libya is 
Gaddafi”’.6 Gaddafi was able to achieve this apotheosis through ‘total control of 
visual representation in public space’7 but, Khatib goes on to say, with the Arab 
Spring a ‘visual reversal’ took place.8 
Right from the beginning of the uprising, the anti-Gaddafi forces made use of 
caricatures and graffiti in order to undo the ultra-human image of the Colonel. 
By distorting and ridiculing the figure of Gaddafi on the walls of their cities, 
Libyans transformed the Colonel ‘from superior being into a literal object, from 
someone who imbued himself with supernatural qualities to a non-human’.9 The 
culmination of this process was, in Khatib’s view, the killing of Gaddafi. When, 
in October 2011, the ‘qaid atthawra’10 was found hiding in a sewer in the city 
of Sirte, he was surrounded by a multitude of people, subjected to violence by 
his captors, sexually abused and killed.11 Eventually, as reported by the world’s 
press, his body was exposed in a warehouse freezer in the city of Misurata with 
people queuing to take pictures with the dead Colonel,12 and then buried in an 
unmarked location in the desert.13 According to Khatib, this process ‘erased the 
subjectivity of Gaddafi’.14 The Colonel was transubstantiated: he turned from 
omnipresent ghost into an inanimate object of violence.
I believe Khatib is right when she says that the Libyan revolution has involved 
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a change in the perception of Gaddafi and a ‘reversal’ in terms of visual repre-
sentation. Based on my own research in Libya,15 however, I also believe that this 
change has not been one from ‘spirit’ to ‘thing’. Gaddafi has not been transformed, 
as Khatib suggests, from supernatural being without body into object without subjec-
tivity. Instead, I would argue, he was turned from potentially man, maybe a ghost 
into just a man (or just a subject, one might say). Contrary to what Khatib implies, 
Libyans harboured the notion of the ‘humanity’ (and therefore the mortality) 
of Gaddafi even before the uprising, though this notion was present only as an 
unverified possibility. If, in Khatib’s description, the dictator went straight from 
super-man to less than man, I found that he passed from potential body/potential 
person into tangible body/definitively a person. The Colonel, one might say, did not 
lose his subjectivity; he actually gained one – particularly, as I will show, through 
his death. The implications of this argument are quite important: Libyans did not 
passively accept the view of Gaddafi as a ‘disembodied symbol’ put forward by the 
propaganda of the regime, but critically engaged with it by questioning it and by 
creating their own narratives around it (‘is he actually a ghost or is he just a man?’).
Believing, Knowing and Pretending
The key question one has to answer when faced with Khatib’s argument is 
this: did Libyans actually believe in the supernatural nature of Gaddafi put 
forward by the propaganda? Analysts of the relationship between the people 
and the state have often shown a tendency to examine propaganda as something 
which is uncritically received by the subjects of power. Within the Marxist 
tradition, for instance, scholars have emphasised a view of state ideology as ‘false 
consciousness’ which is forced, often in a subtle way, on people in order to justify 
exploitation.16 Others, however, inspired by a Gramscian reading of Marx, have 
put more emphasis on consent than on coercion. According to these scholars, 
power is underpinned by hegemonic processes aimed at presenting ideology as 
‘the natural state of things’. By accepting ideology as ‘common sense’ people 
unconsciously become collaborators with state and elite power,17 often because 
they are ‘charmed’ by the supposed ‘sacrality’ of the state as an institution.18 
Some scholars have further developed this approach, arguing that ideology is 
simply the ‘preferred reading of things’ which is not automatically adopted by 
the subjects of power, but rather negotiated, re-interpreted and re-articulated.19 
Propaganda, therefore, allows for different readings and for personal re-elabo-
ration. More importantly, propaganda allows for pretence to be displayed by 
its intended subjects, and this is particularly relevant for an analysis of the 
perception Libyans had of their leader.
In a study of public life in Turkey, Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that often people 
know full well that ‘state ideology’ is a false construction aimed at  propagandistic 
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purposes, but they still behave as though they accepted it to be true.20 Navaro-
Yashin draws on Lacanian psychoanalysis as interpreted by Slavoj Žižek to argue 
that a person might be made aware of the reasons behind the symptoms of his 
psychological distress, but that does not necessarily mean that the symptoms will 
disappear. The neurotic might relate to the neurosis as a fundamental part of his 
identity: knowing the root of his problems might therefore not be enough for 
him to ‘let go’ of his symptoms and be healed.21 Similarly, Žižek proposes that 
while state subjects may be aware of the farce of propaganda, they still behave 
in everyday life as if they believed it to be true.22 To use a Lacanian metaphor, 
they hold on to their symptoms out of fear of the unknown (‘what would we 
do without the state?’). Eventually, according to Žižek, by doing one starts to 
believe: ‘in the process of pretending, one ultimately (consciously but irratio-
nally) ends up actually believing in the ideology’.23 Navaro-Yashin agrees with 
Žižek’s premises, but she also qualifies this view, arguing, contrary to Žižek, that 
‘pretenders’ do not necessarily turn into ‘believers’.24 Sometimes the subjects of 
power simply pretend, she says, to accept propaganda while in fact being critical 
of it ‘in order to survive within the limits of the constraints upon them’,25 thus 
becoming ‘accomplices’ of the state. And if it is true that in time this ‘pretence’ 
might generate actual belief, it is also true that often it remains as it is.26
I find this point particularly significant for my argument in reflecting criti-
cally on Khatib’s account of Gaddafi’s transformation during the revolution. 
Navaro-Yashin argues that ‘knowledge of the farce’ is not necessarily ‘belief 
in the farce’, but she also concedes that in some cases the first might generate 
the second (that is, by pretending some people might start to believe). She 
therefore implies that the line that separates sceptical ‘knowing’ from ‘believing’ 
is sometimes blurred27 – some might believe, others might not, and others in 
turn might only ‘half-believe’. Bearing this in mind, I argue that Gaddafi’s Libya 
was characterised precisely by this ‘blurriness’ between knowledge of reality and 
belief in the façade, and that the Libyan revolution provided a way to dissipate 
the ambiguity between the two. Doubtlessly, under the regime Libyans behaved 
as if they accepted the super-human nature of Gaddafi, while in fact they knew 
that he was just a man.28 Libyans, however, also retained an ambiguous approach 
towards Gaddafi. They engaged in everyday actions aimed at stressing the mere 
humanity of the Colonel − jokes aimed at ridiculing him, for instance29 − but 
at the same time, they also genuinely referred to him as ‘a disembodied dark 
power’. In other words, far from simply believing in the supernatural status of 
their leader, as Khatib seems to imply, Libyans kept a certain precautionary 
distance, uncertain as to whether the Colonel was a man or a ghost. Then, when 
they finally had the chance to ‘prove’ one of the two possibilities, they operated 
a sophisticated process of incarnation. By visually caricaturing the body of the 
Colonel through graffiti (and eventually by ‘touching’ him, killing him and 
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‘hiding’ his body) they ‘gave him a body’, though a distorted, disfigured and 
eventually ‘missing’ one. In short, they touched the intangible, they realised 
that it was − as they hypothesised – tangible and then precisely because of this 
tangibility, they were able to remove it.
This dynamic is extremely interesting, particularly when it comes to under-
standing why Khatib’s account does not do justice to the ‘aesthetics’30 of the 
Libyan revolution. Significantly, my interpretation disputes some aspects of 
Navaro-Yashin’s argument too. In her analysis of ‘pretence’ Navaro-Yashin says 
that the ‘accomplices’ of the state, those who know but pretend they do not, 
ultimately help to reproduce the structure of power.31 Even when these subjects 
might be critical of state propaganda, by pretending to accept it they reinforce 
it: there is a compliance with the state even in their ‘resistance’ against it. This 
is certainly true, but when it comes to the ‘double’ perception that Libyans had 
of Gaddafi, there is a further issue to be considered. As I will show, Libyans 
were stuck indecisively between ‘knowledge of the farce’ and ‘belief in the 
farce’, but it is precisely because of this ‘unresolved’ perception that they could 
conceive the potential humanity, and thus mortality, of the Colonel. Pretence, 
as opposed to full acceptance, leaves space for a certain openness to different 
possibilities of the truth. Being ‘pretenders’, as opposed to full believers, Libyans 
(or at least some of them) could conceive of the Colonel’ s body, and thus also 
of his potential removal from power, as a ‘potential truth’. Therefore, reversing 
Navaro-Yashin’s position, one might argue that there was resistance, or at least 
potential resistance, in their compliance. 
Libyans related to Gaddafi as a man/ghost, and eventually ‘confirmed’ his 
humanity. In order to shed light on this process I will present a visual analysis of 
Gaddafi’s propaganda − mainly the way in which he presented himself publicly 
– and an examination of the perception Libyans had of their leader based on 
ethnographic material collected in my fieldwork.32 Obviously, the process I 
analyse is not representative of the entirety of the Libyan experience under 
the regime or during the uprising. Indeed, when Gaddafi was in power Libyans 
actively interacted with the regime, some working for it, some negotiating with 
it, some fighting against it, without any concern for the bodily (or ghostly) nature 
of the Colonel. By concentrating on Gaddafi’s body and non-body, however, I 
will try to illuminate some of the complexities that have characterised the fall of 
the Jamahiriya. In particular, I will show that some pre-existing factors ‘prepared’ 
the revolution in the people’s perception. By demonstrating that Libyans had 
the revolution in mind as a potentiality. I will also demonstrate that the regime’s 
state propaganda ultimately failed in its intent to deify Gaddafi as a symbol of 
the nation. Though uncertain with regard to the superhuman nature of the 
Colonel during the years of his ascendancy, Libyans still tended to identify him 
as a dark ghost rather than as a disembodied father of the nation. 
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The ‘Disembodied Career’ of the Colonel 
Before I look at the ‘incarnation’ of Gaddafi operated by the revolution it is 
important to present some aspects of the Colonel’s visual propaganda during 
the years of the regime. As suggested by Thomas Csordas, charisma, under-
stood in Weberian terms as a quality by which one is ‘set apart from ordinary 
men’,33 is always the result of specific rhetorical operations.34 The person who 
claims to transcend the realm of common human experience has to persuade the 
commoners of his special gifts,35 and the method to do so is to eliminate from 
his public persona whatever is not godlike.36 In the end, charisma is rhetorical 
self-transformation.37 An analysis of charismatic leadership requires, therefore, 
a study of the performance of charisma.38 During his four decades in power, 
Muammar Gaddafi adopted different rhetorical devices in order to ‘perform’ 
his superior status. Above all, he constantly changed his appearance through 
clothes, accessories and paraphernalia, and eventually through plastic surgery. 
This continual change of outfits should be looked at as a way to prove that the 
Colonel’s body was more than a mere body. It is therefore important to trace a 
brief history of this attempt at disembodiment. 
Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, when, as a junior military officer, 
he staged a coup d’état, together with a small group of fellow soldiers. Libya 
was a monarchy at the time. In colonial times, during the Italian occupation, 
the powerful Sufi order of the Sanusiya had guided the Libyans in the struggle 
against the occupiers, and at the end of the war the head of the order, Idris 
al-Sanusi, had become king with the help of the British.39 King Idris, more 
a Sufi mystic than a politician, had reluctantly accepted the crown.40 Libya 
had become independent but westerners were effectively still free to operate in 
the country to their advantage. Muammar Gaddafi, then an unknown twenty-
seven year old born into a Bedouin family in Sirte, felt that it was time for a 
change. Following the example of the Egyptian ‘free officers’ whose socialist 
revolution led by Jamal Abdul Nasser had overthrown the Egyptian monarchy 
in 1952, Gaddafi and his ‘free officers’ seized power and abolished the monarchy. 
Their intent − as explained in what was going to be known as ‘communiqué 
number one’ (the first public declaration of the officers) − was to ‘remove all 
past hindrances to solving the various social and economic problems of the 
Libyan nation’.41
Gaddafi, the ‘free officer’, a short-haired, clean-shaven man in plain military 
outfit, presented himself as a young and sober guide for an old and corrupt 
country: a fresh force whose aim was to create a new, modern Libya free from the 
‘hindrances’ of the past. Right from this initial phase one can detect the seed of 
what was going to become a ‘disembodied status’. Gaddafi showed himself both 
to Libyans and to the western media as a man but also, at the same time, as more 
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than a man. In a 1976 BBC documentary shot in Libya, a commentator tells 
us that Gaddafi lived in a ‘soldier’s house, furnished right out of the local store, 
and identical to the other officers’ homes in the Tripoli barracks’.42 Gaddafi ate 
like everyone else: his breakfast consisted of ‘a glass of milk, coffee and a piece 
of bread’. He did not have bodyguards, and he presented himself as a tangible 
leader driving his car in the streets of Tripoli. The same commentator, however, 
goes on to say that ‘this is no ordinary soldier; this is the mercurial strongman 
who is dragging Libya from the poverty of the Middle Ages into the oil tech-
nology of the twentieth century’. With time, this seed of super-humanity started 
to flourish. 
The coup of 1969 had been an ‘empty revolution’. At the time, the ‘free 
officers’ did not really know what they wanted, but soon came the time to 
organise the principles of the new Libya.43 Between 1975 and 1979 Gaddafi 
published his ideas in the ‘Green Book’. Slowly but steadily he started to preach 
his own understanding of revolution, of society, of socialism and of Islam (in 
essence his idea of the Jamahiriya). The preacher felt the need to strengthen 
his looks. Gaddafi gradually abandoned the image of the Spartan soldier and 
embraced a more fitting one, that of the reformer from the desert, the great 
revolutionary warrior. The transfiguration had begun. Medals, badges and all 
sorts of military paraphernalia started to appear on the Colonel’s uniform. With 
his longish hair, ‘exaggerated’ military outfit and strong features, he adopted 
the archetypal physical image of the revolutionary messenger. Sunglasses of all 
shapes and forms became his trademark and a baton his companion in many 
parades. In 1975 the Italian journalist Mirella Bianco proposed a highly blas-
phemous but nevertheless significant comparison: Gaddafi, the ‘voice from the 
desert’ resembled the prophet Mohammad, ‘the messenger of God’.44 
Through the 1980s and 90s Gaddafi presented himself more and more as 
a symbol. One might argue that this transfiguration was partly a reaction to a 
series of internal threats to his political project.45 Perhaps for this reason he felt 
the need to visually stress that he was Libya and that Libya was him. In order to 
portray himself as authentically Libyan, he appeared in traditional clothes, and 
emphasised his Bedouin roots. With a tendency to exoticise his own culture, 
he famously slept in tents46 (even during diplomatic visits to other countries), 
professed the goodness of the Bedouin ethos and wrote on the corruption of 
urban life.47 Though critical of tribalism – in his mind a threat to national 
identity – he often publicly praised the tribal values of traditional Libya.48 The 
Colonel wanted to be more Libyan than the Libyans; however, he also wanted 
to symbolise through his public persona the policies adopted by the Jamahiriya. 
As part of his propagandistic project Gaddafi called for an improvement of 
the condition of Libyan women, traditionally excluded from work and from 
literacy, and he repeatedly stressed the importance of engaging them in the 
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revolution. His attempts were only partially effective, but to symbolise his 
policies he surrounded himself with female bodyguards, ‘amazons’ committed 
to the protection of their leader.49 In the late 1990s Gaddafi expressed his 
solidarity with sub-Saharan Africa, rejecting his initial Arab nationalism and 
launching, instead, a new pan-African approach in foreign affairs.50 Extremely 
large African-style tunics, colourful clothes and hats became the order. His body 
became a canvas, a simulacrum of changing symbols. In July 2003 he partici-
pated in the African Heads of State summit wearing a shirt decorated with the 
map of Africa overlaid with photos of African freedom fighters.51 In 2008 he 
received the title of ‘King of Kings’ by a gathering of 200 traditional African 
rulers. He never forgot, however, that his symbolic roots were those of the Arab 
struggle. In the same year, at a press conference, he wore a uniform imprinted 
with the pictures of famous Arab leaders, among them his chief inspiration, 
Jamal Abdul Nasser.52 On a 2009 visit to Italy, the old colonial oppressors, 
the Colonel descended from his aeroplane having pinned a photo of Omar al 
Mukhtar on his chest. Mukhtar was a guerrilla leader who had played a funda-
mental role in the struggle against the Italians in colonial times.53 By displaying 
Mukhtar’s picture, the Colonel wanted to ensure the symbolic meaning of his 
visit would not be lost on his hosts.
Gaddafi seemed to age very slowly but, then again, symbols do not age. In 
the last years of his life, he resorted to plastic surgery and, as became clear after 
his death, to wigs. According to his personal plastic surgeon, interviewed after 
Gaddafi’s death, ‘he did not want the young people of his nation to see him 
as an old man’.54 The Colonel began to sport a beard, the last change in his 
visual odyssey, but he kept it trimmed, in the style of a younger man, perhaps 
in an attempt to show that revolutionaries age, but not quite like everyone 
else. Even at the very end of his career the Colonel stressed that he was a 
symbol. Right at the start of the Arab Spring he stated that none could ask 
him to surrender his powers to the people because he did not have any political 
power. His position, he said, was rather a symbolic one, very similar to that of 
the Queen of England.55 Gaddafi’s project of transition from body to symbol, 
however, involved more than a careful manoeuvring of looks and appearances: 
it was also based on a ‘colonisation’ of the visual space of Libya itself. 
At the time of my fieldwork Gaddafi was literally everywhere. In 2008 the 
city of Tripoli was filled with posters and billboards portraying him in different 
phases of his life and highlighting different aspects of his symbolic persona. 
The main square of the capital, the Green Square, later to be renamed the 
Square of the Martyrs following the fall of the regime, stood as an important 
urban meeting point: people would cross it more than once a day in order to 
access the main roads of the city centre. The Green Square was decorated with 
a large green poster showing the Colonel in traditional Libyan clothes against 
Caricature and Incarnation in the Libyan Revolution
— 101 —
a blue sky: hands held high in a sign of victory, the number thirty-eight on one 
side commemorating the thirty-eighth anniversary of the revolution, with rays 
of light emanating from it. Opposite this, on the other side of the square, was 
another large poster portraying a much younger Gaddafi in the act of planning 
the revolution with his fellow officers. Pictures of the Colonel could be found 
in all public offices, in hospitals and in Tripoli airport. Mosques displayed 
photographs of the Colonel praying, his head on the ground, dressed in pious 
garments, and Tripoli museum had a permanent exhibition showing his old blue 
Volkswagen Beetle, the ‘mythical’ car driven by the Colonel at the time of the 
1969 coup. Gaddafi was there as an omnipresent symbol, while his actual body 
seemed to have completely disappeared. Many of my Libyan friends told me 
that they had not witnessed a public speech by the Colonel in years. Gaddafi’s 
residence in the centre of Tripoli, Bab el Aziziya (The Magnificent Gate), a 
compound covering six square kilometres and surrounded by three sets of high 
concrete walls, soldiers and tanks, stood as a mausoleum rather than as a house. 
Often I heard stories of people being shot just because they stopped their cars 
close to the building: Aziziya seemed impenetrable. The Colonel’s body was 
hidden behind this fortress, his presence survived in posters and pictures and he 
seemed to have succeeded in transubstantiating into a symbol. A closer look, 
however, suggested otherwise.
Gaddafi, Muammar, Dog or Satan?
Talking to my Libyan friends, I realised that Gaddafi’s pluri-decennial attempt 
to disembody himself into a superhuman symbol did not have the effects he 
wanted. My friends showed a certain ‘blurriness’ in assessing the nature of 
their leader, the same ‘blurriness’ between knowledge of false representation 
and belief in it that I previously mentioned when discussing the arguments of 
Khatib, Navaro-Yashin and Žižek. They knew the Colonel was, in actual fact, 
only a man, but they also referred to him as a dark, devilish non-body. Scholars 
have suggested that kings and rulers are often believed to have two bodies, one 
made of flesh and one symbolic and disembodied ‘through which the dignity of 
kingship survives all human frailty’.56 Perhaps this applies to colonels too. The 
disembodied dimension of Gaddafi, however, was articulated as ‘dark and evil’ 
rather than as patriotically transcendent as in the nationalist images promoted 
by the propaganda. 
During the years of the Jamahiriya the presence of the regime was very 
‘physical’. Libyans suffered violence and nepotism in their everyday lives, and 
the secret service was omnipresent. As I was told − and as I witnessed myself − 
people would constantly be stopped in the streets by the police, interrogated and 
spied upon. Often the line separating the monitoring system and the monitored 
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was blurred. I was told, for example, that anyone could easily sell a piece of 
information to the secret police, and I still remember a friend in Tripoli telling 
me how he wanted to become a government informer because he could not find 
any other job. According to a popular joke, every Libyan was constantly spying 
on other Libyans (if you are a spy you are simply doing your job; if you are not 
one then you spy on people in order to learn whether they are spies). The regime 
was a fleshy entity made of real people, often known people. With the person 
of Gaddafi, however, things were more complicated. In conversations Libyans 
oscillated between referring to the Colonel as a physical being and treating him 
as a ghost: they held the notion of the Colonel’s humanity as a potentiality. 
People in Tripoli lived in a space saturated with the symbolic and visual 
presence of Gaddafi, and sometimes they ‘contributed’ to this space by putting 
up pictures of the Colonel in their workplaces, mainly because they were forced 
to. Often, however, Tripolitans would refer to the leader simply by his first name, 
‘Muammar’. This, I was told, was a precautionary measure − if asked by the 
police they could have said they were talking about a different Muammar, quite 
a common name in the country. But there was also something ‘familiar’ about the 
use of Muammar. ‘Gaddafi’ was the cruel, intangible tyrant, while ‘Muammar’ was 
the volatile person who had been around for forty years. Commenting jokingly 
on the ever-changing rules of the Jamahiriya, Ahmed, a taxi driver in his forties, 
once told me: ‘You never know with that Muammar, he might wake up tomorrow 
and decide to ban smoking, and then we will all have to quit cigarettes.’ Some 
referred to the Colonel using well-known insults drawn from the animal world: 
the same swear words one would use in everyday life as terms of abuse or affec-
tionately among friends. Showing a tendency to verbally merge ‘animal’ and 
‘human’,57 Libyans would regularly use kelb (dog) or tes (goat) to refer to people 
they met in the flesh every day, both enemies and friends, as much as they used 
the terms to refer to Gaddafi. To quote a friend, ‘I cannot go abroad and find a 
job because the goat has locked up Libyans in their own country.’ Interestingly, 
however, the same people would also refer to the Colonel as an untouchable 
dark entity, one that transcended normal physical interaction.
Ludvy, for instance, a young IT worker in his twenties, was very fond of 
referring to Gaddafi as ‘zamil’ (‘companion’, ‘passive homosexual’), a very ‘fleshy’ 
term used, again, both as an insult and jokingly among friends. Ludvy was very 
critical of the regime and often offered me explanations of the political agenda 
lying behind the Colonel’s actions, unveiling the falsity of propaganda for my 
sake. In one of our conversations, however, he also told me: ‘You know, the zamil 
(homosexual) has survived so many assassination attempts that we all think there 
is something magical about him.’ My friend’s tone hovered significantly between 
joke and statement, between ‘knowing’ and ‘believing’. He tentatively described 
Gaddafi both as a politician who could be ridiculed and as an  intangible, dark 
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entity. Ludvy also told me a story he heard from some elderly people. Once, 
right before the rise to power of the free officers, the citizens of Benghazi were 
demonstrating in the streets in protest at King Idris, accused of being a servant 
of the West. The protesters were shouting ‘Even Iblis [the Devil] is better than 
Idris!’ According to the story, the pious Sufi king heard the shouting and peace-
fully replied ‘Amin’ (‘So be it’), and so the devil, Gaddafi, took power. Tripol-
itans would often alternate between calling the Colonel some colourful familiar 
swearword and referring to him as the much more meaningful Shaytan (Satan).58 
My friend Abdallah, a university teacher in his twenties, often ridiculed Gaddafi 
in our conversations, but he also told me that, according to many, the Colonel 
had dealings with the dark powers. Abdallah told me that many Libyans believed 
Gaddafi was an expert sorcerer and that through witchcraft he could transcend 
the limits of the physical world. In Libya sahar (sorcery) is understood as the art 
of manipulating jnun,59 the genies, in order to harm people, to see the invisible 
and to gain knowledge of the future. According to Abdallah, Gaddafi was able 
to survive many assassination attempts because the genies kept him informed 
about the thoughts of those around him. Abdallah told me that once, during a 
meeting with Gaddafi, a soldier felt the temptation to shoot him and free Libya 
from its tyrant. The Colonel read the soldier’s mind with the help of the genies; 
he turned towards him and said, ‘You are too young for this, son, forget about 
it.’ Abdallah told me that once Gaddafi refused to board an aeroplane because 
his genies revealed to him that there was a bomb onboard.60 
Some of my friends told me that they had personally met a distant relative 
of Gaddafi, an indirect proof of his ‘corporality’, but they seemed to be less sure 
when they came to assessing the actual humanity of the leader himself. I spoke 
to only a few Libyans who had personally met the Colonel, but these meetings 
were often described to me with a degree of uncertainty. These people knew 
they had met a man, but at the same time, they were also inclined to believe 
that there was more than a body there. Ali, a travel agent in his late thirties, 
told me that once, when he was much younger, he had met the Colonel at a 
very important wedding to which Gaddafi had been invited. As often happens 
with Libyan weddings, and quite befittingly for the Colonel, the meeting had 
taken place in a tent. The occasion seemed to indicate the materiality of the 
Colonel. Nevertheless, Ali described the leader to me in ‘transcendental’ terms: 
Gaddafi, who was surrounded by bodyguards, was an ‘exceptionally tall person, 
the tallest I have ever met’. Ali told me that his complexion was unbelievably 
‘white’, something that cannot be found ‘amongst common Libyans or common 
men in general’. 
Sometimes my informants would reconcile the tangible and the intangible 
by deciding that the Colonel was just a man, though not the man he wanted 
people to believe he was. Mahmud, for instance, a young student I used to chat 
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with, offered an explanation which was also reported to me by other people of 
different ages and status. According to Mahmud, Gaddafi was actually a Jew, 
an agent of Israel sent to damage the Libyans. ‘How else would you explain his 
insane policies?’ he asked me once. More frequently, however, the diagnoses of 
the Colonel’s nature were a strange mixture of realism and metaphysics. When 
the people I spoke with tried to imagine a possible post-Gaddafi scenario they 
often started with: ‘When he dies …’ and finished by saying, ‘Is he actually ever 
going to die?’
Libyans described the humanity of Gaddafi as an uncertainty, and therefore 
as a potential truth. The prospects of violating the borders between ‘ghost’ 
and ‘man’ in order to reveal this humanity were also presented to me as a 
potentiality: something impossible but not inconceivable. At the time of my 
fieldwork, a number of Tripolitans had become particularly close to the figure of 
Mohammed Kasherma, an extremely famous Sufi saint from the city of Zlitan, 
in Tripolitania, who died only five years before my arrival in Libya. Stories of 
Kasherma’s supernatural deeds were circulating widely among my Libyan friends 
and if some accepted them with disbelief, others took them as proof of Kash-
erma’s spiritual powers. According to one of these stories, which was reported 
to me by a large number of Tripolitans, Kasherma was able to walk into Bab el 
Aziziya (the Colonel’s inexpugnable fortress-residence) at will; he miraculously 
eluded surveillance passing through the high walls. In one version of the story, 
Kasherma even convinced Gaddafi to accept him as his spiritual master. 
On the one hand, one might interpret this narrative as a symbolic victory 
of the saint over the devilish Colonel. On the other hand, however, the story 
reveals the possible humanity of Gaddafi. God revealed that the Colonel was just 
a man: theoretically, his distant presence could be breached, his rules violated. 
During the months of fieldwork, the ‘probable tangibility’ of Gaddafi ended up 
influencing even me, a non-Libyan. Once, perhaps influenced by tales of abuse 
my friends suffered under the regime, I had a dream in which, to my surprise, 
I punched Gaddafi in the face. In my dreams the symbol I witnessed every day 
on posters and other images had become tangible. It felt to me as though my 
Libyan friends were living in a world where Gaddafi’s humanity was an unver-
ified fantasy. With the advent of the Libyan revolution of 2011, however, this 
unverified truth − the body and the humanity of the Colonel − became not only 
verifiable but also representable. 
From Disembodied ‘Ghost’ to ‘Frizzy Hair’
When I came back to Libya in early 2012 the regime had fallen and Gaddafi 
had been killed. Walking through the streets of Tripoli and Benghazi I imme-
diately noticed that the revolution had involved a massive reappropriation 
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Figure 5.2 Image of Bob Marley versus Gaddafi (Photo: I. Cherstich).
Figure 5.1 Image of Che Guevara versus Gaddafi (Photo: I. Cherstich).
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Figure 5.3 Martyrs of the revolution and caricature of Gaddafi 
(Photo: I. Cherstich).
of visual space. Libyans had started to go back to normal everyday activities, 
but the signs of war were still visible. The two cities were crowded as usual, 
the shops were open and if some of my friends were excited about the future, 
others were mourning their dead or crying over their broken houses. They all 
moved, however, in a new visual space made of crumbling walls, bullet holes 
and − significantly − graffiti. Some inhabitants of Tripoli and Benghazi had 
chosen to write pro-revolution slogans: ‘Down with Gaddafi’ or ‘Thank you, 
Tunisia’ (referring to the country where the Arab Spring had started). Others 
preferred to express their hate for the regime through drawings and pictures. In 
some cases these images featured ‘generic’ symbols of revolt: Che Guevara and 
Bob Marley, with Che standing out almost as a specular but opposite image of 
Gaddafi: longish hair, beard, military hat (see Figs 5.1 and 5.2). For the greater 
part, however, Libyans had put up pictures of the martyrs of the revolution and 
caricatures of the Colonel (see Fig. 5.3). 
In both cases, with the martyrs and with Gaddafi, one could detect a certain 
will to embody: a desire to give flesh both to those who had lost their lives and to 
the enemy, whose body had been only a mere potentiality before the revolution. 
At the time of my visit, a little controversy had been sparked in Benghazi. The 
city had been freed from the forces of the regime during the first half of the war, 
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Figure 5.4 The municipal court: an improvised museum of the revolution 
(Photo: I. Cherstich).
and during the conflict people had transformed the municipal court, a large old 
building not far from the city centre, into an improvised museum of the revo-
lution (see Fig. 5.4). Posters of the martyrs with their names and dates of death 
had been displayed inside the main hall, but the National Transitional Council 
− the national body that had emerged in leading the revolution − was pushing 
for the place to return to its original purpose.
Meanwhile, the people of Benghazi seemed to relate to the court building 
as a cemetery rather than as a museum. Mothers would come to ‘visit’ their 
dead sons, eager to talk about them with fellow visitors, kissing the pictures 
and crying over them, as did brothers, fathers and friends of the martyrs. Obvi-
ously the museum had symbolic value, but it seemed to me that putting up the 
posters of the dead, whose bodies were often missing, was a way to preserve or 
reconstruct the tangibility and corporality of the deceased − a process that can 
also be found in other contexts of martyrdom, imagery and loss.61 A less obvious 
process of incarnation was also taking place, however. The volunteers who kept 
the museum had decided to put up a number of drawings by schoolchildren of 
different ages, and many of them featured caricatural renditions of Gaddafi. In 
these drawings, the bodily nature of the Colonel, once only a potential reality, 
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Figure 5.5 Effeminising and corporalising Gaddafi (Photo: I. Cherstich).
was expressed, affirmed and mocked. In some, Gaddafi was dressed like a woman, 
with lipstick, bushy eyebrows and other fleshy details, perhaps a comic take on 
the Colonel’s habit of dressing eccentrically, here translated into transvestitism 
(see Fig. 5.5). 
Gaddafi, whom my friend Ludvy had only tentatively described as a ‘homo-
sexual’, was now ‘effeminised’ but also ‘corporalised’.62 In other caricatures, the 
body of the Colonel had been distorted and shaped into that of an animal: his 
prominent nose had become the sting of a mosquito, his curly hair the fur of a 
rat, an obvious reference to Gaddafi insulting the rebels as ‘rats’ during the war 
(see Fig. 5.6).63 The ‘animal swearwords’ that people had been using to mark the 
potential humanity of the Colonel were now somehow translated graphically. In 
one of the drawings a particularly talented child had drawn a realistic caricature 
highlighting the details of Gaddafi’s face: the nose, the teeth and the wrinkles 
(see Fig. 5.7). This drawing was surrounded by photographs of the martyrs, and 
someone, perhaps the artist himself, had crossed out the caricature with a red 
mark, almost in a desire to show that the Colonel’s body, now a certified reality, 
was no more, while the bodies of the martyrs remained, preserved in memory 
and possibly alive in heaven.
In some of the graffiti in the streets, Gaddafi was portrayed as Satan, with 
horns, devilish dark eyes and fangs (Figs 5.8 and 5.9). In others the Colonel 
sported a swastika or Star of David, signs of his dictatorial status and his supposed 
secret Israeli identity (see Figs 5.9 and 5.10). For the greater part, however, the 
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Figure 5.6 Martyr of the revolution and Gaddafi the rat (Photo: I. Cherstich).
graffiti simply featured Gaddafi’s face with exaggerated features: his curly hair, 
his fleshy lips, his prominent jawline, the mole close to his nose (a slight imper-
fection that could be seen in some early Gaddafi portraits but that the Colonel 
must have decided to remove) (see Figs 5.3 and 5.11–5.14). 
If it is true, as it has been argued, that drawing a spiritual being means injec-
 ting the spirit into a tangible form,64 it is also true that caricatures, more than 
any other form of representation, affirm flesh and identity. Caricatures are both 
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Figure 5.7 Gaddafi no more (Photo: I. Cherstich).
Figure 5.8 Gaddafi the devil (Photo: I. Cherstich).
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Figure 5.9 Gaddafi the devil, with swastika (Photo: I. Cherstich).
Figure 5.10 Gaddafi the devil, the Mossad agent (Photo: I. Cherstich).
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Figure 5.11 Gaddafi with a scar and with stitches (Photo: I. Cherstich).
Figure 5.12 Graffiti of Gaddafi with exaggerated facial traits 
(Photo: I. Cherstich).
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Figure 5.13 Graffiti of Gaddafi (Photo: I. Cherstich).
Figure 5.14 Further graffiti of Gaddafi (Photo: I. Cherstich).
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a naturalistic and a conceptual form of art: they aim ‘at the greatest likeness of 
the whole of a physiognomy while all the component parts are changed’.65 Cari-
catures exaggerate – and therefore assert – a person’s physical idiosyncrasies.66 
I was witnessing a visual affirmation of the potential (and now definitive) 
humanity of the Colonel, of his ‘real’ physical traits. Through visual reappro-
priation Gaddafi had gained a tangible subjectivity which was once only latent. 
While I was taking pictures of the graffiti some people commented, ‘Look, he is 
photographing Bu Shafshufa (the one with the frizzy hair), a new nickname that 
had become popular all over the country during the uprising. Before the revo-
lution Gaddafi had been both ‘ghost’ and ‘body’, but now he was pure body: a 
fleshy ensemble of frizzy hair, moles and beard. In one piece of graffiti the author 
had portrayed Gaddafi with a scar and with stitches on his face: the ghost could 
be touched, hurt, killed (see Fig. 5.9). 
The body of Gaddafi was present not only in drawings but also, in a sense, in 
the slogans accompanying them. On a large broken wall in Benghazi someone 
had written in English: ‘He fucked us for forty-two years.’ The actions of the 
Colonel had been physicalised. More remarkably, the body of Gaddafi was also 
present in photographs. As part of this affirmation of the corporality of the 
Colonel, many in Tripoli had gone to see the corpse of the dictator, ‘seizing’ 
the bodily nature of Gaddafi by photographing his battered body in the nearby 
city of Misurata. They kept the photographs on their mobile phones: the final 
proof that the ghost was just a man, as many had suspected. I did not have a 
chance to interview any of those who had been present at the time of the actual 
killing. However, bearing in mind the perception of Gaddafi prior to the war 
and considering the dynamics of visual revolt, I suspect that it must have been 
a ‘physical moment of revelation’.
Undoubtedly, the brutal killing and rape of Gaddafi raises a set of extremely 
important moral and political questions, questions that need to be faced and 
discussed. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that abusing and destroying the 
Colonel’s body was not simply an exhilarating act of rage; nor it was merely the 
expression of a will to objectify, desecrate and demasculinise. The killing of the 
Colonel was not the ritual slaughter and sacrifice of the god/spirit described 
in some anthropological literature,67 nor was it a Freudian assassination of the 
symbolic father (of the nation, in this case) aimed at freeing oneself from the 
shackles of a castrating domination.68 The killing was, among other things, the 
verification of a hypothesis. The body of the Colonel stopped being a possibility 
and became truly a body through graffiti, but much more so through his very 
death, when people realised that he could be touched, mocked, humiliated and 
torn apart. If it is true, as Lacan claimed, that human existence encompasses 
the ‘symbolic’ dimension, the ‘imaginary’ and the ‘real’,69 then the killing of the 
Colonel could be defined (no doubt to the irritation of some Lacanian purists) as 
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an ‘explosion of the real’. If the ‘real’ is the impossible truth that we, as creatures 
of symbols and imagination, fail to encounter in normal life but which is always 
there, lurking at the back of our consciousness,70 then the killing of Gaddafi 
was precisely this: a revelatory (but in truth very much expected) meeting with 
flesh and blood now expunged from any attempt to conceptualise the tyrant 
as a ‘ghost’. Paradoxically, Gaddafi became truly a man only when he was no 
more. Even more paradoxically, the Colonel gained full ‘fleshness’ when the 
anti-Gaddafi forces decided to hide his body. 
One of the consequences of being a tangible, embodied human being is that 
one can be mourned. The act of mourning, one could say, begins by localising 
the dead, by tracking down the body71 or by creating a substitute for it in case the 
body cannot be found.72 Mourning entails a danger: the capacity to ‘manoeuvre, 
to speculate, to try to profit or derive some benefit … to draw from the dead 
a supplementary force to be turned against the living’.73 Hiding the body of 
the Colonel was not the final exorcism of a ghost, but a political manoeuvre 
aimed at damaging the man and his supporters. Once the Libyans realised − or, 
to be more precise, proved − that Gaddafi was just a human being, they drew 
the only logical conclusion. They suspected that the phantom was a man; they 
traced the ghost, found that he was made of flesh and hid the body, because 
flesh can be mourned. Through concealment, they completed the process of 
incarnation, a process whose seeds, as I have shown, preceded the revolution. 
In the months following Gaddafi’s burial in the desert, Libyans started to refer 
to the Colonel as al Maqbur (the buried one). The half-man, half-spectre had 
become an un-named body, his fleshness confirmed by its own un-mournability.
A Walk through Bab el Aziziya
Through a study of the perception of the Colonel before and after the revo-
lution one realises that Gaddafi’s Libya was a much more complex place than 
some analysts have suggested. Contrary to what scholars like Lina Khatib have 
argued, Libyans were not passive recipients of a visual propaganda aimed at 
transforming Gaddafi into a symbol, who suddenly woke up and discovered the 
lie. On the contrary, Libyans lived as people entangled in constant speculation 
and analysis, questioning the nature of their leader. Though influenced by the 
‘symbolisation’ of Gaddafi propagated by the regime, they articulated the figure 
of the Colonel as a disembodied spectre, not as the disembodied hero. Though 
inclined to believe that Gaddafi was a ghost, they also knew that he was most 
probably human. They were stuck between pretence and belief, but this situ-
ation gave them a degree of freedom, the freedom to distantiate themselves 
from propaganda and to conceive the potential humanity and mortality of the 
Colonel. By understanding that Gaddafi was perceived as a ‘potential man’, one 
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realises that the idea that the regime would come to an end was present as a 
potentiality before the uprising, and this is particularly important for a compre-
hension of the political aesthetics of the Libyan Revolt. Mainly, it shows that 
Libyans had the revolution ‘somewhere in their perception’ even before the 
actual revolution. More importantly, in analysing this process one realises that 
today Libyans inhabit a space filled with proof of Gaddafi’s humanity, proof that 
was once hidden and is now being discovered. 
One of the first things I did when I arrived in Tripoli after the war in 2012 
was to visit Bab el Aziziya. At the time of my fieldwork, it was a scary and 
impenetrable castle that everyone avoided. Now, however, the gigantic walls of 
the fortress had been bulldozed down by tanks, and I decided to venture through 
the ruins with a Libyan friend. My friend had already explored the place, and 
he wanted to show me what had been hidden for so long. Inside the stronghold 
there was, quite simply, nothing special. Beyond the walls there was a cluster 
of demolished houses, some of which had already been occupied by homeless 
people, living where the ghost had once lived. My friend told me that when the 
revolutionaries had stormed the place they found a vast quantity of weapons 
and secret escape tunnels. However, he also told me that they were surprised to 
find simple apartments with beds, furniture, kitchens and clothes: ‘We thought 
it was going to be an imperial residence, but there is nothing in here.’ The 
‘Magnificent Gate’ was not that magnificent. It was, after all, a house inhabited 
by men. The trick had been revealed, but Libyans, one might say, already sort 
of knew. My friend seemed very happy. He told me that people were slowly 
entering all those spaces that were once forbidden, including the other houses 
belonging to Gaddafi and his family. Libyans were discovering more and more 
proof of what they once only suspected. 
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Poetry of Protest: Tribes in Yemen’s 
‘Change Revolution’
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and Rayman Aryani
Chapter 6
Introduction
In mid-January 2011, a day or so after Tunisia erupted in protest against the 
regime of President Ben-Ali, thousands of Yemenis took to the streets of Sana’a 
in a protest which then spread to cities and towns throughout the country (see 
Fig. 6.1). They were demanding a change in their government, headed by Ali 
Abdullah Saleh who had been in power for thirty-three years. 
His government was charged with corruption, violation of human rights, 
economic mismanagement and attempting to modify the republican consti-
tution in order to lift the presidential term-limit. After the ousting of Tunisia’s 
Ben-Ali, Yemeni protesters widened the scope of their demands to include the 
withdrawal of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power.
Though the number of protesters was relatively modest in the beginning 
(around 1,500 at each protest), by mid-February it grew to well over 100,000 
people in cities such as Sana’a and Taiz.1 The western press was so focused on 
the drama of Cairo’s Tahrir Square, however, that these images that resembled 
the 1964 Civil Rights March on Washington are unknown to us. To properly 
appreciate the scale of those numbers one has to bear in mind that the protests 
took place in cities whose total population is about two million each; thus they 
were far larger a proportion of the total urban population than the protests in 
Cairo, say, or Tunis were. 
There were two other exceptional facts about the Yemeni protests: they were-
often led by women activists and organisers, one of whom, Tawakkul Karman, 
was to win the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. Heavily veiled women by the tens of 
thousands also vigorously participated in them, albeit surrounded and protected 
by their male kinsmen, holding placards and banners, shouting slogans, pumping 
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Figure 6.1 Protesters in Change Square (Photo: Email4Mobile/Wikimedia). 
their fists and waving the Yemeni flag (see Figs 6.2 and 6.3). 
Though embedded within a patriarchal order (and perhaps because of it), 
these women risked, and sometimes lost, their lives to join mass-organised 
public demonstrations. That is to say, they were not on the sidelines, provi-
sioning the men with food and administering first aid (though they did that too) 
but at the frontlines, where they were eventually fired upon by national security 
forces (see Fig. 6.4). 
The other outstanding fact was how peaceful the demonstrations were, even 
though the Yemeni population overall is well armed. To some, this latter fact 
was all the more remarkable when one bears in mind that tens of thousands of 
tribesmen joined the protests by laying down their arms at the gates of Sana’a 
University and congregating in the square outside the university which was 
dubbed Taghayyur (Change) Square, before marching with their fellow citizens 
down the main thoroughfares to Freedom Square in downtown Sana’a. The 
stereotypical view of tribesmen, Yemeni and otherwise, is that they almost 
always resort to arms when entering into political conflict, that they are not 
much interested in public dialogue and that they are incapable of setting aside 
their own partisan bickering in order to work toward a larger, collective good. 
Yet not only did tribesmen from across Yemen join the protests peacefully, they 
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Figure 6.2 Yemeni woman in traditional dress in Change Square with the 
Yemeni flag drawn on her hand and ‘no immunity for traitors’ written on her 
palm (Photo: Z. Alkulaibi).
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Figure 6.3 A Yemeni woman drawing the Yemeni and Syrian flags and writing 
‘punishment is our demand’ on her hands (Photo: Z. Alkulaibi).
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Figure 6.4 Thousands of women protesting against the regime (Photo: Al 
Jazeera English).
agitated for a common political and economic agenda, and did so in such large 
numbers that they arguably were decisive in forcing the president – whose power 
depended heavily on their support – to step down. In a country where tribesmen, 
who are sedentary and concentrated in the country’s agricultural highlands, 
represent roughly 35 per cent of the total population (and some would argue 
that this figure is as high as 50 per cent or more), their role – whether active 
or passive – would have to be important for any mass movement within the 
country (see Fig. 6.5). 
Of course, the involvement of the tribes in the Yemeni Arab Spring would 
prove to be more complicated than we can possibly sketch here, with some 
supporting the protesters, some the regime and others standing on the sidelines 
to await the outcome before deciding whom they would throw their support 
behind. It has sometimes been said that tribesmen were ‘following the orders of 
their sheikhs’, suggesting that they were falling into step with their own leaders 
rather than the revolutionary youth − and this is often noted in order to cast 
aspersions, rather than validate their political commitment. Of course, many 
non-tribal youths who took to the streets were also led by their party leaders 
– be they Islahis, such as Tawakkul Karman, or Socialists – while others were 
acting under the supervision of their fathers and brothers or their bosses, yet 
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Figure 6.5 Protesters including 
tribesmen ask Saleh to ‘leave’ 
(Photo: S. Qaid).
their fervour and revolutionary credentials were seldom called into question. 
Moreover, it is somewhat of a fantasy to suppose that tribal sheikhs in Yemen 
commonly have the power to command their constituents to do their bidding or, 
conversely, need to bribe or otherwise incentivise them to join them in political 
action. One works through consensus or one works alone.
More interesting questions are what sort of political subject a Yemeni tribesman 
might be, insofar as it is possible to generalise across such a large section of the 
population: how does such a subject act politically, and in which contexts? It is 
well known that Yemeni tribesmen have acted as political subjects not only in 
their own tribes but also in the Yemeni urban and national public spheres for 
decades,2 but what this chapter argues is that aspects of their localised practices 
and rhetoric were in fact quite easily adaptable to mass urban demonstration 
and protest in the Arab Spring, where their actions were also front and centre. 
Among the more startling features of such a tribal subject is the poetry he 
or she produced in the course of conflict mediation, arguably the most avidly 
listened to and widely circulated of all the expressive protest forms that emerged 
in the Yemeni uprising. To be sure, there was also rap music, graffiti, poster art, 
religious hymns and verse written in Classical Arabic – among other genres and 
registers − but it is astonishing how little attention has been paid to tribal poetry 
as a key art performed in the protests. It is not altogether obvious to us why that 
is the case. Is it that western media have a hard time fathoming Arabic, let alone 
Arabic poetry, which is why they fasten on more intelligible or more familiar 
visual art forms? Is it the assumption that ‘true’ revolutionary protest can only 
come in forms introduced from outside the Arab world such as rap rather than 
genres more ‘indigenous’ to the region, as it would appear many western analysts 
assume? Swedenburg raises a similar question regarding the prominence western 
journalists give to rap music in Arab popular protest.3 For example 
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As Gulf leaders try to broker an exit for the embattled Yemeni president, 
the protest camp in Sana’a Change Square has become a flourishing political 
and cultural space. The streets leading into the square are lined with tents, 
full of protesters who say they will not leave until President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh does too. In the heart of the square, street vendors sell grilled corn and 
fresh juices. A large stage dominates the space. It’s where political leaders, 
preachers and activists stand up and address the crowds during the day. In 
the evenings, singers take their place. One musician, Muhammad Nasser 
al-Adroei, is rapping his way to revolution. ‘Be wise, the government is 
poison, the one who annoys it is killed,’ he raps in Yemeni dialect. The 
crowd joins him for the chorus, chanting that much-repeated slogan of the 
Arab revolutions: ‘The people want the fall of the regime.’4
But the importance of tribal poetry even escaped the Arab media like Al Jazeera. 
Are observers of the Yemeni Arab spring, Arab and non-Arab alike, faced with 
a kind of ‘cognitive dissonance’ that cannot place the figure of the ‘troublesome’ 
tribal Arab in the ground of progressive political protest? The tribes belong in 
the rural setting, not the urban one. The tribes are backward, not modern. Tribal 
poetry is colloquial and not prestigious like Classical verse, and therefore cannot 
express the lofty sentiments of a unified nation. It was as though tribal poetry 
and mass urban mobilisation for the common good was a huge contradiction, 
an A and not-A, that could not be reconciled in the minds of many non-tribal 
Yemenis as well as most media (including Arab ones). 
To explain why tribal poetry played such a key role, let us present an abridged 
ethnography of it in Yemen. We will then be able to better appreciate the power 
of the poetry that was performed, and why and how it circulated so widely. 
But before that, we need to say a brief word about the protests leading up to 
the events that would be called the Yemeni ‘Arab Spring’, events which tribal 
poetry was already representing and contesting.
Events Leading up to January 2011
It is often said in the reporting of the Arab Spring that street protests erupted 
‘spontaneously’ (a way of talking about them which has its own politics that 
cannot be explored in depth here). Revolutionaries rarely like to admit that 
their call to action has historical roots in prior mobilisation and protest that 
drew attention to a problem and began a movement to correct it − a time 
before the revolution declared itself a revolution.5 This was perhaps even more 
so the case for the Arab Spring revolutionaries who were invariably described 
(by themselves and others) as ‘youthful’ and had hardly come to adulthood, let 
alone revolutionary consciousness, when these prior protests began. There was 
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a need for them to feel that they are the authors or originators of revolutionary 
action. 
In fact, anger against and extreme discontentment with the regime of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh had been there a decade before 2011. The signs became unmis-
takable in 2002 when retired army personnel, including former officers, protested 
in the southern governorates of the country against cutbacks in their pensions. 
This was followed in Sana’a by large teacher strikes and demonstrations, 
many of which involved women – the backbone of Yemen’s public education 
system – also protesting cutbacks in their salaries. But these economic griev-
ances were only the tip of the iceberg of public discontent. In southern Yemen 
in particular, a growing resentment against the Sana’a regime was based on a 
well-founded perception that the south’s resources (its oil, water, port facilities 
and commercial investment possibilities) were being exploited by northerners 
without fair compensation or return to the south. Even the promise to include 
southerners in the regime’s central government rang hollow to many south-
erners who complained that the unification of the former Yemen Arab Republic 
(northern Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (southern 
Yemen) that came about in 1990 and led to the creation of the Republic of 
Yemen – a union that was almost dissolved by a bitterly fought civil war in 
1994 that the north won – was in the end less a unification than a colonisation. 
Challenges to the regime’s legitimacy were compounded in 2005 by Zaydi Shi’a 
protests in the northern part of the country around the city of Sa’da against 
religious discrimination of their sect, but also economic and political margin-
alisation of the sa’dah religious elite (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) 
within Yemeni society ever since the 1962 revolution overthrew the thousand-
year-old imamate in which they held sway. This ‘Houthi Rebellion’ (so named 
after the sa’dah family that began this protest and subsequently led a successful 
military resistance against the central government) couched its grievances less 
in the language of class ressentiment than in that of popular protest against regime 
corruption and attempted presidential usurpation of power. They cloaked their 
own partisan demands in populist sentiments, and thus stoked the flames of 
rebellion against the Sana’a regime. 
Throughout it all, tribal poetry was composed to analyse the societal problems 
facing the country and to suggest solutions to them; poetry that was taped and 
then sold and circulated in Yemen’s stereo stores and markets as well as to 
diasporic Yemeni communities in the Gulf, Europe and the US. Unfortunately, 
no empirical research has been done on this production and circulation of tribal 
poetry in the years from 2002 to 2011 specific to the protests against the regime, 
and so this assertion is based more on the experiences and anecdotal evidence of 
the authors than on systematic study. However, a sense of what we mean can be 
gleaned from a remarkable documentary film, Men of Words (2009) by Johanna 
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Ihle, which was shot in the tribal region of Yafi’a just north of the port of Aden. 
It focuses on only one of the poetic genres discussed in the ethnography below, 
the qasidah, but it is the most important one in the system of tribal poetic genres, 
and explains why it is a favourite for political commentary and criticism by tribal 
poets. In one of a number of telling scenes, shot in a Yemeni sitting room where 
poets, their friends and admirers − not to mention political agents of one kind 
or another from the local state authority, different local political factions and 
different tribes − are assembled to listen to poets recite their poetry or to listen 
to cassette tapes of such poetry, we learn of grievances mounting against the 
regime, including a state encroachment upon what is perceived as local sover-
eignty. A warning is issued – all in wonderful metre and rhyme – that if these 
grievances are not adequately addressed, the country will split into a ‘thousand 
fragments’. In hindsight, with regard to events since the 2011 revolution, this 
prediction has been proven to be eerily prescient. The country is in danger of 
splintering into three semi-autonomous entities (north, centre and south), not 
to mention the dozens of different interest groups within those. This movie 
was probably shot in 2008, three years before the protests in Change Square, 
but already the key themes that would become the platform of the Arab Spring 
are enunciated. We do not wish to suggest that the Yafa’is were revolutionaries 
in the making, only that tribal poetry was already being wielded to frame the 
problems and the solutions to them. In other words, tribal poetry was already 
a central part of a decade-long (at least) national discourse on the need for 
governmental reform. It is time now to examine that poetry in more detail. 
An Ethnography of Tribal Poetry
Tribal poetry is composed in several genres, and only the qasidah (mentioned 
above) is done so in writing; in other words, only this genre’s written and printed 
text – the finished product − is actually the focus of aesthetic attention. The 
qasidah poem is never composed in the course of a performance, though after 
the text is finished, it may be recited by the poet, or set to music and chanted 
by a professional musician and recorded on audiocassette tape. In the case of 
the greatest of these odes, the text may be printed for publication and in books. 
The poem is composed by an individual poet who, whether literate or not, can 
take his time to work on the poem until he is satisfied with it. Sometimes the 
qasidah is completed in one sitting, sometimes the process may take days or, in 
rare instances, years. The poet is often identified by name in a line leading up 
to the poem, such as ‘The poet Yahya Al-Anasi said …’, followed by what he 
said in the rest of the text. More often than not the poem is a single text, but 
it need not be, if it is a ‘challenge’ (da’wah) to another poet with whose views 
Yahya Al-Anasi disagrees, that poet then being required by the honour code to 
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utter his poem (in the same metre and rhyme scheme no less) as a ‘reply’ (ijabah). 
The dialogue between the greatest duelling poets may not end with that simple 
exchange but can extend over several challenge/riposte pairs, the series forming 
a fascinating commentary on whatever issue of the day has preoccupied the 
poets and their public. 
As for the art of improvisational composition, it is reserved for the other two 
genres – the zamil, a two-line poem, and the balah, a poem of many lines whose 
words are composed in an oral performance (also involving music and dance) 
and are never the same from one performance to the next. This is even more 
so the case for the balah, whose text is never memorised or recited, than for the 
zamil, whose text enjoys enough fixity as to transcend the moment or immediacy 
of composition. Many zamil poems deemed great are memorised and orally trans-
mitted across several generations (though the tradition is relatively shallow in 
historical terms by comparison, say, to the Homeric epic) or in modern times 
are written down and printed. But the point is that the text of these two genres 
of poetry is composed in an oral performance and thus has to emerge in public 
and on the spur of the moment. 
The aesthetic attention in the balah is on the performative process more 
than on the product or the text that emerges in that process. (In that sense the 
artistry resembles rap or jazz.) As for the ‘author’ of these poems, it is always a 
lone individual endeavour for the zamil, and always a collective one for the balah. 
Both genres entail a poet and a chorus (who are also dancing while carrying the 
poetic line), but in the case of the zamil the poet ‘gives’ the two-line text for the 
chorus to chant, whereas in the case of the balah the entire poem is composed 
by a number of poets taking turns building the text line by line and is never the 
same from performance to performance. When the next poet is ready to offer 
a line, the chorus picks it and the performance proceeds in this fashion until it 
is deemed complete (which usually means that an older poet draws the perfor-
mance to a close with the speech act that initiated it, an invocation of Allah 
and a call for prayers and blessings upon the Prophet and his family). 
Just as with linked qasidah poems, so too with zamil poems there may be 
challenge-and-response pairs, with several such pairs comprising a dialogical 
series that comments on local events. The balah poem too has its challenge-and-
response pairs, but they differ from the others in that the routine is built into 
the performance itself. Because of this, the balah poem is often referred to as a 
‘game’ (the reference is spoken of within the poem itself) – a game of duelling 
poets. Several such paired duels of challenge-and-response might occur within 
a single poetic performance, requiring the audience to track them polyvocally 
much as a listener might the themes of a Bach fugue. 
The final noteworthy characteristic of the zamil and balah performances is 
that they are always carried out in the context of a specific ritual; indeed, they 
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are such an important component of such rituals that the latter can seem incom-
plete without them. The balah is performed indoors in the wedding host’s sitting 
room on the occasion of his samrah, the evening spent entertaining and relaxing 
with him before he meets the bride and consummates the marriage. The game of 
the balah is indeed spoken of as a ‘gift’ from the wedding assembly to the groom, 
a gift of diversion and fun. To fulfil his obligations, a wedding guest is expected 
to participate in a balah performance – best of all as a poet, but failing that as 
a chorister – by way of honouring the groom and his family. If one agrees to 
attend a wedding, one can expect to participate in a balah performance, and if 
none is forthcoming everyone feels a little disappointed, if not uncomfortable. 
Whereas the balah performance is not found outside this specific ritual context, 
the zamil is always performed outdoors, and on many more ritual occasions in 
addition to the wedding. The poet and the chorus chanting his line walk (or 
more accurately, march in a dance step) in rows along a dry stream bed (the 
bottom of a wadi) towards some destination, be it a mosque in which they will 
pray or a house in which they will celebrate the groom’s wedding. 
This location and spatial configuration will be very important in under-
standing how tribal poetry is inserted into the mass protests of the Yemeni Arab 
Spring. The poem is chanted to someone, an audience that listens carefully 
to its words and judges the intention of the arrivals. And what are the ritual 
occasions? The eid, or holiday that comes after Ramadan, the month of fasting, 
and after the month of the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, is often marked by 
zamil performances commemorating the religious meaning of the occasion. This 
is done by formulae invoking the Names of God (such as The Merciful, The 
Compassionate, The All-Knowing) and calling on the people to pray to God 
and ask for blessings on His Prophet and his family: all in a strict metre-and-
rhyme scheme, of course. As they approach the village in which the wedding 
is to take place, the guests announce their arrival with a zamil poem honouring 
the occasion, while their hosts await them at the village entrance, savouring the 
words of greeting and praise. 
The most important ritual occasion in which zamil poetry is composed is that 
of conflict mediation. It is an important moral obligation in tribal society to try to 
solve conflicts peacefully: the use of arms is almost always a last (and desperate) 
resort. That means not only that the contestants must submit to arbitration but 
that bystanders must volunteer to be arbitrators and put forth a goodwill effort 
to resolve the conflict justly according to ‘urf (tribal law). This applies across 
a broad spectrum from the most banal or everyday altercations (a dispute over 
debt, for example) to the most serious and heinous crimes such as homicide, 
rape or property theft: that is, everyone must become involved to resolve the 
conflict. The disputants will hand over to the arbitrator their ceremonial daggers 
as guarantees of a truce, and he dare not refuse to receive them, being obliged 
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to mediate their disagreement peacefully. There is no excuse like ‘I am busy’ or 
‘I have no experience in such things’. In the most serious conflicts, the sheikhs 
will arrive with their tribal entourage at the stage (masrah), at which they will 
hear the plaintiff and defendant in the case and conduct a public proceeding 
or trial, chanting a zamil poem expressing their moral point of view in the case. 
They do this while marching up the wadi to the masrah in full hearing of the 
assembled crowd. 
Not all tribes produce all three genres, though all three will appear across 
the entire tribal spectrum, with the qasidah and the zamil being ubiquitous 
but the balah not, along with some others not mentioned in this paper. It is 
important to understand how these genres form a system, in the sense that 
a set ensemble of compositional and performative practices lies behind them. 
This is really the key: that a tribal poet knows how to compose in all three 
genres, not because he has to master an entirely different repertoire of skills for 
each one, but because he must master the requisite skills that cut across all of 
them in order to produce a text recognisable as a qasidah, balah or zamil. The 
difference is the intensity with which one or more of these skills is developed, 
or the combination of skills needed, in any given genre. In the qasidah, it is the 
verse-text that is fetishised, hence structures such as metre, rhyme and other 
forms of what Roman Jakobson called parallelism abound.6 These skills are also 
present in the other genres but to a lesser degree, leaving collective improvi-
sation to be foregrounded (along with dance and music) combined in a single 
performance. The balah text is often referred to as the ‘qasidah of the balah’ and 
in strictly textual terms the two are nearly indistinguishable in terms of length 
and verse structures, though the qasidah’s is much richer or varied and the balah 
text is indexically tied to a specific ritual occasion – the wedding samrah – in 
which it is doing crucial cultural work such as entertaining the groom. The 
zamil employs many of the same metre-and-rhyme schemes to be found in the 
qasidah, but it is much shorter. As with the case of the balah, it is seen to have 
crucial structural features in common with the qasidah; for example, a poet will 
sometimes take a text which he composed as a zamil and then expand it into a 
qasidah, reifying, in effect, the words of the zamil from both the performance and 
the situation to which it was tied by focusing entirely on the text. Thus it would 
be a mistake to see these genres in isolation from each other and concatenated 
into a simple assemblage: they form a system in which one genre has structural 
relations to the other. 
The reason to emphasise this aspect of the tribal poetic tradition has to do 
with what we are calling the tribal male political subject. To be such a subject 
one must be able to perform in all three genres. This may not be obvious, based 
on what we have said so far of the poetic genres, but it will be when it is pointed 
out that commentary on what are said to be political topics are not reserved for 
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the qasidah or the zamil, for example, but may also take place in the balah. Major 
political events such as the uprising against the Sana’a regime in 2011 were 
commented on in all three genres and on a myriad of different occasions, with 
different views expressed in the challenge-and-retort routines. For example, a 
critic of the regime might challenge a defender, requiring the latter to reply in 
the same metre and rhyme. In other words the entire poetic system is mobilised 
as a rhetorical apparatus.7 If one is to have one’s views heard in the tribal public 
sphere, one must be able to compose in all three genres. On the one hand, this 
appears harder than one might suppose: a great qasidah poet is not necessarily 
quick-witted enough in the cut-and-thrust that characterises the balah; and, 
conversely, the ‘balahteer’ may not have the patience or dexterity to write a 
structurally intricate ode. On the other hand, as long as one keeps practising by 
composing poetry on ritual occasions, it is easier than one might think because 
of the structural relations among the genres. If it is important to be able to 
participate in a public rhetorical system that exists at a very deep level in tribal 
society, then mastery of the system is essential for the tribal political subject’s 
potency. Without such a mastery one might be heard, but only in one genre and 
only on specific and limited occasions. 
Sound Reproduction of Tribal Poetry: Benjamin Revisited
One last thing needs to be mentioned before we return to tribal poetry in the 
Yemeni uprisings, and that is the circulation of this poetry within the national 
public sphere. In pre-modern days, before the advent of sound recording, poems 
were spread by word of mouth, and there were specialists in tribal society, known 
as mulahhin (composer of song), who learned the poem by heart and then sang 
it before audiences. This tradition still exists, but face-to-face transmission has 
been almost entirely replaced by the cassette player. With the advent of sound 
recording, first through the cylinder-based and then the disk-based gramophone 
from the 1920s through the 1940s, and then the magnetic tape recording from 
the 1950s until the present day, the transmission of poetry has been mediated 
by mechanical means, allowing poems to circulate over a much larger social 
sphere and even to distant diasporas. ‘Sound studios’ began to flourish in the 
1960s where tapes of poetry, some many decades old and from far-flung parts of 
Yemen, were sold to patrons within the country and abroad. One such studio, 
called ‘A Part of my Land’, located in Aden, is featured in the film Men of Words 
and more fully analysed in Flagg Miller’s The Moral Resonance of Arab Media,8 an 
ethnography of the tribal qasidah and the soundscapes in which it has flourished 
in southern Yemen and the Yemeni diaspora in Brooklyn, New York. Another 
such studio is ‘The World of Happiness’ in Sana’a, described by Steven Caton.9 
One could go into the store and ask what were the latest or hottest poetic hits 
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and be shown a shelf full of tapes in their plastic containers. Some had a big X on 
them, indicating that the tape was banned by central government because of its 
politically sensitive criticisms of the state, but could be purchased nonetheless 
under the counter and with no questions asked. 
Of course, these sound studios are more than purveyors of poetry, clandestine 
or otherwise, for Hindi, western and Arab pop music are sold in them as well, 
not to mention Qur’anic chanting and religious hymns associated with various 
sects or with martyrdom stories of revolutionary figures; and so tribal poetry has 
by virtue of this eclectic juxtaposition been transformed in value as part of a 
new soundscape and sensibility. Video too has made its way into these shops, 
with films sold next to poetry and music. Taking advantage of the possibilities 
of sound-splicing and image-editing allowed by the computer, sound studios 
refashion tribal poetry’s performance by making it sound like something ‘other 
than’ tribal poetry − such as a pop song or a religious hymn − though remaining 
faithful to the verbal text. We discuss some examples of this below. This makes 
the identity of the tribal poem ambiguous: is it a tribal poem or is it a religious 
chant? And is its message consequently reframed as something else and adapted 
for a different political aim? 
To return to tribal poetics, it is important to note that the qasidah is the 
sole work of art, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin,10 that can circulate in the 
age of mechanical reproduction, whereas the balah and the zamil do not and, 
arguably, cannot. This fact raises a question about the work of art in modern 
mass reproduction that Benjamin does not entertain in his essay. Can all tradi-
tional works of art be removed from their original ritual contexts, shed their aura 
and circulate by being reproduced in mechanical forms, or are some more recal-
citrant to this move than others? I would argue the latter. So tied to the ritual 
context are balah and zamil poetry and, even more, so tied is their aesthetics to a 
presumed origination in an immediate performance that mechanical mediation 
and circulation may be possible but entirely beside the point. Yemenis listen 
to taped qasidah poetry but almost never to taped balah or zamil performances 
except for nostalgic reasons (for example, as a record of all the nice things 
that were said in the groom’s wedding balah). When asked why they wouldn’t 
they might respond, ‘Why would we? The point is to compose the poem in 
the moment of its performance, not to listen to that performance over and 
over again. Once the moment has passed, one composes a new poem.’ In other 
words, there is no fetishisation of the performance or the text, no reification of 
it beyond the immediate context in which it emerged. But the qasidah is another 
matter. Precisely because the aesthetic orientation is towards the text per se 
rather than the latter’s indexical relation to a ritual or its performance as is the 
case for the balah and the zamil, the text of the qasidah can be reified and, as it 
were, commodified without destroying its aesthetic force. 
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The fact that the tribal qasidah can be mechanically reproduced and then 
circulated through the public sphere means that the tribal political subject qua 
poet can be heard in the national public sphere that is wider than the tribal one, 
and in turn can listen to the debates within it. And for this reason, the value of 
the qasidah, which was always seen as the ‘queen’ of poetry, has gained a renewed 
value because of its ‘fungibility’ within the nation’s communicative currency. 
But that also makes it vulnerable, as suggested above in the discussion of the 
stereo studio, to being morphed into something quite unlike what the original 
poet may have intended. The Yemeni public sphere is almost entirely unregu-
lated when it comes to copyright protection, although laws are in place against 
copyright infringement; even so, tribal poetry is inherently ambiguous when 
it comes to who ‘owns’ it or has the right to circulate it. Even in the past, the 
poem, though attributed to an author, was altered to suit the whims or political 
views of the person passing it along, the difference being that such remaking did 
not go beyond a tribal sphere of control and therefore could be monitored and 
challenged by the original poet, if need be. In the modern world of mechanically 
mediated reproduction, where the possibilities of circulation are nearly limitless, 
this control is all but illusory. And so, if the poet wants to launch his poem in 
the public sphere, he has to swallow his distaste at what happens to it on the 
waves of electronically transmitted sound. 
Tribal Poetry in the Yemeni Arab Spring
When the tents were set up in Change Square (they are still there – the longest-
standing tent city in the history of political protest – though they are largely 
unoccupied now), poets would go from tent to tent delivering their poetry. 
Figure 6.6 Poet performing inside a tent in Change Square (Source: 
AhrarYemen, YouTube)
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Figure 6.7 Protesters listen to poet performing a poem (Source: Ahraryemen, 
YouTube).
This is the sort of face-to-face transmission of tribal poetry characteristic of 
the pre-modern era. Here is an example captured, ironically enough, through 
the mediation of the iPhone.11 The audience is clearly made up of tribesmen, 
judging from their outfits (see Fig. 6.7). They are seated in the tent chewing 
qat, a usual pastime. The poet, also in tribal clothes, gives the following chant:
The Land of Yemen, Its People Revolted (poet unknown)
Tell our government I have a new one
Injustice has crossed the line, and the land of Yemen, it’s a nation revolting
We are here to tell you to leave, we are here to say Saleh leave
Listen to me, don’t be stupid, and dialogue will not work with us
Listen to my advice and obey, no we will not fear your bombs
even if machine guns rain
This is an order you must obey, your people command and you must obey.12
A popular poet who emerged from the uprising was Mujib Al-Rahman 
Al-Khowlani, probably from the region of Khawlan east of the capital, Sana’a. 
He first caught the attention of devotees of tribal poetry with his poem ques-
tioning the motivation of the government in the Sa’dah wars, which began long 
before the 2011 uprising. Al-Rahman was able to capture the sense of confusion 
Yemenis felt over the Sa’dah conflict, and the on and off nature of the war. 
Since 2006, the Saleh regime had fought six wars against the Houthis, and in 
his poem, Al-Rahman asks, ‘For God’s sake, have you heard of a war that lasted 
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six years, and with a phone call it ends?’ This poem made Al-Rahman a popular 
poet beyond tribal audiences, and his poetry readings became celebrated events 
during the uprising. Another example of his poetry is a poem about a soccer 
match, which serves as a metaphor for the ‘game’ the Saleh regime is playing 
which, the poet tells us, is ‘a game of one, sabotaged unity, and considers its 
oneness democracy’. Al-Rahman describes how, in this soccer match, Saleh 
assigned himself the role of player, referee and spectator. 
What is interesting about the soccer metaphor is that, as Thomas Stevenson 
and Abdul Karim Alaug have noted,13 soccer in Yemen became a form of sport 
diplomacy, opening contacts between governments before unity in 1990 and as 
a means of conveying important political messages. Thus, the metaphor is not 
just fanciful but on some fundamental level quite literal. During the Yemeni 
revolution, Al-Rahman travelled around Yemen delivering poems in different 
city squares, raising peoples’ consciousness about the demands of the people in 
Change Square. 
In late February 2011, a little over a month after the protests began in Change 
Square, the tribes joined the uprising. The relatively young Sheikh Al-Ahmar, 
paramount sheikh of the Hashid Confederation, the most influential if not the 
largest tribal confederation in Yemen, threw its support behind the revolution. 
This was significant because the Al-Ahmar brothers − sons of the late and 
redoubtable Sheikh Abdullah Hussein Al-Ahmar, one of Yemen’s most powerful 
figures − and their tribal followers had been historic, if also erstwhile, allies of 
the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime. Tribes from another powerful confederation, the 
Bakil, however, also came to Sana’a to join the protesters, some from the region 
of Khawlan al-Tiyal where one of the authors did his fieldwork back in the late 
1970s.14 They had long-standing grievances against the regime, stemming from a 
perceived neglect of their region’s economic development. The fact that support 
for the President was eroding among all the tribes was telling of his weakening 
grip on power. However, he still seemed to have the support of the army.
To many in Change Square the Ahmar clan’s decision to side with the revo-
lution was a mixed blessing, however. The Ahmars were infamous for their 
corruption and ruthlessness; indeed, they were hardly noteworthy for expressing 
democratic sentiments. Anxiety mounted among the protesters that the 
Al-Ahmars would eventually hijack the revolution. As one of the revolution’s 
self-assigned press secretaries said to one of the authors in Change Square’s tent 
city, ‘Someone like Hamid Al-Ahmar wants to get rid of Saleh so he can have 
a larger piece of the pie’.15 On the other hand, they were heavily armed and 
capable of protecting the protesters from violent suppression by the army and, if 
need be, other government forces, so their presence was also welcomed. 
On 18 March 2011, an event occurred that might well have been the tipping 
point in what led to the ousting of President Ali Abdullah Saleh a year later. 
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It became known as the ‘Friday Massacre’ or the ‘Friday of Dignity’. On the 
previous weekend, riot police had killed seven protesters, and a march of around 
100,000 Yemenis filled a mile-long road leading to Sana’a University to mourn 
their deaths. Journalist Tom Finn was at the scene and filed a report:
As the prayers came to an end … the sight of billowing black smoke from 
a burning car caught the attention of the protesters who began surging en 
masse towards it. Witnesses say security forces fired six shots into the air 
before turning their weapons on those charging towards them. As violence 
flared, plainclothes men appeared on the roofs of nearby houses and began 
firing on the demonstrators with Kalashnikovs.16 
Over fifty people were killed and over 300 injured in what was later described as 
a massacre. Among the dead and injured were dozens of tribesmen. 
There is obviously much more to say about the Yemeni revolution, but we 
need now to focus on the role of Yemeni tribal poetry in it. A great deal of the 
poetry composed during the protests that took place in Change Square was 
filmed and posted on YouTube.17 
One example shows a scene taking place at night. The camera is focused on 
the Sana’a University monument, a triangular, needle-shaped structure that is 
brightly lit and at the base of which a stage has been built. Decorative strings 
with pictures attached stretch across it (see Fig. 6.8). Someone on the stage 
introduces the poet Majli Al-Qubaisi, who appears in tribal garb. He is greeted 
exuberantly by the crowd. Holding a piece of paper in his left hand, he reads 
Figure 6.8 Majli Al-Qubaisi performing a zamil 
(Source: Ghaleb Al-Hamdani, YouTube).
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the lines of what appears to be a long zamil poem over the microphone to the 
huge crowd assembled below. The text may well have begun as a two-line zamil 
which he then expanded, thinking to turn it into a qasidah one day. Rather than 
recite the lines, he chants them in a strong, high tenor voice. This kind of vocal 
delivery is characteristic of zamil poetry, and the tune is one of the traditional 
ones used for the genre. After the poet chants a line, the audience picks it up 
and repeats it in the same melody. Undoubtedly, Al-Qubaisi composed the zamil 
before this occasion and audience members were already familiar with it, which 
is probably why they were able to repeat the lines so readily. This antiphonal 
structure of poet and chorus is also characteristic of zamil poetry. The parallel 
is not perfect, of course. Ordinarily the poem would have been composed on 
a march, and we will see other instances of that later, but for now one has to 
imagine the stage as a kind of masrah, or meeting place, where the parties in a 
conflict convene to try to settle their differences peacefully. The tribesmen have 
laid down their arms at the entrance of the University to arbitrate a transfer of 
power for the government.
Notwithstanding speculation on our part (there has not been a chance to 
return to Yemen to interview the poet), it is likely that this performance took 
place in late March, after the ‘Friday Massacre’, for it refers obliquely to it. Yahya 
and Ahmed are mentioned, the former of whom was the President’s nephew, 
the latter his son, both of whom were held responsible by the revolutionaries for 
ordering security forces to fire on demonstrators indiscriminately that day. The 
president is described as a leader of mafia and thugs and told to inform Yahya 
and Ahmed that ‘We will not be intimidated by your military with live bullets 
or with sticks.’ The rest of the poem attests to the determination of the people 
to seek justice and hold the persons who committed these crimes responsible. 
The poem ends with the clarion lines: ‘In God’s name we will not be ruled by 
a dictator/He led us with division and racism/His accomplishments are killing 
and murder/Thuggery. Thuggery. Thuggery.’
Ma Nebaly (poet Majli Al-Qubaisi)
We don’t care, we don’t care, we don’t care.
O leader of the mafia and thugs
To our nation, we will sacrifice our soul and our money
Welcome death, life is a struggle
Hit us with your bombs and guns
Hit us with your planes and tanks
Tell Yahya, and your son Ahmed
We will not be intimidated by your military
With live bullets or with sticks
With all your power and more
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For our revolution we will do anything
You will not deter our proud people’s revolution
With our honest intentions, our heads held high
Our determination and vigour will remain strong
And justice will be brought by days and nights
We will hold you responsible for this and that
For the patient, bitter and sweet taste the same
I will drink it especially on this issue
And solidarity is best against arrogance
In God’s name, we will not be ruled by a dictator
He led us with division and racism
His accomplishments are killing and murder
Thuggery, thuggery, thuggery.18
This poem became immensely popular and was circulated widely in the Yemeni 
public sphere, including the internet, but not necessarily in the version that 
was filmed in Change Square. There are several variants.19 Some were clearly 
produced in a stereo studio or by someone using a computer editing system. 
The image is taken from a video (probably from an iPhone) showing a large 
demonstration, and though it is not clear which one it may be, the assumption 
is that it is the demonstration in Change Square on the ‘Friday Massacre’. An 
Arabic caption identifies the text as a zamil composed during the revolution, 
though no author is given attribution. Though not word for word identical with 
the zamil poem read by the poet Majli Al-Qubaisi in Change Square, it certainly 
bears enough resemblance to it in rhyme, metre and content as to be the ‘same’ 
poem. Of course, we have learned that this is what tribal poets have to put up 
with, the circulation of their poems in forms that are not necessarily sanctioned 
or controlled by themselves. What is more interesting is that the musical form 
of this version does not resemble a zamil performance so much as it does a 
religious hymn (nashid), and this because of the melody and the more Qur’anic-
sounding diction. This makes sense, of course, in the wake of the massacre in 
which many tribesmen were killed along with other marchers. As we have seen, 
much zamil poetry performed in the Yemeni Arab Spring has been captured 
on video and posted on YouTube, possibly for the delectation of the Yemeni 
diaspora community as well as local Yemenis. This is not surprising. As Yemeni 
tribesmen marched to protest the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh they would 
perform the zamil in a traditional dance step, with their ceremonial daggers held 
aloft, dancing along the streets on their way to Change Square. Although they 
were in the city, not the rural wadi, the spatial organisation of the performance 
is nonetheless exactly the same: a thoroughfare (this time a street rather than 
a stream bed in a wadi) leading to a masrah at which the hoped-for peaceful 
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conflict resolution is to take place. The picture shows a delegation of the Murad 
tribe (from far eastern Yemen) entering Change Square performing their zamil, 
although unfortunately, the sound quality is not good enough to catch the words 
(see Fig. 6.9).20 
Another zamil performance, this time of the Bani Jabr tribe of Khawlan 
Al-Tiyal from eastern Yemen, shows tribesmen entering Change Square (the 
needle-shaped monument is visible behind them) (see Fig. 6.10). The zamil 
salutes Yemen and the revolutionaries who have announced a new Yemen.21 
And finally, a zamil from Marib in eastern Yemen shown on YouTube was 
performed before a crowd that repeats the poet’s lines just as they would in a 
regular poetic performance. 
Ya ‘Ali [the President], the people have decided
Don’t delay! There is no way for you to go
except the exit.22
The tribes marched in Change Square to express their views in poetry, and just 
as it is clear at conflict mediation what the consensus is regarding who is at fault 
and what the resolution is, so it was on this occasion: Ali Abdullah Saleh had 
to go.
Figure 6.9 Murad tribe entering Change Square (Source: Ahmed Ali, YouTube).
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Figure 6.10 Members of the Bani Jabr tribe performing a zamil in Change 
Square (Source: A. Hamza, YouTube).
Figure 6.11 Protesters marching down one of Sana’a’s main streets 
(Photo: Al Jazeera English).
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown the potency of what we call a tribal political subject 
in the Yemeni Arab revolution, as demonstrated in ‘his’ poetry performances 
during the events that spanned January to March 2011. 
This poetry, understood as a system of genres that is circulated through 
various media in the public sphere, has a long and complex tradition, in which 
the discussion of politics plays a central role, be it a criticism of local goings-on, 
regional affairs, the central state’s shortcomings or international affairs. It used 
to be that only a genre like the qasidah was amenable to sound recording and 
circulation via the cassette tape, but with the advent of the mobile phone and 
smartphones, oral performances nowadays can be filmed in situ or as they are 
happening, with the sound and images then circulated via the net. This means 
that the full range of tribal poetry, from qasidah to zamil to balah, is now widely 
available to both a national and transnational public that in the past would 
have only heard the qasidah on the cassette tape. We have learned that a topic 
may be debated in the tribe in all three genres, and so this broader exposure is 
consequential. 
At the same time that this exposure to tribal poetry has broadened, the 
performance of that poetry has been introduced into urban settings, the street 
and urban mass mobilisation (the demonstration) where it did not exist before, 
making it a valuable protest practice. And the remarkable thing is that the 
poetry has not had to undergo any major transformation for this to happen: the 
march down the wadi is seamlessly interpolated into the march down the street. 
But this is not to say that tribal poetry has not been transformed. The text 
of the tribal poem can be sung as a hymn and be interpolated into discourses, 
mainly religious ones, with which the poem had no original connection, thus 
changing the political interpretation of its message. Suddenly tribesmen have 
become religious martyrs of the sort memorialised by the conservative religious 
party, for example. 
Because of orientalised views of the tribesman as a troublesome citizen, there 
is a danger that his contribution to the revolution will be overlooked or down-
played. In reality, when historians look back on the voices of the Yemeni revo-
lution, it will be his and the youth in general that in all likelihood will stand out. 
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A Fractured Solidarity: Communitas and 
Structure in the Israeli 2011 Social Protest
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Chapter 7
Introduction
In the late spring of 2011, following the widespread social and political protests 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Spain and Greece, several Israeli academics and 
political commentators went on record to suggest that no similar events could 
occur in Israel in the near future. As reasons for this assessment they cited the 
country’s perceived security situation, which dissuades citizens from protesting 
what are believed to be lesser ills, as well as the fact that the Israeli economy was 
generally considered to have withstood the global economic crisis fairly well.1 
Shortly thereafter, however, and despite these predictions, on 14 July 2011 the 
largest social protest in Israel’s history broke out. 
It started with a small number of makeshift tents pitched on Tel Aviv’s Roth-
schild Boulevard, a move initiated by a young college graduate, who had been 
evicted from her home, and her friends, and soon grew into a nationwide protest 
involving a plethora of tent encampments around the country. The inhabitants 
of these encampments represented a variety of social groups and socioeconomic 
concerns, all expressing a general sense of discontent and outrage associated 
with Israel’s increasingly neoliberal policies. These feelings were captured by 
what emerged as the protest movement’s most visible slogan and chant, ‘The 
people demand social justice’ (ha’am doresh tzedek xevrati).2 
As the unprecedented scale of the protest became clear, activists, politicians, 
media professionals and the public at large began to debate its meaning and 
outcomes. Was it a turning point in Israeli social history as some commentators 
declared, or was it, as others claimed, just a loosely orchestrated, large-scale and 
multi-sited ‘griping party’3 that invited people to vent steam, yet remained inef-
fectual? These polar assessments, and many others in between, had one important 
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thing in common – all recognised that this protest transformed the heart of Tel 
Aviv, and with it many other locations around the country during the summer 
of 2011, into a uniquely experienced juncture in the country’s history, one that 
has already become etched in Israeli collective memory as a fleeting moment of 
empowerment and possibility. 
Based on a combination of ethnographic observations at protest sites and an 
examination of the discourse produced within and about the protest movement 
at the time, our main interest in this chapter is to reach a better understanding 
of this moment by interrogating its semiotic landscape and experiential texture. 
Clearly, the protest movement was not only temporally demarcated in the 
summer of 2011, but, like similar movements around the world, it was also 
spatially demarcated through the visible and embodied ‘occupation’ of public 
spaces, providing yet another contemporary example of ‘the emplaced character 
of collective action, the fact that it requires physical locations as stages for its 
performances’.4
As the protest spread, the ‘protest space’ became space-on-the-move, ranging 
from tent encampments to other identifiable protest sites that inhabited 
anything from small vigils to televised mass demonstrations. While clearly 
oriented towards real-world issues, including pressing social problems and policy 
considerations, and while clearly involving a great deal of strategising, organ-
ising, mobilising, coordinating and coalition building, the activism that found 
its home in this tent protest was not conceptualised by either activists or their 
target audiences as ‘doing politics’. Conjuring a time-out-of-time and a place-
out-of-place, the protest movement became both a real and an imaginary site 
of possibility, and a repository for playfully constructed symbols and meanings 
through which its politics of ‘anti-politics’ emerged. We leave the question of 
the protest’s outcomes aside for the time being, noting only that these ‘outcomes’ 
are usually considered within a political frame, and will return to them in the 
conclusion. 
In trying to understand the nature and dynamics of contemporary protest 
movements, Gerbaudo points out that ‘in the absence of a formal organisational 
structure, collective action is always structured by the forms of communication 
responsible for “setting the scene” of its display’.5 This scene serves as ‘the point 
of departure for a complex process of social re-composition and symbolic articu-
lation, facilitating the “fusion” of individuals into a new collective agent’.6 This 
conceptualisation, with its focus on embodied experience, place and emotional 
effervescence, resonates with Victor Turner’s dialectical conceptualisation of 
structure and communitas.7 We therefore revisit Turner’s notions by proposing 
to explore the Israeli protest culture of summer 2011 as a liminoid sphere in 
which individuals voluntarily and playfully enter a space where traditional 
social relationships and hierarchies are temporarily suspended and replaced by 
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the unity and heightened emotionality of shared purpose and solidarity.8 We 
attend to what Turner termed the ‘subjunctive mood’ of culture – the potential-
ities and possibilities as envisioned within the rhetoric and practices of protest.9 
At the same time, we also focus on moments of structural/anti-structural unrest, 
addressing the ways in which these possibilities were constrained by a variety 
of structural impulses.
Liminality, Spatiality and Participation Structures
It has become commonplace to discuss many of the international 2011 protests, 
as well as contemporary social movements more generally, in terms associated 
with the affordances enabled by new media for organisation, mobilisation and 
networking across geographical and social divides.10 Without disregarding the 
significance of these developments in social movement practices, however, 
the Israeli protest – much like others around the world11 – demonstrates the 
continued importance of physical public space for political resistance and social 
activism. 
Throughout the summer of 2011, the tent encampments laid out in public 
spaces in urban centres across Israel came to both house and symbolise the 
protest against rising housing costs, the mounting cost of living and the neoliberal 
socioeconomic regime that was responsible for the break-up of the Israeli welfare 
state. These liminal enclaves, and the many people swarming to them to engage 
in dialogue, debate and joint protest activities, charted new possibilities for both 
reasoned discussion and heightened expressivity in Israeli public life. At least 
for a while, portions of the Israeli urban landscape, the contours of Israeli public 
discourse and patterns of sociability were simultaneously transformed, as Israeli 
citizens from all walks of life reclaimed and appropriated public space, asserting 
their ‘right to the city’.12 In so doing, they transformed both the physical land-
scape and its associated meanings through their embodied presence.
At the height of summer, Tel Aviv’s main protest site on Rothschild Boulevard 
spanned almost its entire length, a distance of approximately 1.6 kilometres. 
Positioning their tents within what is today one of Tel Aviv’s priciest real estate 
locations, and centre to many of the city’s high-end restaurants, the protesters 
mischievously subverted the street’s bourgeois environment by constructing 
a carnivalesque jumble composed of improvised tents, shabby furniture, self-
managed kitchen facilities and medical services, impromptu musical and theat-
rical performances, spontaneous marketplaces for the free exchange of clothes, 
books and other paraphernalia (ironically called ‘free markets’), and bodies in 
varying states of dress and undress (see Figs 7.1 and 7.2).
At the same time, this laid-back atmosphere was complemented by a seem-
ingly unprecedented engagement with ‘serious’ political issues. Citizen-strangers 
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Figure 7.1 The Rothschild kitchen facilities (Photo: O. Livio).
spent many evening hours sitting in ‘dialogue circles’ that emulated domestic 
living rooms and listening to lectures dealing with macro-level socioeconomic 
issues they had never dwelt on before (see Figs 7.3 and 7.4), which helped 
them make sense of the personal economic difficulties that gave rise to the 
protest in the first place. Broadly modelled on similar ‘general assemblies’ in 
Spain and elsewhere,13 these discussion forums were an exercise in grassroots 
participatory democracy characterised by a desire for non-hierarchy, collective 
and consensual decision making, and public transparency, in an attempt to chal-
lenge and contest dominant social and political relations.14 The tent encamp-
ments thus became powerful ‘terrains of resistance’15 and turned into ‘physical 
sites of contention involving myriad embodied spatial struggles … and symbolic 
sites of contention over the meaning of space’.16
As in other spaces of protest around the world,17 the Rothschild Boulevard 
protesters’ reclamation of space made use of the cultural-historical associations 
of the street in order to invest it with new meanings. Originally named ‘Street 
of the People’ (Rexov Ha’am), Rothschild Boulevard is bookended by the city’s 
main cultural institutions at one end and the original site of one of Tel-Aviv’s 
oldest houses, established by one of the city’s founding families in 1909, and 
Independence Hall, where Israel’s independence was declared in 1948, at the 
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Figure 7.2 A ‘free market’ for the exchange of books and clothes 
(Photo: O. Livio).
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Figure 7.4 Public lectures on Rothschild Boulevard (Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.3 Domestic ‘living rooms’ on Rothschild Boulevard (Photo: O. Livio).
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other. Protesters could thus situate themselves explicitly against the city’s and 
the nation’s historical and cultural background, constructing the space of protest 
as both local-contemporary and national-historical.18 In one of the protest’s 
most iconic moments (see Fig. 7.5), protesters standing in front of Independence 
Hall staged a re-reading of Israel’s Declaration of Independence at precisely the 
same day of the week and time of day in which it was originally read, delivering 
the clear message that a renewed contract between the state and its citizens 
must be established. Rothschild Boulevard’s name, reworked on many street 
signs as ‘If I Were a Rothschild Avenue’ (see Fig. 7.6), after a famous line from 
the musical Fiddler on the Roof, added an ironic dimension to the protesters’ 
economic grievances.
As liminal spaces, the tent dwellings were dominated by an idyllic spirit of 
communitas – inclusive, non-hierarchical and reflective of affective, immediate 
relations between participants,19 including the many visitors who came to the site 
to experience a new-found sense of democratic promise. While the demographic 
profile of the protesters was certainly not proportionally representative of the 
Israeli population at large, and overrepresented young, middle-class urbanites 
(much like the composition of tent sites across the Western world),20 one could 
nevertheless experience an unusual co-mingling of strangers transcending, at 
least to some extent, conventional barriers of class, gender, ethnicity, religiosity 
and geographic location. This bringing together of individuals from different 
social spheres embodied not only the quest for socioeconomic change, but also 
the desire to practise alternative values of ‘affective solidarity’21 such as egali-
tarianism, mutuality and the free exchange of ideas. It was also seen as a means 
of combating feelings of alienation and atomisation associated with living in the 
contemporary metropolitan city. 
The spatial organisation and participation structures within the tent 
encampment, at least as initially devised, also encouraged a sense of togeth-
erness and communitas. Tents were, for the most part, spaced evenly across 
sites, with no immediately visible distinctions of class or social position. 
Throughout the first few weeks of protest, the main activities carried out within 
tent encampments were local assemblies and forums, in which participants were 
encouraged to talk freely and share their concerns. Talk itself was viewed as a 
social equaliser, connecting people and leading to mutual recognition of shared 
viewpoints and interests. Participation structures followed many of the patterns 
established by the Indignados movement in Spain.22 Participants were intro-
duced (and introduced themselves) only by their first names, thus minimising 
distinctions based on public recognition, levels of expertise, age, experience and 
even degrees of involvement within the protest movement itself. All partici-
pants were also encouraged to sit on the ground, with speakers only standing 
up while they talked. Perhaps most importantly, the floor was open to anyone 
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Figure 7.5 Re-reading Israel’s Declaration of Independence (Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.6 A reworked street sign: If I Were a Rothschild (Photo: O. Livio).
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wishing to speak – whether an active participant in the local encampment or a 
visitor from outside.
Many (although not all) discussions were carried out in ‘dialogue circles’, an 
arrangement that has a long history and considerable resonance in Israeli youth 
movement culture. As explained by the prominent Israeli poet Haim Gouri, the 
‘culture of the circle’ represents
the connection between equals and partners, […] not a brilliant speaker 
in front of an enchanted, excited, cheering crowd. […] It strove toward 
democracy in its exalted sense. It understood that every revolution wishes to 
provide its members with recognition of their own worth and their human 
dignity. It had leaders, but they rose from within it and came back to it.23
Dialogue circles were modelled on these early Zionist spatial arrangements of 
inclusive sociability and belonging, with their equalising and democratising 
potential, epitomised by the ritualised ‘soul talks’ conducted by early pioneering 
groups.24 The circle as an embodied cultural metaphor is yet another example of 
the use made of national-Zionist symbols within the protest movement. Indeed, 
this movement largely constructed itself as a return to the foundational tenets 
of Zionism – tenets that had allegedly been deserted by modern-day Israeli 
leaders. By recreating foundational tropes and invoking legendary moments 
of the nation’s history, the protest was thus constructed as a movement back 
to an authentic past (which was itself dominated by the Zionist rhetoric of 
biblical return). In a sharp critical analysis of the protest movement, Uri Gordon 
identified this strategy and the ideology it served, noting that the movement’s 
messages ‘were presented not as a matter of social conflict along class lines, but 
instead through appeals to social unity as an expression of “true Zionism” – 
rhetoric that panders to Israelis’ nostalgia for the collectivism and republicanism 
of the early state’.25
The Limits of Communitas
Indeed, while the spirit of communitas was certainly felt within protest sites, 
suspending traditional divisions of class, ethnicity, age, gender and so forth – 
manifestations of Israeli society’s most crucial structural cleavages continuously 
impinged upon this utopian spirit, thereby setting limits to the experience of 
togetherness. In many respects, this simultaneous co-presence of anti-structural 
communitas and the re-inscription of structure may have been the defining 
characteristic of the protest movement.
In terms of spatial arrangements, we observed that beneath the veneer 
of visual chaos and homogeneity that initially met the visitor’s eye at the 
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 Rothschild tent encampment, there simmered significant social stratifications. 
As the encampment gradually spread out, individual tents representing many of 
Israel’s peripheral cities and towns were erected towards the south-west end of 
the boulevard. As a result, the attempt to demonstrate the inclusiveness of the 
protest movement in fact reproduced real-world sociospatial divisions between 
centre and periphery. The establishment of alternative encampments across Tel 
Aviv – and the accompanying battle over the perceived ‘authenticity’ of each 
site – was another indication of these divisions. Similarly, in the city of Haifa, 
the four tent encampments, while working in tandem, were clearly differen-
tiated in terms of class and race (Arabs/Jews, middle class/working class), and 
this found expression in the focal concerns voiced by those who participated in 
their activities. With time, spatial-structural divisions became so pronounced 
that several newspapers covering the protest produced a map of the Rothschild 
Boulevard tent dwellings indicating the social stratification of tent enclaves 
within the site.
Furthermore, the purportedly non-hierarchical structure of the protest 
movement, which in its early stages resembled the rhizomatic organisation of 
the anti-globalisation movement,26 and consisted of a loosely aligned ‘network 
of networks’27 that represented shifting coalitions of interest with variable 
entry and exit points, quickly devolved into a traditional political power 
struggle between individuals and groups competing for resources, visibility and 
influence.28 This power struggle, too, reflected structural differences rooted in 
class and ethnic identifications. Of particular resonance was the gulf between 
those identified as protest ‘leaders’ by the media and the general public – the 
initial group of protesters who had pitched the first few tents, virtually all of 
whom were young student activists from a largely middle-class Ashkenazi-Jewish 
background – and the organisers who were more attendant to the day-to-day 
operation of the encampments themselves.29 
As the more publicly visible ‘leaders’ retreated from the tent encampments 
and shifted their core activities to the political realm, local grievances were 
quick to surface, and the different interests and agendas held by protesters of 
different backgrounds came to the fore. As one lower-class activist cited by 
Asher Schechter explained, referring to the protest movement’s most iconic 
leader, Daphni Leef:
[She] is a good girl, but she doesn’t know life. She didn’t come from the 
bottom. She came and somehow made some move, but does she understand 
housing? Does she understand social distress? She’s a young woman. She’s 
never had a cheque bounce. She hasn’t been to these places of social distress. 
We’re not up to the measure of Rothschild. They’re in a different place.30 
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Support for the protest among Israel’s Palestinian citizens was also often ambiv-
alent.31 Levels of support, while high, remained much lower than among the 
Jewish population, where it reached 90 per cent, fluctuating at around 60 per 
cent.32 As one prominent Palestinian activist noted: ‘At first it was perceived 
as a struggle that did not speak to the Arab population in terms of language and 
content. People asked me what “people” they were talking about when they 
demand social justice − the Jewish people?’33 In this respect, it is significant to 
note that only a few mixed Jewish-Arab tent encampments were established 
throughout Israel (in Jaffa, Lod and Haifa), and most encampments remained 
segregated in terms of nationality, thus replicating the dominant Israeli mode of 
spatial existence. Within mixed encampments, too, tensions sometimes surfaced 
as a result of differences of opinion involving Jewish-Palestinian relations both 
within Israel and in the Occupied Territories.34 
Reactions to the protest among the national-religious population – in 
particular that associated with the right-wing settler movement and the Israeli 
ultra-Orthodox community – were also rather cautious. While the protest 
addressed socioeconomic concerns that were often very relevant for these 
populations (the ultra-Orthodox population is among Israel’s poorest, and 
the West Bank settlers’ disproportionate public funding is a source of political 
controversy), the common perception of the protest as targeted against the 
(right-wing) government, as well as its call to shift the focus of public discourse 
and policy from security-related issues to issues of social equality and justice, 
were often at odds with the agendas and central concerns of these religious 
groups. Several political figures associated with the national-religious and ultra-
Orthodox communities in fact argued that the protest had been ‘hijacked’ by 
the left, which was hiding its real goal of toppling the government under the 
façade of all-inclusiveness. 
The tension between the spirit of communitas and underlying structural divi-
sions animated the protest’s unfolding and was a constant topic of discussion 
and debate both within the movement and in the discourse surrounding it. In 
the end, this was probably the most significant cause of the protest’s demise as 
a widespread cultural phenomenon. This same tension was evident in protest 
culture semiotics, to which we will now turn. 
Intertextuality, Play and Performance
Probably the most visible element of the tent protest culture involved the 
words, images and multimodal signs strewn all over the protest sites, as the tents’ 
surfaces and the spaces between them became the pages upon which the story 
of the protest was constantly being reinscribed and regenerated in a variety of 
playfully constructed home-made signs, slogans and symbols, mostly based upon 
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a (presupposed) shared culture. This playfulness has become characteristic of the 
globalised ‘protest culture’ in both international and local social movements in 
recent years,35 giving rise to a subjunctive mood or imaginary that is reflective 
of a postmodern, self-conscious generation of activists who attempt to combat 
political cynicism and the accompanying sense of inefficacy that is associated 
with more traditional political activism.36 
We found many examples of such ‘tactical frivolity’37 in our observations, 
perhaps best exemplified by a sign spotted on a tent in Rothschild Boulevard (see 
Fig. 7.7), which read ‘We are the creative class’ (anaxnu hama’amad hayetzirati). 
This particular sign was not only an expression of this tent owner’s self-reflexive 
stance, but also itself a play of words – replacing the term ‘productive’ (yatzrani), 
which is part of the commonly used Hebrew collocation ‘productive class’, 
with the term ‘creative’ (yetsirati). This linguistic play was a self-defining social 
statement that identified the tent dwellers as a new ‘class’ whose particular qual-
ities involved agency, humour and a free, creative spirit. As such, it captured a 
central feature of the Israeli protest movement – the marked creative and ludic 
spirit that animated its expressive culture. This spirit dominated the semiotic 
landscape of the tent dwellings and the large demonstrations that punctuated 
the protest routine with moments of heightened affective solidarity.
Figure 7.7 ‘We are the creative class’ (Photo: O. Livio).
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For our purposes here, perhaps the most significant element in consid-
ering the rhetoric of protest is the ways in which the spirit of communitas was 
conjured through the invocation of its core characteristics. This is of particular 
importance within a protest culture that attempted – with varying degrees of 
success, and occasionally drawing criticism precisely because of this attempt38 
– to sustain an all-inclusive, all-encompassing category of ‘the people’, through 
which movement solidarity and the sense of vital, affective, non-hierarchical 
relations could be maintained, if only in the short term.39 As Laclau has demon-
strated,40 this discursive constitution of ‘the people’ as a political subject stands 
at the heart of political operation, and as such requires three simultaneous 
conditions, all of which were present in the Israeli case: (1) an equivalential 
logic positing the equality of individuals and their demands, with a particula-
rised social demand coming to stand in for all other social demands and thus to 
speak ‘universally’; (2) a discursive simplification of the political terrain into a 
binary opposition in which ‘the people’ stand in opposition to ‘power’, with the 
enemy constructed as ‘the oligarchy, the establishment, big money, capitalism, 
[or] globalization’;41 (3) the emergence of a new identity founded upon consti-
tutive heterogeneity, in which ‘a new agency [is created] out of a plurality of 
heterogeneous elements’.42 
Indeed, the category of ‘the people’, named as such, has animated several 
of the recent protests around the world, most notably in the Tunisian and 
Egyptian revolutions.43 In Israel, too, this category was used in multiple ways in 
an attempt to author unity both in public proclamation and through the public 
intimacy of face-to-face encounters. It served to transcend structural distinc-
tions of age, class and ethnic background, and thus became a powerful political 
tool through which the protest was largely depoliticised. Indeed, the protest’s 
most prominent slogan, enunciated rhythmically like the beat of a drum – ‘The 
people, demand, social justice’ – itself became a verbal emblem of this utopian 
quest for social solidarity that harked back to the spirit of ideological commu-
nitas of early Zionist days.
One means of expressing the revival of this spirit was via signs, slogans and 
images that often performed their rhetorical work through intertextuality and 
citation, involving audiences in a game of innuendo and gap-filling that made 
them active participants in the construction of the protest messages, and thus 
of an imagined community of shared reference. The ability to decipher this 
linguistic play, and thereby participate fully in the protest culture, was thus 
predicated upon belonging to the same speech community44 – a group sharing a 
cultural-textual background, norms of communication and patterns of linguistic 
behaviour. While speech communities are of course never homogeneous, and 
significant differences exist even between individuals who consider themselves 
members of the same communities,45 in this case it appears that in using cultural 
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Figure 7.8 The staging of Dira Lehaskir, a popular children’s book 
(Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.9 Transformation of the popular song The Winter of ’73 
(Photo: O. Livio).
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expressions largely associated with mainstream, middle-class Jewish culture, the 
protest movement attempted to project a sense of national unity, albeit one that 
still excluded the non-Jewish population as well as non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish groups.
Among the main building blocks of this protest culture were elements of 
mainstream Israeli education and culture such as biblical verses, proverbs, 
idiomatic and formulaic expressions, and well-known children’s songs and 
rhymes. These were joined by elements of contemporary media-based culture 
such as TV icons. Utilising and reworking the texts and imagery of the local 
‘recursive archive’,46 protesters creatively drew upon shared cultural tropes to 
simultaneously comment on current issues and imagine future possibilities. 
Linguistic manifestations of this shared culture included, for example, the circu-
lation of biblical coinages such as ‘tzedek, tzedek tirdof’ (‘Seek justice and pursue 
it’) and the use of sound play for poetic effect in slogans such as ‘tzedek, lo tzdaka’ 
(‘Justice, not charity’). 
At the same time, many performances were carried out in a lighter vein. 
Thus, for example, a frequent occurrence was the chanting of ‘labibi sheli shalosh 
dirot’ (‘My Bibi has three apartments’) – a jab at Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu’s affluence involving play on a well-known children’s verse that 
says, ‘My hat has three corners’. Similarly, public, parodic stagings of the classic 
Israeli children’s book by poet Leah Goldberg, Dira Lehaskir (‘An Apartment 
for Rent’), were performed on one street corner (see Fig. 7.8), with the original 
text playfully manipulated to reflect current rent issues and mock contemporary 
housing policies and government ideologies.47 
Signs and slogans posted on tents similarly transformed, often through 
irony, a variety of iconic cultural texts broadly associated with young middle-
class Israelis. A sign posted on one tent (see Fig. 7.9) rewrote the lyrics to the 
popular song The Winter of ’73, an unofficial anthem of the so-called ‘peace 
generation’ that grew up during the time of the (failed) peace process of the 
1990s; but whereas in the original song the younger generation address their 
parents, claiming that ‘You promised a dove, an olive branch/You promised 
peace at home’ – the current sign waxed poetic about more material concerns: 
‘You promised an apartment, a parquet or marble floor/You promised a living 
room at home/You promised a window and doors.’ What had originally been an 
abstract, rather depoliticised call for peace was now detached completely from 
external sociopolitical realities, focusing – literally as well as politically – on the 
domestic front. Indeed, it was the relative prevalence of calls of this type that 
led many critics to accuse protest activists of ignoring political realities and of 
failing to address the continued occupation of Palestinian territories or engage 
with the Israeli-Arab conflict in ways that might be divisive for the protest’s 
new, all-embracing class of ‘the people’.48
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In line with the movement’s origins in protesting the lack of affordable 
housing, the themes of house and home were among the most prominent within 
the localised array of symbols that filled the protest arena. The tents themselves 
symbolised the housing crisis as a state of homelessness – and contributed to 
the creation of the liminal space of protest by blurring taken-for-granted spatial 
notions of private and public within urban space. This was epitomised clearly 
in what was probably the protest movement’s most visible sign (see Fig. 7.10), a 
yellow tent icon enclosing the Hebrew letter bet, which formed the beginning of 
the slogan ‘bet ze ohel’ (‘bet is for tent’). This was a playful linguistic disruption 
based on another popular song intended to teach children the Hebrew alphabet. 
In this song, which follows the general pattern ‘A is for …, B is for …’, the first 
Hebrew letter, aleph, stands for ohel (tent), and the second, bet, stands for bayit 
(house/home). These lexical markers were switched in the protest slogan to 
form the playfully discordant bet ze ohel, thus punctuating the perceived impos-
sibility of home attainment through linguistic disjointedness, by intentionally 
pairing the wrong word with the wrong letter. The non-attainable ‘house/home’ 
became, in the protest, a tent.
Similar effects were achieved through visual means, often playing in one way 
or another on the ‘house’ theme. Thus, a small-scale model of a windowless 
white house with a red roof (see Fig. 7.11) – the ultimate symbol of the desired 
Israeli home, the cottage – was constructed on a boulevard corner and claimed 
to symbolise the government’s impenetrability: a condition of being closed on 
all sides, disconnected from one’s environment. Not far from there, a recon-
struction of the well-known image of the pre-state Tower and Stockade model 
of Jewish settlement was perched in the middle of Rothschild Boulevard amidst 
a sea of tents (see Fig. 7.12), symbolising the national Zionist heritage of home-
building and place-making,49 which protesters felt contemporary housing 
policies had eroded. Once more, this forged a temporal link between contem-
porary protesters and Israel’s original Zionist settlers – simultaneously invoking 
the spirit of timelessness associated with communitas and situating the protest 
within the confines of mainstream Zionist ideology. As demonstrated by Chris-
topher Pinney (this volume) in his analysis of the 2011 protests in India, such 
imagery mobilises local history in complex processes of cultural citation and 
reiteration targeted at both the present and the future – critiquing the present 
while imagining the political possibilities of the future, which are themselves 
rooted in the achievements of the local past.
Within the tent encampments, the tents themselves were often designed to 
emulate most closely – albeit playfully – the characteristics of young urbanites’ 
everyday dwellings, thus creating fluid and flexible borders between private and 
public realms. Signs posted on tent entrances were often ironic variations on 
signs posted on the doors of rented apartments – ‘kan moxim bekef’ (‘It’s fun 
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Figure 7.10 ‘Bet ze ohel’ (Logo design and slogan: Y. Kellner). (Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.11 An impenetrable ‘house’ on Rothschild Boulevard 
(Photo: O. Livio).
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Figure 7.13 ‘I have fun protesting here’ (Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.12 The ‘Tower and Stockade’ construction on Rothschild Boulevard 
(Photo: O. Livio).
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Figure 7.14 A tent expressing solidarity inside a real home (Photo: O. Livio).
Figure 7.15 Theodor Herzl on a balcony (Photo: N. Vieman).
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protesting here’) replacing the clichéd ‘kan garim bekef’ (‘It’s fun living here’; 
see Fig. 7.13); humorous signs about inflated tent rents, prime tent locations 
and unique accessories available in specific tents were plentiful; and various 
symbols of urban domesticity were creatively deployed, from coloured mailboxes 
to improvised ‘patios’ and ‘balconies’ on which dwellers attempted to flee from 
the summer heat. Likewise, some street residents found creative ways to express 
their solidarity with the protesters; one resident pitched a tent on his own (real) 
balcony (see Fig. 7.14), and another participated in the nostalgic atmosphere by 
constructing an image of Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, with 
a placard bearing Herzl’s signature quote, ‘If you will it, it is not a dream’ (‘im 
tirtzu, ein zo agada’; see Fig. 7.15).
In a widely circulated image that adorned T-shirts created especially for the 
protest, a blue house icon was placed over the Israeli flag so that its triangular 
‘roof’ completed the image of the Star of David (see Fig. 7.16), with the caption 
‘Fighting for home’ (also ‘Fighting for a house’, since in Hebrew there is one 
term for both ‘home’ and ‘house’) affixed at the bottom. Likewise, the national 
emblem of the state, the Menorah flanked by olive branches, was coloured in red 
and drawn with a crack in it, with the warning ‘fragile’ attached (see Fig. 7.17). 
In this way, the physical materiality associated with the protest  movement’s 
Figure 7.16 ‘Fighting for home’ on the Israeli flag (Photo: O. Livio).
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Figure 7.17 A reworking of the national emblem of Israel (Photo: O. Livio).
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focus on housing was extended to symbolically encompass the state itself, whose 
precarious condition was constructed as analogous to the lack of housing security 
experienced by the protesters. By equating the protesters’ wellbeing with that 
of the state, the protest was constituted as representative of the entire ‘people’, 
rather than of specific political, class or ethnic interests. Illustrating this claim, 
a large placard at the Rothschild site proclaimed ‘kol Israel ohalim ze laze’ (see 
Fig. 7.18) – a play on the Jewish proverb maintaining that all Jewish people are 
responsible for each other’s wellbeing, with the word for ‘responsible’ (arevim) 
being replaced by the word for ‘tents’ (ohalim). In this way a rhetorical claim for 
complete inclusiveness was made, albeit through the use of a religious proverb 
that applies solely to Jews. 
Towards an Anthropology of Protest Cultures
In more than one way, then, the landscape of protest was a tug-of-war between 
order and chaos, structure and anti-structure, uplifting moments and ongoing 
strategising. At times, this tension yielded a welding of categories, such as the 
hybrid construction of the private-public spaces of the tent-dwelling enclaves; 
on other occasions, it created double-layered configurations whose interpre-
tation was grounded in intertextual invocation; on yet other occasions, irony 
became the trope through which order in the guise of respectability and official 
Figure 7.18 ‘All Israel are tents to one another’ – a playful variation on a 
 religious proverb (Photo: O. Livio).
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power was playfully challenged by dissident voices. This often took the form of 
word play anchored in a shared knowledge of language or allusion to a shared 
fund of cultural texts.
As has been the case in protest sites around the world,50 the Israeli protest 
terrain also harboured a fruitful tension between the abstractness of general 
proclamation and the specificity of down-to-earth policy discussions. This was 
reflected in the use of broad and abstract terms such as ‘the people’, ‘the protest’ 
or ‘justice’, on the one hand, and the requirement to translate these broad cate-
gories into the specifics of actual policies and allocation of public resources on 
the other. While the social and economic policy discussions that dominated the 
scene of dialogue circles were mainly conducted through reasoned argument 
and debate, the protest’s abstract ‘umbrella terms’ animated these discussions by 
serving as inspirational tools of identification and mobilisation. Thus, the same 
questions kept returning in different guises: Was it one or many protests? How 
inclusive could references to ‘the people’ claim to be? Was it serious political 
action or just a utopian diversion? What counts as social justice? While answers 
were diverse, their very posing as a common concern signalled the distinctive 
flavour of the summer protest – a self-reflexive critical stance that blended a 
seriously committed activist spirit with the liminal playfulness of carnival.
More than two years after the protest’s demise (at the very least, as a large-
scale social phenomenon), many of the questions posed throughout its lifecycle 
remain unresolved. Its legacy remains controversial and open to different inter-
pretations, and while on the one hand it was argued that it is ‘the only protest 
movement in the Middle East … which has not achieved any of its aims’,51 it 
was also pronounced successful in changing the contours of Israeli discourse and 
shifting the political agenda so as to place engagement with socioeconomic issues 
on a par with political security-oriented ones.52 But it has also  solidified the sepa-
ration between these two domains. Thus, the results of the 2013  elections have 
been interpreted both as a symbol of the protest’s success (particularly in the 
meteoric rise of the Yesh Atid party, with its nostalgic, middle-class appeal) and 
as evidence of its failure, due to its ‘inability to create a new political language 
that links the question of social justice to the regime that discriminates against 
various groups because of their identity’.53 
In considering the implications of these competing interpretations, and 
more generally the protest’s complex and often internally contradictory arena, 
some themes emerge that appear to complicate Turner’s conceptualisation 
of structure, communitas and the relationship between them. Clearly, some 
features of communitas were easily recognisable in this form of protest – its exis-
tential spirit, its emergence within liminal spaces at the interstices of structure, 
its constant generation and regeneration of playful symbols and metaphors, 
its challenge to hierarchical social relations, its abstract philosophical stance 
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and subjunctive mood, and its lived experience as an out-of-time, out-of-place 
phenomenon with a distinctly sacred aura – which turned protest sites into 
cultural attractions for ‘pilgrimage’ tours.
 In terms of its developmental process, too, the 2011 protest appears to follow 
some of Victor Turner’s proposed trajectory, including the emergence of bureau-
cratic structures and the gradual imposition of norm-governed practices and 
activities – as well as the transition by several protest leaders into the institu-
tionalised political arena.54 At the same time, some characteristics appear to 
be more ambiguous. In particular, communitas and structure are for the most 
part interimplicated in terms of both space and time, and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the ‘end result’ of the liminal moment does not appear to map neatly 
onto either of Turner’s classificatory schemes of schism or re-integration. In 
some ways, traditional structural arrangements appear to have reasserted their 
dominance – particularly with regard to divisions between social groups within 
Israeli society and the primacy of a republican ethos of differential rights for 
different citizens based upon different perceptions of relative ‘contribution’ 
to the Israeli collective (itself considered as primarily Jewish). In other ways, 
the protest movement appears, at the very least, to have invigorated citizens 
who had formerly experienced a sense of powerlessness, providing them with 
‘rhetorical and operational openings’55 for imagining newfound civic and demo-
cratic possibilities. 
In his later work,56 Turner attempted to clarify some of the ambiguities arising 
from the possibilities inherent in liminal moments. Considering the potential 
effects of these moments, he wrote that:
I sometimes talk about the liminal phase being dominantly in the ‘subjunctive 
mood’ of culture, the mood of maybe, might be, as if, hypothesis, fantasy, 
conjecture, desire – depending on which of the trinity of cognition, affect and 
connation is situationally dominant. Ordinary life is in the indicative mood, 
where we expect the invariant operation of cause and effect, of rationality 
and commonsense. Liminality can perhaps be described as a fructile chaos, a 
storehouse of possibilities, not a random assemblage but a striving after new 
forms and structures.57
It is perhaps this conceptualisation of liminality as a ‘storehouse of possibilities’ 
that is of most theoretical relevance here for thinking about the sociopolitical 
implications of moments of communitas. There is a tendency, among commen-
tators as well as academics, to consider the consequences of ritual and liminality 
as dichotomous entities: either celebrating their anti-structural achievements 
or lamenting their failure to achieve revolutionary ends and constructing them 
as futile exercises of self-congratulatory pseudo-resistance.58 Our analysis of 
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the 2011 protest movement suggests that neither of these evaluations captures 
the contradictory nature of such moments. Protest may be both structural and 
anti-structural, frivolous and serious, reformist and conservative. Evaluating its 
meanings and effects requires close attention to both temporality and scale, and 
assessing its long-term consequences in real time, or shortly thereafter, is a risky 
endeavour indeed.
In work closely related to Turner, but not directly aligned with his own publi-
cations, a variety of scholars have addressed the fascinating phenomenon of key 
moments and/or spaces in which dominant societal norms and conventions are 
temporarily suspended, and which give rise to a sense of communitas and a belief 
in people’s power to liberate their thought and/or effect considerable social 
change.59 One of the most consistent observations of such research has been 
that such moments and spaces are, for the most part, evanescent. Fundamental 
structural change is possible, but rare. In most cases, when the prophecies asso-
ciated with the subjunctive moment fail, ‘structure return[s] and the movement 
becomes institutionalised, or the movement disintegrates and its members merge 
into the environing structured order’.60 Another common characteristic of these 
moments and spaces is that they tend to operate outside of the realm of that 
which is considered explicitly ‘political’ – in theatre and play, in performance 
and in various forms of popular and alternative culture. In fact, translating the 
achievements of the spirit of communitas arising in phenomena such as tent 
encampments and demonstrations into the realm of everyday politics appears 
to be extremely difficult.61
It would appear, therefore, that any theorising arising from the analysis 
of protest movements such as that which occurred in Israel in 2011 requires 
addressing these problematics; first, by considering the potentials and limita-
tions of evanescent moments and spaces, as well as perhaps the more implicit 
long-term implications that current theory tends to underestimate. What are the 
conditions under which the ‘storehouse of possibilities’ envisioned by Turner and 
others may retain some residual impact, influencing future structural relations in 
ways that may not be immediately identifiable? Jill Dolan’s notion of ‘utopian 
performatives’ may be helpful here.62 Whereas moments of communitas generally 
appear to be fleeting, perhaps the shared cultural imaginings, the destabilisation 
of categories formerly taken for granted, the experience of unexplored possi-
bilities and the sense of political efficacy they inspire, may eventually be realised 
to at least some extent by those whose imaginations have been thus transformed. 
Communitas, in this sense, may be conceptualised as an ongoing, fluctuating 
process rather than as a specific moment bound in time. Some evidence from the 
Israeli protest – including the explicit politicisation of a formerly excluded and 
indifferent generation of youngsters, as well as a noticeable shift in the topics 
raised in public discourse towards issues of class and social justice – suggests that 
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this possibility is perhaps not too far-fetched. At least some work on the long-
term effects of cultural resistance seems to support this view.63
Second, theorising communitas requires close scrutiny of the relation between 
performance, ritual, play and politics. In Turner’s scheme,64 social drama is funda-
mentally conceived as arising from a momentary disruption of the prevailing 
social order, which unfolds in sequential stages of breach, crisis and redress, 
resulting in schism or reintegration. We have already seen that this classifi-
cation is perhaps too tidy – as these stages may in fact be co-present rather than 
sequential, at least under some circumstances.65 As Turner gradually shifted his 
attention from more ‘compulsory’ rituals and dramas to the realm of voluntary 
performance and play,66 proposing the somewhat ambiguous distinction between 
‘liminal’ and ‘liminoid’ phenomena (the former associated with obligatory ritual, 
the latter with voluntary leisure and play), the relation between the ‘realm 
of primitive hypothesis’67 and real-world processes of social transformation 
remained underdeveloped. 
Analysis of the Israeli protest offers some rudimentary paths to further theo-
rising. It would appear that performance, ritual and play need to be closely 
examined for the variety of differential potentialities and possibilities they 
afford. Thus, for example, it appears that they are not always transgressive. Some 
possibilities may indeed challenge the prevailing order, but some may be more 
nostalgic and conservative. Potentially transgressive performances and subver-
sions such as those we witnessed at protest sites may function as ‘rehearsals’ 
for real-world changes, but they may also operate as a ludic diversion that is 
decidedly anti-confrontational and avoids addressing real-world inequalities and 
injustices. The voluntary nature of such liminoid phenomena is to some extent 
a privilege enjoyed by the middle class, and this play may sometimes function 
as an escapist fantasy or safety valve rather than as a fundamentally anti-struc-
tural practice.68 Roger Caillois’ view of play as a continuum ranging from paidia 
(unstructured, spontaneous, anarchic) to ludus (structured, rule-governed) may 
be helpful here;69 while many of the performances we witnessed strove to project 
an image of paidia, their reliance on mainstream culture, their accommodation 
to well-established theatrical norms and their nostalgic spirit may situate them 
more in the realm of ludus, and thus help explain the ultimately traditionalist 
spirit of much of Israeli protest culture.
Finally, it is clear that the relationship between communitas and physical 
space must continue to be examined, particularly at a time when social move-
ments are increasingly using the opportunities provided by new media to extend 
their activities into the virtual sphere. If there is one common finding to all 
research investigating the social protest movements of 2011 across the globe, 
it is that physical space and embodied presence still matter; that it is the recla-
mation and appropriation of real, quotidian public space by real flesh-and-blood 
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individuals that enables the crucial, if limited, opening of new imaginaries of 
democratic possibility. This does not, of course, guarantee positive consequences, 
nor does it mean that cyberspace is irrelevant. And while it appears to be clear 
that physical public space is required for the emergence of communitas, the 
space of new social media may enhance the possibilities for this public space to 
maximise its effect through a new ‘logic of aggregation’70 that encourages masses 
of individuals from diverse backgrounds to assemble within emotionally infused 
physical spaces.
As the protest moves farther away from the present time and towards the 
realm of memory and (sometimes) nostalgia, it appears that a significant portion 
of social discourse continues to address its measurable effects and legacy. These 
discussions tend to focus on issues of practical efficacy, which, while certainly 
important, are not the only way to consider what the protest has achieved. 
From an anthropological standpoint, no less important are those questions that 
relate to the post-liminal phase, which in this case, as we have seen, fits neither 
a schism nor a re-integration model neatly. Addressing such questions at this 
point may be premature. We believe that a closer look at the actual play of 
symbols and practices associated with liminal times and their structural and 
anti-structural impulses may help us move from questions of practical efficacy 
to questions of cultural meanings, that is, to an anthropology of protest cultures.
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Gandhi, Camera, Action! 
India’s ‘August Spring’
Christopher Pinney
Chapter 8
The Arab Spring has leaked into India, albeit in a humid late-monsoon incar-
nation: ‘Anna’s August Spring’ was one prominent television slogan which 
sought to link the neo-Gandhian at the heart of the movement described here 
to events in Egypt and North Africa. However, if events in (what is usually 
referred to, sensibly, in India as) ‘West Asia’ were truly seismic, articulating aspi-
rations so long-suppressed that they acquired a quality of newness, in South Asia 
the ‘August Spring’ was incarnated as a repetition. Not so much an earthquake 
as a burp or belch from the past.
Popular visual culture in India, and the politics it mobilises, continues to play 
out a set of political concerns and ‘media tactics’ whose basic infrastructure and 
parameters have been established over the last century. This chapter explores 
how these constraints have operated within the context of the recent mass 
anti-corruption movement focused initially on Anna Hazare and subsequently 
the Right to Information activist Arvind Kejriwal. These parameters involve a 
recurrent citationality, which following the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss 
we might conceive of as a kind of bricolage, a logic, or science, of the concrete, 
involving the recirculation of a ready to hand syllabary through which the 
bricoleur speaks through the ‘medium of things’.1 Lévi-Strauss drew a contrast 
between the ‘engineer’ who mobilised ‘raw materials and tools conceived and 
procured for the purposes of the project’ and the bricoleur whose ‘universe of 
instruments is closed’ and whose tools are ‘the contingent result of all the occa-
sions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the 
remains of previous constructions or destructions’.2 This bricolage involves the 
circulation of signs rather than concepts, an increasing velocity of previously 
available meaning which (to deliberately corrupt Frederick Jameson) demands 
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that what is potentially politically efficacious is always ‘half-seen in advance’3 
and which (to develop a Deleuzian metaphor) folds inside and outside , signifier 
and signified into ‘media-folds’ of origami-like complexity.4 This examination 
of political discontent in contemporary India will take us across the country 
through a travel narrative that progresses from Delhi in the north, proceeds to 
Madhya Pradesh in central India (and the town and village where I have been 
conducting anthropological fieldwork and visual research intermittently since 
1982) and finishes in Mumbai on Anand Chaudas (blissful fourteenth) when 
tens of thousands of images of the god Ganesh are immersed in the Arabian Sea. 
In late August of 2011 much of India was transfixed by the actions of the 
septuagenarian neo-Gandhian Anna Hazare. Fasting, possibly until death (he 
would curtail his hunger strike on the thirteenth day), he sat on a stage in Delhi’s 
Ramlila grounds underneath a large photographic image of M. K. Gandhi. The 
events at the Ramlila grounds received ever-increasing media coverage: dozens 
of Indian news channel crews erected their own stages on the edge of the 
ground, numerous cameras mounted on cranes documented every moment and 
the visual image of Anna Hazare as a ‘second Gandhi’ or ‘come-again Gandhi’ 
was beamed across the country twenty-four hours a day. 
The relationship between Anna Hazare and M. K. Gandhi powerfully 
demonstrates the continuing vitality of figures associated with anti-colonial 
nationalism, not simply as empty points of visual reference but as forces that 
continue to animate, in complex ways, the political landscape and the repertoire 
of political possibilities in India. If, as is often claimed, Hazare is in some sense 
‘repeating’ Gandhi, can we also detect a more widespread repetition and citation 
at work which embeds contemporary Indian politics in something akin to what 
Jameson termed a ‘Third World allegory’?5 It is this (I use the term advisedly) 
‘burden’ of India’s colonial history which I hope to illuminate in this chapter, 
together with Gayatri Spivak’s Derridean notion of the ‘graphic of iterability’6 
and a Deleuzean ‘texturology’ which tangles the inside in the ‘pleats of matter’7 
and what he elsewhere describes as ‘moving, living folds’.8 
The Indian political ‘archive’ is highly dynamic, an unstable location which 
has certain authorising functions but is continually spewing the past into the 
future. Aspects of this idiom were described as the ‘recursive archive’ in an 
earlier book, Photos of the Gods,9 in relation to commercial artists’ often extensive 
collections of earlier image production. These were used as storehouses of future 
potential visualisation and were commonly drawn upon to solve issues relating 
to present-day commissions. None of these images were sedimented: they all 
remained ‘live’, ready to fall into a future which was yet to be.
In a similar manner, the recent Anna Hazare agitation ‘folded’ itself into 
a past which it remade anew. Centrally conceived as a kind of deformative 
iteration (‘second Gandhi’ or aj ke Krishna – ‘Krishna for today’), the campaign 
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also oriented itself around a host of popular media iterations of the history which 
empowered the movement. These included Gandhi updated via the Hindi film 
Lage Raho Munna Bhai (Carry On Munna Brother) and a script already partly 
written by Rang de Basanti (Colour of Spring), the film which perhaps more than 
any other spectacularly negotiates the role of the archive in the popular. 
The image and media-saturated nature of the Hazare political movement was 
immediately apparent as I approached the Ramlila grounds in Delhi in August 
2011: numerous commercial vendors were selling merchandise of various kinds. 
Firstly the ubiquitous Gandhi caps (topis) on which are printed main anna hun 
(I  am Anna) and which had become the almost universally worn uniform of his 
supporters. This was a reference to the Tunisian protesters’ identification with 
the self-immolating stallholder Mohamed Bouazizi and helps us make sense of 
some of the media parallels made between the Arab Spring and Hazare’s anti-
corruption movement. In addition to the caps, Indian flags in various sizes were 
available; also on sale were tricolour scarves that allowed followers to literally 
drape themselves in the national colours, plastic waistcoats with various anti-
corruption slogans and badges adorned with Hazare’s smiling face.
On entering the Ramlila ground one was immediately confronted with the 
tension between the de-individuating possibility of the topi which allowed 
everyone to fuse their identity with the leader and the desire to leave one’s 
Figure 8.1 A Hazare supporter adds his signature to a banner near the 
entrance to the Ramlila Maidan. August 2011 (Photo: C. Pinney).
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Figure 8.2 Aj ke Dhritarashtra (Today’s Dhritarashtra). A Photoshopped 
placard displayed at the Ramlila Maidan protest. Mother India is shown 
being disrobed in the centre of the image, Anna Hazare appears incarnated 
as Krishna on the left and a blind Manmohan Singh (the Prime Minister) 
appears on the right above Suresh Kalmadi and A. Raja (Photo C. Pinney).
 individual marks: large printed banners near the inside of the entrance were 
being energetically overlaid with thousands of signatures by those for whom 
simply also being Anna Hazare was insufficient (see Fig. 8.1). The individualism 
of those at the Ramlila ground was also apparent in the extraordinary profusion 
of hand-made images and texts which many protesters brought with them. These 
ranged from small photocopies – some advocating the hanging of members of 
the current government or depicting Hazare as a wrestler – to elaborate collaged 
spreads, to complex cartoons and paintings (often dependent on the pun that 
Anna was not andhi [blind] but was Gandhi) to Photoshopped visual allegories 
(Aj ke Dhritarashtra) that depicted Hazare as a modern-day Krishna, fighting (in 
a reanimation of the Mahabharata struggle) corrupt figures such as the disgraced 
head of the Commonwealth Games Committee (Suresh Kalmadi) and a poli-
tician implicated in a $40 billion 2G telecom spectrum sales scam (A. Raja), 
these being presided over by the ‘blind’ Manmohan Singh who echoes the blind 
Dhritarashtra (see Fig. 8.2). 
Dhritarashtra, described in the Mahabharata, was blind from birth, was the 
father of the Kauravas and uncle to the five Pandavas with whom his sons fought 
the Kurukshetra war. He was present when Yudhisthira lost the dice game, and 
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Figure 8.3 Ye hai hamari andhi sarkar (This is our blind government). Placard 
displayed at India Gate. A distinctively attired Manmohan Singh is shown 
blindfolded in the centre of the image (Photo: C. Pinney).
remained silent when Dushasana tried to disrobe Draupadi (the Pandavas’ wife) 
in front of the court. The disrobing of Draupadi, an episode endlessly visualised 
in early lithography, then film and subsequently television10 became perhaps 
the archetypal trope of a subjugated India whose chastity was threatened by 
colonisers. 
Other imagery on display mobilised maps of India with Mother India at the 
centre flanked by images of Gandhi and Anna Hazare with slogans such as 
Bhrashtachar Bharat Choro! (Corruption Quit India!), or maps of India in front of 
which were depicted three monkeys illustrating the (originally Japanese) visual 
proverb ‘see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’. Gandhi was very attached to 
a small wooden carving of three monkeys gifted to him by Chinese devotees. 
These seem to creatively deform the original East Asian motif into a warning 
about the dangers of a government which chooses not to see what is occurring 
in front of it: the images served as demands to look at and confront evil in the 
form of corruption. One protester at the post-fast ‘victory’ celebrations at Indian 
Gate brought his own placard which depicted a blindfolded Manmohan Singh 
unable to see his ministers scurrying away with briefcases filled with cash under 
the slogan Yeh hai hamari andhi sarkar: puri bhrast (This is our blind government: 
completely corrupt) (see Fig. 8.3).
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Across this incredible range of visual creativity a common theme emerged: 
Anna Hazare was an echo of something or someone else: usually Gandhi, but 
sometimes also Krishna. It was this secondary identity (dusra Gandhi, or ‘second 
Gandhi’, see Fig. 8.4) that was foregrounded far more insistently than any ‘self-
present’ claim he might be able to make (as an ex-army sergeant turned village 
disciplinarian who has spent many decades campaigning against alcohol and meat 
consumption in his Maharashtrian village). His campaign, indeed, mobilised 
several of the tropes that feature in late-twentieth-century printed images of 
punishments in hell. Usually known as karni bharni (roughly, reap as you sow) 
or karma ke phal (the fruits of karma), these images pair deeds and consequences, 
showing misdemeanours and their punishment. Most illustrate the taking of 
bribes (rishvat lene) through images of smoky backrooms in which sinister men 
smoke, drink and play cards. The black marketeer and the tax defaulter are also 
frequently depicted. These are part of a popular visual culture and moral conser-
vatism which seems to directly inform Anna Hazare’s worldview.
The Hazare campaign’s own website (www.annahazare.org) celebrates his 
achievements over many years in his natal Maharashtrian village of Ralegan 
Siddhi, noting that ‘Today the villagers have completely given up brewing of 
liquor. Nobody sells liquor in the village. Further, the shopkeepers [have not 
sold] cigarettes, beedies and tobacco … for the last 13 years.’ 
Figure 8.4 A painted banner displayed at India Gate showing Anna Hazare as 
a ‘second Gandhi’ (Photo: C. Pinney).
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Press reports indicate that this transformation was built upon the public 
thrashing of alcoholics by Hazare himself (they are tied to a pole and he thrashes 
them with his army belt). Indeed, he has frequently asserted the desirability of 
hanging corrupt politicians and ‘cutting off the hands’ of thieves. India Today 
suggested that ‘Anyone who drinks [in Ralegan Siddhi] gets a lashing more 
reminiscent of Pakistan in the reactionary age of General Zia-ul-Haq’,11 but we 
might also add that it is reminiscent of the moral codes of karni bharni. Hazare 
was quoted as saying that compulsive drinkers are taken to the
temple and he has to swear by God that he won’t drink in future. And [if] 
even after all this he drinks then we will tie him up to the electric pole in 
front of the temple and then beat him up so that he gets scared.12 
Alongside the ‘secondary’ echoes in which Anna was a come-again Gandhi 
re-enacting the messianic iconography of karni bharni imagery, there was also a 
set of three-way refractions through which Anna Hazare was imagined through 
the already mediated image of commercial cinema’s depiction of Gandhi and 
other anti-colonial nationalists of the early twentieth century. Most of this was 
presented in ways which were immediately graspable to the audience co-present 
at the Ramlila ground but which, nevertheless, for our purposes here requires 
some careful unpacking and analysis.
Figure 8.5 A Hazare supporter displays images including Lage Raho Anna 
Bhai (Photo: C. Pinney).
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In this spirit let us focus on one young man who wandered around the Ramlila 
grounds bearing a complex tableau of photocopied cartoons and collages (see 
Fig. 8.5). One of these showed Anna Hazare, wearing his trademark topi, riding 
a motorbike along with two key aides in what became known by the media 
as ‘Team Anna’: the former policewoman Kiran Bedi and the Right to Infor-
mation activist Arvind Kejriwal whose Aam Aadmi (Common Man) party, at 
the time of writing in mid-2013, spearheads the movement. Beneath this scene 
is the legend ‘Lage Raho Anna Bhai’ (‘Carry On Anna Brother’), a reference 
to the very popular film Lage Raho Munna Bhai (‘Carry On Munna Brother’) 
directed by Rajkumar Hirani in 2006, which made Gandhi the hallucinatory 
moral conscience of a small time Mumbai hoodlum.
It was through this film that Gandhi acquired a new potency in the form of 
Gandhigiri (Gandhi-coercion). Munnabhai, played by Sanjay Dutt, is infatuated 
with the voice of Jahnavi, a radio jockey on a Mumbai radio station. Hoping 
to meet her in person, he forces five experts at gunpoint to help him win a 
phone-in quiz on the Mahatma to commemorate Gandhi Jayanti (Gandhi’s 
birthday). This successful dadagiri (that is, the bullying behaviour associated 
with a dada or hoodlum) soon gives way to an equally efficacious Gandhigiri 
as Munna protects an old people’s home from an avaricious realtor (to whom 
the radio station’s listeners are urged to send flowers) who finds a hallucinatory 
Gandhi advising him on a new selfless mode of efficacy: moral power, rather 
than muscle power. The website www.Gandhigiri.org subsequently sanctified 
the interchangeability of dadagiri and Gandhigiri, noting that Sanjay Dutt, the 
film star, following his conviction for the possession of semi-automatic weapons, 
would be housed in the very same jail (Yerawada in Pune) that Gandhi had 
formerly occupied. This was grotesque irony translated into destiny. Cinema 
and televisual media once again prophesise the new world. This is a process 
with a venerable history in India as elsewhere: one thinks of Anuradha Kapur’s 
argument about the way in which early chromolithography, Parsi theatre and 
cinema helped make the Gods ‘more real’: ‘representationally the past and 
the present almost look the same: the time of the Gods appears to be “our” 
historical contemporary time’.13 Anna Hazare’s time − which was also Gandhi’s 
time – was the beneficiary of this historical echo chamber.
The film (Lage Raho Munna Bhai) brilliantly demolishes the empty ‘statist’ 
Gandhi. In one scene Munna, prompted by Gandhi himself, urges the removal 
of all Gandhi statues and the erasure of his name from all public thorough-
fares, and the subsequent internalisation in each person’s heart of Gandhi as 
a moral force, divorced from his hollow and used up state-approved manifes-
tation. Writing at the time of the film’s release, Arunabha Ghosh and Tapan 
Basu observed that the film shrinks from embracing any thoroughgoing 
radical re-envisionment of Gandhi’s politics: it continually edges towards and 
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then retreats from the  possibility of ‘being mired in Gandhi’s socioeconomic 
thoughts – a complete no-no for today’s consumer economy driven India’.14 
This ‘re-purposing’ of Gandhian thought for a neoliberal context perhaps helps 
explain the easy mobilisation of Lage Raho in the context of the Anna Hazare 
campaign.
Hazare’s campaign came to a climax on the final Saturday in August 2011 
when the Indian Parliament was forced to debate – against the background of 
Anna’s deteriorating health − the campaign’s demands for a Jan Lokpal (people’s 
ombudsman) bill, which would counter corrupt practices. Parliament voted in 
principle to proceed with the investigation of the possibility of such a bill and 
Hazare announced that he would terminate his fast the following morning. This 
announcement was made while Hazare sat on stage with two media figures who 
are of relevance to the narrative advanced here. One was Rajkumar Hirani, 
the director of Lage Raho Munna Bhai, the movie which had established much 
of the cinematic infrastructure for Anna Hazare’s own incarnation of ‘Gandhi, 
Camera, Action!’ The other was Aamir Khan, who had been directed in a 
later movie by Hirani (3 Idiots) but who is perhaps best known for his role in 
Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra’s Rang de Basanti (2006), a film about the revolu-
tionary freedom fighter Bhagat Singh, the biggest grossing Hindi film of that 
year, with Bafta and Academy Award nominations.
Bhagat, a revolutionary Marxist executed by the British in 1931, remains prom-
inent in many South Asians’ consciousness, and Rang de Basanti was a sustained 
exercise in the ‘folding’ of the past into the present, an exemplary instance of 
‘texturology’. The film pushed cinema’s temporal involutionary potential to its 
furthest limit through its juxtaposition of different, co-present, histories which 
gave it the status of a kind of meta-text of the possibilities of historical repetition 
and bricolage. Mehra’s own website gives the following synopsis:
A young London-based filmmaker chances upon the diaries of her grandfather 
who served in the British police force in India during the freedom struggle 
… She comes down to Delhi, and casts a group of five friends to play the 
pivotal roles of these revolutionaries. However, products of modern India, the 
five youngsters initially refuse to be part of the project as they don’t identify 
with these characters from the past. Not surprising, since they’re part of a 
generation of Indians that believes in consumerism. To them patriotism and 
giving one’s life for one’s beliefs are the stuff stuffy text-books are made of. 
They would rather party than be patriots. In the film both the 1930s British 
India and the India of today run parallel and intersect at crucial points. As 
the film reaches its resolution the lines between past and present [blur] as 
they become one in spirit.
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This blurring is precipitated by the death of a friend, Ajay, a pilot in the 
Indian Air Force. His crash is ascribed by the authorities to pilot error, but the 
friends know that he was killed as the result of faulty parts that a corrupt defence 
minister acquired through a kickback deal. So the friends have to avenge them-
selves, just as Bhagat and friends had to avenge the death of Lala Lajpat Rai (who 
died as the result of injuries inflicted by the colonial police during the visit of 
the Simon Commission in 1928). Initially, they hold a candlelit protest at India 
Gate in Delhi, a gesture subsequently imitated by numerous other campaigns 
including Anna Hazare’s, who gathered at India Gate on the evening of the day 
on which Anna finally broke his fast. In Rang de Basanti past and present blur, and 
they murder the corrupt defence minister, a plot line deemed so incendiary that 
the film was screened privately for the Congress alliance, then Defence Minister 
Pranab Mukherjee, for prior approval. The same Pranab Mukherjee would, five 
years later, broker the rapprochement between the Congress Government and 
‘Team Anna’. At the Hazare India Gate event there was much evidence of the 
complexity of the historical echo chamber – for instance, the placard made by 
one protester which demanded that ‘Black Englishmen Quit India’ (Kale Angrezo 
Bharat Choro) and drew explicit parallels between the Quit India Movement of 
August 1942 and Anna’s movement of August 2011 (see Fig. 8.6).
Rang de Basanti offers a variety of conflicting positions: at the beginning we 
see Bhagat in sepia flashback reading Lenin in prison prior to his execution and 
Figure 8.6 Kale Angrezo Bharat Choro (Black Englishmen Quit India). Placard 
displayed at India Gate (Photo: C. Pinney).
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lamenting to McKinley who takes him to be hanged that he has interrupted the 
meeting of ‘one revolutionary with another’. Bhagat also tells McKinley that 
‘this isn’t the end, this is just the beginning’. But in the Rang de Basanti version 
one has to wonder − the beginning of what? Towards the end of the film, after 
the friends have stormed a radio station they tell Indian youth that they must 
‘get involved’, and here their revolutionary logic fails them since one of their 
suggestions to their disaffected countrymen is to ‘join the police’.
Although the film upset many on the right (and was reportedly pulled from 
all Gujarati cinema halls), many on the left saw it as an appropriation of a 
collective struggle for justice into a practice of statist proceduralism in which 
ideology was of no account, merely, participation – ‘doing something’. Many 
on the left complained that Rang de Basanti transformed Bhagat into a fashion 
accessory for Delhi’s disaffected young bourgeoisie in the same way that Lage 
Raho transformed Gandhi into a funky grandfather. 
In the autumn of 2012 Arvind Kejriwal struck out on his own, forming 
a political party (Aam Aadmi Party) and seemingly alienating himself from 
Hazare. He continues to struggle to establish an organisational base for the 
party but he has clearly signalled a trajectory that steers him away from the 
Gandhian ‘belch’. He now wears a topi with the slogan ‘Main hun aam aadmi’ (‘I 
am the common man’) and announced on 5 March 2013 that he would start an 
indefinite fast from 23 March which he hoped would become the focus of a new 
civil disobedience movement in which people would ‘stop paying their bills.’ 
Kejriwal points out that 23 March is no arbitrary date: it is, as he pointed out, 
‘the anniversary of Shaheed Bhagat Singh’s martyrdom’.15
Leaving Delhi and heading ten hours by train south to the town and village in 
Madhya Pradesh, which I have been visiting since 1982, I found myself speaking 
with Kailash ‘Haathi’, a commercial photographer and old friend. It turned out 
that he had travelled to the Ramlila grounds a week earlier in order to express 
his political support for the Hazare campaign. A friend had commented that 
there was no evidence of anyone from Malwa (this area of Madhya Pradesh) at 
the protests and that someone should go. Hence Kailash decided to paint himself 
in Indian national colours and, having affixed a spindly tail, incarnate himself 
as Hanuman (see Fig. 8.7). Being a photographer and having a son engaged in 
the family business ensured that his departure for Delhi was extensively docu-
mented photographically, and it was also covered by a local cable news network. 
But this was as nothing compared to what he termed (using the English phrase) 
the ‘total media coverage’ that awaited him in Delhi. Here he was interviewed 
by dozens of journalists and asked to dance continuously in a roped-off area in 
front of the main stage upon which Hazare sat. Kailash excitedly told me about 
his appearance on the
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Urdu channel, English channel, your Gujarati channel. Channels in the 
south. Wherever there is in the world, in all those channels. I went through 
the whole world. Also in China. A friend who works there in a factory rang 
his relative in Delhi and told him that he’d seen me [Hanuman] walking in 
Delhi.
Back in Madhya Pradesh his son used his mobile to film his father’s numerous 
appearances on national television and I was shown mp4 footage on the computer 
in their photostudio in another display of ‘folded’ media. 
As I headed further south, after two weeks in Madhya Pradesh en route to 
Mumbai, Anna Hazare’s presence continued to remain inescapable. I attended 
the Ganesh visarjan or immersion on Girgaum beach on a rainswept day 
throughout the course of which numerous small and massive Ganesh images 
were ‘cooled’ in the Arabian Sea. Many of these had been extracted from 
tableaux in which the anti-corruption movement had featured prominently: in 
one case Ganesh was paired with Anna Hazare holding a placard demanding 
‘Stop Corruption Now!’ In several other tableaux a topi-wearing Ganesh had 
himself become a recumbent Anna Hazare, just as the recumbent Anna Hazare 
at Ramlila Maidan had become Gandhi. Second Gandhi and second Ganesh: 
everything was already ‘half-seen-in-advance’ and in its familiarity seemed 
Figure 8.7 Kailash leaves Nadga Jn for Delhi’s Ramlila Maidan, dressed as the 
god Hanuman (Photo: Courtesy of K. Haathi).
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inevitable. This ‘involution’ is what Deleuze describes as the ‘fold’ – that kind 
of origami procedure that folds the inside and outside, past and future into each 
other in complex new ‘texturologies’ in which old surfaces and historicities no 
longer have fixed identities. 
The crowds at Girgaum, and elsewhere throughout western India on anand 
chaudas, have been gathering since the 1890s when the premier political theorist 
and nationalist of his epoch – Bal Gangadhar Tilak – decided that a collective 
occupation of public spaces by Hindus in the name of a colonially authorised 
‘religion’ was one way of circumventing the colonial state’s prohibition of poten-
tially ‘seditious’ political activity. This is one example of what elsewhere I have 
analysed as ‘iatrogenic’ politics and religion, a ‘contaminated’ and new hybrid 
form of activity precipitated by attempts to escape constraints imposed by the 
colonial state.16
Derrida was no doubt correct to observe (in a prefiguration of Latour) that the 
engineer is simply a myth invented by the bricoleur.17 (To put it in Latourian-
speak we might say that ‘We Have Never Been Engineers’). We are all brico-
leurs destined to fantasise about the possibility of becoming heroic engineers. 
Spivak points to a corresponding (i.e. symmetrical and inverted) danger of 
essentialising the stability of bricolage as a self-contained and self-present order 
Figure 8.8 Main anna nahin hun (I am not Anna) (Photographic montage by 
R. Rahman. Courtesy of R. Rahman).
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in which all possible terms are known in advance and are stable (i.e. ‘repetition 
without difference’ – the spurious certainty of speech). She points to a ‘graphic 
of iterability’ (we might think of this also as the logic of the concrete and of 
the mimetic) which introduces a slippage − a fundamental feature of iteration 
in which the self-sameness of the bricoleur transforms itself into its other.18 
Bricolage thus ceases to be a closed system and becomes instead a messy zone 
of citational creativity.
The ‘graphic of iterability’ may be obscure, expressed in this Derridean 
language. However, as part of the science of the concrete − speaking through 
the medium of things, through visual citation − it may be more easily graspable. 
Hence the artist Ram Rahman turns main anna hun into something iterably 
different − a topi worn by M. K. Gandhi declaring main anna nahin hun (I am not 
Anna) (see Fig. 8.8). Here Gandhi himself, ostensibly the ground zero authori-
sation of repetition without difference, insists on its impossibility − ‘We Have 
Never Been Engineers’, but equally, bricolage has always been performatively 
and deformatively ‘hot’ in being politically charged, and citation will always be 
creative and unpredictable.
To emphasise ‘hot’ bricolage is to stress the political potentiality of the cita-
tional practices which surround the anti-corruption movement in India. In a 
global frame, dissent continues to take sustenance from Gandhi as a symbol, 
perhaps in recognition of his early mastery of spectacle. He articulated his own 
‘science of the concrete’ through somatic experiments with his own body, and 
through the political mobilisation of material forms such as salt and khadi or 
homespun cloth.19 Gandhi was a presence in Tahrir Square through placards 
quoting him, and the Indian Ambassador to Egypt, Navdeep Suri, saw in 
Egyptian protesters’ chants of ‘silmayyiya’ (‘peaceful’ or ‘peacefully’) further 
proof of his impact.20
But it is also important to record the sense of impossibility and frustration 
that also characterises many village engagements with the movement, expressed 
perhaps most succinctly in the description of corruption being like ‘gajar ghas’ 
(‘carrot grass’). Carrot grass (Parthenium hysterophorus) is an invasive weed acci-
dentally introduced into India in the 1970s in imports of US red wheat, which 
once present in a field is impossible to eradicate. Another commonly invoked 
metaphor likens corruption to a bamboo splinter, once inserted impossible to 
extricate. 
Since the heady days of August 2011 the anti-corruption movement has split. 
Anna Hazare has retreated back to the security of Ralegan Siddhi, his Maha-
rashtrian village, and Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party, after dominating 
the headlines in late 2012 with a series of exposés of leading politicians, has 
struggled to build a political base, so far with little success.21 Indeed, one could 
argue that Anna Hazare movement’s chief legacy is mass public support for the 
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Aadhaar, or the Unique Identification Scheme currently being trialled in various 
states including Madhya Pradesh. I was able to get myself enrolled, temporarily, 
in November 2012 and experienced the procedure at first hand. This system will 
eventually attach a twelve-digit number to a facial photograph, retinal scans and 
finger and thumb prints of every Indian citizen. Once ‘all residents are enrolled’ 
it will be impossible, it is claimed, to activate a mobile phone SIM card, open 
a bank account or travel in any reserved category on the railways without this 
twelve-digit number. Aadhaar is an astonishingly ambitious database with huge 
potential for state misuse, and yet every village and small-town resident with 
whom I have spoken embraces this project warmly. Their self-willed interpel-
lation into the state appears to promise a freedom through visibility. As one 
low-paid labourer (in whom I had hoped to find evidence of subaltern resistance) 
told me, once he has his number he will be able to travel the whole length 
of India without rok-tok (obstacles or obstructions). Others stress the manner 
in which the namber (number) will prevent those without entitlement from 
claiming Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards that give them access to subsidised 
rations. State surveillance, in other words, promises to regulate petty corruption.
The perhaps surprising enthusiasm for Aadhaar by those who see in it the 
utopian possibility of finally achieving a citizenship of proper entitlement and 
free passage expresses a desire for a new form of contract between citizen and 
state of the kind that the Anna Hazare campaign foregrounded. This willing 
embrace of the necessity of making oneself visible to the state can be seen 
as one response to the persistent discourses around state ‘blindness’ that have 
emerged in recent anti-corruption agitations. Citizen-produced imagery, as we 
have already seen, repeatedly conjured a state blind to the injustices suffered 
by its citizens. Manmohan Singh was depicted as the blind king Dhritarashtra, 
and as head of an ‘andhi sarkar’ (‘blind government’). In choosing to see only 
the benefits of Aadhaar, rather than its potentially huge disciplinary capability, 
Indians might be understood to be seeking the rectification of an imbalance in 
the distribution of the visible in ways that would not surprise Jacques Rancière.22 
In India, as elsewhere, a movement of dissent seems to be laying the foundations 
for a future regime which will better be able to regulate dissent.
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Short Circuits: The Aesthetics of Protest, 
Media and Martyrdom in Indian 
Anti-corruption Activism
Martin Webb
Chapter 9
Introduction 
Protest movements do not just emerge out of nothing, however sudden their 
spectacular mobilisation might seem. They often have a hidden archaeology of 
sustained, less visible activism. In this chapter I develop two interwoven narra-
tives that explore this in the context of India. One provides background and 
historical context to complement the chapter by Christopher Pinney for this 
volume, outlining a before and after to his rich visual analysis of the huge Indian 
anti-corruption protests during August 2011. I do this by looking at the emer-
gence and organisation of some of the activist networks which gathered around 
the campaign for a Jan Lokpal (people’s ombudsman) bill, figureheaded by the 
activist and social reformer Anna Hazare. I go back to a period before the events 
of 2011 to sketch out the shape of the well-established anti-corruption activist 
‘scene’ from which the initial mobilisation for the protests developed. Drawing 
on fieldwork carried out in Delhi before and after the height of the protests of 
2011, I explore how the relatively settled and stable connections and everyday 
practices of the anti-corruption scene were overlaid with a more dynamic and 
confrontational mode of engagement drawing on earlier repertoires of protest 
promoted in part through the use of social media and the development of a 
strong movement brand.
A second ethnographic narrative traces earlier iterations of protests in support 
of a Jan Lokpal bill through to an anti-corruption rally in Delhi in 2012, a rally 
held during a period in which the movement was widely seen to be waning. Here 
we see how the visual metaphors and narratives employed by anti-corruption 
activists show a shift in relation to themes of sacrifice, citizenship, the nation 
and, in particular, martyrdom. This shift is illuminating. When leading activists 
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undertake spectacular fasts, as in 2011, the potential for sacrifice and martyrdom 
is presented as a pregnant possibility. This possibility plays a central part in the 
rhetoric of the protest as the vital signs, the weight, blood sugar and pressure, 
heart rate and liver function of the person fasting are monitored and relayed to 
the expectant crowd and media. The monitoring of the suffering body of the 
person fasting creates a liminal moment, a collective holding of breath, which 
forestalls other potential modes of protest, in particular violence. The fasting 
body of the movement leader provides a centre around which other strategies 
and events are organised, both for and against the cause. 
But the risks inherent in these highly monitored ‘fasts unto death’ might be 
contrasted to the risks faced by ordinary anti-corruption activists from around 
India. In recent years a number of activists have been murdered for attempting 
to expose corrupt or illegal practices in their local areas. The use in the 2012 
protest described here of narratives and iconic imagery of these (extra)ordinary 
activists tells us something else about the anti-corruption movement which goes 
beyond a focus on the hot and spectacular phase of protest. It shows us how the 
anti-corruption scene celebrates itself through these icons of everyday struggle 
and in doing so creates a self-sustaining narrative that highlights continuity. 
In demonstrating how the ‘second freedom struggle’ can literally be a matter 
of life and death, anti-corruption activists present their work as a meaningful 
ongoing process rather than as subject to externally applied categories of success 
or failure.
In thinking about activism in this processual way I would argue that it is 
important to look beyond the hot phase of the protests in order to contextualise 
these political movements; to look around their edges and behind the scenes 
to better understand not just their novelty, but also something of their histories 
and social lives. In doing so we might learn something about how activists 
imagine the worlds that their actions prefigure, and the role that this plays in 
the style and practice of the action. We might also think, in this case, about how 
corruption and anti-corruption are such ‘fecund signifiers’1 that they allow short 
circuits to be made between the different levels through which people under-
stand and experience their citizenship, between the micro interpersonal/local 
and the national and transnational. These discursive short circuits allow people 
to connect everyday struggles to larger themes, producing not just imaginations 
of the state,2 but understandings of why things are as they are and what might 
be done to effect change.
In this respect the politics of anti-corruption, by connecting everyday local 
events to a sense of national malaise, allows the incorporation of disparate social 
and political subjectivities − strange bedfellows − and the projection of an 
uncritical politics focused on the formal citizenship of an imagined Aam Aadmi 
(common man). Like that of the ‘unknown soldier’, the experience and struggle 
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of the Aam Aadmi is a singularity through which threats to the nation might be 
rhetorically expressed, but also, through action in the form of individual active 
citizenship, and sacrifice in the form of abstinence (from food or bribery), or 
even martyrdom, a means by which national renewal is presented as a possibility. 
Movements and Scenes: A Partial History of Anti-corruption 
Activism in India
Since independence in 1947, corruption has been a recurring public concern 
in India and movements against corruption have played a significant role in 
the political landscape that can be traced through to the present day. The first 
Five Year Plan for the nation declared ‘a continuous war against every species 
of corruption within the administration as well as in public life generally’.3 
Subsequent reports into the reform of public administration identified a need to 
simultaneously promote public virtue and put mechanisms in place that would 
mitigate opportunities for patronage,4 a policy narrative which has remained 
fundamentally unchanged.5 In the 1950s and 60s the voices and moral authority 
of veteran Gandhian, Sarvodaya (progress for all), and socialist activists such as 
J. B. Kripalani and Jayaprakash (JP) Narayan were significant in developing a 
political narrative which attributed bureaucratic and political corruption to an 
incomplete revolution at independence. Systems, privileges and personnel had 
been carried over from the colonial administration into the new civil services 
in the haste to start the country on the course of national development, they 
argued, and national renewal was required to set the country back on course.6 
This narrative and the actions which flowed from it provide the antecedents of 
the ‘second freedom struggle’ discourse prevalent today in contemporary Indian 
anti-corruption activism.7 
The first iteration of this ‘second freedom struggle’ was the emergence in 
the early 1970s of a non-violent mass movement for bureaucratic and political 
reform in the northern state of Bihar, led by JP Narayan. What became known 
as the ‘JP movement’ took on national significance and posed a direct challenge 
to the government of Indira Gandhi,8 accusing her of corruption and misrule. A 
simultaneous legal challenge in the Uttar Pradesh High Court to the legitimacy 
of Indira Gandhi’s election to parliament by her electoral opponent Raj Narain, 
citing corruption, malpractice and a lack of transparency in her constituency 
campaign,9 also put pressure on the Prime Minister. Gandhi lost the case, invali-
dating her election, but managed to persuade the President that the threat of 
political disorder required the suspension of democratic government. Emergency 
rule was declared in June 1975, remaining in force until 1977. JP Narayan and 
a great many other activists were arrested and jailed. Arguably the most signif-
icant political event and challenge to India’s democracy since independence had 
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been precipitated by an anti-corruption movement framed as a second freedom 
struggle, and by a legal case focused on issues of corruption, accountability and 
the abuse of power. 
Corruption stayed very much within the public consciousness through the 
post-emergency era and across the partial dismantling of the ‘License-Permit 
Raj’10 that took place with the liberalisation of the Indian economy after 1991. 
Although there was some reform and a reduction in the commanding role of the 
state, in line with the policy logic of good governance, economic liberalisation 
offered opportunities for new arrangements between state and private sector 
actors,11 and significant corruption ‘scams’ continued to dominate the news. 
With liberalisation came the emergence of a ‘new middle class’, a class less often 
employed as state bureaucrats but instead in newly developed sectors such as 
information technology and outsourced international business processes. Fear 
of, and dissatisfaction with, bureaucratic and political corruption became part 
of a new middle-class political subjectivity. Discourses of corruption became 
wrapped into new middle-class moralities and perceptions of the nation and 
of electoral representation, and into everyday social distinctions and spatial 
politics, particularly in urban India.12
These political and economic events and social processes echo in the 
politics of the contemporary Indian anti-corruption activism scene13 which has 
coalesced since the mid-1990s through the intersection of campaigns and activist 
networks gathered around specific issues: for example, the institution and imple-
mentation of the Right to Information (known colloquially as the ‘RTI’); the 
declaration of assets and criminal records of political candidates; campaigns for 
judicial accountability; and most recently the campaign for a Jan Lokpal. Across 
the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of organisations emerged to engage with 
concerns about corruption, aiming to encourage Indian citizens to take a more 
active role in auditing and monitoring the public sector. Rural organisations, such 
as Anna Hazare’s Bhrashtachar Virodhi Jan Andolan (People’s Movement Against 
Corruption) (BVJA) in Maharashtra, or the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan 
(Labourers and Farmers Power Organisation) (MKSS) in Rajasthan, deploying a 
‘movement’ style of pro-poor, non-party, voluntary political action at the ‘grass-
roots’,14 and associating broadly with the secular left in Indian politics, gained 
prominence for their work in accessing official documents through which the 
implementation of the government’s pro-poor development projects could be 
audited.15 In southern India, metropolitan middle-class NGOs such as Loksatta 
in Hyderabad and the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore took on corruption 
and governance as a central theme in their work, developing local constitu-
encies and gaining prominence in national and international policy circles.
Urban grassroots groups such as the East Delhi based Parivartan gained promi-
nence in the early 2000s, taking the tactic of social audit backed up by legal 
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mechanisms for transparency and accountability into impoverished working-
class neighbourhoods and developing links between well-connected middle-
class activists and the urban poor.16 The success of Parivartan in particular 
lifted the putative leader of the group, Arvind Kejriwal, at the time a senior 
Internal Revenue Service Officer, to national prominence, even before he took 
his leading role in the anti-corruption protests of 2011. This period also saw 
the emergence of the National Campaign for the People’s Right to Information 
(NCPRI) and the related Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR). Both 
groups were oriented to lobbying central government and using legal provisions 
such as public interest litigation (PIL) to institute legal measures to combat 
bureaucratic and political corruption. Significant milestones were the success 
of the ADR campaign in 2002 to require election candidates to file affidavits 
detailing their criminal, financial and educational backgrounds, and the central 
role which leading NCPRI activists17 played in the drafting process for the Right 
to Information Act of 2005.18
The period which saw the opening-up of the Indian state and economy 
under liberalisation also saw the mainstreaming of ‘rights-based approaches’ to 
development in the language of donors, governments and development practi-
tioners,19 and the penetration of international good governance policy norms 
focused on transparency and accountability into state planning.20 This shift 
helped to open up the administrative reform processes to accommodate roles 
for civil society organisations and advisors, an environment which allowed the 
activist scene to mature to the point that individual activists, CBOs or NGOs 
took up subcontracting roles providing expertise, training and media support 
to government, business and development agencies, as well as to other NGO 
networks. In turn some of this advocacy activity was funded through links main-
tained with international social entrepreneurship foundations, NGOs based in 
the Indian Diaspora, and through agencies such as the Ford Foundation.21 In 
these respects by the mid-2000s significant parts of the anti-corruption activism 
scene had been effectively ‘projectised’22 in that considerable material, organ-
isational, human and symbolic resources had gathered around particular issues, 
activist networks and prominent individuals.
Transparency and accountability mechanisms, such as the Right to Infor-
mation, have become emblematic of everyday struggles against corruption, 
presented as the tools through which the ‘common man’ might raise a voice 
and interrogate bureaucratic and political rule at both local and national levels. 
These are mechanisms provided for the use of Indian citizens whatever their 
class, status or political affiliation, although it is class, status and political affili-
ation that often determines the uses to which they are put.23 As well as playing a 
role in the ‘movement’ politics and actions of pro-poor CBOs, mechanisms such 
as the Right to Information Act 2005 were eagerly taken up by the ‘new middle 
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classes’24 of the ‘metro’ cities in local campaigns against corruption. In Delhi this 
happened particularly through Residents’ Welfare Association (RWA) activism 
oriented towards issues such as infrastructure maintenance, cleanliness, land use 
and the removal of slums, key features around which the reordering of urban 
spaces in India’s cities, highlighted in the recent work of a number of scholars, 
has taken place.25
As internet usage expanded in India, metropolitan middle-class activists and 
Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), particularly in the US, were also connecting 
with each other through busy message boards and forums with titles such as 
Hum Janenge (We will know) on which anti-corruption ‘crusaders’ would share 
experiences and discuss strategies and issues concerning the implementation 
of transparency mechanisms and legislation. Enmities as well as friendships are 
played out on message boards, especially through the participation of icono-
clastic individuals interested in questioning government policy and spending, 
but who are also highly suspicious of the politics of the more organised and insti-
tutionalised ‘activist’ scene and its leaders. Perhaps because of some activists’ 
and groups’ connections to secular left politics (since some groups support the 
rights of slum-dwellers and other marginalised groups in India’s cities), but often 
because of the suspicion that some activists were benefiting from funding that 
flowed from foreign sources and thus were involved in ‘anti-nation’ activities.26
Considering all this, we can appreciate why most of my earlier research into 
anti-corruption activism in Delhi took place not in situations of emotional 
street protest but in homes, workspaces and meeting rooms in which activists 
gathered to discuss the fine detail of strategy or the nuances of the law, to 
help clients with paperwork problems or to intercede in cases of bureaucratic 
delay.27 The aesthetic of the scene I researched in Delhi was a workaday one, the 
issues mostly personal to the clients that came to organisations for help. In the 
quotidian work of activists, ‘Corruption’ (Bhrashtachar) acted as a meta-concept 
to which other issues were linked. The term did not have the central signifi-
cance that it would take on during the protests of 2011. This is not particularly 
surprising; the hot phase of protests requires strong words around which people 
can gather. The everyday work of activism and advocacy employs a subtler and 
less confrontational use of language.
Within the anti-corruption scene prior to 2011 instances of spectacular 
protest, the emotionally charged dharna (sit-in) or the making of demands 
through public fasting, were exceptional. During my earlier fieldwork in Delhi 
I encountered two significant instances, and to connect the themes of active 
citizenship and sacrifice raised in the introduction with the more quotidian 
existence of the anti-corruption scene, it is to one of these that I will now turn.28
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System Rationalists and Satyagrahis
– An Earlier Campaign for a LokpaL
On a Sunday afternoon in late August 2007 I was sitting with a group of activists 
of the Gandhian Satyagraha Brigade (GSB) at a protest outside the gates of 
the Gandhi memorial garden at Raj Ghat in central Delhi. The group were 
gathering to protest at the government’s failure to introduce a bill to institute 
a parliamentary ombudsman, the Lokpal, who would have the power to hold 
members of parliament accountable and provide a mechanism through which 
complaints against them might be investigated. Although the agitation for a Jan 
Lokpal bill led by Anna Hazare in 2011 is perhaps the most prominent campaign 
to date, the issue is an old one. Versions of the Lokpal bill had been intro-
duced to parliament on eight occasions since the 1960s, but all had failed to 
pass through both houses. When the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance 
(UPA) government had come to power in 2004, it had included a promise to 
enact the bill as part of an administrative reforms agenda in the document 
setting out its aims, the ‘Common Minimum Programme’.29 By 2007 there had 
still been no movement on this issue and the GSB, after a long campaign of 
letter writing, had decided to move to a programme of outdoor protests, on every 
other Sunday, until the Lokpal bill was passed. 
The GSB is an offshoot of the Delhi chapter of the Lok Sevak Sangh (LSS), 
an NGO established in the late 1970s by activists imprisoned by the emergency-
era regime of Indira Gandhi. The LSS is in turn a wing of one of India’s oldest 
NGOs, the Servants of the People Society, founded in 1921 by the indepen-
dence movement leader Lala Lajpat Rai. The group is oriented to Gandhian 
social service and community development, but also has a long-held focus on 
corruption issues and on political corruption in particular. The Delhi chapter 
of the Lok Sevak Sangh is also notable because in the late 1990s it had taken 
on the responsibility of being the Indian franchise, for want of a better word, 
of Transparency International (TI), arguably the world’s best known and most 
influential anti-corruption NGO.
By the mid-2000s the LSS was largely an organisation of older ‘grey’ activists 
led by the then octogenarian Shambhu Dutt,30 a lawyer and freedom fighter 
involved in Gandhian social service since his participation in the Quit India 
movement. Many LSS/TI activists have held high rank in the civil and defence 
services, or in the judiciary, and as such the group has some influence and reach 
even if it does not have a great deal in the way of funds. This influence, the 
ability to gain the ear of high ranking contacts within the state, was central to 
the group’s strategy for promoting its aims and for encouraging government-
owned Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) involved in industries such as oil, 
gas and steel production to adopt Transparency International branded anti-
corruption products such as the ‘Integrity Pact’.31
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Thus the LSS draws together vernacular forms of Indian anti-corruption 
activism based on Gandhian principles of nation building and moral authority, 
the class and bureaucratic hierarchies of the Indian establishment and the brand 
name of an extremely influential international anti-corruption NGO. Taken 
together, these factors provide sufficient social and cultural capital to allow the 
LSS to send representatives to high-level forums such as the government of 
India’s Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), which in its final 
reports had recommended the institution of the Lokpal and the forfeiture of 
illegally held assets, two of the LSS’s main aims.32
The intended style of the Sunday protests had been set out in the minutes of a 
meeting earlier in the year. They stipulated that there be no eating and drinking 
at the protest, ‘no obstruction to traffic, no shouting of slogans’. The protest, 
in the form of a performance of satyagraha (truth force), was to be organised to:
scrupulously observe the following basic postulates laid down by the Father of 
our Nation, Mahatma Gandhi: a) Satyagraha is a tapasya (penance) for the 
truth; there is no place in it for untruth or violence. b) In Satyagraha there 
is no enemy, and no hatred or ill-will for the opponent; and c) A satyagrahi 
knows no defeat.33
Figure 9.1 The Gandhian Satyagraha Brigade protest in 2007 close to the gate 
of Raj Ghat, the memorial to and cremation site of M. K. Gandhi in Delhi 
(Photo: M. Webb).
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Figure 9.2 ‘Condemn Corruption: Bring Lokpal’ – sign around the neck of 
a fasting volunteer at the Gandhian Satyagraha Brigade protest at Raj Ghat 
2007 (Photo: M. Webb).
This aim produced a quiet and sober event. A white pandal (cloth tent), of the 
type used for outdoor social gatherings, had been hired and erected on a stretch 
of pavement across the busy road from the gate of the memorial garden. Inside 
the pandal a low dais covered in white cloth and with a few bolster cushions was 
erected, and at its foot were a small number of cloth-covered chairs for those 
attending in support. The dais was reserved for activists who had volunteered 
to fast for the day, identified by black armbands. Around the neck of one of the 
volunteers on red ribbon hung a simple black-on-white printed sign, ‘Condemn 
corruption – bring Lokpal’, providing legal detail to the simple white banner 
declaring ‘Satyagraha Against Political Corruption’ in blue lettering hung across 
the front of the pandal. The atmosphere inside was quite jovial. The activists, 
all middle-class men of retirement age, were very personable. They were here to 
support Shambhu Dutt, and were enjoying their Sunday out together (see Figs 
9.1 and 9.2).
Although Dutt was not fasting on this occasion, it was very much his moral 
authority that brought the men together. Through his life history Shambhu 
Dutt connected the protest to two significant events in the history of the Indian 
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nation. The original anti-colonial freedom movement in which Dutt had 
marched with M. K. Gandhi, and had been imprisoned by the British, and the 
emergency period from 1975 to 1977 during which he had been imprisoned again 
by the Indian government for his connection to the JP movement. Through the 
person of Shambhu Dutt the Sunday protests referenced both struggles, an idea 
reflected in the discourse of those present that the nation was undergoing a 
second freedom struggle, a struggle against the rule of corrupt politicians.
The conversation of the activists followed familiar registers of corruption 
talk in Delhi. They reflected the concerns and everyday complaints of upper-
middle-class residents of the city’s ‘garden colonies’34 that the city, and by 
extension the nation, was dysfunctional because of corruption. ‘Why were 
there so many unauthorised buildings in the city?’ ‘Because municipal engi-
neers have been bribed to turn a blind eye to their construction.’ ‘Why were 
the private buses in the city involved in so many accidents?’ ‘Because their 
rich and influential owners pay off the police and government inspectors to 
ignore the flouting of safety regulations and speed limits.’ ‘Why were the streets 
not cleaned properly?’ ‘Because the municipal sweepers were paying off their 
bosses to allow them to moonlight at other jobs.’ To paraphrase Evans-Pritchard 
on witchcraft amongst the Azande,35 corruption was presented as a means of 
explaining any ‘unfortunate events’. In turn these narratives were interspersed 
with stories of visits to relatives abroad, most often in the US or Canada, and 
descriptions of encounters with order and civility, civic pride, bureaucratic 
courtesy and efficiency beyond India. Another register dealt more specifically 
with the criminalisation of politics and the abuse of power by elected officials. 
Again this register is connected to the understanding of both the city and the 
nation and intersects with the middle-class concerns about ‘dirty politics’ so 
often expressed in the forums, both face to face and online, in which members 
of Delhi’s Residents Welfare Associations (RWAs) meet to discuss ways in 
which the city might be reordered.36
From these conversations a focus on fixing systems emerged. As one activist, 
a retired military officer who also acted as a consultant on governance issues, 
suggested, Babus (civil servants) had become so used to not being questioned 
that it is no surprise that they are confused when suddenly, through mechanisms 
such as the Right to Information, they are told that they should ‘entertain’ public 
grievances. But, he added, at the same time the officials can also reasonably 
claim, and often do, that they themselves are victims of an inflexible system. 
Thus, he argued, better systems, and a great deal of training, needed to be put in 
place that would allow people inside the government to stop pulling in different 
directions and start working for the public. Reproducing the development 
‘project speak’ prevalent in global efforts to promote governance,37 people like 
himself, he said, could have a role ‘training the trainers’. 
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The quiet nature of the protest allowed plenty of space for these conversa-
tions and also for other leisurely activities such as the breaking up and passing 
round of the Sunday paper, the ritual perusal of the matrimonial sections and the 
discussion of current affairs. My presence at the protests also provided some light 
relief and an opportunity to question a foreigner about my experience of India. 
Passers-by entering the gate of the Gandhi memorial garden opposite would 
look across at the protest but the lack of spectacle, the road that lay between 
the gate and the pandal and perhaps the sign being in English did not encourage 
many to make a closer inspection. 
Catching a lift back to south Delhi with four of the satyagrahis one Sunday 
after the protest, there was talk in the car of taking stronger action. One man 
in particular thought that the protest was too quiet and should take a more 
confrontational stance, but there seemed little chance at the time that this 
would happen. The protests produced a couple of columns in the Delhi papers, 
but no further media splash.38
2011 – Moving to the Centre
The GSB continued their letter-writing campaigns and occasional fasts between 
2007 and 2010, but by January 2011 they had decided to move their protest 
to the central Delhi site known as ‘Jantar Mantar’. The Jantar Mantar itself 
is an historical monument, a Mughal-era astronomical observatory sited a few 
hundred metres from the central New Delhi shopping area of Connaught Place. 
But behind the monument and running south towards the central government 
ministries, Parliament and the national monuments of India Gate and the Presi-
dent’s residence, is Jantar Mantar Road, Delhi’s authorised protest site for over 
two decades. The wide road allows space for thousands of people to gather and 
easy access for the outside broadcasting trucks of Delhi’s rolling news networks. 
It is often the site of long-term protests and fasts, with representatives of protest 
movements from all over India coming to the ‘centre’ to highlight their cause 
and petition the government. 
From the beginning of January 2011 the GSB organised a month-long ‘rolling 
fast’ at Jantar Mantar. An online petition started by the group set out the plan:
Members and supporters of GSB are sitting on a relay fast since Jan 01, 2011 
at Jantar Mantar, New Delhi […] A few members of GSB sit on hunger strike 
from 10:00 AM to 5:00 PM every day. This will continue till Jan 28, 2011. If 
the government does not do anything by Jan 29, then seven (7) Gandhians 
will go on a fast-unto-death from Jan 30 (Martyrs Day, the day Mahatma 
Gandhi died), 2011. The seven Gandhians who will go on the fast-unto-
death include six freedom fighters who took part in the Quit India Movement 
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and later struggles […] The ever-increasing corruption is destroying, nay, has 
destroyed, the moral fibre of the Nation. Corruption is not an issue limited 
to any one or a few political parties. Who will set this right, where shall 
a common citizen go, for the elimination of political corruption, except 
pressure from all, or a significant proportion of concerned citizens?39 
The GSB’s decision to move to a ‘fast-unto-death’ could have serious conse-
quences: the youngest of the six satyagrahis was seventy-eight years old. But the 
wider context in which the fast was taking place had also changed. Revelations 
of massive corruption scandals relating to the preparations for the Common-
wealth Games and the selling-off of bandwidth licences for the next generation 
of 2G mobile phones had surfaced, and the Lokpal had gained attention as a 
possible campaigning issue. Responding to these scandals in the latter part of 
2010, prominent anti-corruption campaigners had come together under the 
banner India Against Corruption (IAC) and formed an alliance with two new 
players in the anti-corruption scene, both with access to considerable support 
and resources: the yoga guru Baba Ramdev and the leader of the Art of Living 
Foundation, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar.40 The period had also seen the emergence of 
social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, as campaigning tools.41 Further 
afield the Arab Spring was gaining momentum and mass protests in Egypt at the 
end of January were threatening the power of the Mubarak regime. 
In a 2013 interview with Shivendra Singh Chauhan, an influential figure in 
the development of the IAC social media campaign, he described to me how it 
was 30 January 2011 that marked a profound shift in the campaign for the Lokpal 
bill. This was the day in which large numbers of people emerged onto the street 
in cities around India in response to a call which had been broadcast across 
social media, particularly Facebook, since late the previous year. It was also the 
day on which leading members of the IAC went to visit the GSB satyagrahis at 
the site of their fast at Jantar Mantar and persuaded them that they should give 
up their sacrifice and let the higher-profile, better connected to media and better 
organised IAC campaign take over the fight. In its monthly bulletin of February 
2011 the LSS noted that:
We are coordinating with India Against Corruption in this crusade […] Shri 
Arvind Kejriwal asked us to request the satyagrahis to postpone their fast, 
which started from Jan 30th, since it clashed with their rally, to which we 
expressed our reservation and told them that the satyagrahi’s resolve would 
in fact support their cause.42 
However, confronted with the possibility that the leaders of the IAC would visit 
the dharna site with ‘hundreds of their supporters’, and after consultations with 
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their own supporters and working committee, the GSB activists decided that it 
would be ‘unwise’ not to agree with the request, and that they should present a 
joint front with other organisations pursuing the same cause.43 The fast-unto-
death was abandoned.
Shifting a Gear: Social Media, Marketing and Martyrdom
I am not going to deal with the protests of 2011 in detail; Christopher Pinney’s 
chapter in this volume provides insight into the aesthetics of these events and 
the citational folding into the protests of the freedom struggle, popular film, and 
nationalist and religious iconography. However, it is worth noting briefly once 
again the importance of the 2006 films Rang de Basanti44 and Lage Raho Munna 
Bhai,45 with their narratives of national renewal and the possibility of a second 
freedom struggle, to the anti-corruption scene. Rang de Basanti had already been 
woven into the repertoire of earlier anti-corruption protests and what Ritesh 
Mehta calls ‘flash activism’ engendered by news media-led SMS campaigns 
aimed at the middle classes. This effect was most obviously manifested in Delhi 
in 2006 through a series of protests, including Rang de Basanti-inspired candlelit 
vigils at India Gate, over the acquittal of the accused in the sensational murder 
of the model Jessica Lal.46 
Some commentators were sceptical about the extent of Rang de Basanti-
inspired middle-class mobilisation, particularly beyond urban north India.47 
However, what is not in doubt is the effect that the film had on the repertoire 
of middle-class protest in Delhi after its release in 2006. At the time my activist 
informants were focused on organising a national anti-corruption campaign, the 
‘Drive Against Bribe’, anchored from Delhi and headed by figures who would 
later become prominent members of the IAC movement in 2011, including 
Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia.48 The campaign aimed to help people 
solve bureaucratic problems and delays by using the Right to Information.49 It 
was organised through tie-ups with newspapers and TV news networks, partic-
ularly NDTV, and drew on the potential, articulated by Rang de Basanti, for 
political engagement by middle-class people beyond a politics based on struggles 
over urban space and caste.50 My activist informants noted the way that the 
film affected the willingness of people, particularly young students from Delhi 
University, to volunteer for the campaign. The influence of Rang de Basanti’s 
patriotic narrative of radicalised middle-class youth and martyrdom was borne 
out by the enthusiasm for the film among young student volunteers at the Delhi 
‘Drive Against Bribe’ camp I attended in the summer of 2006.51 I was asked 
again and again by young volunteers if I had seen the film, and was told by many 
that they had been to see it multiple times. Candlelit vigils became a familiar 
part of the repertoire at activist events such as these, with informants identifying 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 206 —
Figure 9.4 Drive Against Bribe banner, Delhi, 2006 (Photo: M. Webb).
Figure 9.3 The Delhi Drive Against Bribe camp – Indira Gandhi Stadium, 
2  July 2006 (Photo: M. Webb).
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them specifically as a post-Rang de Basanti phenomenon.52 The character of the 
Drive Against Bribe camp itself was not one of protest, however. The volun-
teers were there to help people with everyday bureaucratic problems, and the 
national colours of saffron, white and green, so much in evidence in the 2011 
anti-corruption protests, were not present either in the logo or at the regional 
camps (see Figs 9.3 and 9.4).
In the 2011 Jan Lokpal bill protests, activists were attempting to reforge the 
instrument of collective action by the middle classes through the medium of 
social media. While talking to Shivendra Singh Chauhan in a Skype interview 
in February 2013, he sent me a number of links to different Facebook pages 
and YouTube videos relating to the 30 January 2011 protests. In a YouTube 
compilation of photographs of protest marches from cities around the country,53 
the song ‘Khalabali’ (‘upheaval’ or ‘turmoil’) from Rang de Basanti provides the 
soundtrack to a slide show of marchers carrying banners, many showing the 
increasingly ubiquitous India Against Corruption logo. 
Shivendra told me the story of how the logo was developed. At an anti-
corruption rally in Delhi on 14 November 2010, at which movement leaders had 
gathered to speak out and organise action against a number of recent corruption 
scandals, Shivendra had taken a photograph of one of the posters at the event 
(see Fig. 9.5).
Liking the design of the image, Shivendra sent it to his friend Akash, a graphic 
designer, and asked him to work it up into a logo for the IAC campaign. Akash 
sent back five variations of which one was chosen (see Fig. 9.6). The saffron and 
green represent two of the colours of the Indian tiranga (tricolour), but here the 
pure white band of the national flag is turned to the black of corruption. 
In the use of these national colours, in contrast to the visual representa-
tions used in the Drive Against Bribe campaign, which focused on individuals 
acting against corruption on behalf of themselves, we see the emergence of an 
aesthetic short circuit that connects the idea of corruption directly to the idea 
of the nation. If the Drive Against Bribe campaign was about finding solutions 
to personal grievances with the state,54 then this new campaign instead signifies 
the threat to the nation engendered by corruption.
The logo was uploaded to the IAC 
Facebook page and also circulated through 
an email campaign calling people to march 
on 30 January, and in which Shivendra 
asked people to:
Figure 9.5 Janyuddh Bhrashtachar ke 
virodh – People’s War Against Corruption 
(Photo: S. Singh Chauhan).
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Figure 9.6 The India Against Corruption campaign logo, a ubiquitous symbol 
during the protests of 2011 and 2012 (Photo: S. Singh Chauhan).
Please forward this email to everyone you know. This won’t get you free 
laptops or mobiles, nor will it bring you bad luck and misfortune. This is 
how you can spread the word and do your bit in India’s decisive war against 
corruption.55 
In these actions we see the emergence of a brand for the 2011 campaign, and a 
means of dissemination which is focused on internet users, the majority of whom 
will be from the metropolitan middle classes. Shivendra told me that the IAC 
Facebook page started to gain ‘traction’ after the email campaign and that up 
to 30 January he had worked hard with activist networks and also with workers 
from the Art of Living Foundation to try to spread marches to as many cities as 
possible. In the end there was interest in organising marches from sixty cities 
in India, and internationally. Shivendra noted how the possibility of organising 
such a large event through social media caught many activists and the main-
stream media by surprise. He also stressed that because of the medium many 
who attended, and who also later attended the fast by Anna Hazare at Ramlila 
Maidan in north central Delhi, were ‘not activists’, but ‘office goers’, and he 
included himself in this. 
Social media played a further role in the branding of the IAC campaign with 
the creation of a central site from which to download digital images relating to 
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Figure 9.8 Protestors in Israel with IAC branding images. The banner in 
the centre reads ‘India’s Second Freedom Movement’ and uses images of 
 revolutionaries and martyrs for independence, including Bhagat Singh 
(Photo:  Courtesy S. Lal – IAC Branding).
Figure 9.7 Protestors in Pune, Maharashtra with IAC branding banners picket 
an MP’s residence (Photo: Courtesy IAC Branding).
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the campaign. Developed by marketing executives and web developers dispersed 
around the country and working as volunteers, the iacbranding.org website 
offered a number of different images to be used for different purposes as banners, 
posters or T-shirt prints. The banners were secular in theme, except where the 
iconic figure of Anna Hazare with fist raised was paired with an image of Baba 
Ramdev and the slogan ‘Anna Baba saath saath’ (‘Anna and Baba together’). 
Many images grouped Anna Hazare with national icons of the freedom struggle 
such as Gandhi or the revolutionary martyr Bhagat Singh, citing the struggle 
for independence and reiterating its themes.
Utilising social media, the branding of the campaign was fast paced. Sunil 
Lal, a key figure in the IAC branding team, told me how the team was not 
directed from the IAC campaign office but rather kept track of the campaign 
and responded to events. He recalled: 
In [a] wartime like situation we kept ourselves glued to the TV and followed 
each and every word of Anna Hazare very carefully. Between that we picked 
up ideas and created slogans and designs at a lightning speed and posted them 
on the website and Facebook to spread it immediately. One instance I would 
like to narrate […] It was on 20th August 2011 at Ramlila Grounds, when 
Anna gave a call to gherao [surround/picket] homes of MPs in their native 
cities all across India, as they were not paying any heed to our demands. It 
was around 2pm. We immediately sat down to create banners for the protest. 
Within an hour we had posted 4 banners on the site. And in evening by 
around 5pm onwards we saw that those banners were used across the nation.
Sunil provided a number of photographs of people using iacbranding.com mate-
rials which he had collected on the group’s Facebook page (see Fig. 9.7). Loca-
tions included Israel, Chicago and Geneva (see Fig. 9.8).
The potential for feedback between the digital production of the banners 
and their digital reproduction in photographs of protests became a powerful 
driver for Facebook pages related to the campaign. The images − encouraging 
‘likes’ and other comments − were in turn monitored by IAC activists reviewing 
Facebook site usage statistics in order to gauge the popularity of images, actions 
and events.56
Shahid Diwas: Common Men and Martyrs
In 2012 I returned to India. Through attending and viewing news coverage 
of public protests against corruption, I was struck once again by the dynamic 
nature of the Indian political archive and the way in which images from the 
past are ‘spewed into the future’,57 not just through the referencing of images of 
martyrs from the original freedom struggle, iconic figures nationally recognised, 
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Figure 9.9 Hawkers with Anna T-shirts and caps – Jantar Mantar, Delhi, 
25 March 2012 (Photo: M. Webb).
but also through the use of images of martyrs from the modern anti-corruption 
scene itself. By this I mean that the activist scene I saw in 2012 reflects on and 
celebrates its own continuing existence, aesthetically connecting the struggles 
of ordinary citizens and the threat that corruption poses to the nation. 
I arrived at the 25 March protest at Jantar Mantar to be greeted by a scene 
very different from the Lokpal bill protests of the Gandhian Satyagraha Brigade 
in 2006. Hawkers lined the pavement next to the Jantar Mantar monument, 
selling Indian flag wristbands, face paints, T-shirts and badges, and the ubiq-
uitous Anna topi (hat), a white nylon replica of Anna Hazare’s own headgear 
with ‘Main Anna Hun’ on one side and the English translation ‘I am Anna’ 
on the other (see Fig. 9.9). Instead of the quiet white pandal of the Gandhian 
Satyagraha Brigade there was a large and very loud sound system linked to a 
covered stage. Big screens placed in the crowd showed pictures of the stage as 
well as short films to engage the crowds when there was no action to look at. 
Across the width of Jantar Mantar Road, stretching from the stage, was a rank 
of media crews sitting in elevated positions with boom cameras ready to swing 
out over the crowd. At the other end of the street a pack of outside broadcast 
vans had gathered with snaking cables and generators (see Fig. 9.10).
There were other dharnas on at Jantar Mantar Road that day, one a large 
group of people who had been the victims of a collapsed marketing scheme and 
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were asking the government for compensation, and two others campaigning 
for reservations for government jobs. But it was clear that this one-day fast 
by Anna Hazare was going to be the main event. When I arrived at about 
9am there were already hundreds there. As the morning progressed the crowd 
swelled to several thousand as people filtered through the barriers at the top of 
the road, were searched perfunctorily by policemen with metal detectors and 
were then released into what had become an arena. It was a mixed crowd of 
the middle classes, in the broader sense. Along with the Delhi RWA activists 
carrying the banners of their organisations and the groups of students from 
colleges such as the elite Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), there were also 
substantial numbers of people who had come into the city from the surrounding 
states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. The crowd appeared predominantly male 
and over 30. To complement the hawkers outside, the IAC also had an official 
merchandise stall selling T-shirts and hats and providing information. One of 
the items on offer was the latest plan to allow people to connect with each 
other and to try to keep the momentum going. The ‘Anna Card’, also available 
in Hindi and costing twenty rupees, was a further attempt to reach out to those 
without easy access to internet connections, building on earlier phases of the 
campaign in which supporters had been invited to send a missed call to the IAC 
Figure 9.10 Looking down Jantar Mantar Road across the crowd at the 
25 March 2012 protest (Photo: M. Webb).
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Figure 9.11 An ‘Anna Card’ bought by the author at the 25 March 2012 
event in Delhi (Photo: M. Webb).
as a means of ‘liking’ the movement (see Fig. 9.11).
When Anna Hazare arrived in a two-car convoy, the crowd mobbed the 
vehicles and then escorted him to the stage. As he emerged out of the crowd 
onto the stage the prominent IAC activist Kumar Vishwas, who later went on to 
become a leading member of the Aam Aadmi Party, started a call-and-response 
with the crowd: ‘Bharat Mata Ki,’ called the MC, to which the crowd responded, 
finishing the sentence with a resounding ‘Jai!’ (together the phrase makes ‘Long 
Live Mother India’); ‘Vande,’ called the MC, ‘Mataram,’ replied the crowd (‘I 
bow to you mother’ – from a poem by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, now the 
national song of India); ‘Inquilab!’ (‘Revolution!’) called the MC, ‘Zindabad!’ 
(‘Long live!’) replied the crowd. Throughout the day the speeches of leading 
IAC activists would be introduced with these calls-and-responses, references 
not just to the nation, but also directly to the freedom struggle, and thus to the 
IAC ‘movement’ as the second freedom struggle. Looking across the crowd the 
overwhelming impression was of an event such as a national cricket match, the 
Tiranga being the most visible symbol by far (see Fig. 9.12).
The stage was dressed in white with two national flags crossed at the back. To 
the left of these was a large banner bearing the image seen in Fig. 9.13.
The text might be translated as ‘How many more martyrs in the war against 
corruption? If we had the Jan Lokpal bill then perhaps these lives would have been 
saved!’ The special theme of the day was one of martyrdom and remembrance. 
Although the banner bears the totemic image of M. K. Gandhi, 23   March is 
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Figure 9.13 How many more martyrs in the war against corruption? 
(Photo:  indiaagainstcorruption.org).
Figure 9.12 Anna Hazare taking the stage at Jantar Mantar, 25 March 2012 
(Photo: M. Webb).
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actually the anniversary of the death of independence revolutionaries Bhagat 
Singh, Sukhdev Thapar and Shivaram Rajguru, hanged by the British colonial 
government in 1931, and is celebrated as a shahid diwas (martyr’s day).58 The 
smaller images on the banner were the faces of activists from around the country 
who had challenged corruption and had been murdered as a result. Many of 
these cases involved people who had used the Right to Information, often with 
great persistence, to attempt to uncover connections between state officials 
and practices such as illegal mining.59 Joining Anna Hazare on stage were the 
families of some of those who had been killed. They gave speeches about their 
relatives, and short films were shown detailing the cases in a dramatic news 
style. Other displays relating to martyrs were more homemade such as the one 
commemorating Narendra Kumar, an Indian Police Service officer who had 
been murdered in March 2012 for his work to expose illegal stone mining in 
Maharashtra (see Fig. 9.14).
Through the use of these images of anti-corrupton martyrs, we see how the 
protest creates a space in which short-circuit connections can be made between 
local issues in which anti-corruption activists are involved and what is perceived 
as the national malaise of corruption. The connection between the first and 
Figure 9.14 ‘Imandar IPS afsar shahid Narendra Kumar amar rahe’ 
(‘Upright/correct IPS officer martyr Narendra Kumar, immortal/undying’) 
(Photo: M. Webb).
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‘second’ freedom struggles is manifested in the aesthetics and poetics of the 
protest. At the same moment the nation, and the common man’s possible rela-
tionship with the nation as an active citizen, is made immanent through the 
cropped family photographs of the martyrs and the authenticity of the speeches 
made by their family members. By these means the movement, broadly repre-
sented as a waning force in the media, reinforces its continuity and the serious 
realities of its work. Here, assembled around the symbolic suffering through 
the fasting of a leading activist, Anna Hazare, we see the everyday dangers of 
blowing the whistle on corrupt practices.
Conclusion
In a 2012 interview with Shambhu Dutt of the GSB he talked of his regret that 
the GSB had ended their fast in January 2011. He appreciated how the India 
Against Corruption campaign had managed to cause a stir, but ultimately was 
disappointed in the style in which it did. The GSB’s quiet protest, intended to 
demonstrate unflinching resolve, but also love and sympathy for their opponents, 
had been replaced by a noisy spectacle in which slogans were chanted and accu-
sations were hurled back and forth. For Dutt the events were not examples of 
satyagraha (truth force) or tapasya (penance), but rather tamasha (spectacle). His 
attitude referenced the aphorism printed on the front page of the LSS bulletin 
from February 2011 in which the group announced the reasons for giving up 
their fast. In a box on the top right-hand corner of the page were the words ‘Be 
the change you want to see in the world – Mahatma Gandhi’. For Shambhu 
Dutt the aesthetic and poetic presentation of the India Against Corruption 
protests of 2011 and 2012 did not prefigure a world that he wanted to see.60 
Despite his misgivings, what is evident is that these spectacular protests using 
citation and reiteration of the imagery making up the Indian political archive 
did create a powerful connection between the idea of the everyday struggles of 
the aam aadmi (common man), the notional Indian citizen unmarked by caste, 
class or religion, and a sense of threat to the nation engendered by the abuse 
of political and bureaucratic power. Through this continously manufactured 
and updated short circuitry, and particularly through the use of iconic images 
of martyrs, the anti-corruption protests celebrated not only the history of the 
nation but also, beyond success or failure, its own continuity.
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‘The Mother of all Strikes’: Popular Protest 
Culture and Vernacular Cosmopolitanism in the 
Botswana Public Service Unions’ Strike, 2011
Pnina Werbner
Chapter 10
Introduction
The events of the Arab Spring inspired a new sense of hope and determination 
among people living geographically far apart. They underscored the power of 
ordinary people to make a difference, their capacity to mobilise bodily against 
authoritarian regimes, using social media, texting and other networks of citizens 
or workers to protest against drastic economic cutbacks, and to demand a 
rethinking of current values and priorities. The rebellions of Tunisia and Egypt, 
epitomised in the giant gatherings in Tahrir Square, became a symbol of protest 
against the odds and of courage in the face of brute tyranny. They inspired a 
series of other rebellions elsewhere in the Arab world and huge protests beyond 
it. In Botswana nearly 100,000 public service trade unionists sang songs of 
rebellion as they gathered daily for over two months under a giant Morula tree 
in the capital, and in towns throughout the country. 
From Egypt to Botswana, a range of quite different countries witnessed worker, 
youth and middle-class rebellions against the political and capitalist status quo, 
the privileges of a tiny, wealthy and often corrupt elite, at a time when the 
majority could no longer earn a decent wage. Participants stressed the democratic, 
egalitarian nature of their protests, animated by a spirit of inclusiveness across 
religion, gender, class and ethnicity. They demanded a return to the welfare state 
and the egalitarian principles that underpinned it. And wherever they occurred, 
mass mobilisations did not simply express a politics of revolt: they were, equally, 
staged aesthetic and poetic performances that echoed and re-echoed similar 
themes in song, slogans and gestures from country to country across the globe. 
Each protest was local and distinctive aesthetically, but they also borrowed from 
the rest, creating in each place a sited, vernacular cosmopolitanism. 
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Botswana had joined this wave of protests on 18 April 2011, with a massive 
strike of five public service unions jointly claiming to represent 93,000 workers 
out of 103,000 public sector workers, in a country with a population of 1.7 
million. Although the eight-week strike began as a simple labour dispute over 
pay, it escalated to become a test of fundamental values of democracy, social 
justice, equality, freedom of speech and the right to live in a welfare state that 
paid its employees a living wage. It articulated the desire for ‘change’ with a 
capital C. In the present chapter I argue that the Botswana strike resembled a 
new social movement in forging a shared identity across a wide occupational 
spectrum and in mobilising the whole of civil society in a call for dialogue 
and justice. The strike’s social and cultural effervescence negated the apparent 
decline of trade unions in the industrialised world − from being some of the 
earliest social movements to becoming highly sclerotic and institutionalised. 
Indeed, we need to remind ourselves that the Arab Spring in Egypt was not only 
massively supported by the trade unions but followed several years of workers’ 
struggle, while in Tunisia, too, the trade union federation from the beginning 
played a central role in the revolution of 2011.1
Trade unions in South Central Africa have historically always been, in many 
respects, cosmopolitan or ‘international’ in their orientation, aware even during 
the colonial period and more so since independence of ILO (International 
Labour Organisation) international law, human rights and labour struggles else-
where.2 In his magisterial survey of the ‘labour question’ in French and British 
Africa outside South Africa, Frederick Cooper documents the emergence of 
an emancipatory discourse of self-governance, citizenship and labour rights, 
and the growing international links of African unions to international labour 
organisations, during the period following World War II.3 There has also been 
a tendency within the worldwide labour movement for popular culture, songs 
and slogans to cross international boundaries. This internationalism has become 
even more marked in an age of global media news dissemination. In this spirit, 
the present chapter argues that in the 2011 public service unions’ strike in 
Botswana, tribal and popular cultural traditions and ideas of authority were 
deployed, combined with a wider cosmopolitan consciousness of protest move-
ments elsewhere, to create a shared popular culture of protest. 
The central adversary in the strike, the government-as-employer, came to 
be epitomised in the figure of the President, Lieutenant General Seretse Ian 
Khama. Khama had been Commander of the Botswana Defence Forces before 
entering politics. Despite being democratically elected with wide support in 
2009, his authoritarianism was perceived to stem also from his ancestry; he is the 
elder son of Sir Seretse Khama, founding president of Botswana and hereditary 
paramount chief of the Bamangwato tribe, the largest in Botswana, an office 
Sir Seretse abdicated when he entered secular politics. Unlike the father, the 
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son was crowned paramount chief (a title currently held temporarily by his 
brother). While his royal ancestry made him powerfully charismatic among rural 
folk, among workers and the intellectual elite his unwillingness to abdicate the 
chiefship was popularly seen as another sign of his sense of absolute entitlement 
and hence of his authoritarian personality. He was head of the Botswana Demo-
cratic Party, which has ruled Botswana by winning free elections without a break 
since independence in 1965. For unionists, many of whom support the oppo-
sition parties, this forty-five-year uninterrupted stretch of rule is seen as another 
sign of Botswana being a de facto authoritarian one-party state.
Khama is thus regarded as a highly authoritarian figure by the unions. If 
the strike seemed revolutionary to the media and public, it was because thus 
far in his presidency Khama had countenanced little dissent, was seen to have 
surrounded himself with yes-men and -women and to have made a series of 
arbitrary decisions. It is significant that ‘the state’ came to be culturally and 
symbolically constructed during the strike, and embedded in traditional notions 
of authority.
Like other protest movements in 2011, the strike in Botswana was aestheti-
cised through a process of ‘citation’:4 a fusion of past images and images from 
spatially distant events in North Africa and elsewhere with currently invented 
images in new bricolages and assemblages. The ‘political’ thus came to be 
powerfully inserted aesthetically by encompassing such displaced tropes, often 
subliminally, through performative acts of (re)iteration, ‘doubling up’ and 
mimesis, into the new context of the strike.5 In particular, strikers and the media 
aestheticised the false pretensions of autocratic power while prefiguring, through 
performance, the just society. They appealed to a transcendental morality and 
Christian values.
Social movement theorists have debated whether the state is necessarily 
always the main target of social movements. Missing in this debate, however, is 
the fact that the state is not simply an objective reality. It must be constructed 
culturally and aesthetically.6 So too in Botswana. As in most chiefly societies 
in South Central Africa, Tswana traditionally have made a distinction between 
the office of the chiefship and the incumbent of office;7 a good chief is one who 
serves his people and they, in turn, grant him legitimacy. Schapera cites the 
Tswana proverb ‘A chief is chief by the grace of the people’8 to argue that 
historically, good chiefs (dikgosi) were expected to aim for peace (kagiso) and 
harmony, and to be virtuous, generous and caring.9 
As we shall see, this popular expectation did not accord with the tough, 
uncompromising monetarist policies adopted by Ian Khama as President, which 
he defended as aimed at bringing down the deficit and which were much praised 
by the IMF. The belt-tightening in the public service followed the global credit 
crunch in 2008, which hit diamond-dependent Botswana particularly hard. At 
Botswana Public Service Unions’ Strike, 2011
— 225 —
one point in 2008, Botswana ceased to trade in diamonds and was haemor-
rhaging its accumulated reserve funds. At the same time, as unionists and oppo-
sition leaders repeated in speech after speech at the strike grounds, the President 
was widely regarded as extremely self-indulgent and personally wasteful and 
his trumpeted policies towards poverty alleviation were – rightly or wrongly − 
rejected by workers as short-termist and idiosyncratic.10
Khama’s unwillingness to meet directly with the union federation leaders, 
to aim for kagiso rather than confrontation, was another source of wide popular 
condemnation. This refusal, along with his various policy decisions, had made 
‘Ian’, as my chapter will show, a worthy target of popular dissent, viewed 
somewhat hyperbolically as a potential ‘dictator’ who needed to be reminded 
that he was a ruler only by the grace of the people. 
The different aesthetic and performative dimensions of the strike as popular 
protest forged, I propose, a local, vernacular working-class culture, while echoing 
the protests beyond Botswana. Popular culture in the strike was dramatised in 
multiple bodily and sentimental articulations: in the spiritual expressions of 
protest through prayer; in satirical humour, dances, hand gestures and songs 
of ‘rebellion’ mocking politicians and civil servants; in the stunts and forays 
beyond the strike grounds to invade government meetings, attend successive 
court hearings en masse or lend support to strikers in other towns; and in the 
speeches calling for change, including ‘regime change’, that made reference 
to and echoed the Arab Spring. In this latter respect the strike created a 
consciousness of cosmopolitan participation – for the first time Batswana were 
part of a wider international social movement. This fabricated not only an 
innovative, popular vernacular cosmopolitan culture; workers also spectacu-
larly forged, through performance, solidarities across classes between manual 
workers and white-collar or professional civil servants. In many senses this was a 
middle-class rebellion that encompassed manual labourers as well, but it was also 
a working-class protest that encompassed middle-class workers. Above all, it 
was youthful, humorous and ludic, signalling a generational shift among public 
service workers. Elsewhere I document the politics of the strike.11 Here I want 
to underscore its popular cultural dimensions.
Initially, the strike was in support of a union demand for a 16 per cent pay 
rise across the board, following three years of 30 per cent inflation in which 
public service salaries were frozen voluntarily following the temporary collapse 
of diamond mining in 2008. The government refused, however, to contemplate 
a pay hike while Botswana’s economy was still in deficit and the world economy 
shaky, despite the rise in diamond sales during 2011. There were undoubtedly 
additional political motives behind the federation of public service unions’ 
decision to strike, including the government’s delay in forming a bargaining 
council, and the desire by union leaders to advertise widely the existence of the 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 226 —
newly founded Botswana Federation of Public Sector Unions (BOFEPUSU). 
But the radical erosion of their salaries was a critical factor, especially for the 
blue-collar workers I had studied, who were barely surviving on salaries that 
even before the credit crunch were well below a living wage: cleaners, cooks, 
groundsmen, drivers, hospital orderlies, porters, pump attendants, messengers, 
gravediggers, security guards and the like. 
Both sides, but particularly the government, dug their heels in. The President, 
Ian Khama, refused to meet with BOFEPUSU federation leaders. Over time, as 
the strike dragged on with no resolution in sight, the federation began mobil-
ising support from an increasingly expanding number of actors in civil society. 
Despite a total news blackout in the national press, radio and TV, the private 
media supported the strikers from the start, both the private press and private 
radio stations; but joining the voices calling for dialogue were chiefs sitting 
in the House of Chiefs, Church leaders, ex-Presidents, opposition (and some 
government) politicians, representatives of the Botswana Confederation of 
Commerce, Industry and Manpower (BOCCIM), MPs and Parliament, the great 
and the good. Support came in addition from international trade unions such as 
Public Service International (PSI). Before the strike ended, the whole nation 
had in effect mobilised to demand that the President meet the strikers, which 
he consistently avoided doing. The scale of the strike, its national reach, was 
unprecedented. The unanimous support of the private press and radio created 
a critical public debate on matters of social justice as never before. The strike 
generated a profound sense that something fundamental had changed for the 
better in Botswana, that Botswana would never be the same again, as I was told. 
Initially, the strike did not appear to be about social justice, but as it progressed 
and as the chasm between the workers and government became more and 
more evident, issues of social justice and equality, which affected in particular 
low-paid industrial-class manual workers, surfaced and became central to the 
negotiations.
Under the Morula Tree 
During the whole eight-week strike workers gathered daily under a giant Morula 
tree in the Gaborone Secondary School (GSS) sports grounds for the whole 
day. Botswana is a deeply Christian country and the first hour of each morning 
was devoted to prayers, hymns and sermons, often taking on the character of a 
revivalist meeting, with singers and preachers recruited from among the workers 
who stood or sat in a semi-circle around the stage, under the tree (see Fig. 10.1). 
One of the preachers, an older man with a creased forehead, gave an impas-
sioned prayer one morning asking God, the heavenly kgosi (king or chief), to 
alleviate the workers’ pain. He called on the worldly kgosi, Ian Khama, not to 
Botswana Public Service Unions’ Strike, 2011
— 227 —
fail the workers. Political prayers are a generic feature of union piety. Workers 
have faith that God is on their side. As one speaker said on another occasion:
And so with our prayer ... being that the Lord is on our side … So we assemble 
under this tree every day … God Himself said that if there are two or three 
people meeting in my name, then I am the fourth one there! So too in our 
case, God has been here with us. He has been walking with us and encour-
aging us to go on.12
The federation’s delegates’ conference was opened with a prayer: ‘Our father 
in heaven, we come before you this afternoon … in the name of Jesus. We are 
gathered here Lord as your people, in your presence … and we look upon your 
divine intervention.’13
Almost from the start of the strike, the Morula tree under which the praying, 
choir-singing and speeches all took place began to assume mythical, sacred 
dimensions, much like the centre of a pilgrimage cult. As Johnson Motsh-
warakgole, the Manual Workers Union Organising Secretary and uncrowned 
king and father of the trade union movement in Botswana, told the assembled 
workers:
Figure 10.1 Under the Morula tree (Photo: P. Werbner).
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Figure 10.3 Carrying branches from the GSS grounds (Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.2 Johnson under the Morula tree (Photo: P. Werbner).
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Those of us who are gifted singers and gifted poets … I know that there are 
some teachers here who are gifted at both. Let us now find a name that we can 
call this tree by!!! Because this is a historic Morula Tree!! We have to give it 
a name befitting it!! This tree is the one that will set us free!!14 
As workers began to go out on forays beyond the grounds, they carried with 
them green branches cut from trees in the grounds (see Fig. 10.3). Although 
they told me the trees were merely for shade, it was evident that the branches 
were also a metonymic extension of the sacralised strike grounds and the sacred 
Morula tree to other places in the land, a further sign of the tree and ground’s 
powerful sanctification in prayer and song.15 The tree became a symbolic coun-
terpart to the grand structure of parliament, a kgotla (traditional public forum) 
for the workers of Botswana. 
Beyond Division: Songs of Rebellion and Worker Solidarity
The strike in itself was a major achievement: the first legal strike in Botswana 
with clear terms agreed with the government – or so the unions believed. The 
link to the Arab Spring had also already been established by the press, which 
proclaimed that ‘Botswana joins worldwide uprisings as civil servants prepare to 
strike’.16 The very name given to the strike, ‘the mother of all strikes’, echoed 
ironically the wars in the Middle East.
By 27 April, however, what had started as a ten-day strike had turned into a 
strike that was extended indefinitely, after the government broke its own strike 
rules. Johnson Motswarakgole stressed the achievement in the strike of worker 
solidarity across class in a public speech under the tree:
Yes, it was by intention that we founded … BOFESPUSU. A union where 
you would find doctors for members, nurses and labourers for members − the 
likes of us [jokingly], the Motshwarakgoles of this world!! Cleaners, clerical 
staff and teachers for members, social workers and drivers for members [again 
jokingly], bootlickers [malope − a reference to the scabs who had not joined 
the strike] for members, as well as meteorologists for members!! It was by 
intention that we founded such an organisation! We deliberately set out to 
do that! 
For Motshwarakgole, long-time leader of the lowest paid, least educated blue-
collar manual workers in public service, and himself claiming to be uneducated, 
the fact that the strike rallies transcended divisions of class and occupation 
between workers fulfilled a long-held dream. Worker divisions were oblit-
erated in shared performance under the tree. As the salary gap in Botswana 
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has continued to widen hugely, with luxury consumption accentuating class 
divisions, the marginalisation of industrial class workers has become ever 
more evident. Johnson had worked hard to initiate and foster the formation 
of the BOFEPUSU federation. It was his idea, sold to the other public service 
workers. The reasons were presented as pragmatic. The federation would give 
public service unions greater clout in their bargaining with the government. 
But visionary, even utopian ideals of worker solidarity were explicitly articu-
lated during the strike. Whether this solidarity could outlive the strike or not, a 
local working-class cultural vernacular was being created through performance, 
one that drew on generic folk, church and traditional ritual and ceremonial 
traditions shared across Botswana, and combined them with a modern worker 
consciousness. Motshwarakgole continued:
But what stunned me most [were] … The songs that are sung here, and the 
way in which they are created … Every time I come here, I find that there 
is a new song release! Every time I come here I’m told that they are doing a 
run-through of their new song, one that they just came up with!! So, truly, 
this is testament to the amount of talent we have in our midst here!
Figure 10.4 Sausages (Photo: P. Werbner).
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The grounds in the capital, where I attended the strike, had a festive quality 
(see Fig. 10.4). Dozens of food stalls sold anything from sugar cane, watermelons, 
mealies (corn on the cob) and large fried burewurst (South African style sausages) 
to traditional streetcorner lunches − seswa (beef cooked Tswana style), lamb 
chops, chicken in stews, curries and roasted, cooked pumpkin, beetroot, cooked 
green vegetables, soup and salad – all for bargain prices. Fizzy drinks and ice-cold 
water were on display, while peddlers sold oranges and sweets, walking around 
the grounds pushing supermarket trolleys. The vendors, men and women, were 
doing a roaring trade. This was the beginning of the strike and workers still had 
money in their pockets. 
Colourful clothes added to the carnivalesque atmosphere (see Fig. 10.5). 
Workers wore an assortment of multicoloured union T-shirts or boiler suits boasting 
union logos or past worker rallies. Young women, tall and slim, hair piled in pleated 
designs, chatted with young men in the crowd, immaculately dressed in the latest 
fashions. Other workers were dressed casually in jeans. Standing all day under the 
tree in the hot sun was an exhausting experience. By 10 o’clock the grounds began 
to look like a beach resort with people relaxing in cavernous folding canvas chairs, 
shaded from the hot sun by multicoloured golfing umbrellas that serve as parasols 
in Botswana. Clusters of teachers from the same school sat together. 
Figure 10.5 Parasols (Photo: P. Werbner).
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Figure 10.6 Rangers choir (Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.7 Confrontation between Mma Bakwena and BOFEPUSU 
(Cartoonist: Selefu, The Monitor, 16 May 2011, p. 12).
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The dancing and singing was repeated and elaborated day by day as dozens 
of new songs, dances and choir performances were invented, responding to inci-
dents, satirising, mocking and insulting politicians and senior civil servants who 
were said to be oppressing the workers. The two competing choirs, Rangers 
and Mosquito,17 had formed during the first few days of the strike. Each had its 
own choir leader and its own style. Sometimes a veteran manual worker union 
leader would sing one of the old traditional, pre-strike union labour songs from 
the podium in his booming deep bass voice, but the young strikers preferred the 
new songs. The old songs seemed passé, of a bygone era. Audiences around the 
tree joined in the song choruses and, as the choirs danced, new recruits from the 
crowd entered the dancing circle, singing and clapping (see Fig. 10.6).
The new songs travelled throughout the country. Many made satirical 
comments on the current catastrophic state of workers’ household economies, 
defiantly proclaiming they would survive since they were already indebted 
anyway to loan sharks (known in Botswana as microlenders):
We’ve Come a Long Way with the Microlenders
We’ve come a long way with the Re tswa kgakala le machonisa 
 Microlenders 
We don’t care Ga re na sepe
(Even if) he/it18 cuts, he cuts O a kgaola (x 2) 
(Even if) he/it takes it all O a tsaya otlhe (x 2)
We don’t care Ga re na sepe
In another song in the same spirit workers made a gesture of throwing their 
wallets to the ground:
Songs attacked the Director of the Directorate of Public Service Management 
(DPSM) Mma Bakwena, representing government as the employer. In the words 
of one very popular song:
We call Mma Bakwena to us Re biletseng Mma Bakwena (x 2)
To put her deep in the lion’s jaw Re mo tsenye mo ganong la tau (ta-oo)
Mma Bakwena’s confrontation with the Unions was satirised in the press (see 
Fig. 10.7). 
In another insult song, workers attack false rumours about them:
Mma Bakwena remove your blouse Mma Bakwena tlhobola
To be flogged O kgwathe [kwata = to beat]
We are ending the noise and chatter Rona, re fedisa medumo le dikgang 
about the workers tsa babareki
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Mma Bakwena is here portrayed as a petty criminal, to be flogged in the 
customary court (see Figs 10.7 and 10.8).
As the strike progressed, the number of cartoons increased and songs surfaced 
about Ian Khama, chief target of the workers’ wrath. The son of Ruth, an 
Englishwoman, and Seretse Khama, founding President of Botswana, Ian, a 
fifty-year-old bachelor, was often mocked for the grammatical errors he made 
in Setswana. He was described in one song as ‘A predator with a lion’s mane’ 
and, in a further line, a ‘toothless old lion’.19 This particular song also refers to 
his being a bachelor: ‘He has no child, he has no “darling”’, and it concludes ‘A 
lion with a lion’s mane, he should be shielding us, the workers’. 
In the newspaper cartoons, Khama is depicted as angry, oppressive or trapped 
(see Figs 10.9–10.11).
Even more insulting was a song sung in the last days of the strike that 
compares Khama with Mugabe and Gaddafi, again signalling the international 
consciousness of the workers:
Mugabe, Gaddafi
By my father, we would rather go to prison Ka ntate, re ka mpa ra tsena  
 ka dikgolegelo 
Truly, we swear Ruri, re ya ikana
Figure 10.8 Bruising battle (Cartoonist: Selefu, The Monitor, 20 June 2011, p. 8).
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Figure 10.10 Khama: ‘I’m gonna squeeze ’em’ (Cartoonist: B. Chiepe, 
The   Monitor, 6 June 2011, p. 6).
Figure 10.9 Khama smashes car (Cartoonist: B. Chiepe, The Monitor, 16  May 
2011, p. 6).
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By my father, we’d rather be ruled Ka ntate, re ka mpa ra buswa
 by Mugabe ke Mugabe
Than by Khama Go na le Khama
Truly, we swear Ruri, re ya ikana
By my father, we’d rather be ruled Ka ntate, re ka mpa ra buswa
 by Gaddafi ke Gaddafi
Truly, we swear Ruri, re ya ikana
Than by Khama Go na le Khama
Several of the songs mock the ‘balope’, the so-called ‘bootlickers’ or union scabs 
who have not gone on strike but spend their time instead currying favour with 
the government, including government officials and ministers:
Mma Bakwena Stop Bootlicking
Mma Bakwena stop bootlicking Mma Bakwena lesa bolope
Iyelele [a cry] Iyelele 
We say, isn’t it just the other day  Ka re, ga se maloba 
That you gave us small change? O re neela chenchi? 
Isn’t it the other day? Ga se maloba?
We say, you, Masisi [Minister of Kare, wena, Masisi 
Presidential Affairs] 
Abandon bootlicking Lesa Bolope
Figure 10.11 Khama tied to a tree (Cartoonist: Selefu, Mmegi, 17 May 2011, 
p. 8).
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We say, you, Matambo  Kare, wena Matambo
 [Minister of Finance] 
Abandon bootlicking Lesa Bolope
We say, you, Ian [Khama] Kare, wena, Ian
Abandon your arrogance Lesa bogoma
In the cartoon seen in Fig. 10.12, Masisi, the Minister of Presidential Affairs, is 
satirised as a thug. 
Another bootlicker song criticises Khama for hiding from the workers while 
going around villages distributing charitable handouts such as blankets in front 
of Botswana TV cameras. 
Bootlicker (Malope)
When they see us Fela ga ba re bona (x 2)
They hide among people Ga ba re bona ba iphitha ka batho
Heya, the bootlickers think, they say  Heela, malope ba ithaya, ba re (x 2)
Heya, Ian thinks he will be liked Heela, Ian o ithaya ba re bo a ratiwa 
by people ke batho 
[When] He gives them a blanket  O ba phakisa mapai
Some songs drew on expressions from other Southern African languages:
Figure 10.12 Masisi (Cartoonist: A. Lekgaba, Weekend Post, 4−10 June 2011, 
p. 10).
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Relax Guys
Relax guys, we live to be happy Phanzi madoda, re dula re thabile 
When Mma Bakwena lost her temper Ya re Mma Bakwena a betwa ke pelo 
She cut her skirt fringe [that is,  A kgaola makgabe 
she was overwhelmed] 
When searching for the workers A ntse a re o batlana le badiri
[presumably to call them back to work] 
At the grounds, the choirs enter the circle in a long line, two or three people 
deep. Many of the dances are adaptations of widely practised traditional folk, 
drinking or wedding dances. Having danced around in a circle blowing penny 
whistles and vuvuzelas, the singers form a semi-circle, with the onlookers 
clapping or joining in. But singing is an equally important part of the forays 
beyond the grounds. Some of the songs are borrowed from neighbouring coun-
tries, just as some of the early Manual Workers Union songs were translations of 
worker songs from elsewhere in Europe. The following song, which I first heard 
sung during the petition march to the Ministry of Health, was said to refer to 
one first sung when Nelson Mandela went to prison (I was told it had also been 
sung at the earlier Manual Workers Union 1991 strike):
You Remain to Fight for our Rights (Ditshwanelo)
I am being taken away Na ke saya
Taken away to prison Ke saya kgolegolong 
You remain to fight for Lona lo sale lo lwela 
Our rights Ditshwanelo
Even if I die Lefa ke sule
I fought for our rights Ke lwela ditshwanelo
You remain Lona lo sale 
To fight for our rights Lo lwela ditshwanelo
After a petition was handed to the Minister of Health at the Civic Hall, unionists 
streamed out of the gates and, apparently spontaneously, danced down Indepen-
dence Avenue opposite the main Gaborone mall, blocking the traffic (see Fig. 
10.13). They formed two blocks, singing favourite insult songs, blowing football 
whistles and vuvuzelas and waving the green branches they carried from the 
GSS grounds. The police stood by impassively. At this point the strike was still 
very peaceful.
I talked to some teachers at the grounds about ‘insult’ songs (dipina tse di 
roganang). They denied immediately that the songs were insulting. What about 
the Mma Bakwena song, I asked. The union is the lion, that’s not an insult. 
What about the song that says that Khama has no child, no sweetheart? That’s 
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just a fact. He is a predator, a lion – chiefs are lions (but, they added, he is an 
old lion). What about the song saying they would prefer Mugabe or Gaddafi to 
rule them? That’s not an insult either. Malope (bootlickers) – that’s not an insult, 
just a statement of fact. 
The implication was that the songs were in a Tswana tradition according to 
which ‘a song contains no insult’.20 Many old Tswana songs have insults, I was 
told, but people just tell you that it’s from bogologolo (long ago). In Botswana, 
where to insult someone is said to be against the law, these responses point to the 
roots of union insult songs in the licence accorded traditional songs of rebellion 
widely sung by commoners throughout the Southern African region against 
chiefs on ritual occasions.21 Even though the songs are spontaneously produced 
without, it seems, consciously drawing on the past, they are understood in terms 
of that genre, as indeed are popular local rap songs. Despite this tradition, insult 
songs did provoke anger from politicians and, later, the police. 
In the words of one journalist, the songs ‘lampoon the wealthy upper crust 
for living it up while the workers do not have money to buy basic essentials’.22 
Gospel songs, he continues, were converted by the workers into ‘defiant lyrics’. 
Although such music was ‘common in other Southern African nations that 
struggled for independence’, he says, it was new in Botswana, a nation which 
Figure 10.13 Dancing outside the mall (Photo: P. Werbner).
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had had a ‘largely peaceful transition to independence’. Now, however, ‘the 
workers have given birth’ to ‘an essentially protest music’. 
The songs represent the more exhilarating moments of fun the strike 
generated. They were embodied performative moments of collective creativity 
that built up a sense of camaraderie and comradeship across divisions of class, 
occupation, gender and regional origin. In other respects, of course, the strike 
exacted a heavy toll from workers, especially as it dragged on for eight weeks 
without resolution and moved to a confrontational stage when strikers were 
fired or denied their salaries.
Court Cases and Early Forays beyond the Grounds
From the start, as we have seen, the private media in Botswana, including both 
the press and radio, supported the strikers. By contrast, both the government’s 
national newspaper, The Botswana Daily News, and Botswana Television (BTV) 
ignored the strike, as though it was not happening. This news blackout was 
satirised by the press (see Figs 10.14 and 10.15).
Despite the official blackout, the strike was clearly regarded in Botswana as 
the only news in town. Instead of meeting the unions directly, Khama chose 
Figure 10.14 Government news blackout (Cartoonist: B. Chiepe, The 
Monitor, 30 May 2011, p. 6).
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Fig: 10.15 State-owned media poodles of government (Cartoonist: 
Selefu, Mmegi, 24 June 2011, p. 46).
Figure 10.16 Khama at a village campfire (Botswana Guardian, 13 May 
2011, p. 12).
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Figure 10.17 Advocate Chilisa at the Industrial Court (Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.18 Unionists at the Industrial Court (Photo: P. Werbner).
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to speak about the strike on his visits to rural areas, broadcast on BTV (see 
Fig.  10.16). 
The strike was characterised by forays, incursions and invasions beyond the 
GSS grounds. The lengthy court cases between the unions and government 
were dramatic events which lasted late into the night and even, in one case, 
into the early hours of the next day. They brought workers together bodily as 
they sang their way to court or sat for hours on end, packed like sardines into the 
court’s exceedingly hot, limited space, while they listened to complex technical 
legal arguments (see Fig. 10.17). During the second court case, on 6 May, union 
members from all over the country converged on the capital. The crowds at 
the grounds were vast, a sea of white in sympathy with the striking doctors and 
nurses. From the grounds they marched to the industrial court (see Fig. 10.18). 
Though Facebook and the internet are not yet universally used in Botswana, 
everyone owns a mobile phone, and texting is constant. Strikers could assemble 
instantly at the Industrial Court, as in one case (in which exceptionally the 
union triumphed) that ended at 3.30 am, having lasted all night. Workers 
streamed out of the court house, dressed in white, and danced around the front 
court plaza and car park, singing the Mma Bakwena song. There were still at 
least 100 workers present. I went to bed at 4.15 am.
The fourth and final court case in this series, however, was a blow to the 
unions: the presiding judge confirmed his earlier interdiction ordering all 
Figure 10.19 Industrial Court orders workers back to work (Mmegi, 28 April 
2011, p. 8, reprinted 25 May 2011, p. 10.).
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essential workers back to work. The press responded to this back-and-forth with 
its own brand of humour (see Fig. 10.19). This led to the second phase of the 
strike.
The Second Phase of the Strike: Political Confrontation 
and  Cosmopolitan Invocations
On 3 May, in announcing a five-day extension of the strike, Motshwarakgole 
invoked the Arab Spring explicitly:
People, let us not forget that now, as never before, nations of North Africa are 
freeing themselves from the chains that once bound them. The Egyptians and 
the Libyans are setting themselves free … they are setting themselves free, 
especially taking into account that over there, people get killed for that. But 
over here, no one can be killed. Our arrangements are in accordance with 
the law. We deliberately extended this strike by five days.23
Speaker after speaker under the Morula tree reiterated that the law had been 
subverted by the Industrial Court. The hardening mood was signalled by the 
workers’ refusal to sing the national anthem which they had touchingly sung 
a few days earlier, during the May Day rally. In the escalating confrontation, 
doctors and nurses, along with many other essential service workers, refused to 
obey the court order and go back to work (see Fig. 10.20).
Figure 10.20 Doctor bins court order (The Telegraph, 18 May 2011, p. 8).
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The protests elsewhere in the world were echoed in gestures borrowed inter-
nationally, though some had undergone a metamorphosis. Thus, for example, 
every time speakers talked about ‘regime change’, the audience rolled its hands 
in a wheel motion indicating change. This gesture took on and became a great 
source of enjoyment. The same word for change, fetola, is apparently used for 
marinating meat on the spit while the spit rotates. In the original Spanish 
protest, however, the same gesture was used to imply ‘I’m bored, get to the 
point’, a meaning adopted in the Israeli protests in the summer of 2011.24 
Workers shouted their appreciation using the old Manual Workers Union cry 
‘Viva babereki [workers], viva!’, answered with ‘Viva the spirit of no surrender!’ 
The South American and Cuban roots of ‘Viva’ or ‘Hula’ still echo among 
trade unionists as these rallying cries travel globally. ‘Regime change’ too 
was a concept that had travelled − from debates about the aim of the war in 
Iraq, to the Arab Spring’s removal of long-serving dictators, to its adoption in 
Botswana, a democratic country where unionists felt strongly that the ruling 
party had been entrenched in power for too long and that the President was 
too autocratic, with a tendency to disregard parliament, and might be inclined, 
they feared, to continue in office after his maximum two five-year terms in 
office ended. The ambiguity in using the call for regime change – was the call 
for an immediate revolution or simply a future aspiration for electoral political 
change? – gave ammunition to the government during the second phase of the 
strike. 
On 17 May 2011, a week after the final court case described above, the 
government fired all striking essential services workers, including eighty doctors, 
Figure 10.21 ‘Nurse, you’re fired!’ (Cartoonist: J. Serero, Weekend Post, 
11−17  June 2011, p. 10).
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Figure 10.22 When Disaster ‘strikes!’ (Cartoonist: A. Lekgaba, Weekend Post, 
28 May−3 June 2011, p. 10).
as well as more than a thousand nurses, cleaners and groundsmen. The news was 
announced on national radio and TV (see Fig. 10.21).25
True to its warning, the government also did not pay the monthly salaries of 
more than 50,000 workers on strike.26 For Manual Workers Union members in 
particular this was a terminal blow. Given all their loans, mortgages and other 
commitments, it was questionable whether they could continue to strike, as one 
cartoonist graphically summed up the implications (see Fig. 10.22):
The cartoon indicates the middle-class nature of workers’ lifestyles in the 
capital. The press reported that microlenders were refusing to lend money to 
strikers, who were trying to postpone their normal monthly payments of mort-
gages, car loans, pensions, funeral insurance, utility bills and so forth.
The final phase of the strike began at this point, with the union offering a 
compromise and mobilising the nation in support of a negotiated settlement. 
This was the phase in which issues of morality and social justice beyond the law 
became significant as the federation reached out to make alliances.
Social Justice Unionism: From Spectacular Forays 
to   Mobilising  the  Nation
Botswana is a small country. Most people in public positions know each other 
and networks are widely ramifying. The strike affected everyone. Many had 
visited the strike grounds in their respective towns, children had been rioting at 
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schools, hospitals were struggling to cope, businesses were not being paid, rela-
tives of strikers were feeling the pinch, welfare recipients had not received their 
benefits. Day after day, for more than six weeks, the media had been dominated 
by reports and analyses of the strike and its implications. As it became increas-
ingly evident that the President would not bend, that Mma Bakwena lacked the 
authority to negotiate and that the courts had failed to deliver, so too the union 
turned to mobilise a whole range of civil society actors.
In a sense, from the start the strike had the ‘feel’ of a social movement. 
It was creative culturally and its participants constantly reflected upon them-
selves, working collectively to forge a shared identity that would unite their 
different unions and suppress divisions between them. If both the leadership 
and ordinary workers made huge efforts to achieve unity, their modi operandi 
differed radically. The workers at the grounds drew inspiration from traditional 
performance genres and fused them spontaneously into a new, shared, worker 
ethos. They drew on international worker and protest movements in gestures, 
slogans and songs, and made these their own. As the strike progressed, there 
was a heightening sense that this was truly a people’s protest, reaching beyond 
fruitless negotiations in stuffy committee rooms, far removed from the corridors 
of power and yet tangibly ‘political’, a lived politics.
Could one describe the strike as an expression of social movement unionism? 
In the South African context, Social Movement Unionism (SMU) arose when 
unions forged alliances with community-based groups, other social movements 
and political parties, such as the anti-apartheid democratic movement and the 
ANC during the transition to democracy,27 the Treatment Action Campaign 
(TAC) and the Anti-Privatisation Forum, a community-based movement. 28 In 
Botswana, in the absence of the kind of powerful mobilisation present in South 
Africa, the union sought other allies within civil society. Sometimes defined as 
‘Social Justice Unionism’,29 the assumption is that such new labour movements 
‘espouse radical change’,30 workplace democracy and gender equality.31 
Writing about the 2011 strike in Botswana, Monageng Mogolakwe argues 
that ‘Social movement unionism recognises the broadness and the intercon-
nectedness of the interests of workers as citizens, commuters, consumers, parents, 
rent payers, and voters, … [it] supersedes the notion of a single class identity 
and interests’.32 However, I want to suggest that in all this definitional elabo-
ration, the original stress in new social movement (NSM) theory, as formulated 
by Alberto Melucci,33 on culture, creativity and identity, is lost. Although the 
Botswana 2011 public service strike was not in any simple sense post-materialist, 
the strike combined materialist claims with a post-materialist moral demand for 
social justice, an innovative symbolic and cultural reconstitution of the both 
the state and workers-as-citizens, and widespread mobilisation of civil society 
associations, to create a new, hybrid social movement formation.
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Peter Waterman has pointed to the resemblances between the new 1980s 
labour movements in Poland or South Africa and New Alternative Social 
Movements (NASM) in an age of globalisation − democratic, peace, feminist 
and environmental movements, all drawing on international networks.34 It has 
been suggested that labour has once again become internationalist, insofar as 
it has rearticulated itself with popular democratic struggles,35 and promotes a 
broader social vision.36 Waterman coins a new term, ‘New Social Unionism’, 
to reflect the affinity with new social movements.37 I prefer, however, to speak 
simply of ‘New Social Movement Unionism’ (NSMU) to highlight explicitly 
the cultural dimensions of worker mobilisation in Botswana as workers called 
for justice and forged a new, shared identity.
Initially, however, it was unclear whether the strike was really about social 
justice. The President, for one, accused strikers on BTV and in the press of 
selfishly and unpatriotically demanding a pay rise when, he claimed, more than 
half the population was unemployed and the country was still recovering from 
an unprecedented recession that had virtually brought it to its knees.38 Vice 
President Merafhe mockingly noted the vast number of ‘luxury cars’ filling the 
GSS grounds (see Fig. 10.23).39 
Newspapers and cartoons recognised that a 16 per cent across-the-board 
settlement would favour high-earning civil servants at the expense of manual 
workers (see Fig. 10.24).
The move to a just redistribution of resources was first articulated in a 
BOFEPUSU Delegates Conference that gathered together regional representa-
tives from all the unions. The leadership put to delegates the radical proposal to 
redistribute the 3 per cent government had offered, some 400 million pula, in a 
‘pyramid structure’ so that low-paid workers would receive the lion’s share of the 
pay hike while higher-rated employees above Grade 4 would receive nothing. 
The idea had originated with the Botswana Council of Churches, whose 
Anglican Bishop offered an ‘ethical solution’ to the strike. It was supported by 
BOCCIM (Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry and Manpower), 
the Botswana equivalent of the CBI (Confederation of British Industry). Most 
remarkable for me was that none of the more highly paid civil servants and 
professionals in the federation, such as the doctors, rejected the offer, even 
though it would mean relinquishing the pay rise they were striking for. The 
idea, however, was rejected by the government. 
This mobilisation of support and sympathy for the strikers across the social 
spectrum, from bishops to industrialists, from NGO leaders to politicians, 
along with the demand for a more equitable distribution of resources, a social 
justice vision, publicised the transformation of the strike into a social justice 
union movement.40 The strike was no longer simply about pay. Pleading 
for a ‘suspension’ of the strike which appeared to have reached a deadlock, 
 Motshwarakgole hinted at a greater vision:
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Figure 10.23 Workers’ cars at the strike grounds (Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.24 Thin and fat men before and after the strike 
(Cartoonist: A. Lekgaba, Weekend Post, 14−20 May 2011, p.10).
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In the beginning, we were all about sitting under a tree and demanding our 
16 per cent but now it is broader than that! … This is proving to be the 
same journey that was taken by the children of Israel, that ended up taking 
forty years! 
Motshwarakgole is implicitly voicing the hope that even if the strike is unsuc-
cessful, it will lead to radical change, the toppling in the long term of the 
entrenched Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) establishment,.
His prediction that dealing with this government was like ‘sitting around 
a bonfire with a madman’ was confirmed when, on 9 June, ten days after the 
Delegates Conference and three days after a grand prayer meeting appealing for 
reconciliation, an official government press release announced the suspension 
of all negotiations with the federation until the strike was over on the grounds 
that the strike had become ‘political’. 
Ministerial Escapades
Once it had suspended the negotiations, the government embarked on a coun-
trywide information campaign to ‘explain’ its response, sending ministers to 
convene public assemblies with local ‘communities’. Well informed, the union 
sent workers to attend these meetings and make sure the ministers had something 
to answer for. At one such kgotla meeting, we waited and waited before eventually 
being informed that the Minister (or was it ministers?) had ‘run away’,  apparently 
Figure 10.25 Ministerial flight (Sunday Standard, 5 June 2011, p. 9). 
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fearing the multitude. Such failed meetings were reproduced throughout the 
local press and media, which had a field day, describing ministers running through 
the mud, desperately jumping into their vehicles. The captions tell it all: ‘Masisi 
runs for dear life’,41 ‘Masisi, Rakhudu booed out of “secret meeting”’,42 ‘Ministers 
run for cover’,43 ‘Ministers flee from audience’44 (see Fig. 10.25).
The Prayer Meeting
By this time there was no doubt that the strikers had humiliated the government 
publicly and made a mockery of its venerable ministers. The workers’ frustration 
at the government’s intransigence was also becoming more tangible. It was in 
this context that an open prayer meeting for peace, reconciliation and dialogue 
assembled at the mall end of the GSS grounds, five days after these events, 
on the afternoon of Sunday, 5 June. This was a meeting of the great, the good 
and the noble: three church federations, including the Botswana Council of 
Churches (BCC), MPs, chiefs, government ministers and an ex-President (see 
Fig. 10.26).
Kagiso, my landlady, who attended as a member of one of the evangelical 
churches, was deeply moved by the event. It was wonderful, she said. She spoke 
passionately. No, the union hadn’t lost because they had been outspoken and 
had shown they were not afraid! There had never been such a strike in Botswana 
before, and the government would know in the future that they can’t just ignore 
the unions, she added hopefully. 
Figure 10.26 Peace meeting (Photo: P. Werbner).
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The End of the Strike
Despite the prayer meeting’s call for peace, the strike ended in conflict. From 
the point of view of the Manual Workers Union leadership, the strike was 
unsustainable. They did not have the funds to help striking unionists who had 
not been paid, as some of the other unions did, and their members had no 
financial cushion. Effectively, the government was using the strike to ‘retrench’ 
industrial-class workers, replacing those dismissed − cleaners, rubbish collectors 
or drivers − with contract firms, without even the usual requirement to nego-
tiate an exit package. They were also replacing dismissed doctors and nurses. 
There were signs of increasing violence, greatly exacerbated by the police’s over-
response to minor infringements, such as road blocking and tyre-burning in the 
later phase of the strike. Rather than reach an unacceptable agreement with a 
government which had rejected the union package, the federation decided to 
‘suspend’ the strike, meaning it could be renewed at another date. But against 
the union leadership, strikers throughout Botswana voted at assembly grounds 
to continue the strike in the face of police violence. As one said to me, we have 
been striking for seven weeks, how can we go back to work now, with nothing? 
The next day in Gaborone, the police responded disproportionately, with 
teargas and rubber bullets. This contrasted with the previous eight weeks of the 
strike when the police were remarkably invisible at the rallies. Now, however, 
they encircled the perimeter fence of the grounds, three or four policemen 
standing together, in full riot gear, with shields, batons and helmets. One 
policeman filmed the assembled workers (see Fig. 10.27). It was early morning 
prayers, on 9 June. In one of the prayers the workers turned away from the stage 
towards the periphery fence, facing the police, arms lifted upwards and palms 
open, their eyes closed (see Fig. 10.28). Later, when I asked them if they were 
gesturing towards the police, to push them away from the grounds, they said no, 
they were just praying. One of the women preachers said, ‘We are now in prison’, 
meaning surrounded by the police. When choirs danced around the perimeter 
fence, I was told, mocking the police with their songs, the police responded by 
lobbing teargas canisters into the grounds. There was one song in particular, 
directed at the police:45
Eaters on the Side
Eaters on the side [sell-outs] you are Majelathoke ke lona
Who bewitched you? Le loilwe ke mang?
Traitors/stooges [Zulu word] of the ruler Mpimpi tsa ba abuse 
Away with you! Sokela koo rona!
We are going forward Re a tsamaela
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Figure 10.27 Facing the police 
(Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.28 Police in riot gear (Photo: P. Werbner).
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Figure 10.29 Regime change: Ian must go (Photo: P. Werbner).
Figure 10.30 Police banner (Midweek Sun, 15 June 2011, p. 1).
Despite the leadership decision to suspend the strike, the following Monday 
about 200 strikers assembled at the GSS grounds in the capital, under the Morula 
tree (see Fig. 10.29). At 2 pm the police arrived in full riot gear carrying a giant 
red (!) banner (see Fig. 10.30) bearing the words:
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All persons assembled here are commanded in the name of the PRESIDENT 
of the Republic of Botswana to disperse peacefully and go to their homes or 
work. Persons who disobey this order will be dispersed by force, which may 
include RIFLE FIRE. All persons remaining here after this order are liable to 
arrest and imprisonment. [Capital letters in the original.]
After holding up the banner, the police advanced on the strikers, brandishing 
guns and baseball bats. At this point the workers dispersed, running to the Civic 
Hall, the mall and the Anglican church. Giving chase, the police arrested some 
thirty people randomly at the Civic Hall. The shocking belligerence of the 
banner, threatening to use gunfire against a relatively small, peaceful assembly 
gathered in the middle of a vast, empty football field, has to be considered 
alongside the terrified response by government ministers to the crowds of 
peaceful strikers attending their meetings. No wonder one of the union leaders 
commented to me mournfully that ‘We live in a military dictatorship!’ 
The police threat of violence points to a yawning social gap between the 
government and its own respectable, educated and hard-working civil servants. 
Rather than recognising that the strikers were ‘one of us’, and the strike a peaceful, 
mostly middle-class rebellion, the government seemed to have convinced itself 
that the strikers were a rampaging mob, out of control like the rioting school 
pupils who had vandalised school buildings in some towns.
The rejection of the union leadership’s call to suspend the strike points 
clearly to the new social movement dynamic of the strike; to the autonomy, 
self-empowerment and democratic tradition that the strike rallies had produced. 
In their caucusing and open democratic debate strikers were in effect ‘“prefig-
uring” the just society they hoped to create’.46 While the leadership recognised 
pragmatically that an agreement with the government regarding the dismissed 
workers must be reached urgently, striking unionists could not be blamed for 
feeling that to return to work now would be to admit defeat. 
Conclusion
This chapter has analysed New Social Movement Unionism, Botswana style, 
the collective creation of a shared worker identity and ethos, drawing on local 
popular culture and traditional modes of celebration, and echoing cosmopolitan 
themes from protest movements elsewhere in the world, in the aftermath of the 
Arab Spring. In particular, it showed, newly invented insult songs called politi-
cians to account and reminded them that, from the President downwards, ‘the 
chief is chief only by the grace of the people’. The emergent social movement 
that the workers shaped collectively was not only exhilarating: it endowed 
strikers with a sense of empowerment, dignity and autonomy and united them 
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across divisions of class, occupation, gender, education and income. But unlike 
the familiar old labour movement with its international political roots expressed 
in rousing songs of protest, solidarity, hardship and struggle, this protest was 
youthful, humorous, satirical and self-consciously part of a global movement, 
reflecting a radical generational and political shift.
Despite being largely a middle-class rebellion, the strikers’ courageous will-
ingness to be counted, to resist what was widely seen to be an unjust, authori-
tarian government endorsing the growing gap between rich and poor, emerged 
spontaneously and over time swept the whole of Botswana in its wake, from 
priests and chiefs to parliamentarians and ordinary folk. The values invoked in 
the public domain were those of fairness, justice and a return to the welfare state. 
Although the strike seemed, on the face of it, to fail in its stated objectives, 
confronted by a powerful government determined to pursue prudent monetary 
policies and eliminate the national deficit before the next elections in 2014, 
and although some workers lost their jobs and most were not paid for over two 
months, the events of April to June were nevertheless a watershed in the history 
of Botswana. During the eight weeks of the strike, strikers forged a new national 
and worker consciousness, and gave notice that ordinary citizens were deter-
mined to protect Botswana’s forty-five-year established tradition of democracy, 
freedom of speech and egalitarian values. 
In Egypt, the popular uprising followed mass strikes by labour unions. In 
Botswana, the felt experience of owning the ‘political’ and the obliteration of 
the usual social divisions between workers did not occur in what Benjamin 
called ‘homogeneous, empty time’.47 It was grasped by workers as a significant 
moment in history in which, as Benjamin put it, ‘time stands still’,48 a time 
in which prior visions of authority were reworked, extended and revitalised 
in rhetoric and popular culture. As Setrag Manoukian has argued with regard 
to the 2009 Iranian post-election protests, the experience of ‘suspended time’ 
linked the Iranian protesters to earlier historical moments when people took 
to the streets, and in which political subjectivity was ‘remolded and recon-
stituted’.49 In Botswana, where past mass protests were few, protesters linked 
themselves, in time, to ritual traditional local protest genres and, over space, to 
world protests elsewhere, in Southern Africa and the Middle East.
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‘Vernacular Culture and Grassroots Activism: 
Non-violent Protest and Progressive Ethos 
at the 2011 Wisconsin Labour Rallies
Christine Garlough
Chapter 11
‘The essence of politics can be subsumed in the question: What are indi-
viduals capable of when they meet, organise and take decisions?’1
Many scholars studying the Arab Spring of 2011 have characterised it as a 
‘great emancipatory movement’ that was part of a ‘year of dreaming danger-
ously’.2 Academic and popular discourse has, by and large, focused on protests 
in the Middle East and North Africa, with commentary on demonstrations in 
Greece, Spain and the UK providing important insights as well. With regard 
to US contexts, most discourse related to the Arab Spring of 2011 concerns 
the Occupy Wall Street movement that spoke to the dramatic rise of income 
disparity and made calls for economic reform. Ignored has been the US 
precursor to the Occupy Wall Street movement – the 2011 spring protests in 
Madison, Wisconsin. Here thousands of protesters – teachers, labour represen-
tatives, farmers, firefighters, students and nurses − marched around the State 
Capitol building in freezing temperatures and falling snow, to oppose the newly 
elected conservative Republican Governor Walker’s war ‘Budget Repair bill’ 
that slashed collective bargaining rights for public employees, cut $1.5 billion 
in aid to schools and local government, and significantly reduced the state’s 
Badger Care programme that provided aid to children and adults from low-
income families not eligible for Medicaid. 
Although the connections between the global Arab Spring movement and 
the 2011 Wisconsin protests have not garnered much international attention, 
the similarities between these grassroots organising efforts were not lost on 
liberals or conservatives in the US context. Given the huge size of the protest, 
almost immediately many news pundits, political analysts and politicians began 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 264 —
to compare the Wisconsin protests to the large-scale demonstrations that had 
just occurred in Cairo. Even though the Wisconsin protests remained non-
violent throughout, conservative talking heads appearing on Fox News and 
similar media outlets predicted Cassandra-like the catastrophic likelihood of 
‘mobs’ developing. The conservative Republican Paul Ryan (R-WI) adopted a 
clear Orientalist overtone when he warned that: ‘[Walker’s] getting riots − it’s 
like Cairo’s moved to Madison these days’.3 Governor Walker added fuel to the 
fire by threatening to call out the National Guard should there be resistance to 
his proposed bill.4 Meanwhile, liberals drew much more positive lessons from 
the global protest, noting similarities in the visible commitment to social justice 
issues, as well as critiques of the corruption and political favours provided to 
corporations by those in power. 
Of course, one of the important differences between contexts was that most 
of the countries involved in the Arab Spring uprisings were authoritarian non-
democracies, ‘so restrictions of free expression and demand for social justice 
and economic justice spontaneously integrated into demand for democracy’.5 
In contrast, in the Wisconsin protests, people were invoking histories of free 
speech in the public sphere and the politically progressive past of the state to 
claim their worker rights and standard of living now under attack. 
Despite such apparent differences, there were important connections between 
these struggles, seen as workers’ struggles. Kamal Abbas, General Coordinator 
for Egypt’s Center for Trade Unions and Workers’ Services, sent a message on 
21 February 2011 to the workers of Wisconsin: 
I am speaking to you from a place very close to Tahrir Square in Cairo, 
‘Liberation Square’, which was the heart of the revolution in Egypt. This 
is the place where many of our youth paid with their lives and blood in the 
struggle for our just rights. From this place, I want you to know that we stand 
with you as you stood with us.6 
Taking note of this declaration, Noam Chomsky wrote on 11 March 2011: 
Egyptian workers have long fought for fundamental rights denied by the U.S.-
backed Hosni Mubarak regime. Kamal is right to invoke the solidarity that 
has long been the driving force of the labour movement world-wide, and to 
compare their struggles for labour rights and democracy. The two are closely 
intertwined. Labour movements have been in the forefront of protecting 
democracy and human rights and expanding their domains, a primary reason 
why they are the bane of systems of power, both state and private.7 
Both the popular press and academic journals have noted the remarkable use 
of social media to overcome limitations on free speech, disseminate the latest 
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information amongst protesters, and demand social and economic justice. From 
Twitter to YouTube, social media played an important role in organising political 
action and community support. Social media also aided people in finding allies 
in distant locations. For example, Medea Benjamin from the Huffington Post 
wrote: 
Egyptian engineer Muhammad Salin Nusair, the one whose photo supporting 
Wisconsin workers went viral, now has thousands of new American Facebook 
friends. He wrote in his blog that many of his new friends were surprised by 
his gesture of solidarity, but he was taught that ‘we live in ONE world and 
under the same sky’.8
Clearly, however, neither the global diffusion of information and expectations, 
nor the spread of popular movements, strategies of civil disobedience and norms 
of civic engagement, are new. The protests were not just the result of new social 
media and the impact of the internet. We need, I suggest, to take a closer look 
at how alternative forms of public communication aided in the framing of 
issues and making of claims in political discourse, and especially how dramatic 
performances within protest contexts provided protesters with an embodied and 
creative experience – in the presence of others − of interrogating exigencies 
their society faces.9 
More specifically, in this chapter I am concerned with the ways in which 
innovative, carnivalesque street performances at the 2011 Wisconsin protests 
gathered large crowds, reflecting through satire and masquerade on other forms 
of political discourse − public speeches, pamphlets and protest signs. These 
playful, artistic, theatrical acts created solidarity in the face of incivility and 
non-recognition, as hope for reconciliation receded. Drawing upon vernacular 
culture, these performances offered protesters ‘the chance to participate in an 
experience of unmasking and condemning the powerful’ and ‘exercise one of the 
last rights of a citizen. The right not to believe a single word they are told’.10 
Protesters transfigured notable local folk characters in uncanny but recognisable 
ways to enact the brutality of state violence and call attention to the dire impli-
cations of Governor Walker’s policy changes. 
In order to better understand the political use of these street plays, I begin 
with a brief history of the Madison 2011 protests. Drawing on theories of 
rhetoric in philosophy, anthropology and folklore, I then discuss the importance 
of ‘rhetorical performance’ in linking ‘persuasion and pleasure, politics and 
aesthetics, citizenship and entertainment, and activism and art’.11 I show how 
progressive Wisconsin protesters used street performances to bear witness and 
educate citizens, as well as respond non-violently to the stripping of collective 
bargaining rights, sweeping cuts to the proposed budget and the Governor’s 
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unwillingness to negotiate or participate in dialogue, as he rapidly pushed these 
changes through the legislature. Each of the performances described revolved 
around questions of sovereignty and the sovereign, especially where these were 
apparent in the broader social and cultural context that informed these protests. 
The answers the street plays offered revealed a good deal about how solidarity 
was understood and how citizens were able to mobilise the carnivalesque to 
convey insightful and serious concerns while calling for public engagement.
The Context of an Uprising
Beginning the day before Valentine’s Day, the 2011 Wisconsin protests erupted 
shortly after recently elected Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker unveiled 
his budget plan. At the heart of his proposal was a determination to elim-
inate collective bargaining rights for most public employees (excepting ‘first 
responders’), while asking the same workers to increase their contributions to 
health and retirement benefits. Swearing off any new tax or fee revenue, the 
budget also cut billions in support for schools, local government and health care 
for low-income families. Walker asserted that without these cuts the state would 
experience a shortfall of $3.6 billion.12
In the wake of his budget proposal, few disputed the need to ‘share the pain’ 
in addressing the shortfalls in the state budget. Other aspects of this policy 
shift, however, were contested and questioned in print, broadcast and digital 
media outlets, in bars and restaurants, and in the family rooms of state residents. 
People questioned the speed with which this complex and sweeping piece of 
legislation was being pushed through, with very limited opportunity for delib-
eration or discussion over substantial cuts to services and changes in workers’ 
rights. Others asked how this budget crisis had come about in the first place, 
especially in light of the fact that the Governor had inherited a surplus when 
entering office. Walker, they argued, gave away ‘$137 million in tax breaks to 
corporations, leaving the state with a shortfall that cried out for a solution’.13 
The sweeping changes advanced by Walker and his Republican allies in 
the state legislature reversed Wisconsin’s celebrated history of labour rights 
and progressive politics. Wisconsin was the first to pass worker’s compensation 
protection, in 1911, and unemployment compensation, in 1932, and hence the 
erosion of collective bargaining rights came as a shock.14 The response was the 
largest political protests in Wisconsin history, occurring within days of the 2011 
Egyptian revolution. Like their counterparts half a world away, the protests in 
Wisconsin presaged broader popular discontent and the spread of the Occupy 
Movement worldwide.
One day after a small group of 150 protesters gathered outside the gates of 
the Governor’s Mansion, University of Wisconsin–Madison teaching assistants 
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Figure 11.1 Protestors at the Wisconsin Capitol (Photo: M. Menocal).
Figure 11.2 Advocating peaceful 
solutions (Photo: M. Menocal).
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Figure 11.3 Keep the movement alive (Photo: M. Menocal).
Figure 11.4 Bob La Follette (Photo: M. Menocal).
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and professors partnered with public school teachers to launch large rallies at the 
State Capitol. Beginning on Valentine’s Day, over 1,000 people gathered at the 
Capitol to deliver ‘Love Notes’, proclaiming their affection for the university 
and teachers and urging the Governor to reconsider. In the days that followed, 
labour leaders insisted on testifying against the Budget Repair bill. Within a 
week, protesters had taken up residency, occupying the State Capitol and estab-
lishing a functioning community, complete with food stations, sleeping areas 
and an information centre (see Fig. 11.1). Within two weeks, by 26 February, 
as many as 100,000 citizens peacefully circled the Capitol in freezing rain and 
bitter cold with protest signs (see Figs 11.2 and 11.3). 
Non-violent and grassroots, the protest movement mobilised largely outside 
party organisations and forged loosely coordinated alliances and workplace coali-
tions.15 The protests soon became national and international news, drawing 
cable news hosts and international journalists. Support for the protesters and 
their cause poured in from across the nation and the globe (see Fig. 11.4), often 
taking unexpected forms. For example, one local pizza restaurant received orders 
to deliver food to the demonstrators ‘on behalf of people from all fifty states, over 
sixty countries and Antarctica’. Such gestures became the material manifesta-
tions of worldwide labour solidarity. 
Contrary to Ryan’s view, there were no riots. Rather, the demonstrators 
were committed to the peaceful expression of their opposition, referring to 
their actions as ‘waging non-violence’. Their preferred outlet was the protest 
poster, creatively crafted to address issues of labour rights, democratic process 
and corporate greed. Placards and signs communicated ‘opinions and feelings 
that touch our innermost sense of who we are and our moral visions about 
how we should act in the world’.16 Chants such as ‘Forward, Not Backward!’ 
(referencing the state’s motto, ‘Forward’) worked to remind listeners of Wiscon-
sin’s progressive political identity. Demonstrators not only occupied the State 
Capitol but also renamed it the ‘People’s House’, reconstituting it as a place 
for the unacknowledged masses, rather than an institution for a privileged few.
Non-violent action continued into late spring and early summer as some 
protesters created ‘Walkerville’, a tent city referencing the Hoovervilles of the 
Great Depression, after the Capitol was cleared, while other activists mobilised 
recall efforts throughout the state. Friendship networks (including those linked 
by social networking sites like Facebook), workplace alliances (especially among 
public sector workers and their allies) and grassroots organising (particularly by 
labour unions and activated citizens) sustained a unified approach of peaceful 
solidarity. These loose networks strengthened over the months of the protest 
efforts, as protesters vied for public support and were supported by the energy of 
newly engaged citizens.17
Much of the rhetoric invoked by the protesters referenced the recorded 
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history of progressive politics and liberal activism in the state. Progressive icons 
such as Robert ‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette, Sr, who was Wisconsin’s Governor 
from 1901 to 1906 and its US Senator from 1906 to 1925, were featured fixtures. 
La Follette, a crusader for labour rights and social reforms, is credited with 
supporting corporate regulation, women’s suffrage, racial equality and, most of 
all, labour unions, which he believed were essential to check the power of large 
corporations and special interests. As a result, his bust in the State Capitol 
became a focal point of attention and activity, with demonstrators draping it in 
protest T-shirts and signs, while asking, ‘What would Bob do?’ (see Fig. 11.5).
Even in its early moments, then, the protests made use of the progressive 
history of Wisconsin, both in discourses and performance. The inventiveness 
of the signs and placards gained national attention. News outlets reported on 
them, whereas the Wisconsin Historical Society and Smithsonian worked to 
collect and preserve them as artifacts. The slogans on the posters varied widely, 
from support for labour (‘Worker’s Rights are Human Rights!’; ‘Stop the War on 
Figure 11.5 Chicago labour supports Wisconsin labour (Photo: M. Menocal).
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Workers!’; ‘There is no America without labour and to fleece one is to rob the 
other’ − Abraham Lincoln!) to claims about democratic principles and practices 
(‘Elected to Serve, Came to Rule!’; ‘Tyrants Don’t Negotiate!’; ‘Democracy = 
Dialogue’; ‘My Kindergarteners are Better Listeners than my Governor!’). 
As these selected examples illustrate, protesters displayed considerable play-
fulness and creativity, drawing upon news events, historical materials, folklore 
and popular culture. Beyond these examples, some demonstrators drew connec-
tions to mythical, literary and movie villains. In one poster, Governor Walker 
was figured as Medusa with snake tentacles writhing on his head that were 
labelled with the names and pictures of his political supporters, such as Cowels, 
Kapanke, Hopper and Darling. The text on the sign read, ‘Hades is Waiting for 
You, Hearts of Stone’. Popular culture narratives and figures were also frequently 
visible. Some included V for Vendetta (‘We will be heard. We will win.’), Star 
Wars (‘There is still good in you (Sky) Walker!’) and Harry Potter (‘Walker is in 
League with Voldemort, Muggles Beware!’).18
The non-violent ‘occupation’ of the ‘People’s House’ continued until 3 
March 2011. During this time, folk practices increased and were central to 
the growing sense of community. Daily drum circles, Midwestern potluck-style 
eating, repurposed protest songs − all became sources of humour directed not 
only at Governor Walker but also at other polarising figures such as the Koch 
brothers (major donors to Republican and Libertarian causes) and Republican 
leaders Jeff and Scott Fitzgerald.
The acrimony and anger on the streets surrounding the Capitol were also 
evident among the legislators charged with debating and voting on Walker’s 
controversial budget proposal. This came to a head on 17 February, when all 
fourteen Democratic state Senators fled across the state line to Illinois. This 
action was meant to deny the quorum the Republican-controlled legislature 
needed to force through the passage of the bill. All this was on the heels of 
assembly Republicans convening a floor session before it was properly scheduled.
In the early morning hours of Friday, 25 February, Wisconsin Assembly 
Republicans passed Walker’s budget bill, which included the controversial 
anti-union measure, through a procedural move in which they abruptly cut off 
debate, approving the bill in a voice vote, 51–17. The manoeuvre caught the 
Democrats off guard, with many unable even to return to their seats to have 
the chance to vote. Consequently, the following Saturday, protests swelled to 
their largest numbers, with waves of up to 100,000 protesters descending on the 
Capitol and the streets surrounding it.
In the days that followed, Republican senators removed the overt fiscal 
elements from the Budget Repair bill, retaining the stripping of collective 
bargaining rights. This allowed them to vote on the bill without a quorum, in 
the absence of the Democratic Senators, passing the measure on an 18–1 vote in 
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favour, with only one Republican Senator dissenting. No Democratic Senators 
were present. On Friday, 11 March, Governor Walker signed the legislation into 
a law that greatly limited the ability of unions representing the state’s public 
employees. The following day produced a huge protest, with Madison police 
estimating upwards of 100,000 people in attendance.19
Vernacular Rhetoric, Folklore and Performance 
As days passed, thousands of protesters gathered at the Capitol and a diverse 
array of performance practices began to emerge, ranging from protest signs to 
choreographed parades. Gruesomely costumed ‘zombie’ street performers lurched 
into the hallways of the Capitol to protest the death of collective bargaining. 
A Mardi Gras style procession was organised by National Nurses United,20 an 
event that drew large crowds of firefighters, students and union members who 
marched to live jazz music, evoking a New Orleans style funeral for the death 
of Wisconsin’s progressive ideals. Many carried hand-made protest signs, while 
‘pall bearers’ bore black caskets with placards proclaiming ‘Some Cuts Don’t 
Heal’ and ‘Save Early Childhood Education’. Despite their humorous satirical 
theatricality, these carnivalesque performances conveyed the powerful sense of 
disenfranchisement and painful disacknowledgment felt by protesters. 
If rhetoric is the art of persuasive speaking or writing, by extension it can be 
applied to other forms of aesthetic performances that aim to persuade. Clearly, 
performances in the Wisconsin protests were far more than just a way to have a 
good time or to blow off steam. They framed persuasive appeals for understanding 
and action. As Bryant has argued, rhetoric, understood broadly, is a form of 
symbolic communication that makes visible matters of contingency and ‘finds a 
home whenever matters are ambiguous, contestable, and questionable’.21 In this 
broader sense, rhetorical performance may be found in puberty rituals, congres-
sional debates, wartime deliberations, community narratives or even symbolic 
displays of the flag. Indeed, public speeches, poetry and theatre performances all 
have ‘a distinctly rhetorical function, using imagination to create what might 
be called historical fictions to give power and life to ideas’.22 Similarly, folklore 
and popular culture are often critically appropriated in rhetorically artistic ways 
to make persuasive appeals grounded in ethos, pathos and logos. The fashioning 
of rhetoric − an explicitly cultural activity − is often a site of struggle: ‘Rhetoric 
happens in unfinished historical episodes, wherein urgent circumstances require 
that we act, even though we lack complete, reliable grounds for determining 
what the best action might be’.23 
We are socialised into rhetorical competence, learning how to call forth 
the appropriate discourse and practices when confronted by crisis or need.24 
 Rhetoricians are attuned to their cultural and social environment, able to 
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provide a ‘fitting response’ in performance contexts. Rituals, art, narrative and 
other aspects of culture provide the material orators selectively draw upon 
to advance agendas, educate constituencies, support social movements and 
constitute  identities. 
Rhetorical events are often inventive collaborative processes in which 
performers and audience members are drawn together into an engagement with 
ideas and problems. This was true in the Wisconsin protest where collaborative 
work highlighted the fact that rhetoric is ‘a creative way of being-with-others’.25 
Rhetoric in this view is concerned with values and ‘values are established with 
the aid of imaginative realisations, not through rational determinations alone 
and they gain their force through emotional animation’.26 In the process, 
audience members become aware that the suffering of others is relevant to their 
own interests; and this, Farrell notes, is the faith of democracy.27
Critical Performances for Critical Times
Krampus at the Wisconsin Capitol
During the spring of 2011, carnivalesque performances at the Wisconsin protests 
played a critical role in calling attention to failings in the political process, 
widening rifts in local communities and perceptions of poor leadership. These 
concerns were addressed, for example, by groups of protesters masquerading as 
the beastly figure of Krampus. Krampus was the subject of some of the most 
visible and uncanny street performances during the protests, causing audiences 
repeatedly to break into laughter, even as they seriously protested for social 
justice. 
Krampus, a menacing mythical figure with pre-Christian origins, has a long 
tradition in the Christmas celebrations of Austria, southern Germany, Hungary, 
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Croatia – areas from 
which many Wisconsinites emigrated during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Travelling from house to house on 6 December with St Nicholas, 
Krampus judges the moral character and ethical behaviour of local children. 
Found wanting, children are publicly shamed and punished by Krampus who 
places their hands and feet in shackles or thrashes their bodies with switches, 
rusty chains or a whip. Extremely naughty children are thrown into a basket on 
Krampus’s back and hauled to his lair where they are eaten or drowned. Worse 
yet, others are dragged, kicking and screaming, to the nether regions.
Krampus – whose name derives from ‘Krampen’, the German word for 
claw – is typically figured as a hairy man-beast or devilish creature with long 
curved horns and cloven hooves. In his honour, on the evening of Krampus-
nacht, groups of men have traditionally taken to the streets dressed in fur and 
wearing intricately carved wooden masks (a disguise sometimes known as Larven 
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Figure 11.6 Krampus knocking for Governor Walker at 
Capitol entrance (Photo: M. Menocal).
that is traditionally passed down through generations) with pointed animal 
ears, an enormous tongue and an unkempt mane (see Fig. 11.6). The early 
Catholic Church discouraged these celebrations, and during the Inquisition 
strong attempts were made to end them by making it punishable by death to 
masquerade as any sort of evil creature or the devil. Nevertheless, the Krampus 
customs survived in remote villages, until, in the aftermath of the 1934 Austrian 
Civil War, these traditions were again prohibited under the Fatherland Front 
and the Christian Social Party.28 Remarkably, Krampus endured this attempt at 
suppression as well. Today, across Europe and in diasporic contexts such as the 
US, Krampusnacht celebrations continue to gain momentum.29 
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Figure 11.7 Shame (Photo: M. Menocal).
In the Wisconsin protests, Krampus appeared at the forefront of several 
marches around the Capitol, shaking his fist and bearing a sign stating ‘Walker, 
Krampus must talk with you’. In these marches, Krampus performs a visual 
argument. In this argument, his appearance provides vivid and forceful reasons 
for undermining any belief in Governor Walker’s moral conduct in office. Kram-
pus’s transcendent authority to judge the Governor, deriving from his traditional 
role as purveyor of moral judgement that extends beyond human law, resonated 
with many audience members. This particular visual argument functioned as 
an enthymeme − an argument with gaps, left to be filled in by the audience. 
In this case: (1) Krampus seeks out and punishes those who behave badly; (2) 
Krampus is seeking out Governor Walker; (3) Walker is behaving badly. This 
performance drew intertextually upon an already present set of discourses at 
the protest that characterised the Republicans’ behaviour as ‘Shameful’ (see 
Fig.  11.7). 
In addition, Governor Walker was derided in public discourse for behaving 
‘as if ’ he were a sovereign (see Fig. 11.8). Like a sovereign, he acted ‘as if ’ he 
had the power to make and to suspend the law without limit. In doing so, 
he appeared to invoke ‘the exceptional right to place oneself above right’.30 
Moreover, like a sovereign, Governor Walker did not feel compelled to respond 
to citizens; rather, he seemed unbound from duties of reciprocity. In this way, 
Derrida notes, both the ‘sovereign and the beast seem to have in common their 
being-outside-the-law’.31
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Figure 11.8 Imperial Walker (Photo: M. Menocal).
This refusal to communicate was underlined by an attending sign proclaiming 
‘Walker, Krampus Must Talk With You!’ It seems that while it is clear that 
Krampus judges Walker to be behaving badly, he is not arriving at the Capitol 
to carry him off to the nether regions or cause him physical harm. Rather, even 
a beast like Krampus advocates ‘speaking together’ about the problems at hand 
− reiterating the non-violent ethos of the protest (see Fig. 11.2). 
Throughout the Krampus street performances, the carnivalesque atmosphere 
created by the performers enhanced the masquerade’s rhetorical potential. 
Krampus’s antics permeated the boundaries between himself and his audience, 
creating an alternative space in which hierarchies were overturned through 
debasement and inversion: the dominant, authoritative voice of the Governor 
and Republican right was denied its legitimacy. Instead, humour challenged and 
undermined the sanctity of this voice, subverting its appearance of authoritative 
power. 
Whose Wisconsin?: The Koch Brothers and Corporate Greed 
Emerson wrote in his Journal that ‘Caricatures are often the truest history of all 
times’.32 The performers of ‘The Koch Brothers and Corporate Greed’ exploited 
this potentiality to convince their audiences of the evil of wealth unchecked. 
Through humorous parodies of excessive wealth and privilege, they offered 
an incisive commentary on politicians’ subservience to American plutocrats. 
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The performance sparked a plethora of conversations and debates amongst the 
protesters − regarding social justice, unions, benefits, American democracy − 
while also referencing larger national and international economic concerns. 
For many protesters, it was common knowledge that Walker’s victory in 2010 
was accomplished, in part, by the backing of the Koch brothers, who were his 
second highest donors (see Fig. 11.9). Fears were confirmed when
on Wednesday, February 23rd … an itinerant blogger from western New York 
called the governor, posing as one of his billionaire donors, David Koch. 
Unlike the democratic senators, union leaders and constituents who had 
been calling the governor all week, he got through. It was less what Walker 
said that was shocking (although he confessed to considering planting trou-
blemakers in crowds of protesters and asked for a donation to the Republican 
senators) than the tone of his conversation, which made it clear that he was 
in the pocket of big money and that his agenda and ambitions were deter-
mined by interests outside the state. Demonstrators began to target David 
and Charles Koch’s Madison headquarters and even conservative supporters 
of the governor began to squirm with discomfort.33 
Early in the protests, activists had spent considerable time trying to educate the 
public about the Koch brothers’ business and political interests. On websites and 
blogs and in flyers, they explained that the New York billionaires Charles and 
Figure 11.9 The Koch brothers – Walker’s puppeteers (Photo: M. Menocal).
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Figure 11.10 Welcome to Wis‘koch’sin (Photo M. Menocal).
Figure 11.11 Wis‘koch’sin is open for business (Photo: M. Menocal).
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David Koch owned almost all of Koch Industries, a conglomerate headquartered 
in Wichita, Kansas. The revenues of this conglomerate were estimated to be 
billions of dollars, making the brothers among the richest men in America with 
combined fortunes only surpassed by those of Bill Gates and Warren Buffett. 
The Koch brothers advocated minimal social services for the needy, dramati-
cally reduced personal and corporate taxes, and decreased industry regulation, 
particularly environmental regulation.34 They had financially supported groups 
like Americans for Prosperity (the non-profit Tea Party organising group), the 
Cato Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute and the Reason Foundation 
− all of which had a history of unsympathetic views toward public sector unions. 
Protesters also called the public’s attention to the fact that two weeks before 
Walker was elected Governor, the Koch brothers opened an office in Madison. 
According to the Government Accountability Board’s website, the firm had 
seven lobbyists who ‘represented various Koch Industries Inc. companies on 
public affairs matters, including Flint Hills Resources, LP, an energy purchaser 
and refiner & transporter of petroleum and Georgia-Pacific, LLC a manufacturer 
of paper, wood products and building materials’. The group’s lobbying interests 
were listed as ‘the environment, energy, taxation, business, policy and other 
areas affecting Koch Industries, Inc. companies’.35 
As the Koch brothers became more entrenched in the local politics, protesters 
became increasingly concerned and public discourse circled around the question 
‘Who are these non-Wisconsinites and to what degree are their interests influ-
encing the direction of our state and the development of our local communities?’ 
(see Figs 11.10 and 11.11). During the protest they drew attention to this problem 
through street theatre performances. The performance of ‘The Koch Brothers 
and Corporate Greed’ was staged on the back of a flatbed truck decorated along 
the sides with posters stating ‘Corporate Greed is Injuring America!’ and ‘Heal 
America, Tax Corporations!’ In a political cartoon ‘come to life’, performers 
enacted parodic representations of nineteenth-century monopolists, dressed in 
top hats, bow ties and white gloves, much like the Billionaires for Bush protest 
group discussed by Angelique Haugerud (see Fig. 11.9).36 These iconic represen-
tations of the ‘upper crust’ recalled past moments when big business had made 
for bad politics in Wisconsin. The critically appropriated images transcended 
their relation to the specific events of the past, creating a more expansive 
rhetorical framework that allowed audiences to re-imagine these narratives in 
relation to the contemporary corporate greed apparent in Wisconsin today. The 
satirical theatrical street performances also referred intertextually to local folk 
hero Fighting Bob La Follette’s war on big business – a powerful undercurrent 
that was not lost on the audience (see Fig. 11.12). The rhetorical performance 
was supported by material documents, as protesters circulated lists of companies 
owned by the Koch brothers and products for boycotting.
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Figure 11.12 What would Bob La Follette do? (Photo: M. Menocal).
As dandified performers pulled the strings attached to Governor Walker’s 
cartoonish head, the argument was clear. Walker was the Koch brothers’ puppet 
(see Figs 11.9 above and 11.13). Like a lifeless marionette, he lacked the sover-
eignty necessary to make his own decisions. Consequently, his economic and 
political agenda was one determined by interests outside the state of Wisconsin. 
This was a theme repeated in various performances during the Wisconsin protests. 
As shown in Fig. 11.13, Governor Walker was figured alternatively as a ventril-
oquist’s dummy or marionette without a voice or a soul − merely a substitute, an 
object that is insensible, inanimate, uncanny, bête or manipulated.37 
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Figure 11.13 Scott, who pulls your strings? (Photo: M. Menocal).
Figure 11.14 Only sheep blindly follow (Photo: M. Menocal).
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This visual spectacle of the Koch brothers’ excess also contrasted sharply 
with the thousands of ‘folk’ who came to protest, not only in their hard hats, 
firefighter gear and police uniforms, but bundled in their everyday parkas, winter 
hats and mittens, required coverage in the quickly dropping temperatures. 
Indeed, in many ways the audience became part of the performance – a sharp 
visual juxtaposition to the brothers’ excessive wealth. The exposed tensions 
between the wealthy and the folk, or Wisconsinites and outsiders embodied a 
politics of visibility that sought to make plain the widening gap between the 
classes. As a radical performance, the performers created a stimulus to delib-
erative engagement with issues of social justice and equity.
Move on Over Walker: The Madison Raging Grannies Are Coming For You!
In this final case study of the Raging Grannies, I consider street performances 
that made yet another argument about where sovereignty lay at the Wisconsin 
2011 protests. Wearing flamboyant kitchen aprons, wide-brimmed granny 
bonnets, house dresses and tattered shawls, senior women from the Madison area 
critically appropriated the figure of the wise ‘granny’ as they performed familiar 
folk songs set to political lyrics. The tunes, meant to provoke laughter from 
the audience, simultaneously reflected upon the serious challenges facing their 
community. As the women marched in the blustery snow, gathering crowds on 
street corners, the songs they performed made one overarching claim − despite 
appearances, sovereignty truly lay in the hands of the people of Wisconsin. 
Of course, their protest movement at the Capitol was not their first gig. The 
Raging Grannies of Madison originated as a sidearm of the Madison chapter 
of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). Their 
first performance, in the autumn of 2003, was for crowds of Madison anti-war 
protesters. Their work continued to grow in the area as they sang at events 
for the League of Women Voters, Lanterns for Peace, LGBTQ Allies Potluck, 
Planned Parenthood, the offices of Congress, Labor Temple and the Social 
Justice Center, as well as Bob-Fest, an annual grassroots festival that celebrates 
the progressive legacy of ‘Fighting Bob’ La Follette.38 The group is open to all 
older women who desire to work for peace, economic and social justice, and the 
environment. Consequently, the group is diverse in terms of age (generally 50s to 
80s), economic background, religion (atheist, Christian, Jewish, Buddhist and so 
on), sexual and even political orientations. The Madison group meets monthly 
at the Oakwood Retirement Village to practise their repertoire and plan their 
next protest performance.39 Recently, they have been actively helping other 
Wisconsin communities form their own groups, making road trips to remote 
towns to start organisations such as the ‘Northwoods Grannies’. As one Madison 
Raging Granny put it, ‘We are not retiring to our rocking chairs. Instead, we are 
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taking care of our community in ways that show the strength of non-violence 
and our commitment to social justice in the public sphere’.40
They are not alone. The Madison Raging Grannies is one branch of an 
established community movement linked nationally and internationally 
through the internet, newsletters and conferences, with chapters in England, 
Greece, Canada, Australia and other countries. Their history began in 1987 in 
Victoria, British Columbia, when ten older women who were participating in 
a street theatre group paddled canoes into Canadian waters to confront a US 
nuclear-powered warship, singing protest songs while dressed in gaudy granny 
gear.41 Today, their playful grassroots activism, in their local communities and 
around the world, is framed as a symbolic expansion of their roles as responsible 
grandmothers who are worried about the future health of the planet.42 
In Wisconsin, the performance of protest songs and narratives of labour lore 
have a long legacy. These entertaining songs and stories express the struggles of 
everyday people and play important roles in protest contexts: expressing anger 
toward the oppressor, unifying constituencies, releasing feelings of resentment 
or renewing resolve to carry on together, despite hardships, and fight for a better 
life.43 I have argued elsewhere that such humorous protest singing has become a 
communicable form of wisdom, assisting Verstehen (understanding).44 
The Raging Grannies create their performances by taking these familiar 
pieces of folklore and injecting them with political humour and commentary. As 
one Granny noted, ‘We try to compose songs with singable, repetitive choruses 
where people can join in. Sometimes we print out the chorus part and hand 
it out to the audience so they can all sing together. That’s a real feel-good 
moment’.45 Another Granny added, ‘We take well-known Wisconsin songs 
and put political lyrics to them, like the “Wisconsin Fight Song” or “The Beer 
Barrel Polka”’.46 This creativity is not mere nostalgia; rather, it forms a critical 
link between past and present in an intersubjective encounter that depends for 
its effectiveness both on the audience’s former knowledge and on their bodily 
presence and participation, to revitalise the spirit of democracy.47
At the spring protests, the Raging Grannies of Madison drew upon a deep 
pool of Wisconsin folklore and American labour lore, adapting more than fifty
Roll the Union On (Wisconsin) 
(Key of A, start on A. Tune: ‘Roll the Union On’. Lyrics: Vicki Ryder)
They give tax cuts to the rich and say it’s good for you and me,
The deficit goes up, down goes the economy.
Our jobs fly overseas, it’s plain as it can be,
We’ve gotta roll the Union on.
CHORUS: 
We’re gonna roll, we’re gonna roll, we’re gonna roll the Union on!
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We’re gonna roll, we’re gonna roll, we’re gonna roll the Union on!
Oh, we don’t get paid for overtime and health care is in doubt,
The rich keep getting richer, that’s what it’s all about.
We’ve got to stick together, we’ve got to rage and shout:
We’ve gotta roll the Union on.
CHORUS:
Koch Brothers and Scott Walker think they’re calling all the shots,
But they haven’t seen what happens when Wisconsin folks get hot,
So we’ll show our solidarity from city, town and farm,
And we’ll roll the Union on!
Figure 11.15 Unwanted (Photo: M. Menocal).
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Their comic playfulness and experimentation with local folk forms connected 
the Grannies with their fellow Wisconsite protesters, while it simultaneously 
asked them to reflect critically about current politics.48 Their popularity was 
reflected in the large audiences that gathered to listen to the familiar folk tunes 
and learn the new verses. One Raging Granny remembered:
I was at the protest when the temperature was 14 degrees, and couldn’t feel 
my fingers, can’t wear gloves and play the guitar. We could sing about three 
songs then stop for hand warming … We would be like buskers and pick a 
corner or spot where there wasn’t another musician or bullhorn in play. [That 
day] we went to the entrance of the Capitol. My thinking was that the people 
who were waiting to go in would like some entertainment … We also were 
able to use the steps as an instant stage. We were asked to sing at the first 
AFL-CIO rally, and we started the event. The crowd usually loves us, and I 
think the younger people are encouraged that a group of older women care 
about what they are doing.49
Performances of songs like the one cited below were especially important to 
many of the public sector workers who, at the time, felt profoundly disenfran-
chised both by Governor Walker’s plan to strip them of their rightful standard 
of living, as well as a prevalent right-wing discourse that called into question 
the value of the professional work they did each day in schools, hospitals and 
offices (see Figs 11.14 and 11.15). The Raging Grannies’ songs took notice of 
the important roles these workers played in their communities and granted 
acknowledgment that exceeded mere recognition politics.
In His Hands
(Tune: He’s Got the Whole World in His Hands. Lyrics: Kathy Miner, 
Madison Raging Grannies)
1. He’s got Wisconsin’s future in his hands, He’s got Wisconsin’s future in his 
hands, He’s got Wisconsin’s future in his hands, But we’re gonna take it 
back!
2. He’s got the fate of unions in his hands (x 3), But we’re gonna take it back!
3. He’s got Badger Ca-are in his hands (x 3), But we’re gonna take it back!
4. He’s got cuts to scho-ols in his hands (x 3), But we’re gonna take ’em back!
5. He’s got recycling programs in his hands (x 3), But we’re gonna take ’em 
back!
6. He’s got the sale of our power plants in his hands (x 3), But we’re gonna 
hold ’em back!
7. He’s got the lives of many people in his hands (x3), But we’re gonna get 
them back!
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[spoken] BECAUSE …
We’ve got the recall movement in OUR HANDS,
We’ve got the recall papers in OUR HANDS,
We’ve got the recall POWER in OUR HANDS,
And we’re gonna THROW HIM OUT!!
As I have argued elsewhere, in the Wisconsin protest the Grannies’ performances 
were meant as a ‘gift’ to the community. Their performances were fuelled by a 
feminist ethic of care that places care within conceptions of democratic citi-
zenship.50 They conceptualised their performances as political acts that helped 
citizens to recognise and judge political problems in innovative ways.51 As one 
Madison Raging Granny commented: 
her because we care. The reason we are raging together is because we want to 
change society for the better. We really do want to make this a better world 
for our kids. And we are passionate about it, so there is a purpose to our 
performances that goes outside of ourselves and a sense of care.52 
The performances enacted a relational sense of self. At the same time the Raging 
Grannies’ songs were brutally explicit about where they believed the fault lay. 
Move On Over, Walker
(Key of E, start on B. Tune: John Brown’s Body. Adapted by Susan Bickley 
from the Grannies’ classic ‘Move On Over’. Revised by Bonnie Block, 
Glen Benjamin, Kathy Miner, Mary Sanderson)53
CHORUS: 1
Move on over, Walker, or we’ll move on over you,
Move on over, Walker – we’re the Grannies coming through,
Move on over, Walker, we are having you recalled – We’re the Granny 
Union Brigade!
You started with the teachers and moved on to nurses, too;
EMTs and Snowplow Drivers were not good enough for you.
You used your bully pulpit to abuse our unions strong – You started out all 
wrong!
CHORUS: 2
Next will come the banksters, and the selling of our state
To the corporate polluters – you will not hesitate,
We see it in your budget plans: the ruin of our state,
We’re not gonna take it any more!
CHORUS: 3
You snuggle up to mining magnates, and cast out the tribal drum
Maybe you just don’t drink water, but all living things need some
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Penokee must be saved … and our schools and health care too
Scott Walker we’re done with you.
In the public performance of these political songs, there were clearly designated 
enemies. Badiou has argued that a real enemy
[is] not someone you are resigned to take power periodically because lots of 
people voted for him. That is a person you are annoyed to see as head of 
State because you would have preferred his adversary … An enemy is some-
thing else: an individual you won’t tolerate taking decisions on anything 
that impacts yourself … In politics, it is this struggle against the enemy that 
constitutes action. That is ‘genuine politics identifies its real enemy’ and then 
proceeds to address the exigencies at hand.54 
Animosity complicates processes of reconciliation and calls for consensus in the 
public sphere. Nevertheless, groups like the Raging Grannies argued that there 
could be little deliberation on the issues at stake because they were grounded 
in values that left no room for compromise. In response, they decided to leave 
aside consensus while they sought to appeal to ‘the broad middle’ of undecided 
voters, which was quite small due to the intense polarisation of the electorate 
in Wisconsin.
What May Come: Experiences in Times of Dissent
What will come of these movements, whether Cairo or Madison, remains to be 
seen. Certainly, in Wisconsin, the issues at stake in the 2011 protests are still 
to be resolved. The hundreds of hand-made protest signs taped to the walls of 
the Capitol have been carefully removed and archived in various historical soci-
eties and museums. During the weekly farmers’ markets, however, the Raging 
Grannies still perform protest songs around the Capitol Square. And along the 
highway to Milwaukee, political signs supporting Governor Walker are still 
prominently featured in farmers’ fields. Documentaries like We are Wisconsin 
have been produced and discussed in local town hall meetings. The Solidarity 
Singers and the Pipes and Drums Group are still active at community events. 
In the news and on social media sites, in grocery store aisles and at local restau-
rants, these issues are still being discussed and debated. 
What can be said with some certainty is that for many protesters the embodied 
experience of being-with-others at these events – of marching in the snow, 
making protest signs and participating on some level in street performances – 
was in itself remarkable and changed the ways they understood themselves as 
citizen-actors. For many, this was their first protest event. Living through these 
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happenings (observing, feeling, perceiving, participating first hand) initiated 
them to learn alternative ways of being ‘political’. As David Dayen noted, 
in the bars and on the street, people who I would characterize as townies, 
people who weren’t all that political to begin with, are incessantly talking 
about this issue. It has consumed the town and in many ways has consumed 
Wisconsin and the nation. We are finally talking about things that matter to 
the mass of people.55
This journey, and the struggles that came with it, challenged citizens’ under-
standing of their relationship to government and other powerful institutions. 
Consequently, the question of sovereignty and the sovereign was played out in 
a variety of performances. For some, this centred on imperial authority alienated 
from the citizenry. Others explained this by pointing to the powerful special 
interests that controlled the executive. Most hopeful, perhaps, were those 
political performances that emphasised the agency of ‘the people’ and their 
ability to challenge powerful political actors. Daniel Schultz recalls:
Tomorrow is the greatest threat there is to an unjust today. The protesters in 
the streets of Madison and anyone who watches them with any astuteness 
have learned this lesson well. The protesters have learned that their voices 
can be heard, that they can change outcomes, that when they stand together, 
they can have a future that is meaningfully different than the present. There is 
no political structure, however imbalanced, however stacked against ordinary 
people, that can withstand this mix of hope and social solidarity.56 
Experiences in times of dissent certainly include quiet moments alone, reading 
and responding to social media political postings. They also encompass protest 
performances, in real time, that engage groups of people in calls for social 
justice. This experience, of speaking, listening, reflecting and being-with-others, 
gestures toward broader issues of where ultimate sovereignty resides, and what is 
meant by democracy and justice, beyond the ballot box. 
Notes
 1. Badiou, A. (2009), In Praise of Love, New York: New Press, pp. 53−4.
 2. Žižek, S. (2012), The Year of Dreaming Dangerously, London: Verso, p. 3. 
 3. Journal Sentinel, PolitiFact Wisconsin (2011), ‘U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan compares Madison 
to Cairo, calls protests over collective bargaining changes “riots”’, 18 February 
2011. Online at www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2011/feb/18/paul-ryan/
us- ep-paul-ryan-compares-madison-cairo-calls-prot (accessed 16 January 2014).
 4. Collins, J. (2012), ‘Theorizing Wisconsin’s 2011 protests: Community-based union ism 
confronts accumulation by dispossession’, American Ethnologist 39, 1: 6−20, at p. 10.
Progressive Ethos at the 2011 Wisconsin Labour Rallies
— 289 —
 5. Žižek, The Year of Dreaming Dangerously, p. 74. 
 6. Abbas, K. (2011), ‘We stand with you as you stood with us’, in E. Sagrans (ed.), 
We Are Wisconsin: The Wisconsin Uprising in the Words of the Activists, Writers, and 
Everyday Wisconsinites Who Made It Happen, Minneapolis, MN: Tasora Books, pp. 
136−8, at p. 136.
 7. Chomsky, N. (2011), ‘The Cairo-Madison connection’, in Sagrans, We Are 
Wisconsin, pp. 151−5, at p. 151.
 8. Benjamin, M. (2011), ‘From Cairo to Madison: Hope and solidarity are alive’, in 
Sangrans, We are Wisconsin, pp. 156–62, at p. 157.
 9. Jasper, J. M. (1997), The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in 
Social Movements. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
 10. Baudrillard, J. (2005), The Intelligence of Evil or the Lucidity Pact, Oxford: Berg, p. 
171.
 11. Gencarella, S. O. and P. C. Pezzullo (2010), Readings on Rhetoric and Performance, 
State College, PA: Strata Publishing, p. 1.
 12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Wisconsin_protests (accessed 16 January 2014).
 13. Collins, ‘Theorizing Wisconsin’s 2011 protests’, 10. 
 14. Garlough, C. (2012), ‘Folklore and performing political protest: Calls of conscience 
at the 2011 Wisconsin labor protests’, Western Folklore 70, 3−4: 337−70.
 15. Kaplan, J. (1997), Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroots Movements, New York: 
Routledge. 
 16. Jasper, The Art of Moral Protest, p. 2.
 17. Goldberg, R. A. (1991), Grassroots Resistance: Social Movements in Twentieth Century 
America, Prospect Heights, NY: Waveland Press.
 18. See also Garlough, ‘Folklore and performing political protest’.
 19. Secunda, P. M. (2012), ‘The Wisconsin public-sector labor dispute of 2011’, ABA 
Journal of Labor & Employment Law 27, 2: 293. 
 20. Garlough, ‘Folklore and performing political protest’.
 21. Bryant, D. (1953), ‘Rhetoric: Its functions and its scope’, Quarterly Journal of Speech 
39, 4: 401−24, at p. 408.
 22. Ibid., p. 418.
 23. Farrell, T. B. (1993), Norms of Rhetorical Culture, New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, p. 278.
 24. Brandwood, L. (1976), A Word Index to Plato, Leeds: W. S. Macy and Son.
 25. Ramsey, R. E. and D. J. Miller (eds) (2003), Experiences between Philosophy and 
Communication: Engaging the Philosophical Contributions of Calvin O. Schrag, New 
York: SUNY Press, p. 17.
 26. Bryant, ‘Rhetoric’, 415.
 27. Farrell, Norms of Rhetorical Culture.
 28. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Krampus (accessed 14 June 2013).
 29. www.krampus.com (accessed 14 June 2013).
 30. Derrida, J. (2009), The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume I, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, p. 37.
 31. Ibid., p. 38.
 32. Hess, S. and M. Kaplan (1968), The Ungentlemanly Art: A History of American 
Political Cartoons, New York: The Macmillan Company, p. 41.
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 290 —
 33. Collins, ‘Theorizing Wisconsin’s 2011 protests’, p. 11.
 34. These views dovetail with the brothers’ corporate interests. In a study released 
in spring 2013, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst’s Political Economy 
Research Institute named Koch Industries as one of the top ten air polluters in 
the United States. And Greenpeace issued a report identifying the company as a 
‘kingpin of climate science denial’. The report showed that from 2005 to 2008 the 
Kochs vastly outdid ExxonMobil in giving money to organisations fighting legis-
lation related to climate change, underwriting a huge network of foundations, think 
tanks and political groups.
 35. See http://host.madison.com/ct/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_7e8aa25a-3ec0- 
11e0-9923-001cc4c03286.html (accessed 15 June 2013).
 36. Haugerud, A. (2013), No Billionaire Left Behind: Satirical Activism in America, 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
 37. Derrida, J. (2009), The Beast and the Sovereign, p. 187.
 38. See History of the Raging Grannies of Madison at http://raginggrannies.madisonwi.
us/ (accessed 12 June 2013).
 39. See http://raginggrannies.madisonwi.us/songs/Contents.htm  (accessed 15 June 
2013).
 40. Personal interview, 25 June 2011.
 41. Narushima, M. (2004), ‘A gaggle of Raging Grannies: The empowerment of older 
Canadian women through social activism’, International Journal of Lifelong Education 
23,1: 23−42.
 42. Kaplan, Crazy for Democracy, p. 8.
 43. Greenway, J. (2002), ‘American folksongs of protest, 1953’, in S. Bronner (ed.), Folk 
Nation: Folklore in the Creation of American Tradition, Wilmington, NC: Scholarly 
Resources Inc., pp. 177−88, at p. 182.
 44. Garlough, ‘Folklore and performing political protest’.
 45. Personal interview, 25 June 2011.
 46. Personal interview, 25 June 2011.
 47. Schrag, C. O. (1994), Philosophical Papers: Betwixt and Between, New York: SUNY 
Press.
 48. Branagan, M. P. (2007), ‘The last laugh: Humour in the community activism’, 
Community Development Journal 42, 4: 470−81.
 49. Personal correspondence, 25 June 2011.
 50. Garlough, ‘Folklore and performing political protest’.
 51. Sevenhuijsen, S. (1998), Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations of 
Justice, Morality, and Politics, London: Routledge.
 52. Personal interview, 25 June 2011.
 53. These songs are available from the Raging Grannies ‘song packet’ at http://raging-
grannies.madisonwi.us/songs/Contents.htm (accessed 18 June 2013). 
 54. Badiou, In Praise of Love, pp. 58, 59.
 55. Dayen, D. (2011), ‘The incredible ecosystem of the Wisconsin State Capitol’, in 
Sagrans, We Are Wisconsin, pp. 38−41, at p. 40.
 56. Schultz, D. (2011), ‘There will always be a tomorrow’, in Sagrans, We Are Wisconsin, 
p. 265.
— 291 —
Occupy Wall Street: Carnival Against Capital? 
Carnivalesque as Protest Sensibility
Claire Tancons
Chapter 12
While some commentators and journalists have dismissed Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) as carnival, lawmakers and police officers did not miss the point. They 
reached back to a mid-nineteenth-century ban on masking to arrest occupiers 
wearing as little as a folded bandana on the forehead, leaving little doubt about 
their fear of Carnival as a potent form of political protest (see Fig. 12.1). In 
an article published on 23 September 2011 in The New York Times, journalist 
Ginia Bellafante initially expressed scepticism about ‘air[ing] societal grievance 
as carnival’, but just a few days later she warned against ‘criminalising costume’, 
thus changing her condescension to caution as she confirmed the police’s point: 
masking can be dangerous; Carnival is serious business.1
The mask ban was enacted in 1845 to prevent Hudson Valley tenant farmers 
from resisting eviction by rioting in ‘Indian’ dress and ‘calico gowns and leather 
masks’.2 The arrests at OWS on charges of ‘loitering and wearing a mask’ occurred 
on 21 September 2011, the fourth day of the movement’s occupation of Zuccotti 
Park. The eventual eviction from Zuccotti Park happened two days short of the 
movement’s two-month anniversary and planned day of action known as ‘N17’. 
As Kira Akerman noted:
There is almost something comical in occupiers being evicted from Zuccotti 
Park by the police force in the middle of the night, much in the same way 
Native peoples were surprised in their tents and pushed off their land …This 
time white people with Mohawks and brown boots with Indigenous-inspired 
tassels are banging pots and pans.3 
Carnival hardly exists in the United States any more. It has survived as a 
Shrovetide festival with Mardi Gras in New Orleans and as a summer  celebration 
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Figure 12.1 Woman wearing scarf with police officer, Occupy Wall Street, 
5 October 2011 (Photo: Aristide/economopoulos/The Star-Ledger).
Figure 12.2 Corporate Zombies walk, Occupy Wall Street, New York, 
3 October 2011 (Photo: F. Franklyn, AP).
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Figure 12.3 Millionaires March, Occupy Wall Street, New York, 11 October 
2011 (Photo: AFP/Getty Images).
Figure 12.4 ‘Unemployed Superhero, Master of Degrees, Shackled with 
Debts’, Occupy Wall Street, New York, October 2011 (Photo: J. Martin, AP).
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for the West Indian community with the Labour Day parade in Brooklyn. 
However, the carnivalesque − as a medium of emancipation and a catalyst for 
civil disobedience − is alive and well, and these contemporary carnivals have 
retained their rebellious potential.
The encampment at Liberty Plaza, as occupiers rechristened Zuccotti Park, 
was under Carnival’s sway − until cold weather set in and the camp was raided 
by police on 15 November 2011. In the early days of the movement, primal 
energies gave way to intentional community building and free communal 
feeding, bodies at play and trash on display, excess and refuse. Raised eyebrows 
about alleged sexual acts in the park and confessions of gluttony for the famous 
OccuPie pizza were all instances of the pleasures of the senses and excesses of 
the flesh that are common to Carnival − even under the duress of uncomfortable 
accommodation and police harassment.
Many occupiers have donned costumes during demonstrations. The infamous 
Guy Fawkes masks of the Anonymous hacktivists are still legion, and wearers 
have found at least one legal defender to protect their masking rights, arguing 
that as their sole common symbol the mask is a statement and therefore protected 
by the First Amendment.4 Perhaps more interesting than what some have called 
an activist cooptation of a Warner Brothers corporate product − despite the 
relevance of Guy Fawkes to the British carnivalesque tradition − are classic cases 
of hierarchy reversal, a hallmark of carnival. These include protesters dressed 
up as billionaires and signs reading ‘austerity for you, prosperity for us’. The 
Millionaires March on 11 October 2011, like the drum circle outside billionaire 
Mayor Bloomberg’s mansion on 20 November (which was as cacophonous as 
a charivari), belongs to the subversive realm of the carnivalesque (see Fig. 
12.3).5 Other protesters made up as ‘corporate zombies’ spewed dollar bills from 
bloodied mouths in advance of Halloween, and then upped the ante during New 
York’s annual Halloween parade (see Fig. 12.2).6
Then there were the countless examples of personal ingenuity. In the early 
days of the movement, a helmeted woman in fur boots and a figure skating 
outfit was seen riding a gold and pink papier mâché unicorn. In another case, a 
young man dressed up as what might be called a Zorro Graduate. He wore the 
black mask and gloves of the TV avenger, along with a black graduation hat and 
gown. He held a convict’s chain and iron ball printed with the words ‘student 
loan’ and a sign reading ‘Unemployed Superhero, Master of Degrees, Shackled 
by Debt’ (see Fig. 12.4).
Artists have also answered the call to action. Peter Rostovsky and Lynn 
Sullivan organised The Language Experiment with about twenty other artists 
who came together under the name Build the Occupation. First performed on 
Halloween and then reiterated on N17, the group dressed in orange pie charts 
and 99 per cent glasses. They held signs (at first handwritten, then printed with 
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a font designed by Steve Robinson) bearing words in the fashion of refrigerator 
magnet poetry, with reference to Daniel Martinez’s Whitney Biennial piece ‘I 
can’t ever imagine wanting to be white’ (1993).7 Taken together, the performers 
formed living sentences, the written equivalent of the ‘human microphone’, the 
occupiers’ signature voice amplification technique. These occupation builders 
delivered collective messages that were permutable at will, if within the range 
of a carefully chosen consciousness-raising vocabulary (see Fig. 12.5).
Yet the most poignant message might have been the simplest, exemplifying 
the merit of ‘less is more’ (however un-carnivalesque that may sound). The 
photograph of a young blond man, his mouth taped closed by a dollar bill with 
‘#occupy’ handwritten on it, has become iconic of the movement. Or maybe it 
is because of the American flag tucked in his backpack, putting the whole scene 
into context.
Still more minimalist, ‘baring it all’ had been a strategy of (un)masking at 
Liberty Plaza, as long as the weather allowed. In a corporate world where the 
clothes make the man, with men in suits (aka the 1 per cent) protected by the 
blue shirts (regular police officers) and the white shirts (the commanding officers 
of pepper-spraying fame) from the occupiers (aka the 99 per cent), the spectacle 
Figure 12.5 Build the Occupation, Occupy Halloween: The Language 
Experiment, New York, 31 October 2011 (Photo: B. Vicars. Courtesy of P. 
Rostovsky).
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of nudity is a good reminder of the common human nature of the 100 per cent.8
However, we shouldn’t see Carnival merely for the costumes. OWS might 
well be another Carnival Against Capital − a tactical reterritorialisation of 
public space and political discourse, of social formation and cultural production, 
carried out as a concerted effort to regain democratic rights and liberties.
‘Occupationist International’: Carnival and Anarchism
In fact, carnivalesque protests were a staple of the anti-corporate globalisation 
movement. The Global Carnival Against Capitalism (or J18), organised by the 
activist group Reclaim the Streets, was an international subversive street party 
that took place on 18 June 1999 to coincide with a G8 summit in Cologne (see 
Fig. 12.6). It updated Mikhail Bakhtin’s characterisation of Carnival as a topsy-
turvy world where laughter subverts authority.
Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His World, a study of folk culture in the work of French 
Renaissance writer Rabelais, was written in 1940 but not published in Bakhtin’s 
native Russia until 1965 due to its veiled critique of Stalin’s purges. The American 
and French publications of the book (in 1968 and 1970, respectively) gave 
Figure 12.6 Marcelo Expósito, Radical Imagination (Carnivals of Resistance), 
2004. Video still. The film documents J18 (Source: C. Tancons, ‘Occupy Wall 
Street: Carnival Against Capital? Carnivalesque As Protest Sensibility’ for 
e-flux journal 30).
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European and North American anarchists an anti-hierarchical societal model 
that appealed to their revolutionary aspirations. But it was French situationist 
Raoul Vaneigem, in his book The Revolution of Everyday Life,9 who fuelled the 
May 1968 student movement with what could be called Carnival liberation 
theory. Presciently, Vaneigem wrote that ‘a strike for higher wages or a rowdy 
demonstration can awaken the carnival spirit’, and ‘revolutionary moments are 
carnivals in which the individual life celebrates its unification with a regen-
erated society’.
What seems to prevail in the American incarnation of the Occupy movement 
is a softer latter-day anarchism inherited from the commune movement of the 
1960s and the intentional communities of the 1980s. The latter were themselves 
indebted to the Situationist International and the Italian autonomist move-
ments, and were compounded in American anarchist Hakim Bey’s Temporary 
Autonomous Zone (TAZ), the tactical field manual of alter-globalisation activists 
since 1985.
While the word ‘carnival’ is not to be found in TAZ, ‘occupy’ is. Bey writes, 
‘Because the State is concerned primarily with Simulation rather than substance, 
the TAZ can “occupy” these areas clandestinely and carry on its festal purposes 
for quite a while in relative peace.’ This statement aptly summarises the pre-
eviction situation at Liberty Plaza, with an emphasis on ‘relative peace’ given 
the treatment of occupiers by the NYPD, and a de-emphasis on ‘clandestine’ 
occupation given the media coverage the movement has garnered.10 However, 
only one report to date (in The New York Observer) has explicitly linked OWS 
and TAZ.11
A link that has been more widely made has been between OWS and The 
Coming Insurrection (2009), a pamphlet written by The Invisible Committee, a 
French insurrectionary anarchist group. Glenn Beck has hysterically attacked 
The Coming Insurrection, indicting it as the inspiration for OWS and the inter-
national upheavals that preceded it, from the Greek protests of 2010−11 to 
the UK student movement of 2010 and the Arab Spring. (The latter was first 
acknowledged as a source of inspiration by the occupiers themselves.) The 
pamphlet proclaims that ‘we live under an occupation, a police occupation’, and 
states that ‘we don’t want to occupy the territory, we want to be the territory’, 
thereby reversing the rhetoric of occupation (as in the (Un)Occupy Albu-
querque movement). It casts a pessimistic light on a state of de facto capitalist 
colonisation of the world.12 Since the eviction of OWS and other encampments, 
the need to de-territorialise the occupationist strategy and ‘be the territory’ has 
never seemed more urgent.
The Invisible Committee can be seen as the latest link in ‘the theoretical 
lineage … constructed in retrospect [by international activists] to serve the 
interest of [the] contemporary radical project,’ as Gavin Grindon has put it. 
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Grindon initially identifies Bakhtin, Vaneigem and Bey as part of this lineage.13 
However, what one might call the ‘Occupationist International’ freely borrows 
from the anarchist toolbox, using Bakhtin’s therapeutic laughter, resurrecting 
Vaneigem’s insurrectional ardour and implementing Bey’s guerilla tactics, while 
at the same time rejecting The Invisible Committee’s exhortation to abolish 
general assemblies. General assemblies have been one of the core characteristics 
of OWS, introduced by Spanish activists involved in the M15 movement.
Breaking from this anarchist lineage is former French Resistance fighter and 
concentration camp survivor Stéphane Hessel. His pamphlet Time for Outrage, 
published in French as Indignez-vous! in 2010 and translated into English by The 
Nation in early 2011, has been credited as a source for the Spanish movement, 
where protesters were referred to as ‘los indignados’, and now for the American 
movement, where occupiers are referred to as ‘les indignés’ by the French 
media.14 
But David Graeber − the anarchist, activist and professor of anthropology 
who was called the ‘anti-leader’ of OWS by Bloomberg Business Week and who 
wrote cogently of the movement’s aim as ‘recapturing the radical imagination’ 
− has a singular manifesto of his own.15 His Debt: The First 5,000 Years,16 a 
sprawling history of debt and its economic and cultural implications, might well 
be this generation’s treatise of savoir-vivre (to borrow from Vaneigem’s original 
French title), leaving the Canadian anti-consumerist magazine Adbusters, which 
this summer sent out the call to occupy Wall Street, to do the branding.17 
For, in addition to indicting financiers directly, as in the ‘People’s Trial’ of 
Goldman Sachs on 3 November 2011, OWS also targets the financial system 
as a whole. Thus, it brought renewed momentum to the Move Your Money 
campaign, whose latest initiative was Bank Transfer Day on 5 November 2011. 
This gives credence to the notion that OWS is not so much waging an economic 
war as it is waging a war against the economy, possibly one of the most anarchist 
statements imaginable in a state of corporate occupation.18 
Carnival, Capitalism and Slavery
Just as the economy is the crux of the movement’s concerns, it is also at the 
core of Carnival. The few contemporary commentators who try to establish a 
link between − to borrow Grindon’s categories − ‘carnivalesque attacks upon a 
shared popular culture’ and ‘carnival as part of a shared popular culture’, usually 
look to Europe for models of Carnival. But the carnivals of the Americas provide 
both explanations for and alternatives to the United States’ economic plight.
Carnival was widely practised in the Americas, where colonisation and slavery 
replaced European feudalism and servitude, and where plantations afforded 
experiments with capitalism that would later develop into British industrialism. 
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Figure 12.7 Portrayal of Dr Eric Williams at Carnival in Trinidad after the 
first PNM (People’s National Movement) victory at the polls in 1956 (Photo: 
G. Ifill. Garnet Ifill Photograph Collection. The Alma Jordan Library, the 
University of the West Indies, St Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago).
In the Old World as in the New, Carnival thrived on the extreme disparity 
between masters and their subjects or slaves − what today we would call wealth 
inequality. Role reversals alleviated a brutally divisive social system by crowning 
servants and slaves king for a day. Carnival created an opportunity for society to 
cohere anew, at least for the duration of the festivities.
With this understanding of the structural dynamic of Carnival, it is not 
surprising to see carnivalesque strands appearing in America’s frayed social fabric 
at a time when the rich have never been richer and the poor never poorer. Just as 
for Graeber the current debt crisis is part of a larger story, so is OWS’s carnival. 
As Graeber explains, ‘Throughout history, debt has served as a way for states 
to control their subjects and extract resources from them (usually to finance 
wars). And when enough people got in enough debt, there was usually some 
kind of revolt.’19 It is in this sense that capital and Carnival are opposite sides 
of the same coin, telling the same story from economic and cultural perspectives, 
respectively. Carnival is not merely a cultural practice recuperated by the global 
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anarchist movement and instrumentalised as carnivalesque during protests. It 
harks back to ancient human archetypes in calling for a reversal of the status 
quo as a means to mediate between opposite ends of the social spectrum and 
to create a shared, if fleeting, space to live side by side − a sort of Foucauldian 
heterotopia, or lived utopia.
In stalwart Carnival countries, the century-old festival has failed in recent 
decades to generate political momentum around key societal issues. Instead, it 
has succumbed to forms of rampant consumerism and escapist fun that only has 
political relevance for its power to distract from politics. And yet, despite these 
cautionary tales, Carnival countries and cities offer alternatives to mainstream 
economic and cultural life that are worth examining.
In Trinidad and Tobago, which has a longstanding history of rebellion at 
Carnival time, access to the carnival experience within a costumed band 
includes perks on the road such as music, drinks and toilet and made-in-China 
beaded bikini for women or trunks for men up to $1,500 each – turning exotic 
bodies into tourist commodities. The ‘ole mas’ tradition, which, much like the 
Occupy movement, included cardboard placards adorned with political slogans, 
once offered a healthy public forum for political commentary but is now largely 
extinct (challenging one occupier’s belief that ‘My Cardboard Can Beat Your 
Billboard’). Only a small enclave of artists keeps the ole mas tradition alive. In the 
mid-1980s, Peter Minshall’s Rat Race mas band took Port of Spain by storm with 
Figure 12.8 Cat in Bag Productions, Cobo Town, 2010 (Courtesy of Sean-
Drakes.com).
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its army of masqueraders dressed as rodents holding speech bubbles admonishing 
greed, gossip and gullibility in the local vernacular (see Fig. 12.9).20 In a DIY 
style similar to this vanishing Carnival tradition as it could still be observed in 
2005, artists Ashraph Richard Ramsaran and Shalini Seereeram created T’in 
Cow Fat Cow (2009) and Cobo Town (2010).21 These pieces consisted of hand-
lettered placards and flags bearing puns about government corruption and public 
complicity, such as ‘The People Must be Herd’ and ‘Let us Prey’ (see Fig. 12.8).22 
It may come as no surprise that the slow commodification and diminishing 
criticality of the Trinidad Carnival was initiated by the father of the independent 
nation. Eric Williams founded the People’s National Movement in 1956 and 
became the first Prime Minister of independent Trinidad and Tobago in 1962 
(see Fig. 12.7). Before entering politics he was a professor at Howard University 
in Washington, DC and the author of the landmark historical study Capitalism 
and Slavery [1944], a work so scathing in its critique of the humanitarian view 
of British abolitionists that it was not published in the UK until 1964. However, 
Williams omitted to discuss Carnival as the missing link between capitalism 
and slavery. As Prime Minister, Williams sought to control Carnival through 
the seemingly auspicious Carnival Development Committee, which attempted 
to censor calypsonians’ tongue-in-cheek attacks on an often tyrannical political 
Figure 12.9 Peter Minshall, Rat Race, Port of Spain, Trinidad Carnival, 
11 February 1986 (Photo: N. Norton. Courtesy the Callaloo Company, 
Chaguaramas, Trinidad).
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process. Recent developments in Trinidad and Tobago confirm the suspicions 
of those who believe Carnival to be a tool used by the elite to keep the masses 
in shackles. In late August, the government imposed a state of emergency in 
connection with its constitutionally questionable anti-drug security campaign.23 
So far, the population has shown little interest in protesting to maintain its civil 
liberties. Will bottled-up grievances explode at the next Carnival, or will they 
dissolve in commercialised fun?
Prior to independence, Trinidadians migrated en masse to the United States 
and the UK. In their adopted countries, they revived the resistant ethos of the 
Trinidad Carnival. In New York City, they organised Carnival in Harlem in the 
mid-1940s then in Brooklyn in the early 1960s. It has become the West Indian 
American Day Parade, better known as the Brooklyn Labour Day parade. These 
were fundamentally political gestures aimed at gaining recognition and staking 
claim to territory in a new homeland. In London, Marxist-feminist Claudia 
Jones organised the Notting Hill Carnival in 1959 in an effort to quell the wave 
of white-on-black racism that had culminated in race riots the previous year.
Carnivalesque Goals? Black Carnival, White Carnivalesque
But neither in New York nor in London have black carnivals (as carried out in 
Trinidad or Brooklyn) and white carnivalesque (as performed in global protest 
movements) formed a lasting radical alliance that could combat the economic 
exploitation suffered by working-class communities of colour and, increasingly, 
the white middle class. Perhaps OWS will be the opportunity for such an alliance. 
Meanwhile, this lack of solidarity (reflected by the lack of diversity in protest 
movements) was addressed by cultural theorist Greg Tate with some measure of 
controversy. In characteristically colourful language, Tate wrote a radical rant 
titled ‘Top 10 reasons why so few black folk appear down to occupy Wall Street’, 
which was first circulated on Facebook and then published in the Village Voice 
on 19 October 2011. Many of Tate’s reasons should be well taken, in particular: 
‘Radical Love Theory’, about how the absence of blacks at OWS has spared the 
movement more police harassment; ‘Late Pass Theory’, about blacks’ avoidance 
of unnecessary police scrutiny; and ‘The Prison Industrial Complex Crickets 
Theory’, about the demographic castration of would-be black OWS-ers who are 
currently incarcerated.24 
However, like some other commentators, Tate also takes a jab at the carni-
valesque: ‘As we all know, real thugs don’t do demos or entertain police assault 
for abstract carnivalesque goals.’ This leaves much to be desired in terms of what 
a greater understanding of the Carnival tradition could bring to the movement. 
(Admittedly, Tate was probably not referring to Carnival at all, as is often 
the case when using the word ‘carnivalesque’.) Ironically, Tate’s writing style 
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displays its own carnivalesque sensibility. In a sort of noir grotesque realism, Tate 
resorts to a raced Rabelaisian semantic field through the use of reappropriated 
racial slurs like ‘Negroes’, ‘Niggas’, ‘Niggerisation’ and ‘Niggerdom’. He also 
uses racy expressions such as ‘bootylicious’, ‘muhfuhkuhs’, ‘shit’, ‘asswhuppings’, 
‘grownass’ and ‘clusterfuck’. These expressions are made up of words − booty, 
fuck, shit, ass − that exemplify what Bakhtin called the ‘material bodily lower 
stratum’. But Tate can hardly be blamed for missing the carnival point even as 
he uses carnivalesque language, since in the US this language is more closely 
associated with America’s own brand of racial carnivalesque, from minstrelsy 
to blaxpoitation and hip hop. (It is worth noting that American minstrelsy 
shaped an actual carnival in the early twentieth century, namely the Cape Town 
Carnival in South Africa, which was formerly known as the Coon Carnival.)
Washington-born Tate would not have had the chance to see the Harlem 
Carnival, which was gone by the early 1960s (see Fig. 12.10). And its Brooklyn 
successor, much like its Notting Hill counterpart, is no longer at the forefront 
Figure 12.10 West Indian Day Parade, Harlem, 6 September 1948 (Photo: 
W. Smith. Photographic print. Courtesy Photographs and Prints Division, 
Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York Public 
Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations).
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Figure 12.11 Laura Anderson Barbata in collaboration with the Brooklyn 
Jumbies, Intervention: Wall Street, New York (Broadway and Bowling Green), 
18 November 2011 (Photo: F. Veronsky. Courtesy L. Anderson Barbata).
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of radical strategies (anti-racist or otherwise) having been tamed by too much 
government planning and touristic development. More generally, the dismissal 
of ‘abstract carnivalesque goals’ may evince the legacy of the rift that once 
separated Caribbean immigrants and African-Americans. During segregation, 
Caribbean immigrants, having been educated in the British public school system, 
were favoured for the few jobs available to blacks. This divide-and-conquer 
strategy prevented unity within the US’s African-descended population. One of 
the alleged reasons why the Harlem Carnival lost its parade permit was because 
of a bottle-throwing incident between Caribbean and African-American 
 participants.25 
Around the time Tate’s statement was published, Occupy the Hood and 
Occupy Harlem emerged, urging people of colour to participate in the movement. 
In Manhattan, Occupy offshoots advanced their own agendas through direct 
action in Downtown/Uptown alliances. And at least two interventions have 
used modes of public address associated with both the civil rights movement − 
to which both African-Americans and West Indians contributed − and Carnival 
− an historical Caribbean mode of rebellion.
On 18 November 2011 artist Laura Anderson Barbata led the Brooklyn 
Jumbies in a performance of Intervention: Wall Street in Manhattan’s Financial 
District.26 As their name suggests, the Jumbies come from Brooklyn, where most 
Caribbean New Yorkers live. According to a press release posted on Facebook, 
the goal of the event was to ‘ward off evil and change the mindset of those causing 
misfortune’ (see Fig. 12.11).27 In the tradition of West African stilt-walkers, 
Moko Jumbies embody spirits and are called upon for spiritual cleansing. Moko 
Jumbies have roots in the Black Atlantic world, from Trinidad and Tobago to 
Brooklyn, where they incorporate carnival celebrations while retaining distinct 
spiritual rituals. Barbata, who is from Mexico and divides her time between 
Manhattan and Mexico City, designed business suits (‘reminiscent of David 
Byrne’s Stop Making Sense big suit’) for the 4-metre-tall jumbies, whose towering 
height was both suggestive of the Financial District’s skyscrapers and symbolic 
of Wall Street’s monumental rule over the country.28 Barbata started work on 
this largely self-funded project in 2008 but was finally spurred to carry out the 
intervention by the auspicious emergence of OWS. She said that the inter-
vention and her work overall are more about ‘outreach’ and ‘building cross-
cultural bridges’ than they are about ‘spectacle’.29 
Will the precedent set by this carnivalesque détournement encourage more 
Caribbean-Americans to participate in the movement? This is by no means to 
imply an essentialist view of Caribbean people, according to which Carnival 
is their sole or even main mode of protest. It is, however, to recognise that 
much like freedom songs rooted the civil rights movement, so does Carnival 
root the Caribbean protest tradition.30 One Brooklynite of Caribbean descent, 
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City Council member Jumaane D. Williams, has been an outspoken supporter 
of OWS. He has been arrested at least twice, notably during the 17 November 
2011 sit-in at the entrance to the Brooklyn Bridge (fellow council member 
Ydanis Rodriguez was also arrested that day). Prior to OWS, Williams’s last high-
profile encounter with police came on 5 September, when he was handcuffed 
and briefly detained … at the West Indian American Day Parade.31 
Two days after the intervention by the Brooklyn Jumbies, the newly formed 
Council of Elders, an ‘independent group of leaders from many of the defining 
American social justice movements of the twentieth century’, announced 
an alliance of ‘basic solidarity’ with OWS.32 Time will tell if this gesture of 
intergenerational and cross-racial unity will spur more civil rights leaders of 
colour into action, and if the movement’s non-violent modus operandi will 
prevail over police provocation. For the time being, the example set by the 
Council of Elders seems to have sparked the imagination of mainly white 
activists, as writer and cultural historian Sharifa Rhodes-Pitts remarked − with 
the remark not meant to indict said activists as much as to exhort those missing 
in action.33 Following the passing of ‘the torch of hope and social justice’ from 
the Elders to OWS during an interfaith service at Liberty Plaza and a public 
discussion about ‘space, liberation, and race’ at Judson Memorial Church, organ-
isers and participants set out on a candlelit vigil march from Washington Square 
Park to Duarte Park.
Figure 12.12 Not An Alternative, Mili-tents, New York: Washington Square 
Park to Duarte Park march, 20 November 2011 (Photo: L. Blissett).
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The march was organised by the interfaith clergy group Occupy Faith NYC, 
the Council of Elders and various OWS-affiliated arts and culture groups such 
as Not an Alternative.34 In addition to candles, marchers carried so-called mili-
tents to symbolise occupation, and their destination prefigured a possible future 
occupation (see Fig. 12.12). Despite the military language of deployment and 
invasion the artists-activists used when discussing the dissemination of the 
mili-tents, these and other artistic interventions that surfaced on N17 − such 
as the black-and-yellow banners and placards (the latter doubling up as shields) 
– were not meant to encourage confrontation with the police. On the contrary, 
their purpose was to divert attention away from the overwhelming media 
focus on clashes between occupiers and the NYPD. These interventions, more 
recently carried out with tape, sought to dislocate the power of authority over 
space by appropriating and subverting the colours of official spatial signage. The 
mili-tents, which were held up with sticks, also recalled the umbrellas of New 
Orleans second-liners, that other protest-prone Carnival-inflected American 
tradition.
Social Aid and Pleasure: Second Liners and Mardi Gras Indians, 
Geopsychics and Surregionalists
Perhaps nobody can say whether more blacks and other minorities will rally the 
movement in significant numbers. Besides, as Colorlines editor Rinku Sen put 
it, ‘the question is not if you can bring people of color to the party but if they 
can change the music’.35 But given OWS’s underlying anarchist ideology, might 
not the question as to ‘why so few black folks appear down at OWS’ be more 
productively phrased as ‘where are the black anarchists?’ In New Orleans in the 
late 1970s, Eric Bookhardt and John Clark, two former Louisiana activists from 
the Vietnam War-era counterculture, came close to circumventing the vexing 
disappearance of that rare species, the black anarchist: they invented one.
Earlier in the decade, Bookhardt (now an art critic and practicing Buddhist) 
and Clark (a philosophy professor and self-identified anarchist) were colleagues 
at the University of New Orleans, where they combined situationist-inflected 
anarchism with New Orleans’s own homegrown brand of anarchism: Carnival, 
or as it is known in the local language, Mardi Gras. In an email to this author, 
Bookhardt wrote: 
Carnival almost always is an innately anarchic and psychodramatic event 
… that enables everyone to visualise how things can be different and make 
them different, at least for a day, and that in itself is an inherently valuable, 
liberating, and potentially revolutionary practice. 
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Figure 12.13 Dragon Float in the Mistick Krewe of Comus parade on Mardi 
Gras evening, New Orleans, c. 1970s from the book Geopsychic Wonders of 
New Orleans (Photo: D. E. Bookhardt).
He continued: ‘Carnival was the earliest TAZ prototype because the “king” was 
always a parody and people’s roles within society were always autonomously self-
defined, at least for that day.’36 
In 1979, Bookhardt published the first edition of Geopsychic Wonders, an 
illustrated book celebrating the Crescent City’s idiosyncratic urban landscape 
(see Fig. 12.13). The book sparked a cult following among generations of New 
Orleans artists. Sharing startling similarities with the situationists’ psychogeog-
raphy, whose key words it inverts, geopsychics is a tribute to New Orleans’s 
fertile anarcho-situationist soil.
Some artists who practise geopsychics, like the painter Myrtle Van Damitz 
III, have been involved in both Mardi Gras krewes and local Occupy events. 
In her work, Van Damitz III renders in oneiric hues the kind of transmog-
rified creatures seen in the waking dream that is Mardi Gras (see Fig. 12.14). 
An occasional member of Krewe of Eris, ‘technically the Goddess of Discord 
parade’, and Krewe of Poux (‘lice’ in French), Van Damitz III took part in 
Occupy Frankie and Johnnie’s on 21 October 2011. This was the occupation of 
a local furniture store threatened with corporate takeover by CVS. The store is 
located in the St Claude corridor, the site of New Orleans’s latest artist colony 
and a  neighbourhood increasingly subject to gentrification.37 But as Van Damitz 
III clarified, Occupy Frankie and Johnnie’s ‘was more a farce of Occupy, and a 
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statement about the continuity of free expression and humor in New Orleans 
to make a statement and effect change’.38 Precisely to the point!
The decadent disguises of Krewe of Eris make Occupy Halloween’s card-
board costumes look rudimentary, while Occupy Frankie and Johnnie’s so-called 
costumed malcontents − including artist Skylar Fein running around in a fake 
CVS lab coat while carrying a syringe and a wad of money − are seen as an 
advantage that Occupy New Orleans has over other Occupy movements. 
Whether or not this is true, the Mardi Gras tradition has galvanised New 
Orleans radicals around issues like gentrification and corporatisation, which are 
harshly criticised on such local blogs as Nola Anarcha.39 
Under the pseudonym Max Cafard (‘cockroach’ in French), Clark wrote 
the Surre(gion)alist Manifesto, which cast into words Louisiana’s Creole anar-
chism.40 Bookhardt created the founding figure of surre(gion)alism, Lafcadio 
Bocage (an Afro-Creole), whom he describes as such: ‘He was also a poet as 
well as a philosopher, and his anarchism had its roots in his observations of 
nature and in his contacts with indigenous Louisiana Indians who, in good 
years, excelled at a lifestyle of purposeful leisure.’ Knowing the life and legacy 
of New Orleans’s free people of colour, one can easily imagine Lafcadio Bocage 
Figure 12.14 Myrtle Van Damitz III, Night Walk, 2011. Inks and acrylic on 
paper (Courtesy of the artist).
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as a forbearer of the Mardi Gras Indian tradition.
According to Van Damitz III, participants in Occupy New Orleans and Occupy 
Frankie and Johnnie’s are mostly white, as are the Eris and Poux krewes.41 The 
Mardi Gras Indians and the related Social Aid and Pleasure Clubs are mostly 
black. These latter groups first emerged in the early nineteenth century among 
New Orleans’s slaves and free people of colour, as well as among the city’s mixed 
native Indian communities, to which the Mardi Gras Indians trace their roots. 
On rare occasions, white and black carnival traditions converge, as was the case 
on 22 October when 6t’9, a white Social Aid and Pleasure Club, invited Mardi 
Gras Indian Big Chief Fi-Yi-Yi and his gang to participate in their Halloween 
parade. But for the most part, these traditions remain separate. (One major 
exception is the carefully choreographed dance of Rex, an old-line (white) 
krewe, and Zulu, the first black krewe allowed on the official Mardi Gras parade 
route.) In fact, as musician and historian Bruce ‘Sunpie’ Barnes puts it, the 
Mardi Gras Indian tradition ‘built off of a history of resistance to old laws that 
prevented blacks from masking during Carnival’.
In New Orleans, Mardi Gras remains an exercise in subtle segregation. 
The fact that there are not floats to give Occupy New Orleans any traction 
might confirm, as in Trinidad, the safety valve theory of Carnival. Occupy 
New Orleans officially started on 6 October 2011 and has drawn relatively few 
participants thus far, although Brendan McCarthy of The Times-Picayunes wrote 
Figure 12.15 Black Men of Labor Social Aid & Pleasure Club Second Line, 
New Orleans, 29 October 2011 (Photo: L. Watts).
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that one of their demonstrations ‘had a second-line feel to it’.42 But then, just 
as West Indians played an important part in civil rights movements − most 
famously, Trinidad-born Black Panther Stokely Carmichael, aka Kwame Ture 
− so did Louisianans, including Black Panther co-founder Huey P. Newton, 
leader Geronimo Ji-Jaga and Justice Minister Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin.43 
Though there was hardly anything in the tactics of the Black Panthers recalling 
a New Orleans culture of celebration, the connection between black carnival 
organisations and black political activism is well established. According to 
New Orleans historian Ned Sublette, second lines ‘are in effect a civil rights 
demonstration … demonstrating the civil right of the community to assemble in 
the street for peaceful purposes. Or, more simply, demonstrating the civil right 
of the community to exist’.44 Indeed, in the afternoon of Saturday, 29 October 
2011 veteran activist Jerome Smith was not demonstrating with Occupy New 
Orleans. Instead, he was in the annual second-line parade of the Black Men of 
Labor Social Aid and Pleasure Club, along with Mardi Gras Indian Big Chief 
Fi-Yi-Yi. In speeches prior to the parade, the Black Men of Labor paid homage 
to Freedom Riders and members of New Orleans’ Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) chapter (see Fig. 12.15). Says Bookhardt,
Mardi Gras Indians are, to my mind, anarchist analogs in the sense that they 
are self-organising and non-programmatic expressions of an intuitive ethno-
flâneur sensibility. The route is a dérive and they are expressions of geopsy-
chics and psychogeography, and as such they are intuitive native situationists. 
Anarchists without portfolio. A perfect expression of Nola’s innately anar-
chistic culture of celebration.45
Can the black anarchists be found in New Orleans? If a black radical is a 
jailed radical at best and a dead radical at worst (there are still several Black 
Panthers in decade-long solitary confinement at the Louisiana State Peniten-
tiary in Angola, Louisiana), non-confrontational carnival tactics might offer a 
necessary outlet for otherwise radical practices. More fundamentally, the mutual 
aid systems under which such practices thrive have been honed for centuries 
in New Orleans, ensuring the city’s survival. Basic survival is a radical propo-
sition in the face of post-Katrina disaster capitalism (see Naomi Klein)46 and 
gentrification-fuelled ethnic cleansing,47 which force blacks out of the city. As 
Van Damitz III summarises, ‘There’s a lot more self-determination and group 
harmony in a carnival society.’
As the white middle class is driven out of their homes, campuses and banks, 
they are realising that the social contract no longer works for them, something 
blacks have felt for a long time. At this juncture, it might be critical that black 
carnival and white carnivalesque join forces against capital.48 
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Carnivalesque Protest Sensibility
Scholars Peter Stallybrass and Allon White argue that ‘it actually makes little 
sense to fight out the issue of whether or not carnivals are intrinsically radical 
or conservative’.49 They assert that ‘there is no a priori revolutionary vector to 
carnival’. However, at the beginning of OWS, both sceptical journalists and 
committed protesters made direct references to the mother of revolutions, the 
French Revolution. The former mocked the protesters’ disappointment that ‘the 
Bastille hadn’t been stormed’ (only to later ponder, ‘Carnival or Revolution?’).50 
The latter warned in a ‘memo to the 1%’: ‘The 99% are waking up. Be nervous. 
Be Very Nervous. Marie-Antoinette wasn’t.’ This followed Roseanne Barr’s call 
for the return of the guillotine in a speech at Liberty Plaza. This revolutionary 
chorus was met with an anthropophagic crowd menacing that ‘One day, the Poor 
Will Have Nothing Left to Eat but the Rich’ (or the short version: ‘Hungry? Eat 
a Banker’) (see Fig. 12.16).
What is at stake here is not so much whether the carnivalesque is turning 
OWS into a revolutionary movement. Rather, what matters is the bringing 
to light, through carnivalesque ritual strategy and hierarchy inversion, of the 
Figure 12.16 ‘One Day the 
Poor Will Have Nothing Left 
to Eat But the Rich’, Occupy 
Wall Street, New York, October 
2011 (Source: C. Tancons, 
‘Occupy Wall Street: Carnival 
Against Capital? Carnivalesque 
as Protest Sensibility’ for e-flux 
journal 30).
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Figure 12.17 NYU4OWS, Wally, 17 November 2011. ‘The Spirit of Occupy 
Wall Street at NYU’ bull piñata performance, New York Stern School of 
Business, New York University (Courtesy D. A. Cohen).
Figure 12.18 NYU4OWS, Wall Street Campus Cash (Courtesy D. A. Cohen).
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 314 —
expanse (and expense) of the gap between the 1 per cent and the 99 per cent, 
and the diversity and disparity within the 99 per cent. As much a site of resis-
tance as a relational mode, the carnivalesque occupation of Wall Street is a 
symbolic struggle to break the high-low binarism that has besieged contem-
porary American society, whether in class or race.
Beyond symbolism, what is the likely agency and outcome of this proto-carni-
valesque protest? London’s decade-old Carnival Against Capitalism provides 
some indication. It set the stage for the Battle of Seattle, the World Social 
Forum and other counter-summits. It also enabled the tactical media technology 
behind Indymedia and prefigured the current globalisation of grassroots anti-
capitalist movements.51 
One cannot help but hope that in New York and the other cities where the 
movement has taken hold, the carnival cosmology will supplant the exchange 
economy, as it has in Mardi Gras, allowing for a renewal of the senses atro-
phied by dematerialised financial transactions. But the real reversal of this 
carnival might well lie elsewhere, outside the United States. The Arab world 
is the movement’s proclaimed source of inspiration, having set the tone for this 
century’s worldwide wave of societal change. From this perspective, American 
citizens might be looking a lot more like 99 per cent of the rest of the world’s 
population, no longer in the privileged top 1 per cent.
This inversion of the world order would also help break that other binary, 
the one between western and Arab worlds. It may also resist related reciprocal 
terrorism in which the body, as in Carnival, is the weapon. In response to Rahul 
Rao’s question about what ‘protest sensibility’ might befit a world in which there 
is not one single locus of threat, these protests show that it might well be in 
the all-encompassing and chaotic carnivalesque. Rao posed this question in 
the introduction to his book Third World Protest: Between Home and the World 
(2010). He was responding to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s assertion in 
Empire (2000) that ‘the first question of political philosophy today is not if or 
even why there will be resistance and rebellion but rather how to determine the 
enemy against which to rebel’.52 In their follow-up volume, Multitude, Hardt and 
Negri included a section titled ‘Carnival and Movement’, which was devoted 
to ‘protests that are carnevalesque, however, not only in their atmosphere [but] 
also in their organisation’. They credited Bakhtin for ‘help[ing] us understand 
… the logic of the multitude, a theory of organisation based on the freedom of 
singularities that converge in the production of the common’.53
Staging their carnival in the middle of a severe economic downturn − the 
twenty-first-century form of Lent − the Wall Street occupiers might seem to 
want to have their cake and eat it too. For Bakhtin following Rabelais, the 
essence of carnivalesque celebration was ‘a feast for the whole world’ in which 
oxen were slaughtered and shared among the citizenry, a form of wealth redis-
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tribution.54 So beware: the Wall Street bull may end up like the fattened ox of 
Mardi Gras, sacrificed this coming Fat Tuesday, or the next Black Wednesday.
Postscript 
I originally wrote this closing metaphor on 12 October 2011. Only a month 
later, it came to life. On 17 November 2011, a purple-and-golden bull-shaped 
piñata named Wally, ‘the spirit of Wall Street at NYU’, was castrated in front 
of New York University’s Stern School of Business (see Fig. 12.16 above). Wally 
was created by NYU4OWS, a group of artists and NYU students led by Daniel 
Aldana Cohen, a PhD student in sociology, with funds from the New York 
General Assembly’s Arts and Culture Committee. After being castrated, Wally 
was bashed open by the student body, aka the 99 per cent. From its bulging belly 
fell ‘Wall Street Campus Cash’, fake banknotes featuring pictures and financial 
data about NYU President John Sexton (‘Earns $1.6 million a year’), NYU 
Trustee John Paulson (‘Hedge fund manager who made $4 billion betting on the 
economic crisis’) and others (see Fig. 12.17). The bullfight fulfilled the protesters’ 
desire to ‘destroy the symbols of [the 1 per cent’s] power with a smile’.55 Let 
us hope that more such prophecies will soon be realised, more ancient rituals 
re-enacted and new rituals invented as part of what Jack Santino, in reference 
to the carnivalesque, termed ‘the ritualesque’. Traditionally associated with 
Mexico, the piñata is commonly known to have come from Spain and become 
part of Lenten celebrations. It is also said to have had Chinese origins, where it 
was part of New Year festivities and represented … a cow or an ox.
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Subversion through Performance: 
Performance Activism in London
Paula Serafini
Chapter 13
Introduction
Although many scholars have written on the relationship between art and 
politics,1 there is a significant lack of work addressing the ways in which art 
is explicitly incorporated into activist strategies as a political instrument. I 
consider that this kind of complex political phenomenon calls for updated forms 
of interdisciplinary analysis, including an aesthetic appraisal. In the present 
case, I intend to address this lacuna by suggesting the category of performance 
actions as a way of looking at political actions that have been heavily influenced 
by processes from performance art. This chapter will, therefore, present a theo-
retical background on performance art as well as four case analyses of activist 
groups operating in London from 2010 onwards, in order to show how aesthetics 
and art theory can add a new dimension to the study of political activism and 
social movements.
Political activism, it has been suggested, is artistically creative,2 developing its 
message by frequently producing new material objects such as placards and other 
ephemera, newly formulated chants and songs, and new forms of masquerade, 
theatrical performances and dressing up. Its staged plays and spectacular acts of 
symbolic rebellion aim to reach wider audiences by drawing media attention 
to activists’ messages, often despite a movement’s limited size. This aesthetic 
quality of protest means that, seen historically, one may trace the story of 
political activism through its artistic products and performances, invented and 
staged in each era. 
The first wave of alter-globalisation movements in the 1990s, which was 
associated with groups like Reclaim the Streets in the UK and Direct Action 
Network in the US, gave place to forms of political activism that have combined 
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elements from performance art, theatre and carnival.3 The second wave of 
 alter-globalisation movements that emerged after the 2008 economic crisis, 
with its strong global justice and anti-authoritarian message, has reiterated 
the value of art and creativity as tools for political action, while at the same 
time making extensive use of networks and social media.4 Distinctively, new 
developments in technology have enabled activists to record and then share 
creative  spectacles as never before, expanding the ways in which news, events 
and artistic  performances are experienced.
 My objective in this chapter, however, will not be to define and position this 
form of political action as a new category of artistic practice, considering that, 
as Kershaw has suggested:
As a consequence of radical new ways of thinking – such as deconstructionist, 
feminist, post-structuralist, post-colonial and postmodernist theory − the old 
binary opposition between, for example, propaganda and art, or politics and 
aesthetics, or the real and the imaginary, are deeply problematised.5 
Rather, my objective will be to incorporate into my analysis certain categories 
made available by art theory and aesthetics in order to cast a new light on 
contemporary activist strategies. 
Defining Performance
Performance art has its roots in the vanguard movements of the early twen-
tieth century, with first experiments conducted by groups such as Dada and the 
Futurists. It reached a new stage with the ‘happenings’ of the late 1950s in both 
Europe and the US by artists like Allan Kaprow and Yves Klein,6 and later, in the 
late 1960s and 1970s, with the work of Jean-Jacques Lebel, Vito Acconci, Chris 
Burden and the Fluxus movement, amongst many others.7 Performance art can 
be defined as a live artistic practice which focuses on the body of the performer 
in action, on time and space, and on active interaction with an audience.8 It 
is experimental by nature, and may include elements from dance, theatre and 
music.9 Peggy Phelan argues that the ephemeral aspect of performance is one of 
its defining characteristics, given that: 
Performance honors the idea that a limited number of people in a specific 
time/space frame can have an experience of value which leaves no visible 
trace afterwards … Performance’s independence from mass reproduction, 
technologically, economically, and linguistically, is its greatest strength.10 
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Although both share an emphasis on time and space, performance art is not the 
same as a theatrical performance, for in performance art the dramatic script is 
usually exchanged for a real-time narrative (or lack thereof), there is more room 
for improvisation, and both the structure of the performance and the setting 
(which usually does not include a stage) promote a deeper interaction with the 
viewer. As Bert O. States explains, theatre differs from performance because 
it usually means ‘a text performed “up there” by actors, with emphasis on the 
thing performed (“the play’s the thing”)’.11 Performance, on the other hand, 
focuses on the body of the artist and the act of performing itself. Thus Marina 
Abramovic argues that theatre is ‘fake’ because:
 [T]here is a black box, you pay for a ticket, and you sit in the dark and see 
somebody playing somebody else’s life. The knife is not real, the blood is 
not real, and the emotions are not real. Performance is just the opposite: the 
knife is real, the blood is real, and the emotions are real. It’s a very different 
concept. It’s about true reality.’12 
Although highly controversial and questionable – especially when chal-
lenging the ‘reality’ of theatre − Abramovic’s statement serves to illustrate 
the difference between theatre and performance regarding the physical and 
emotional involvement of the body, which is the reason I suggest performance 
as a lens through which to look at this type of activist practice. Amongst the 
actions I will be analysing throughout this chapter, the reader might note that 
there are many occasions of representation in which activists get into character 
and pretend to be someone else. This will be the case for UK Uncut activists 
disguised as doctors, and members of the University for Strategic Optimism 
posing as professors and lecturers. Nevertheless, in all cases the performance 
is not just an artistic act but also a political action taking place at a strategic 
place, where the body of the activist/performer is exposed and vulnerable − to 
encounters with authorities for example − and embodying certain emotions that 
are a direct consequence of carrying out a political action (excitement, fear, 
pride, joy, and so on).13 This means that the action is not merely a represen-
tation, but also a real-time political action.
Performance art, though it is always about a closer connection to the audience, 
is not always directly participative. Claire Bishop distinguishes between forms 
of less participatory performance, on the one hand, and, on the other, those 
participatory works that look to ‘collapse the distinction between performer and 
audience, professional and amateur, production and reception … Their emphasis 
is on collaboration, and the collective dimension of social experience’.14 Within 
participatory art there are two modes: one that looks for participants but still 
maintains the figure of the author, and one that thrives on collective creativity. 
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The first is ‘disruptive and interventionist’, the second, ‘constructive and 
ameliorative’.15 Although some activists may resort to performance because of 
its potential for disruption and intervention, it is within this second tradition 
of performance art that activists are usually inspired to engage, for participatory 
performance is not only a means to transmit a politically charged message, but 
it can be a political stand in itself by dismissing hierarchies and promoting prin-
ciples of horizontalism. Philip Auslander talks about the political specificities 
and possibilities of postmodern performance which, by being more open and 
allowing the audience to impose their own interpretative system, also offers the 
possibility of a consciousness and moulding of the politics of representation, and 
hence a sort of collective power.16
Through its democratic and open nature, participatory performance therefore 
can be a means to creating a politically active subject that is emancipated and 
aware. It looks to promote equality by dismissing the hierarchical concept of 
the author, and looks to strengthen social bonds through collaboration.17 Victor 
Turner adds that performance − as opposed to the passive critique of other 
cultural forms − has a high political potential because: 
Cultural performances are not simple reflections or expressions of culture or 
even of changing culture but may themselves be active agencies of change, 
representing the eye by which culture sees itself and the drawing board on 
which creative actors sketch out what they believe to be more apt or inter-
esting ‘designs for living’.18
Finally, performance, using the body as the main instrument for expression, is an 
embodied practice. In a performance there is an inner exploration of the artist’s 
body and, in general, an intention to extend this exploration into the audience, 
trying to generate an emotional reaction by stimulating the senses.19 The range 
of emotions that performance artists can appeal to is broad, and can range from 
fear to sadness, or even humour-induced pleasure. Take for example Vito Acco-
nci’s 1972 performance, Seedbed, in which he lay hidden under a platform built 
into the Sonnabend Gallery in New York, and masturbated as visitors walked 
around above him. Visitors could not see him, but could hear him fantasising 
about them from under the platform. This performance generated a mixture of 
feelings in the audience that was a product of a stimulation of the senses (sight, 
sound) and the knowledge of a sexualised body that was in proximity, sharing 
an intimate moment with the visitor. This stirring of emotions was intended 
to serve in the first place to establish a connection with the audience and, 
secondly, as a way of bringing into question issues of gender, violation, privacy 
and sexuality. 
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Performance Activism
Beyond the history, definition and characteristics of performance art, the 
concept of performance action is critical, I suggest, to the study of political 
activism. Performance action describes a type of activist strategy that incorpo-
rates elements from performance art into political action. A performance action 
is therefore creative and symbolic; it is interactive, and is defined by the double 
role of participants as political activists and performers. It is a form of protest, 
as well as a play on the idea of direct action.
Performance action, like performance art, may take different shapes, attitudes 
and structure according to the intention and content of the action. One of the 
ways in which performance is used by activists is in the staging of parodies or 
satirical spectacles that both mock and denounce the ideologies and behaviours 
of governments, corporations and elites.20 In their paper on spectacular resis-
tance, Margaret Farrar and Jamie Warner argue that spectacle can be a powerful 
tool for expressing dissent and inciting massive action.21 Activists engaging in 
this sort of spectacular performance can be regarded as ‘culture jammers’, in 
their words, defined as ‘activists who deliberately subvert spectacular images in 
order to reclaim them’.22 As an example, they analyse the case of Billionaires 
for Bush, a US activist group whose members dress up as stereotypical over-the-
top billionaires with top hats and fur coats, and stage ironic pro-Bush protests 
holding placards that state ‘Corporations are people too’ and similar slogans. 
Unlike the Debordian concept of the alienating spectacle23 the Billionaires aim 
at spectacular performances that require interpretation and decodification on 
behalf of the viewer, thus fighting political passivity and estrangement.24
Another way in which activists resort to performance is as a form of identity 
building, using it as a tool for reproducing symbols. James Jasper argues that the 
affective bonds with other participants, the pride of standing up for one’s values 
and the collective identity experienced when being part of a social movement 
can amount to a very pleasurable experience.25 A collective performance in 
which the body is used as a tool and also exposed to dangers like confron-
tation and arrest, and where the ideology of the movement is being reproduced 
through action, has the potential not only for pleasure, enjoyment and other 
emotions, but for the strengthening of bonds and of collective identity as well. 
Performance and Carnival
Performance actions can also be carnivalesque and, indeed, the similarities 
between these two practices sometimes make them inseparable and indistin-
guishable. In Rabelais and his World, Mikhail Bakhtin offers a symbolic analysis 
of the carnival and the ‘carnivalesque’, starting from its medieval origins and 
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emphasising the subversive character of collective activities such as laughing, 
singing, eating and drinking excessively.26 As Graeber notes, Bakhtin sees 
grotesque imagery ‘as often posed in direct opposition to the stuffy, overbearing, 
and hierarchical “official culture of the time”, a form of resistance against the 
static, lifeless asceticism that the church and civil authorities foisted on the 
masses’.27
So what does carnival have in common with performance actions? As it 
occurred in Seattle in 1999, in the street parties of Reclaim the Streets in 
1995,28 and in many other instances of protest and demonstration, activist 
carnivalesque situations emerged both as a sort of subversion and resistance, 
and as a way of nurturing values of equality and community. For the activists, 
carnival was a ‘form of resistance that merges the political and the aesthetic’29 
and promoted values such as play, pleasure, spontaneity, excess and the recon-
figuration of social hierarchies. It was about ‘rehearsing what it is like to be free, 
a time when power is inverted and the world is turned upside down’.30 Just as 
in participatory performance, the carnival is a creative, collective, non-hierarchical 
embodied experience, in which the body is let loose from the confinements of 
manners and social norms, and becomes a channel for creativity, pleasure and 
joy. I therefore suggest embracing the similarities between these two practices 
in order to appreciate how performance can be carnivalesque, and how the 
carnival can also be seen as a performance.31
Performance Actions in London
For this study I have chosen to focus in the first place on actions taking place 
in London by three activist groups: UK Uncut, Arts Against Cuts and the 
University for Strategic Optimism. The reason behind this selection is that 
these groups chose performance actions as their modus operandi on repeated 
occasions. In addition, I will also focus on Occupy, a movement that spread 
into multiple locations across the world, and into different aspects of everyday 
life. Although known primarily for their occupations, Occupy activists did on 
some occasions incorporate performance elements into their actions, mainly 
as a way of reinforcing resistance symbolically. In addition, they represent the 
second wave of anti-austerity movements that took place in the UK after the 
2008 economic crisis, emerging once the peak of the student protests had passed. 
Referring to them will therefore permit a wider scope for my analysis as well 
as allowing me to apply the category of performance activism to an inherently 
creative movement that does not resort to this artistic practice as its main mode 
of action, but rather incorporates it as an aid. 
The data gathered for this study was based on first-hand observations, active 
participation in one action and content analysis (including of websites, texts 
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and YouTube videos) from actions that took place between November 2010 
and May 2012. While not being an active member of any of the groups or 
networks studied in this chapter, with this study I aim to share with the reader 
the work of recent and current activist groups in London and to advocate for 
a kind of political activity that is embodied, creative and joyful. At the same 
time, however, I intend to provide a critical view, reflecting on the limitations 
and contradictions inherent in this kind of approach. 
The Local Context
The global financial crisis, which developed in 2008, began in the context of the 
United States banking system and real estate market. Its effects quickly spread 
to economies worldwide, and European Union countries were no exception. 
The critical situation of banks in the UK led to the coalition government’s 
announcement of austerity measures, which would serve to bail out the banks 
but at the cost of severe cuts to public services and considerable job losses. One 
of the first measures to be announced were changes to the higher education 
system, following the publication of the Browne Review in October 2010.32 This 
included devastating cuts to universities’ teaching budgets and the raising of fees 
from around £3,000 (the fee cap at the time) to £9,000 a year.33
The first major demonstration in response to these announcements, known 
as ‘Demo 2010’, took place in central London on 10 November 2010. It was 
mostly student-led but with the presence of political groups and parties such as 
the Green Party, the Socialist Workers Party and Socialist Students, as well as 
anarchist groups. Between 45,000 and 50,000 students, friends and supporters 
marched down the streets of London protesting the government’s plans. 
According to the Evening Standard, ‘It was the biggest protest by students since 
1998, when tuition fees were first introduced by Labour’.34 The placards and 
banners carried by the students proclaimed ‘Some cuts never heal’ and ‘Save our 
education’, and the chants were directed both at Prime Minister David Cameron 
and Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. The latter was a common target for frus-
trated students, who angrily denounced the raising of higher education fees as an 
act of betrayal.35 The feeling and message of the march was very clear: ‘We did 
not cause the crisis, we will not pay for it at the cost of our education’.36 Anti-
austerity marches and actions would continue to take place throughout the 
following year, including the emergence of Occupy London in October 2011.
Parallel to the course of these demonstrations and marches, groups of students, 
lecturers and other newly formed affinity groups and local alliances started staging 
occupations, actions and teach-ins that would together amount to a vibrant 
network of activists resisting the ‘cuts’ and fighting for social change. From this 
context emerged the groups and the performance actions I will describe next.
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UK Uncut
UK Uncut was created in late October 2010, and their first action was the occu-
pation of a Vodafone store. Their name started circulating on Twitter and soon 
became well-known, with their actions and the people joining them growing by 
the minute. The group’s declared mission is to act against the austerity measures 
of the government − mainly severe cuts to public services. They look to accom-
plish this by ‘building a powerful grassroots mass movement, able to resist the 
Government cuts at every turn’.37
Amongst UK Uncut’s actions, which have included the occupation of tax-
avoiding stores and companies, was the occupation of banks on 28 May 2011, 
an initiative called ‘Emergency Operation’. Dressed as surgeons and packed with 
fake blood, props and informative leaflets, hundreds of activists across the UK 
set out to occupy and transform several branches of four major high street banks 
into hospitals and surgeries, in order to highlight the importance of the National 
Health Service (NHS), fight its privatisation and the loss of jobs, and express 
their outrage at the government’s cuts to public services, including healthcare. 
Actions took place in more than ten cities (numbers varying according to 
the source), including London, Cambridge, Brighton, Liverpool and Glasgow. 
According to The Guardian, UK Uncut reported that forty branches of banks 
were closed, sometimes with activists inside and, on other occasions, prior to 
the protesters’ arrival, forcing activists to conduct their actions outside.38 The 
event was preceded by the circulation of a video in which activists dressed as 
surgeons danced whilst preparing for the action, checking a list of the essential 
items (‘make props’, ‘call local media’ and so on).39 Humour was without a doubt 
an important aspect of the clip, as well as of the action.
Most of UK Uncut’s actions are intended to be participatory. Moreover, the 
group puts great emphasis on distributing information online as well as through 
their actions (handing out leaflets and proclaiming the actions on megaphones) 
and on encouraging people to take matters into their own hands by either joining 
the group’s actions or creating new groups (hence the promotional video and the 
information provided on their webpage). They are still active, and have recently 
carried out actions that denounced tax-avoiding companies and protested newly 
imposed austerity measures.
Arts Against Cuts
Arts Against Cuts was a group formed in late 2010 by artists, students and cultural 
workers against the Government’s cuts to public services, and was specifically 
opposed to the reduction of funding in Arts education. On 6 December 2010, 
Arts Against Cuts staged an occupation and teach-in at Tate Britain, a hallowed 
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Figure 13.2 UK Uncut, Upper Street: ‘Don’t break our NHS 
(Photo: A. Denney).
Figure 13.1 UK Uncut, Upper Street: ‘Save the NHS’ (Photo: A. Denney).
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cultural space, after members of this group and other activists who joined them 
were not allowed into the prize ceremony and exhibition for the Turner Prize. 
Enforcing the idea that Tate would be empty without art schools, the almost 
200 activists engaged in lectures, collective chanting and life drawing sessions.40 
A second action by Arts Against Cuts was the ‘Orgy of the Rich’ protest which 
took place during an auction at Sotheby’s on 15 February 2011. In the middle 
of the auction a group of protesters who were sitting quietly inside the room 
started shouting and moaning in an orgasmic manner, and after some moments 
of suspense unveiled a banner that read ‘Orgy of the Rich’. The protesters also 
threw fake £50 notes into the audience, and at the same time held a demon-
stration outside the venue which enacted a mock auction of public services. A 
video of this action was widely distributed on YouTube soon afterwards, and the 
protest received moderate media coverage.41
The University for Strategic Optimism
The University for Strategic Optimism (UfSO) is a group that was formed in 
late 2010 by mostly students of Cultural Studies and related subjects. They 
refer to themselves as ‘A university [sic] based on the principle of free and open 
education, a return of politics to the public, and the politicisation of public 
space’.42 Being a ‘University’, they decided to have as their first action a lecture, 
held on 24 November 2010 at a branch of Lloyds Bank at London Bridge. The 
lecture began after a small group of people took the bank by surprise, held up a 
big banner with the University’s logo and started a lecture that would be inter-
Figure 13.3 Art Against Cuts (Photo: M. Popovikj).
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Figure 13.4 Occupy LSX Camp at St Paul’s (Photo: D. Haslam).
rupted by a security guard just after stating the words, ‘Don’t be afraid, no money 
will be harmed during this lecture.’ The lecture was called ‘Higher Education, 
Neo-Liberalism and the State’, and it presented the UfSO, aimed to expose the 
injustice behind the government’s new measures and promoted a politicisation 
of public space.
The second ‘lecture’ took place at a Tesco Superstore on 30 November 2010 
and was titled ‘Market Education, Instant-Mix Degrees and the Commodifi-
cation of Everything’. The lecture started with the presentation and offer of a 
variety of made-up degrees, ironically titled ‘Creative Accounting’ and ‘Desire 
Engineering’ amongst others − this being a clear parody of the path that higher 
education is taking in the UK.43 Later on, the lecturer for the day gave a presen-
tation about the current state of higher education, the millionaire status of 
some of the panellists of the Browne Review, and the consequences of the rise 
in fees and the ideology behind it, leading up to the final question: ‘What will 
become of non-utilitarian learning? What will become of the Arts?’ The lecture 
came to an end when security guards stopped the action, with the last spoken 
sentence being ‘We, the University for Strategic Optimism, give all power to 
the imagination.’44
The last example of an action by this group is the Free Free Market Market, 
which took place on 25 March 2011, and in which I participated. The idea was 
to stage a ‘great education cattle market of the future’ to ‘help the Big Society sell 
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off education and public services’, meaning that fake degrees and services would 
be on sale, and could be bought with fake monopoly money or ‘cultural capital’ 
handed out at the site.45 An invitation circulated beforehand asking people 
to join in by bringing their own stalls and things to sell, or to just ‘swing by 
and flash (mob) your cultural capital’. The group gathered outside the Institute 
of Contemporary Arts and then moved to a secret location: the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Skills. Once there the stalls were set up, a band started 
playing, and cultural capital and degrees started circulating amongst participants 
and the few passers-by who joined in. The action took place outside a strategic 
venue and tried to engage the Ministry’s employees as well as passers-by, but did 
not quite succeed in doing so. Despite the banners and speeches made through 
megaphones, the idea for this performance action was not entirely clear and this 
may have stopped some people from joining. On the other hand, there was a 
well-thought-through plan of producing a video out of it, which took the form 
of an ethnographic study of the Free Free Market Market. Dressed as a ‘stereo-
typical anthropologist’, wearing a khaki shirt and hat, one of the members of 
the group proceeded to interview the different sellers and buyers who explained 
the ironic products and services on sale.
Occupy London
Occupy emerged as a movement in London on 15 October 2011, with a camp 
being set up outside St Paul’s Cathedral after a failed attempt at occupying 
Paternoster Square.46 The major camps at St Paul’s and Finsbury Square were 
set up as a political statement, but not only as that. These sites were turned 
into living spaces in order to extend the temporal and spatial dimensions of the 
protest, and as an example of the reconfiguration of public and private spaces 
that the movement proposed. Camps were open to people who were engaged 
with the movement as well as to those who were not. Following the ethos of the 
Occupy Wall Street settlings in New York (where the movement first started), 
they became not only places to sleep and eat, but also centres for interaction, 
learning, discussion, organising and leisure. The setting up of Tent University, 
the kitchen and the recycling scheme, are examples of how the movement 
extended to multiple aspects of everyday life, and presented a prototype for 
an alternative social living configuration based on principles of horizontalism, 
cooperation and openness.47 
In contrast to other movements, Occupy did not operate only through set 
meetings and planned actions. The camps at St Paul’s and Finsbury Square, 
plus other temporarily occupied sites such as the Bank of Ideas, allowed the 
movement to have a continuity fostered by daily interactions amongst a large 
number of the participants. The occupied sites also allowed the movement to 
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branch out into other aspects of everyday life besides protest, and to channel 
their creativity through a broad set of activities such as putting together a library, 
fixing and decorating occupied spaces, organising workshops, and managing the 
camps’ logistics and infrastructure. 
Even though creativity flourished in the daily activities at the camp, there 
were also specific instances in which activists engaged in protest actions that 
were inherently artistic. One of these took place on 1 May 2012, in the context 
of a ‘comeback’ that the movement had with a series of consecutive actions 
starting on the first of the month, and which I observed as part of different 
protest actions during that day. 
The act of occupation which defines the movement made the tent a dominant 
symbol of Occupy, often portrayed in photographs by the media as a synecdoche 
for the movement. It was highly significant, then, that on such a politically 
charged date members of the Occupy movement decided to set up a ‘flash camp’ 
in the middle of Trafalgar Square, signalling the comeback and resistance of the 
movement with an act and a prop (the tent) which embodied its essence. The 
intention was clearly not to mark a new settlement site − since setting up tents 
in Trafalgar square would guarantee an immediate eviction. The intention was 
to make a statement, to remind the world that the fight was not over, and that 
occupations could happen anywhere and anytime.
Following the Trafalgar Square action, a group of around twenty activists 
moved on to Oxford Street, where they gathered outside different stores and 
proceeded to denounce the stores’ tax evasion in the form of chants encouraged 
by a megaphone. Suddenly, after a group of around thirty passers-by gathered 
around to watch and take pictures, protesters lifted their tents over their heads 
and held them open in the air, in a symbolically charged act of subversion.
The actions of all these different groups and networks illustrate how inventive 
performance action can be used as a tool for political activism. By applying 
categories from aesthetics and art theory, I want to attempt an interdisciplinary 
analysis in order to shed new light on this kind of activist strategy.
The Power of Symbolic Transgressions
Performance clearly allows the transmission of symbolic messages beyond words. 
If we take the case of UK Uncut, dressing up as surgeons and turning banks into 
hospitals constituted a performance action through the deployment of familiar 
symbolic objects out of context, which transgressed normative assumptions 
of where these objects and persons belong. Activists were not occupying the 
place only as protesting citizens, but also as ‘doctors’ looking for a place to work 
because the hospitals had been shut down due to lack of funding. Dressing up 
and acting like doctors therefore made the temporary appropriation of ‘inappro-
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priate’ spaces justified, since banks were responsible for the national debt they 
were not being held accountable for. The juxtaposition of two unlike orders – 
financial and healthcare – made for a symbolically charged action.
The action at Tate Britain by Arts Against Cuts was another example of a 
deeply symbolic action derived from the normative transgression of place and 
its ‘proper’ activities. The staging of the improvised life drawing class did not 
come from a mere desire to draw, but was a performance action looking to make 
a point: if the funding for art schools is cut, we will take over the museum for 
our lessons – the same symbolic appropriation and transformation of space that 
was carried out by UK Uncut.
This subversion of normative space through performance was also essential to 
the Occupy movement. The fact that in Occupy’s action at Trafalgar Square the 
intention was not to actually set up a campsite but rather to send a message and 
state a position, suggests the element of performance in this action, which adds 
a further layer to the act of camping or occupying. The tent, the ultimate occu-
pying tool, encapsulated the symbolic power of the movement, and supported 
bodies in action as they sat in Trafalgar Square for a few minutes before being 
removed by the police. Apart from the symbolic transgression of space, other 
forms of transgression were also used as key instruments of protests and dissent.
Carnival and Humour
The University for Strategic Optimism’s use of parody, irony and humour is a 
good example of how performance can be a powerful creative tool for political 
action. When selling fake degrees at Tesco or making statements like ‘No money 
will be harmed during this lecture’, activists resorted to humour as a way of 
getting through to participants and audiences, appealing to emotions as well 
as to critical thought. Humour and satire were further enhanced by the carni-
valesque elements in their actions, with performances like the Free Free Market 
Market incorporating music, costumes and props, which generated an overall 
festive atmosphere.
Parodic humour was essential for UK Uncut’s Emergency Operation perfor-
mance action, as well as for Art Against Cuts’ Orgy of the Rich performance. 
In the latter, both the orgiastic bodily display and the mock auction of public 
services were humorous parodies of the elites. With its loud, expressive, embodied 
character, the orgy performance action was also carnivalesque in the Bakhtinian 
sense and, as Souren Melikian reported for The New York Times, many members 
of the audience at Sotheby’s were more amused than disturbed by the whole 
event.48 Angelique Haugerud, reflecting on the importance of humour in social 
movements, quotes a member of Occupy Wall Street who explains that ‘being 
able to crack a joke and get people to draw on their own sense of what is right is 
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very powerful’.49 Humour subverts the sanctity which modern society accords to 
public places of high culture, to the untouchable charisma of capitalist institu-
tions such as banks, large supermarket chains or government ministries, and to 
the capitalists and political classes who dominate, reducing eminent buildings 
to bricks and mortar and untouchable elites into exemplars of a lowly humanity. 
The Body as an Instrument
Through the embodied act of performance, activists experienced and provoked 
emotions, and created and transmitted meaning. The body of the performer was 
not only used as an artistic medium, but was also exposed as the political actor 
in its own right, facing the possibilities of confrontations with security, being 
arrested and even submitted to violent repression. In the case of Occupy’s action 
in Trafalgar Square, the bodies of activists took on a further role. The act of occu-
pying is in itself defined by the presence of certain bodies in a specific place. The 
body was thus not only a means for expression, but also a ‘tool’ for occupation. 
The Paradox of Participation: 
Performance, Spectacle and the New Media
Participation is key to many activist actions because there is power in numbers 
and because the intention behind their performances is to inform and invite 
as many people as possible to get involved in political activity towards social 
change. In most of the performance actions described here, participation by 
fellow activists and non-activists alike was encouraged, either through open calls 
in advance, or through attempts to include passers-by as the actions were taking 
place. This tendency towards inclusion can be related to the strand of partici-
patory performance described earlier, which attempts to blur the distinction 
between author and audience, thus promoting a more horizontal kind of practice 
by turning passive spectators into active producers of meaning.50 Participation 
is seen to contribute to the political objectives of the action by reproducing 
certain values through the processes in place. 
Groups like UfSO, UK Uncut and Arts Against Cuts employed tactics that 
seem to be directed at active interaction with the other; at creating a disruption 
of everyday life by inventing an unexpected, crazy situation that would intrigue 
passers-by and invite them to reflect about certain issues such as the ideology 
behind austerity measures and the consequences of cuts to public services. These 
sorts of actions are not thought of as self-contained, but rather suppose inter-
actions and negotiation, whether with the general public, workers of targeted 
institutions or security forces. Herein, however, lies the paradox of the move-
ments, linked to the fact that recruitment and inclusion of members of the 
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public as participants in actions is always limited − one cannot include everyone 
− and sometimes it does not even succeed in including even a few from acci-
dental passers-by. Hence, although their artistic performances were in most 
cases intended to be participatory, they could only (potentially) reach wider 
audiences through the media and online rather than at the site of the perfor-
mance action. Yet the media could not substitute in the final analysis, as Judith 
Butler too has argued,51 for real bodies occupying real spaces.
The question then is: if most of the people who experience the action face to 
face are spectators instead of participants, can the action still be effective in terms 
of generating a response in the audience? How much gets across to an audience 
which is not experiencing the same emotions and sense of involvement as partici-
pants? If we go back to Farrar and Warner’s argument on the political potential 
of spectacle,52 then the subversive symbolism of performance actions is arguably 
what is most valuable, able ultimately to make audiences reflect on the meaning 
and implications of what they saw, then this is true whether they are active partic-
ipants or not. But then the further question may be raised; whether these ironic 
and humorous performances can really be effective in terms of making audiences 
aware and active towards political change, or whether they are merely contained 
experiences that become easily assimilated by the ‘society of spectacle’.53
The question that follows from this is: can an action potentially still be 
‘effective’ when seen on footage as opposed to being witnessed live? A common 
trait among many activist groups is that the production of promotional and 
informative videos of their actions is as important as the performance action 
itself. In some cases, the actions carried out are rather small in size, or take place 
in locations that are not highly frequented, therefore not affecting many people 
directly. In these cases, the production of a video to distribute on YouTube 
becomes a major objective of the action, and the idea of contacting people face 
to face and awakening them from a state of numbness becomes only secondary. 
But I wonder if this is something to criticise or should we come to terms with the 
fact that the role of the media for activists has become crucial, and that a video 
online could be what triggers people into taking to the streets?54 As Jeffrey Juris 
notes, the internet has not only permitted new forms of organisation, but has 
also made it possible to share resources.55 This online sharing is perhaps what 
could ultimately make actions more valuable than their actual live performance, 
if we consider the number of people that can be reached online.
What is at stake when sharing a video of an action, however, is the aura of 
the actual, ‘real’ performance as an artistic ‘event’.56 If we approach these perfor-
mance actions as we do performance art, we might argue that there is an aura 
in a performance that is only transmitted to the immediate audience, and does 
not translate into a recording. The aura is what makes the work of art special, 
irreproducible and different from mundane artifacts and situations. As Peggy 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 336 —
Phelan puts it, ‘Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot 
be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in the circulation 
of representations of representations: once it does so, it becomes something 
other than performance’.57 This raises the question: how much of the original 
action can therefore be captured by a video? Can the recording of an action still 
transmit and generate the same emotions, or will it be limited to being purely 
informative and/or amusing? In the latter case, would this be a loss, or just an 
added way of sharing and experiencing the action?
Conclusion
Performance, I have argued, is a powerful tool for political action, thus making 
art theory and aesthetics useful frameworks for the study of particular forms of 
political activism that engage in this type of artistic practice. I argue that the arts 
– and in particular performance art − are appealing to activists because through 
embodiment and emotions, collective symbols and carnivalesque humour, perfor-
mances can create temporary situations of freedom, transgression, reflection and 
mutual empowerment for participants and perhaps in a secondary sense, for 
audiences as well. Their political potential is that the freedom they invoke ‘is 
not just freedom from oppression, repression, exploitation – the resistance of the 
radical − but also freedom to reach beyond existing systems of formalised power, 
freedom to create currently unimaginable forms of association and action – the 
transgressive or transcendent sense of the radical’.58 Furthermore, the grey area 
in which art and activism blur is a powerful one precisely because of this lack 
of definition. As BAVO explain when describing Rancière’s point of view, the 
uncertain position between the autonomy and heteronomy of art in regard to 
politics makes it:
difficult for the politicians involved to ‘aestheticize away’ the accusations 
expressed by the artist, [and] dismiss them as ‘merely art’… [because] the 
political accusations are too direct for this. On the other hand, it denies 
politicians the opportunity to defuse the indictment in the usual way, with 
familiar political arguments: it is too artistic for that.59 
It is yet to be seen, however, what the larger political implications are of the 
circulation of these performance actions through the internet. The excitement, 
joy and even fear involved in taking part in or witnessing an action first hand 
cannot be captured by recordings. What the internet allows, however, is the 
opportunity to reach mass audiences across the world; to share information and 
tactics, and maybe inspire others to get out on the streets and take matters into 
their own hands. 
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Spain’s Indignados and the Mediated Aesthetics 
of Non-violence
John Postill
Chapter 14
‘If the indignados are so angry, why are they laughing so much?’
Eduardo Romanos1
‘15M nonviolence is not passive, it is neither abidance by the law nor an 
adherence to political convention. Rather it is active, rebellious, disobedient 
and creative.’
Amador Fernandez Savater2
Preface
In July 2010, I moved with my family from England to Barcelona, in Catalonia, 
Spain, to conduct fieldwork on social media and activism for a period of twelve 
months. Having previously carried out field research on internet activism in 
Malaysia in 2003−4,3 I was eager to learn whether post-2004 platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were making any significant difference to 
the everyday practices and collective actions of activists, albeit this time in a 
very different corner of the world.4 As a Spaniard, a reluctant Spaniard but a 
Spaniard all the same, this was my first experience of ‘anthropology at home’ 
after many years living and working abroad. 
When planning the year ahead I did not expect the #SpanishRevolution (as 
the indignados movement was originally known), certainly not in  Catalonia, 
with its strong tradition of regional nationalism and reluctant Hispanity. Indeed, 
the day before my arrival, a million people had protested in Barcelona against a 
ruling by Spain’s Constitutional Court limiting the region’s autonomy. Protesters 
marched behind a banner that read, in Catalan: ‘We are a nation. We decide’.5 
The Political Aesthetics of Global Protest
— 342 —
By October 2010, the nationalist tide had subsided and I began to worry that 
I may not have much internet activism to research in Barcelona. Meanwhile, 
the city’s small but lively ‘free culture’ scene had attracted my interest. Free 
culture activists fight to liberate ‘all individuals and authors/artists from the 
abuses of the cultural industry trade’.6 Their movement is intimately tied to the 
global struggle for internet freedom epitomised by platforms such as Wikileaks 
and Anonymous.7  
My research fears were assuaged in December 2010 when free culture activists 
and internet rights lawyers successfully mobilised to delay the passing of an 
unpopular copyright bill known as Ley Sinde that the Spanish government had 
drafted under US pressure,8 as revealed by Wikileaks. When the government, 
backed by the other main parties, passed the law early in 2011 despite the 
popular outcry, leading internet activists created the online group NoLesVotes. 
This group called on Spanish citizens not to vote for any of the major parties as 
a response to this perceived betrayal. NoLesVotes soon joined forces with Anon-
ymous and other non-traditional formations to create an umbrella platform 
named Democracia Real Ya (DRY). It is no coincidence that DRY’s Barcelona 
home base was the free culture centre Conservas, or that its Madrid equivalent 
was the ‘hackerspace’ Patio Maravillas. 
On 15 May 2011, DRY launched street marches across Spain under the 
slogan ‘Real democracy now! We are not commodities in the hands of poli-
ticians and bankers’. While the marches were well attended, they were not 
envisaged as a preamble to Tahrir-style mass occupations. As I headed for my 
Barcelona home after a long day of marching, I had no inkling that this was 
merely the beginning of a tidal wave of protest that would reach beyond Spain’s 
borders. The turning point came in the early hours of 16 May, as a group of some 
forty protesters decided to pitch camp at Madrid’s main square, Puerta del Sol, 
instead of returning to their homes. One of them, a member of the hacktivist 
group Isaac Hacksimov (once again, the digital activism connection was not 
accidental), explained later: ‘All we did was a gesture that broke the collective 
mental block’.9 Fearing that the authorities may evict them, the occupiers sent 
out calls for support via the internet. The first person to join them learned about 
their collective action on Twitter. 
By 17 May the number of Puerta del Sol campers had swollen to 200 and by 
20 May nearly 30,000 people had taken the square. This demographic explosion 
was mirrored online as countless Twitter threads, Facebook conversations and 
blog posts were hastily produced and shared. Dozens of other cities around Spain 
followed suit, and the nascent indignados/15M movement was now a global 
media event. Soon it would inspire, like the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt 
before it, similar developments around the world, including the Occupy Wall 
Street movement later in the year.10 
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Introduction
One remarkable feature about Spain’s indignados movement, noted by numerous 
observers, is its untiring commitment to non-violence, even in the face of riot 
police provocation and brutality. Compared to other southern European states 
such as Greece or Italy, Spain’s protests have been relatively free from violent 
actions on the part of the citizenry.  
But why are Spain’s indignados so devoted to non-violence? After all, long 
decades of activist and scholarly debate on the effectiveness of non-violence as 
a protest strategy have not settled the issue either way.11 
One main focus of the non-violence literature has been the part played by the 
media, particularly the mass media, in the development of non-violent social 
movements. Thus Vamsee Juluri has called for a rapprochement between the 
philosophy of non-violence and media studies as a way of exposing ‘foundational 
myths about violence in the media’,12 such as the myth about violence being 
natural, historical or cultural. For his part, Samad argues that non-violence 
‘minimizes the loss of human lives, compared to wars or armed conflicts, and 
is apt to bring about real political change’.13 However, he cautions that further 
research is needed in order to contrast the effectiveness of this strategy in 
different political and historical contexts. David Sumner examines the role of 
the print media and TV in the 1960 Nashville Student Movement, in the US 
state of Tennessee.14 Students regarded the media as a key means of garnering 
public support for their cause. Their commitment to non-violence was amply 
covered by the media and ‘helped show that if violence occurred, the students 
were not the ones who initiated it’, for they were portrayed as ‘the good guys’.15 
A better known example is that of Martin Luther King Jr, whose moderate 
stance and mastery of public relations won him the hearts and minds of 
America’s left-liberal media establishment: ‘The fact that African-American 
ministers and non-violent leaders like King called on African-Americans to 
“love their enemies” particularly caught the attention of the media and allowed 
the movement to gain liberals, white sympathizers and donors’.16
Samad argues that technological changes were integral to King’s success.17 
By 1958, over 80 per cent of US households had a TV set and over 96 per cent 
a radio. This put an abrupt end to African-American invisibility, providing ‘a 
window through which millions could watch the black struggle’.18 Without the 
mass media, concludes Samad, King would be today ‘an unsung clergyman’.19 
Other authors are less persuaded, however, about the merits of non-violence 
as a political strategy. For instance, William Meyers agrees that King played an 
important part in the anti-segregation movement, but he was by no means the 
only party involved.20 There was, in fact, a wide spectrum of groups that formed 
a common front around this issue, including the Black Panthers, Black Muslims 
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and a motley of anarchist, communist and other formations. For Meyers, the 
lead role was actually played not by non-violent activists but by the National 
Guard and its credible ‘threat of violence’:
When Presidents of the United States decided to send in the National Guard 
to desegregate schools in southern states, the racists had little choice but to 
back down. Whether the President, Congress or Supreme Court […] did it 
out of the goodness of their hearts, or because they feared a violent revolution 
that would overthrow the government, or because some marchers took oaths 
of non-violence, in the end it was violence and the threat of violence that 
ended segregation.21
With the spread of the internet and mobile phones over the past two decades, 
the question of the technological mediation of non-violent protest has acquired 
greater salience. Drawing from multi-sited research in Barcelona and other 
European cities in the early 2000s, the anthropologist Jeff Juris explores ‘the 
complex relationship between performative violence and mass-mediated 
constructions of violence’,22 taking the anti-G8 protests in Genoa as his main 
case study. Juris defines performative violence as ‘a specific mode of communi-
cation through which activists seek to produce social transformation by staging 
symbolic rituals of confrontation’. Unfortunately for activists, the conventional 
mass media frames of the day undermined their strategy by interpreting these 
confrontations as wanton violence. 
Juris conducted fieldwork before the current global boom in the uptake of 
social media and smartphones. At the time, activists had access to indie/alter-
native media, listservs, email and websites, but mass ‘social Web’ platforms such 
as Facebook, Twitter or YouTube were not yet in existence. This contrast raises 
the question of what difference, if any, the new media technologies have made 
to the recent waves of protest in 2011 and 2013. 
Social movements scholars such as Manuel Castells and Zeynem Tufekci 
contend that media technologies are ‘game-changers’.23 As millions of citizens 
gained access to the internet and mobile phones, says Tufekci, autocrats in 
countries such as Tunisia or Egypt were no longer able to impose informational 
embargos on localised protest. As a result, local information/action trickles 
turned into nationwide cascades that the authorities could not contain. On the 
other side of the debate sit scholars such as Evgeny Morozov who denounce as 
hyperbole accounts that explore the emancipatory potential of the new tech-
nologies.24 Meanwhile, a growing number of authors, including anthropologists, 
are seeking to steer clear of the polemics in order to develop nuanced accounts 
of the part played by digital media in recent protest movements.25 
In this chapter, I take my cue from the latter scholars to explore the mediated 
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aesthetics of the new movements at a time of rapid technological change, a 
question that has not yet received sufficient attention. Drawing from both my 
own fieldwork in Barcelona and from a critical reading of the indignados liter-
ature – most of it published in Spanish and unknown in the Anglophone world 
– I ask what part, if any, the new social and mobile media have played in the 
emergence and stabilisation of a distinctive non-violent aesthetics in Spain. 
My argument is that this new aesthetics is indeed complexly mediated, both 
by ‘traditional’ mainstream media and by new platforms and technologies such 
as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and smartphones. After a brief overview of the 
indignados movement, I then identify five key principles of its protest aesthetic, 
concluding that this new aesthetic has positioned Spain – until recently a 
technological laggard with a dormant civil society – in the global forefront of 
techno-political innovation and social change. 
The Indignados Movement 
Spanish activists and observers alike agree that the 15 May protests were long 
overdue. The collapse of the housing market in 2008 had left the Spanish 
economy in a feeble state, with an overall unemployment rate of 45 per cent 
among young people, and millions more having to survive on low-paid or 
seasonal jobs. The combination of a political class discredited by a string of 
corruption cases, an electoral law that perpetuates a two-party system and the 
precedent of pro-democracy uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt all set the scene for 
a spring of discontent in Spain.26 
The encampments rapidly evolved into ‘cities within cities’ governed through 
popular assemblies and committees. The committees were created around prac-
tical needs such as cooking, cleaning, communicating and carrying out actions. 
Decisions were made through both majority-rule vote and consensus. The 
structure was horizontal, with rotating spokespersons in lieu of leaders. Tens 
of thousands of citizens were thus experimenting with participatory, direct and 
inclusive forms of democracy at odds with the dominant logic of political repre-
sentation. Displaying a thorough admixture of utopianism and pragmatism, the 
new movement drew up a list of concrete demands, including the removal of 
corrupt politicians from electoral lists, while pursuing long-term revolutionary 
goals such as giving ‘All Power to the People’.27
By the middle of June 2011 most encampments were dismantled following 
arduous consensus-seeking assemblies. The aim was to take the movement from 
the central squares and streets to the neighbourhoods (barrios), but not without 
first warning the authorities that protesters ‘know the way back’. Neighbourhood 
assemblies were created in many localities, albeit with uneven levels of partici-
pation.28 At the same time, increasing attention was paid to the elaboration of 
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concrete objectives, for example a fairer distribution of the available work, the 
right to a home or stripping the political class of its privileges.29
In the autumn of 2011, Spain’s indignados aligned themselves with related 
movements in Portugal, Greece, the US and other countries, setting off simul-
taneous demonstrations in over a thousand cities around the globe on 15 
October. Both Twitter and smartphones played an important role here, along 
with live streaming and aggregator sites, in bringing together multiple networks 
of protesters around a set of Twitter hashtags (keywords). Collective Twitter 
accounts were particularly important bridges across the various locality-based 
movements.30 
In Spain, the indignados movement has continued to evolve as a loosely 
articulated constellation of techno-political ideals, practices and actions. For 
example, in May 2012 a group called 15MpaRato was created to take legal 
action against Rodrigo Rato, the former IMF managing director and chief exec-
utive of Bankia. That same month Bankia had requested a €19 billion bailout 
from the Spanish government. In less than two weeks, the new platform had 
built a strong social media profile and raised sufficient money through crowd-
funding to initiate the legal process.31 As a consequence, Rato appeared in court 
that December to face charges of ‘fraud, embezzlement, falsifying accounts and 
price manipulation’.32 Other ongoing initiatives include the Mortgage Victims 
Platform, the Casa Precaria in Madrid (offering advice on self-employment), 
a Catalan network of cooperatives, and the Citizens’ Tide, ‘a coalition of 350 
organisations … that have mobilised hundreds of thousands against privatisation 
and austerity’.33 Writing in late April 2013, Katherine Ainger aptly concludes: 
‘Two years ago the indignados occupied the plazas of cities across Spain to protest 
against the crisis and demand a “real democracy”. Now, it seems, indignation is 
becoming a generalised condition.’34
A Mediated Aesthetics of Non-violence
As said earlier, Spain’s 15M movement is famed for its non-violence. The indig-
nados have always been swift to respond to repeated attempts by certain conser-
vative news media to attach a ‘radical aesthetic’ to the movement, countering 
these media representations with widely shared digital content such as YouTube 
videos showing police provocateurs disguised as ‘skins’ or ‘radicals’, scenes 
of peaceful sit-ins brutally broken up by the police, posters of demonstrators 
facing riot police with open hands raised in the air and chanting, ‘These are our 
weapons’ (Estas son nuestras armas) (see Fig. 14.1), and so on. 
If the noun ‘aesthetic’ (in the singular), can be defined as ‘a set of principles 
underlying the work of a particular artist or artistic movement, [e.g.] the Cubist 
aesthetic’,35 here I will use the term ‘protest aesthetic’ to mean ‘a set of principles 
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Figure 14.1 Poster announcing a non-violence workshop organised by two 
indignados platforms in Burgos (Spain) in May 2012 (Source: Democracia 
Real YA Burgos).
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underlying the subcultural work and style of a particular protest movement’, in 
this case the Spanish Indignados/15M movement. 
Five key principles underlie the indignados aesthetic. First, a firm rejection 
of the ‘diverse tactics’ of earlier mobilisations such as the anti-corporate globali-
sation movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which included (ritually) 
violent tactics.36 This principle was already in evidence during the launch of 
Democracia Real Ya in Barcelona in the Spring of 2011, which I attended, 
and continued to shape the movement’s evolution during and after the May 
2011 occupations. Second, the strategic use of humour,37 and more specifically 
of ‘jocose emotivity’38 both externally (against the ruling elites, the media, 
the police, and so on) and internally (as a way of relieving stress and building 
solidarity among protesters). Third, sophisticated digital practices across the 
porous social/mainstream media divide, deftly exploiting the unique affor-
dances of different technologies, for example the virality of the microblogging 
site Twitter39 or the indexicality of YouTube videos.40 Fourth, the spread of 
free software/culture ideals and practices through techno-political experiments 
with direct democracy undertaken in public spaces.41 Fifth, a perpetually tran-
sient temporality in which the immediate and ephemeral are accorded the same 
weight as the enduring and long term. 
I will now consider each of these aesthetic principles in turn, before recapitu-
lating the argument and concluding with some suggestions for further research. 
Rejection of Diverse Tactics
Samad argues that movements which adopt non-violence must be fully devoted 
to it, for there is no room for half-measures.42 For example, the second Pales-
tinian intifada’s non-violent actions were overshadowed in both the Arab and 
western media by images of ‘armed battle’. Most Spanish indignados have likewise 
stressed the incompatibility of violent and non-violent tactics, eschewing the 
‘diversity of tactics’ that characterised protests against corporate capitalism in 
the early 2000s. This quote from a Catalan activist captures that earlier ethos:
One thing has become clear: we have to coordinate direct action with all 
other types of protest. Who knows when a sit-in or a Molotov cocktail will be 
useful? It depends on the moment. And according to Asian wisdom: ‘always 
do what the enemy least expects’.43 
By contrast, for most 15M participants violence should be rejected in all situa-
tions, as violence ‘always places itself at the heart of the action, like a whirlwind 
that suctions and drags everything else’.44
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15M is a nonviolent movement. This is so essential to it that it wasn’t even a 
decision taken in an assembly […]. We don’t decide our DNA, we start from 
it. […] Nonviolence does not mean nonconflict. The nonviolence of 15M is 
not passive, it is neither abidance by the law nor an adherence to political 
convention. Rather it is active, rebellious, disobedient and creative.45 
For the indie radio station Onda Precaria 15M non-violence is ‘a methodology 
inscribed in the movement’s DNA as a strategy to thwart efforts by the rulers 
and security forces to portray us as a destructive, anti-system minority [una 
minoría antisistema rompelotodo]’.46 
15M activists regard nonviolence as being as essential to the movement as 
its collective intelligence, horizontality, heterogeneity and inclusion.47 Non-
violence is a source of strength, not weakness, a collective strategy founded on 
the belief that it will eventually pay dividends. For Aurelio Sainz Pezonaga,48 
non-violence is intrinsic to the movement’s ‘revolutionary logic’, in the sense of 
not regarding anyone as an enemy, not even politicians, bankers or the police. 
This was neatly captured, he adds, in the chant ‘Police, join us!’ (¡Policía únete!) 
heard in the early days of the encampments. In sum, non-violence trumps the 
supposed efficacy of violence, putting an end to the ‘tyranny of testosterone’.49 
So far the strategy has proven to be a success, but there have been setbacks as 
well. Let us consider first the high points, starting with the May 2011 occupations. 
These were portrayed by the centrist and left-leaning news media as peaceful, 
multitudinous and non-partisan. Images of law-abiding citizens ‘making history’ 
were created and disseminated widely by both professionals and amateurs across 
a huge range of platforms,50 with the notable exception of Intereconomia and 
other conservative media outlets hostile to the new movement. A second high 
point was reached on 27 May 2011, when Catalonia’s riot police used calculated 
brutality to break up a peaceful sit-in at Plaça de Catalunya. According to 15M 
activists:
Fifteen people were injured, as protesters used non-violent resistance to 
defend the occupation. The level of police of brutality can be exemplified by 
pictures taken of a riot officer breaking a protester’s wheelchair. This potent 
image, along with the twitter hash tag #Bcnsinmiedo (Barcelona without fear) 
spread rapidly through the internet, becoming one of the most popular global 
twitter topics for that day. Within hours, solidarity protests were planned in 
every city across the country under the banner ‘We are all Barcelona’.51 
However, a few weeks later, on 15 June, this peaceful image was tarnished 
when irate demonstrators harassed Catalan politicians as they entered the 
regional parliament in Barcelona. This incident provoked a brief crisis within 
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the movement as its spokespersons sought to distance themselves from it. As 
reported by El País:
Politicians of all parties were verbally abused and in some cases pushed around 
(zarandeados) when they tried to enter […] the Parliament building. The 
strong police cordon could not prevent some violent scenes. […] [Protesters] 
painted a black cross on [the regional MP] Montserrat Tura’s raincoat, who 
said that if the 15M movement wishes to gain prestige, ‘this cannot be based 
on spray and on marking people as if they were targets. This behaviour is 
reminiscent of the Nazis.’52 
Fortunately for 15M supporters, the damage was contained through a counter-
demonstration held on 19 June at which large crowds clearly reaffirmed the move-
ment’s non-violent credentials through embodied, mediated performances such 
as holding their hands up in the air while chanting ‘These are our weapons’ (see 
Fig. 14.1). Contrary to activists’ complaints about the news media conspiring to 
label 15M as a violent movement,53 most mainstream outlets were broadly sympa-
thetic to the movement. For example, the centre-right newspaper El Mundo 
reported that on 19 June 15M ‘put on display an undeniably peaceful intent which 
allowed it to recoup the credit it had lost after the violent siege of the Catalan 
parliament’.54 A week later, the centre-left El País (traditionally close to Spain’s 
Socialist Party, PSOE), reported that 71 per cent of citizens surveyed regarded 
15M as a peaceful movement and ‘only 17 per cent see it as being radical’. The 
report concluded that the movement had managed to retain 64 per cent of 
popular support a month after its inception, ‘burying the idea that the incidents 
linked to the movement had undermined it’. Indeed, ’79 per cent [of Spaniards] 
believe the indignados have good reason to protest and support them’.55 
Another challenging episode for the movement’s non-violent reputation 
took place in August 2011 when media reports linked 15M to a Madrid march 
opposing the funding of the Pope’s visit to Spain with taxpayers’ money, which 
ended in clashes with Catholic pilgrims. Although a 15M general assembly had 
decided not to join the anti-Papal march organised by a number of secularist plat-
forms, some news media highlighted the 15M banners on display. The dangers 
of being seen as supporting the anti-Pope demonstration had been aired online 
by 15M supporters in previous days, including by a user of the link-sharing site 
Menéame whose comment was widely recommended by other site users:
I think stepping into the minefield [fregao] of the anti-Pope demonstration 
wouldn’t be desirable for 15M. Think about it, you only need to give them 
half a reason to call us crusties [perroflautas]56 and other nice things, if on top 
of it we join the demonstration, no one will take us seriously.
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The crisis was once again overcome via highly visible displays of non-violence. 
As in previous incidents, this reaction was warmly received by the mainstream 
media, with the predictable exception of the more conservative outlets. These 
successful damage limitation exercises have been a recurrent pattern in the 
movement’s first two years of life. In June 2013, the left-leaning radio network 
Cadena Ser (owned, like El País, by the PRISA group) published the results of 
a survey it conducted among social media users in collaboration with DRY and 
other indignados platforms. Again, it reported a high level of support for the 
15M movement, with 80 per cent of internet respondents having ‘maintained 
their interest in, or connection to, 15M’, adding that these results confirmed the 
ongoing erosion of Spain’s two-party system57 – a conclusion entirely congruent 
with the indignados’ worldview. Moreover, the movement has no shortage of 
influential supporters working with(in) leading news organisations as reporters, 
photographers, editors, bloggers, guest columnists, whistleblowers and so on.58 
Pending systematic research on this matter, the notion that the mainstream 
news media as a whole are conspiring with the political and financial class to 
undermine the 15M movement appears to be unwarranted. As media anthropol-
ogists have demonstrated in a range of cultural contexts, including in authori-
tarian countries such as Egypt, the mass media are always sites of contestation 
rather than the conspiratorial monoliths they are often made out to be in the 
activist imagination.59 
Jocose Emotivity
A second key principle of the indignados’ non-violent aesthetic is their stra-
tegic use of humour, more specifically a jocose style of articulating emotions. 
Although emotions and affect are important areas of growth in social movement 
theory, to date protest humour has been relatively neglected in the literature.60 
At the same time, there is strong evidence to suggest that activists and protesters 
around the globe are using both old and new forms of humour as part of their 
repertoires. For instance, the international platform Movements.org declared 
June 2013 ‘Dictator Appreciation Month’, asking citizens around the world to 
contribute materials to their expanding ‘laughtivism’ web resources ‘[b]ecause 
we love sarcasm’. 
Deborah Gould61 quotes Brian Massumi62 who defines emotions as ‘the 
expression of affect in gesture and language, its conventional or coded expression’: 
‘Whereas affect is unfixed, unstructured, and non-linguistic, an emotion is one’s 
personal expression of what one is feeling in a given moment, an expression that 
is structured by social convention, by culture’.63 
This is an intriguing distinction between affect and emotion, particularly 
in its stress on the momentariness of emotions, but Gould’s exclusive locating 
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of emotion within the realm of ‘personal expression’ is problematic. Instead, 
I wish to expand this definition to suggest that an emotion is an expression 
of what a person and/or a collectivity (e.g. a Puerta del Sol assembly, a Twitter 
trending topic) is feeling in a given moment, an expression structured by social 
convention, by technology and by other cultural elements. 
In a recent paper, Eduardo Romanos addresses the puzzling question, ‘If the 
indignados are so angry, why are they laughing so much?’64 His answer is cogent: 
the indignados use humour strategically, and they do so both instrumentally 
and expressively. In Weberian terms,65 their humour is at once value-rational 
(wertrational) and instrumentally rational (zweckrational): ‘Value-rational action 
is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, 
aesthetic, religious, or other form of behaviour, independently from its prospects 
of success”’.66
For Romanos,67 then, there is far more to indignados humour than merely 
having a good time, for protesters are ‘aware of a number of benefits associated 
with the use of humour that [go] beyond having fun’. This can be seen in the 
workshops run by activists to foster individual and collective creativity around, 
for instance, the making of witty placard messages. Many of these messages 
‘subverted already familiar texts’ from popular or political culture, for example 
‘It’s not a crisis. It’s just that I don’t love you any more’ (‘No es una crisis, es que 
ya no te quiero’).68 
Another 15M analyst, Antón Fernandez de Rota,69 finds a parallel in this 
subversive language with political humour in the former Soviet Union. This 
author borrows from the anthropologist Alexei Yurchak70 the notion of stiob (or 
hyperidentification), an approach employed by Russian critics of the communist 
regime. The ‘jocose emotivity’ (emotividad jocosa) of stiob was neither sarcasm 
nor cynicism:
[Yurchak] employs this Russian term to describe a satirical or jocose style 
that differs from sarcasm, cynicism and other forms of absurd humour by 
demanding an overidentification with its target, thereby purporting to support 
the very same thing it ridicules.71 
Similarly, the indignados are subverting Spain’s existing political language 
through slogans such as ‘We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us’, by 
‘playing stiob with the liberal dictionary and phraseology’.72 In addition, Spain’s 
indignados have frequently resorted to humour to highlight police provocation 
and violence through slogans, blog posts, tweets, YouTube videos and other 
media forms. For instance, a November 2012 tweet directed its readers to an 
embedded YouTube video showing peaceful demonstrators confronting alleged 
police infiltrators. The author did this by cleverly remediating onto Twitter 
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the popular chant ‘Spooks, you morons, you think we can’t see you?’ (‘Secreta, 
idiota, te crees que no se nota?’).73 In doing so, the indignados are using humour 
to distance themselves from mainstream media portrayals (real or imagined) of 
the movement’s ‘radical’, ‘skin’ or ‘violent’ aesthetic. For example, in September 
2012 the collective account of the Leganes (Madrid) assembly shared via 
Twitter a YouTube video showing, once again, police infiltrators: ‘So the “radical 
aesthetic” types are the same ones who are helping to arrest people?’74
Indignados often take aim at the mainstream media through slogans such as 
‘Don’t turn off your TV, you may accidentally think’ (‘No apagues la televisión … 
Podrías pensar’).75 One habitual practice is to humorously counter representa-
tions of 15M protesters as ‘crusties’ (perroflautas, see above) popular with Spain’s 
reactionary news media. One widely shared instance of this line of defence 
involved the conservative, anti-indignados Intereconomia, ‘doubtless the TV 
channel that generated the most laughter’.76
One particularly celebrated moment was a stunt [montaje] that took place in 
Plaça de Catalunya. [A] ‘rich kid’ [un niño pijo] who claimed to be part of 15M 
but [felt out of place surrounded by joints and crusties, was silenced by] an 
avalanche of roars of laughter [that] burst in front of the cameras and went 
on to set cyberspace abuzz, ridiculing the more nostalgic sector of the right.77
Jocose emotivity can be used both externally, to attack the news media, the 
police or politicians, and internally, with the aim of fostering a sense of solidarity 
while relieving stress among protesters.78 An example of the latter orientation 
was the ‘aerobics assemblies’ held on 12 and 19 June 2011, prior to the general 
assembly at Puerta del Sol, where ‘[a] group of activists dressed up in tacky 
and grotesque gym clothes took over the assembly’. Following a series of fitness 
routines in which the non-verbal language used in assemblies was parodied, the 
performers became embroiled in an absurd argument over how to redecorate 
one of the encampment kitchens. The performances ‘served to cool tempers 
at moments of great stress caused by the intervention of the police or internal 
arguments’.79 
Viral Reality
In the Introduction to this volume, we learned that during the Botswana protests 
a new form of egalitarianism emerged across class divides through ‘shared cele-
bratory practices and shared suffering’. This was certainly the case in the streets 
and squares of Spain, too, but here we should also stress the pervasive mediation 
of new technologies of sharing, especially social networking sites and smartphones. 
With the explosive uptake of these media in recent years, hundreds of millions 
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of citizens around the world have acquired the ability to decide how and with 
whom to ‘share’ digital content.80 While early cyberspace scholars announced 
the coming of an age of ‘virtual reality’,81 what we are witnessing today is rather 
the rise of a shared viral reality, i.e. the accelerated co-production and sharing 
of news and opinion by media professionals and amateurs through social/viral 
media.82 The mainstream media may have retained the ability to set the day-to-
day current affairs agenda,83 but they must now contend with the citizens’ new 
power to share (or not to share) a potentially viral item.84 
Like protesters in other countries, Spain’s indignados have made sophisti-
cated use of viral technologies to pursue non-violent ends whilst denouncing 
physical and/or symbolic violence by the police and the ruling elites. Jeff Juris 
and Maple Razsa describe how the Occupy movement made effective use of 
‘the viral flows of images and information generated by the intersections of 
social and mass media’ to mobilise and inspire many thousands of people across 
America and beyond.85 Although police violence contributed to the diffusion 
of the Occupy movement, it also ‘drove activists into submerged forms of orga-
nizing’. Juris makes a connection between police violence, social media virality 
and the growth of the Occupy movement:
Like the ‘viral’ images of New York City police pepper spraying two women 
at #Occupy Wall Street, videos of the eviction and the aggressive police 
response, including their wrestling to the ground of several clearly nonviolent 
members of Veterans for Peace, circulated widely via social and mainstream 
media platforms, generating widespread sympathy for #Occupy Boston. This 
afternoon’s march … would again draw several thousand protesters. It would 
also be one of more than a thousand October 15 #Occupy protests around 
the world, a testament to the viral circulation of protest in an era of social 
media.86
Along similar lines, Joan Donovan describes Occupy as ‘a social change network 
that leverages both online and offline social networking to propagate ideas and 
produce distributed direct actions’.87 Comparable processes have taken place in 
Spain, for instance, following the earlier mentioned eviction of protesters from 
Barcelona’s Plaça de Catalunya on 27 May 2011 which ‘went viral’ within a 
matter of minutes. 
In the 15M imaginary, today’s viral sophistication portends tomorrow’s political 
emancipation. The indignados’ exaltation of virality is a form of discourse in 
which technology and grassroots politics are seen as being inextricably tied. 
Virals are regarded as an expression not only of popular indignation but also of 
an increasingly internet-savvy citizenry taking on an obsolescent system run by 
technological illiterates. Thus the influential 15M activist and researcher Javier 
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Toret, a psychologist by training, argues that the viral technologies helped to 
create ‘a collective mood’ in Spain. Before the 15M movement, he jokes, ‘we 
nerds [frikis] of the world were all alone and friendless’. For Toret, ‘emotions are 
political’ and 15M tweets carry twice as much ‘emotional load’ (carga emocional) 
as non-15M tweets. This renders them inherently more ‘viral’.88 
Digital content related to the movement often carries not just an emotional 
load but also an explicit message urging recipients to share it widely. For instance, 
in March 2012 the indignados platform NoLesVotes shared on Facebook a skil-
fully designed poster. This design centred on a striking image consisting of a 
classic protest fist holding an iPhone accompanied by the Spanish text (my 
translation): 
OUR ONLY WEAPON IS REALITY 
THERE IS NO DEFENCE AGAINST IT
RECORD 
PHOTOGRAPH 
SPREAD 
This brief text and picture capture with rare clarity the indignados’ dual 
commitment to viral reality and to non-violence – indeed, in the 15M universe 
the two are mutually constitutive. That is, 15M non-violence and its necessary 
counterpart, police and government violence, can only become a reality in the 
public consciousness if citizens make use of their mobile and online devices to 
‘record, photograph, (and) spread’ them. In terms of Peirce’s semiotics, 15M 
(audio) visual propaganda exploits the iconic indexicality of film and photog-
raphy,89 that is the direct causal link obtaining between a photographic or filmic 
image and the object it represents (in this case, police brutality), in order to 
bolster the movement’s non-violent credentials. 
To summarise, Spanish protesters have learned to combine two distinct tech-
nical affordances – photographic indexicality and social media virality – to great 
rhetorical and aesthetic effect. As always with social innovations, though, these 
advances carry with them unintended consequences.90 Thus the indignado 
author Isaac Rosa warns that the long-term exposure to violent materials via 
social media can lead to the ‘normalisation’ of police violence as an enter-
tainment genre: 
It is now customary to spend the day after a strike or demonstration watching 
the hundreds of videos of police brutality that circulate through social 
networks. The [14 November] strike has, as expected, added a few more 
titles to our film library. […] We share videos, examine photographs more 
suited to a forensic inquiry (split heads, bruised backs, even eye-gouging) 
and gather information to count the victims: how many wounded, how many 
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arrested, how many journalists assaulted, how many police infiltrators […]. 
It’s beginning to feel like a routine, another day in the cycle of protests.91 
Public Hackerspaces
Although the popular revolts in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries were 
a source of great inspiration to indignados and occupiers on both sides of the 
Atlantic, we should not lose sight of another key source of ideas, technologies 
and personnel, namely the free culture/internet freedom movement epitomised 
by formations such as Wikileaks, Anonymous, the P2P Foundation or the Free 
Culture Forum. Over the past few years we have witnessed the mainstreaming 
of this broad movement, with previously marginal, ‘geeky’ initiatives such as 
Wikileaks or Anonymous becoming household names around the globe thanks 
to the complicity of mainstream media such The Guardian, El País or The New 
York Times. I propose to call this trend the mainstreaming of nerd politics.92 
The link between this global trend and the 2011 and 2013 waves of 
protests remains poorly understood. An ideal entry point to this question is 
The  Revolution Will Be Digitised, a prescient book completed by the journalist 
Heather Brooke as the Tunisian uprising was breaking out in December 2010.93 
Brooke investigates the goals and activities of internet activists in the United 
States, Iceland, Germany and other countries as part of an inquiry into the 
‘Information War’ pitting them against powerful governments and corpora-
tions. She notes the centrality of ‘hackerspaces’ to their endeavours. These are 
horizontal, democratic physical spaces devoted to ‘playfully creative problem 
solving’ (i.e. hacking) shaped by their users’ pragmatism and anti-authoritari-
anism.94 
Transposing this idea to the 2011 movements, I wish to suggest that geeky 
indignados took their hackerspaces to the streets and squares of urban Spain 
where they hybridised them with other context-specific practices and tech-
nologies. In doing so, they created new forms of techno-political praxis, civic 
engagement and protest aesthetics, some of which later diffused to the United 
States and elsewhere via the Occupy movement where they continued to 
hybridise and mutate. 
As I explained in the preface, the influence of the free culture scene on Spain’s 
15M movement was seminal. According to Bernardo Gutiérrez, Madrid’s hack-
erspaces have evolved a unique twenty-first-century hacker aesthetic distinct 
from the aesthetics of other free culture hubs in Europe.
From the end of the ’90s, free culture became entangled in Madrid with 
social movements [located] in squats [centros okupa] such as El Laboratorio. 
While Berlin’s squatters are still wedded to a punk aesthetic and a classic anti-
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Fascism, in Madrid’s over thirty Squatted Social Centres, a new networked 
world is being created – a horizontal, aggregating world. A new world imbued 
with a hacker ethic that dissolves all online/offline borders. […] [These 
centres] are extensions of the squares occupied in the spring of 2011.95 
Other advocates of free-culture inspired political reform (or revolution) are, 
however, more cautious.96 Following fieldwork at the intersection of Madrid’s 
free culture and indignados scenes, the Spanish anthropologist Adolfo Estalella 
stresses the enormous effort of ‘translation’ required when seeking to apply 
online ‘logics of collaboration’ to offline contexts – the same conclusion reached 
by Christopher Kelty some years earlier following transnational ethnohistorical 
research on the free software movement.97 Adolfo Estalella notes that when the 
notion of commons (procomún) is invoked in 15M circles, this is often done in 
dramatic terms.98 Thus the commons becomes both ‘a threatened good’ (un bien 
amenazado) and a dramatic genre designed to produce a new ‘urban sensitivity’ 
through neighbourhood assemblies and other grassroots formations.  
These caveats notwithstanding, the hybridisation of hacker/free culture and 
protest ideals, practices and aesthetics is a multifarious process with poten-
tially far-reaching consequences. Spain’s ongoing techno-political experimen-
tation and innovation are undeniably world class − a result of Spain’s unique 
 combination of a bankrupt political economy, a thriving squatter-hacker 
subculture and a vast pool of qualified young people unable to find employment 
and therefore able and willing to invest their creative labour in the new 
movement.  
Perpetual Transience
The fifth and final principle in the indignados’ protest aesthetic is its perennially 
transient temporality. By this I mean the paradoxical blending of ephemerality 
and endurance in 15M participants’ orientation towards the future. On the one 
hand, the indignados borrow from Mexico’s Zapatistas the idea that ‘We walk, 
not run, because we are going very far’.99 This idea can be seen at work across 
the vast universe of 15M discursive practices, both online and offline. As the 
activist anthropologist Asur Fuente put it in June 2011, ‘One cannot demand an 
ideology [un ideario] from 15M, for what they are looking for is a social change. 
Besides, you cannot expect the same from a one month-old movement as you 
do from a 130-year-old party’.100 In some contexts, the idea can take on more 
of a free/hacker culture character, for instance in the public space experiments 
discussed in the previous section in which, by analogy to free software coding, 
modifying and sharing, the indignados’ outputs can be seen as ‘techno-political 
prototypes’ that are perennially ‘in beta’.101 
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On the other hand, indignados’ personal and collective actions are charac-
terised by an ‘inevitable and attractive aesthetic of the urgent and fleeting’.102 
In the occupied spaces, new forms of popular action arose that did not require 
to be expressed ‘through lasting artistic manufactures, but rather through a 
common creativity that emerged spontaneously out of the need to be there 
and to protest’.103 This fleeting quality is beautifully captured by the ‘analogue 
Twitter’ co-created by Plaça de Catalunya occupiers and 15M sympathisers in 
mid-May 2011, at the height of the encampments (see Fig. 14.2). This ‘fantastic 
invention’ consisted of a large pedestal covered in post-it notes. Passers-by were 
encouraged to share their brief thoughts and messages with fellow citizens and 
visitors. In effect, this was microblogging transposed from the internet to a 
physical space: ‘When the wind blows, [the post-it notes] are as ephemeral as 
tweets’.104 
Perpetual transience is also present online, and particularly on Twitter. If 
YouTube quickly emerged as the ideal platform on which to share evidence of 
police brutality, owing to the inherent indexicality of its audiovisual format 
Figure 14.2 An ‘analogue Twitter’ created by occupiers and visitors of 
Plaça  de  Catalunya, Barcelona, in mid-May 2011. ‘When the wind blows, 
[the  post-it notes] are as ephemeral as tweets’ (Senabre, 2013) 
(Photo: E. Senabre Hidalgo, Estigmergia.net).
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(see above), Twitter is the world’s pre-eminent site for the collaborative making 
and unmaking of transient publics. Although efforts were made in the past to 
form Twitter ‘tribes’ (known as Twibes) around shared interests such as soccer, 
sociology or Bollywood, these all foundered. Instead, the hashtag-driven logic 
of Twitter favours users’ engagement with one another via fleeting threads of 
conversation, not enduring groups.105 Over time the indignados have learned 
how to ‘work the algorithm’ so that their concerns will became ‘trending topics’ 
on Twitter, thereby helping to shape the political and media agenda. 
To recall Habermas’s famous distinction between ‘the lifeworld’ and ‘the 
system’,106 the indignados may practise and preach ‘real democracy now’ in their 
lifeworld assemblies, but when it comes to their hopes for systemic change, they 
expect to attain real democracy only at some undefined point in the future. As 
they are wont to say, ‘This is only the beginning.’
Conclusion
In July 2011 the Spanish radical leftist website Kaos en la Red published a rant by 
the hip hop artist Nega that goes to the heart of this chapter.107 Charging against 
the ‘slogans and false prophets’ of the nascent indignados movement, Nega’s 
critique can be summed up in three main points. First, he attacks the indignados’ 
‘almost pathological obsession’ with non-violence – not the non-violent civil 
rights protests in 1960s America, but rather a ‘decaffeinated’ version whose 
advocates ‘would not hesitate to brand as terrorists the hippies who chained 
themselves to the rail tracks to stop weapons from being shipped to Vietnam’. 
To Nega, the 15M notion of non-violence was designed by the large media 
corporations: whilst throwing paint or an egg becomes ‘terrible anti-system 
violence’, the latest labour reform is not violence but unavoidable collateral 
damage. Second, he regards 15M as anything but a radical movement. Being 
radical is ‘getting to the root of a problem’, not dreaming up bland slogans such 
as ‘For a just justice’ that even the most reactionary sectors of the right would 
subscribe to. Given that the indignados’ intellectual referents are contemporary 
media personalities rather than ‘Marx, Mao or Marcuse (or Debord, Foucault or 
Sartre)’, we should not expect from them profound or radical graffiti (after all, 
this would be vandalism). At best we can hope for dull cardboard slogans such 
as ‘We are not anti-system, the system is anti-us’ or ‘They don’t represent us’. 
Third, Nega argues that the 15M movement suffers from a culture of immediacy. 
Being ‘slaves to the ephemeral’, the indignados are caught in an endless loop in 
which they produce prodigious numbers of ‘little books’ (libritos) with titles such 
as Be Outraged, Commit or React that ‘saturate our bookshops’ and are recom-
mended by the country’s main department stores.  
This is not the place for an extended response to this spirited piece. Instead, 
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I will use it as a way to recapitulate my argument about the mediated aesthetics 
of 15M non-violence. Let us first take up Nega’s remark about the indignados’ 
‘almost pathological obsession’ with non-violence. As we have seen, there were 
sound historical reasons for choosing non-violence. This strategy possesses a 
logic of its own, a logic that is regularly reaffirmed through technologically shared 
images, words and deeds, namely the belief that violence and non-violence 
are incompatible. By rejecting the ‘diverse tactics’ and ‘radical aesthetics’ 
of previous mobilisations against corporate globalisation,108 the indignados 
managed to include in their struggle millions of Spaniards who would have 
otherwise kept their distance from the protests. This is succinctly captured in 
the slogan ‘Without violence there are more of us’ (‘Sin violencia somos más’).109 
An avoidance of radical aesthetics, however, does not mean that the indig-
nados movement lacks radicalism. In early 2011, when Spain’s political class 
approved copyright legislation under US government pressure, as confirmed by 
Wikileaks via El País, the same internet activists who had campaigned to block 
the new legislation went on to form NoLesVotes, a platform that called on the 
Spanish people not to vote for any of the major political parties. Shortly there-
after, NoLesVotes formed a coalition with Anonymous, Juventud Sin Futuro and 
other emergent groups under the umbrella platform Democracia Real Ya (DRY) 
which organised the 15 May 2011 marches that were to transform Spain’s 
political climate within days. 
This amounted to a schism between vast sections of the Spanish population 
led by 15M ‘non-leaders’ and the political and financial elites – with the police, 
the media, academia and other societal fields finding themselves caught in 
the middle of a protracted conflict that is far from being resolved at the time 
of writing (June 2014). In other words, by declaring a radical break from the 
existing political order – representative democracy – the indignados are paving 
the way for radical change. Whether this will take the shape of gradual reform 
or sudden revolution remains to be seen, but we can be certain that there will 
be no returning to Spain’s stagnant ‘transition culture’110 that followed the end 
of the Franco regime in 1977.  
Finally, the accusation that the indignados are ‘slaves to the ephemeral’ 
is baseless. The 15M movement has in fact developed a political aesthetics 
that conjoins the ephemeral with the enduring. Twitter trending topics, tent 
cities, Facebook groups and barrio assemblies may come and go, but the wide-
spread realisation that Spain’s political system is in acute need of repair (or 
replacement) has not gone away. We caught several glimpses earlier of how the 
indignados language has entered Spain’s ‘national conversation’. Ironically, this 
was possible thanks to the support of the supposedly pro-Establishment news 
media. Recall, for instance, how the centre-left broadcaster Cadena Ser, tradi-
tionally close to the PSOE, ‘confirmed’ the erosion of Spain’s two-party system 
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on the basis of a survey jointly conducted with several indignados platforms. 
A key finding of this research is indeed the gap between 15M rhetoric 
about a monolithic ‘mainstream media’ (los medios de comunicacion) seeking to 
undermine the movement, and the actual discursive practices of news media 
organisations which are often, in my experience, quietly pro-15M. Further 
research is urgently required on the actual (as opposed to imagined) coverage of 
the movement by the mainstream media. Such research is likely to complicate 
these simplistic portrayals. Indignados activists are understandably prone to 
‘outing’ police infiltrators via social media, but we should not overlook the 
importance of the movement’s own ‘discursive infiltrators’, that is, journalists, 
intellectuals, artists and others who are active 15M participants, or at least 
supportive of the movement, and help to shape public opinion in their favour 
through their mainstream reporting, commentary, art installations, and so on. 
All in all, far from being Nega’s shallow, ‘decaffeinated’ version of the 1960s 
civil rights movement, the indignados’ mediated aesthetic has been pivotal to 
the growth and maintenance of the movement, as well as transforming Spain 
into an unlikely global leader in techno-political innovation. 
Further comparative work is also needed on the diachronic and processual 
dimensions of mediated aesthetics in Spain and other states. In the contem-
porary era in which variously positioned political actors (rulers, politicians, 
activists, journalists, citizens and so on) have access to multiple media, when 
analysing a struggle it is crucial that we establish which media ensembles – or 
media mixes – came to the fore at which particular stages of the conflict.111 Here 
I have only been able to sketch the unique aesthetic ‘package’ that makes up the 
15M movement in a rather synoptic, ‘snapshot’ manner. A future diachronic, 
phase-by-phase analysis112 of how this political aesthetic unfolded over time will 
allow me to shed light on its ‘field dynamics’,113 not least on the part played 
by old-school leftists like Nega who feel excluded from the indignados’ inclu-
siveness. 
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The Poetics of Indignation in Greece: 
 Anti-austerity Protest and Accountability
Dimitrios Theodossopoulos
Chapter 15
The official policies of austerity and restructuring implemented as a remedy to 
the financial crisis have fuelled intense public discontent and inspired local 
narratives of indignation in Greece. Since 2011, indignation has become a 
master trope of protest1 that communicates a wide array of meanings that are 
used by local actors in Greece to come to terms with the crisis. At the inter-
national level, as Daniel Knight perceptively observes,2 the Greek crisis itself 
has been employed as a trope for issuing a warning about what may happen 
to those who resist neoliberalism’s economic logic. At this particular juncture, 
however, Greek citizens care less about the appropriation of ‘their’ crisis abroad 
than about the consequences of the crisis in their everyday life.
Two years after the introduction of austerity measures was announced to 
the Greek public, the crisis itself and its repercussions are still issues that many 
ordinary citizens in Greece debate in their everyday conversations. They talk 
about their current predicament with ‘rhetorical force and purpose’3 and use 
rhetorical arguments to persuade others − their interlocutors − ‘but also them-
selves’4 about one or another explanation of the crisis. In this chapter, I refer to 
this particular type of local rhetoric as indignant discourse. As Michael Herzfeld 
notes, the term rhetoric often involves a clear distinction between ‘the rhetorical 
and the real’,5 a demarcation that is too artificial to capture the purposeful ambi-
guity and irony of Greek everyday unofficial discourse. Thus, I confine my use 
of the term rhetoric to refer to political party discourse, and I follow Herzfeld in 
using ‘social poetics’ − the poetics of indignation, as my title suggests − to refer 
to the everyday pursuit of meaning and accountability in crisis-afflicted Greece.6 
Focusing on the poetics of indignation, I explore anthropologically two 
key concepts that figure prominently in Greek anti-austerity discourse as this 
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has been articulated in the context of the crisis: ‘indignation’ (aganáktisi) and 
‘mnimónio’, a word the Greeks use to refer to the austerity measures. I follow 
the transformation of the indignation discourse from an early stage of sponta-
neous protest (summer 2011) to its subsequent appropriation by party politics. 
During this period, indignation, which originally signalled a departure from 
official political lines, has been used to encourage the restructuring of Greek 
official politics and the crystallisation of new political formations, legitimised 
via parliamentary elections. Yet, despite the representation of anti-austerity 
discourse in the parliament − and its relative officialisation by association with 
the legal structures of power − indignation remains an important concept in 
local contexts and continues to inspire a bottom-up exegesis of the crisis.
The poetics of indignation in Greece do not merely represent a discursive 
weapon or a responsibility-evasion tactic, but rather epitomise an attempt to 
explain the crisis and negotiate accountability in the context of the crisis. 
Beyond the level of party politics, indignation with austerity remains the 
common thread of a versatile local discourse, which encourages local actors 
to embark on an exegetical pursuit for meaning in unofficial everyday conver-
sation. It is this pursuit of meaning and its diversity that can be best captured 
through an anthropological lens, offering an insight into the crisis that diverges 
sharply from the generalising accounts of the Greek crisis in the media. Such an 
ethnographic approach, with its focus on thick description, can make a critical 
contribution to the social scientific theorising of the crisis, which is currently 
dominated by economic accounts and statistics.7 In fact, a currently expanding 
anthropological literature of the Greek crisis has recently emerged to which this 
chapter makes a direct contribution.8
Following an interpretative approach, I begin my anthropological analysis 
by outlining the context of discontent in Greece along with (and following) 
the interpretation of the concepts that make it meaningful. This is because my 
main focus is not on the anti-austerity protest of summer 2011, or the period 
of complicity to party politics that followed it, but rather on the concepts of 
indignation and austerity themselves, and their significance in shaping local 
interpretative trajectories of the crisis in Greece. The local views I draw upon 
were presented to me during fieldwork in the town of Patras, a medium-sized 
town in southern Greece. My respondents, ordinary middle- and working-class 
citizens, indignant with the austerity that has plagued their lives, are mostly 
people with whom I have shared views about politics for longer than a decade.9 
Their arguments have provided me with a partial but nuanced account of the 
Greek anti-austerity discourse, the ambivalences that it engenders and, more 
importantly, the aetiology of the crisis as this is debated in everyday, unofficial 
conversation about accountability.
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Indignation as a Trope
Since the beginning of the crisis, the notion of ‘indignation’10 has been central 
to everyday discourse in Greece; so central that I have recently described it as 
a ‘master trope’ of protest.11 It figures prominently in the vocabulary of almost 
everyone in Greece and it is used, I will argue, to negotiate much more than the 
word itself. We can better grasp the versatility of indignation, if we appreciate 
its metaphorical potential − drawing on Fernandez12 − as referring to actions 
and words that communicate a variety of hidden messages. Thus, indignation 
has been used extensively in the context of the crisis − in Greece and elsewhere 
− to negotiate figurative arguments, which clarify the position of local actors 
(arguing from dissimilar political affiliations), and also, more importantly, to 
articulate diverging sets of meaning, primarily, although not exclusively, about 
accountability. 
In its metaphorical capacity, indignation links different narratives of account-
ability together. These include, first and foremost, the representation of being 
taken by surprise, as most crisis-afflicted respondents in Patras did not expect 
this turn of events. The figurative use of indignation communicates anger 
towards those politicians who were aware of the nation’s bad economic state, 
and kept this information hidden from the public until one day the bad news 
suddenly exploded into the public sphere. Indignation also targets those many 
politicians in successive governments who created the conditions of debt (and 
lack of transparency) that resulted in the current situation. It further relates to 
a perceived sense that the crisis represents a perversion of the natural expecta-
tions in life: one goes to university to receive a degree in order to acquire a 
good job, but now there are no jobs for young people; within the labour market, 
the previous expectation of salary increases or promotions is met instead with 
reduced salaries and significant threats to jobs. Instead of economic prospects 
improving over the course of one’s life − a norm established in Greece in the 
last forty years − they are now ominous and dire. 
As the play of different figurative images associated with indignation unravels 
in everyday discourse, it engenders identifications with new subject positions: 
the indignant protester, who may also be the indignant young unemployed, 
the indignant pensioner (whose pension has been devalued), the indignant 
parent (previously encouraged to bear many children to counter the nation’s 
demographic decline, and who has now lost several child-related benefits), 
the indignant shop owner (whose clientele is now diminished), the indignant 
taxpayer (whose reduced salary cannot accommodate the increased rate of 
taxation). Such new and old identities of indignation communicate, in turn, 
with familiar figurative permutations of political subjects: the indignant conser-
vative (who sees stability falling to pieces), the indignant socialist (who sees 
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hard-won benefits vanishing one after the other), the indignant communist 
(who says ‘I told you about capitalism before, but you didn’t listen’) and, to add 
a sinister figurative distortion, the indignant fascist (who hates ‘the migrant for 
having a job while “he” hasn’t’).
Indignation, in its many and constantly transforming figurative combina-
tions, brings closer together politics with arguments about ethical conduct, to 
communicate messages about the collapse of the moral community. There is 
a profound sense of injustice emanating from the experiences of the crisis at 
the local level: it is felt, embodied, omnipresent in everyday life. This feeling 
of overarching unfairness − ‘some others have benefited from the Greek debt’, 
‘some others have appropriated the money and are not paying the consequences’ 
− permeates the discourse of my respondents in Patras and is underlined by 
indignation, its figurative and polysemic capacity for meaning. ‘Yes, we are 
indignant,’ my respondents repeat in arguments that start and end with this 
powerful trope: here indignation becomes an introduction and a conclusion to 
larger narratives that describe and evaluate the crisis: it embraces those narra-
tives and connects their constituents in a meaningful whole.
In this broader sense, indignation links the current predicament of austerity 
with previous crises experienced in the past; for example, memories of famine, 
war, poverty and social inequality in the twentieth century.13 Suffering, as 
many anthropologists maintain, is a major theme in the modern Greek moral 
imagination14 and resonates with an ‘agonistic’ ethos15 and a view of life as 
a constant struggle.16 In its re-emergence as a metaphor of indignation, the 
suffering of the austerity-afflicted community provides a solid foundation for 
criticising visible examples of injustice and inequality in the world economic 
order (such as the current economic crisis). Local political narratives, Pnina 
Werbner explains, often encourage intimate connections between ‘the moral 
community, the aesthetic community (or interpretive community) and the 
community of suffering’.17 
In this respect, indignation with austerity provides local actors with an oppor-
tunity to ‘globalise their local predicaments’ within a broader ‘moral narrative’,18 
articulating arguments that seek the attention of power-holders (those politi-
cians, at home or abroad, who shape economic policies). Thus, far from being 
merely a ‘weapon of the weak’ or a discourse hidden from public view,19 indig-
nation with austerity in Greece attempts to challenge dominant explanations of 
the crisis, and, as I will shortly explain, has inspired lasting changes to the Greek 
political landscape. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to admit that 
indignation with austerity in Greece is a force to be reckoned with: it inspires 
persuasive figurative arguments and anti-hegemonic explanations of power, but 
also social change.
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‘MniMónio’: The Spectre of Austerity Measures
Soon after the imminent possibility of bankruptcy was announced to the Greek 
public in 2009, the Greek government attempted to implement a series of austerity 
measures, including cuts in salaries and benefits and increases in taxation. These 
unpopular measures − revised and expanded by successive governments since 
2010 − have been referred to in Greece by a particularly generalising term, ‘to 
mnimónio’, which translates into English as ‘the memorandum’ or, in bureaucratic 
language, as the memorandum outlining the Economic Adjustment Programme 
for Greece. This programme was introduced as a condition for Greece receiving 
a substantial bailout, and it is this very conditional nature of the arrangement 
that has led many local actors in Greece to perceive the mnimónio as a foreign 
and/or top-down imposition, rather than an agreement aiming at economic 
recovery.
In local conversational contexts in Greece, but also in the rhetoric of political 
leaders and the reportage of most journalists, the mnimónio is treated as a highly 
reified concept: a societal force, a living organism or monster that threatens 
the survival of the primary social economic unit − the household − and, by 
extension, the social values that encourage and sustain its reproduction. Such 
is the unpopularity of the mnimónio, taken as a concept and policy, that one 
major political party (PASOK) has crumbled as a consequence of introducing 
the first version of these measures, losing much of its public support, while other 
political parties from the left and the extreme right, have risen by rhetorically-
manipulating the avalanche of negative associations related in an all-inclusive 
manner to this reified concept. Yet, for most Greeks, the mnimónio is not a mere 
concept. 
The reification of austerity measures as mnimónio has offered compelling 
metaphorical opportunities for arguments and political mottos that inspire 
indignation and facilitate the articulation of the poetics of discontent. Austerity, 
in all its manifestations, has acquired a name in everyday discourse, and its 
name, mnimónio, enables local actors to negotiate accountability in simple and 
unidirectional terms, making pointed evaluations. These involve (1) those 
economically powerful and foreign Others who have introduced the idea of 
the mnimónio (such as, but not exclusively, the European Commission and the 
IMF) and imposed it on Greece; (2) those who have negotiated the mnimónio 
with the foreign agents and voted for it in the Greek parliament (pro-mnimónio 
political parties or MPs); (3) those fellow citizens who tolerate or, rather, do 
not explicitly react against the mnimónio and thus appear to be complicit in the 
logic of austerity. In contradistinction, there are those who resist the mnimónio 
in occupation or in protest, those who oppose it in the parliament (the anti-
mnimónio parties – in Greek, anti-mnimoniaká kómata) and those who openly 
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express an anti- mnimónio stance (anti-mnimoniakí thési, -ápopsi) and who make 
the majority of the voices heard in the everyday.
Since the very beginning of the post-crisis era, the poetics of discontent 
in Greece have transformed mnimónio, a previously empty, bureaucratic and 
not very frequently used term, into a versatile discursive weapon that points a 
finger at the root causes of austerity. Some people are seen as having introduced 
the mnimónio (this anti-social, ultimately bureaucratic idea); some others have 
accepted it (in the guise of various types of economic rationality); while many 
others detest it and do not see it as necessary. Thus, in everyday discourse in 
Greece, the mnimónio can be seen as being imposed hegemonically by others, 
rationalised as an excuse to introduce western structures of efficiency and/or 
transparency, used to rhetorically capitalise from the crisis and collect votes. 
The mnimónio can also provoke, agitate, harm and instigate resistance or, more 
widely, indignation. 
Considering the recent nature of the mnimónio’s signification as the reified 
spectre of austerity, its contribution in negotiating the responsibility for the crisis 
has so far been enormous. If with respect to its use in conversation the mnimónio 
is a discursive weapon and a rhetorical tool, in its more abstract conceptuali-
sation as a term synonymous with austerity, it has become (and continues to 
become transformed) into an embodied experience of limitation, a reversal of 
the usual social expectation of advancement in one’s life, a source of despair. 
For those among my respondents in Patras who see themselves as ambitious and 
hardworking, the mnimónio, they argue, has set a ceiling to their ambitions or 
prospects in life: their university degrees have not materialised into jobs, their 
work investments have not materialised in promotions and their businesses have 
ceased to expand and are, indeed, in most cases shrinking. For those in Patras 
who are less ambitious or satisfied with the art of living ‘with less’, the mnimónio 
is seen as the embodiment of an anti-social, calculative and impersonal logic 
that closes all previously acceptable routes of getting by in life. It is a heavy 
burden (éna város), as they say, that directs their lives towards poverty. Thus, 
for example, I was told that:
Life here is not as it used to be. Now we live with the mnimónio, this monster 
that is haunting our lives. We have returned back to [living as in] previous 
times (se álles epohés). (sixty-five-year-old man in Patras, Greece, July 2012)
Once the children had more than their parents, and the grandchildren much 
more than their grandparents. Now has come the mnimónio making us all 
poor once more. The young now live with the reduced pension of the old. 
(forty-five-year-old woman in Patras, April 2013)
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All this injustice that you see – the poverty, the unemployment – has a name: 
it is called the mnimónio. We, the young, believe that there is only one way 
out … the mnimónio has to die. (twenty-two-year-old university student from 
Patras, June 2012)
Here, indignation and the mnimónio (the reified embodiment of austerity) are 
used as figures of speech with imaginative moral, rhetorical force: they depict 
a world of agonistic conflict between Greek citizens and the constraints set by 
their government and/or the international establishment.
The Protest in the Square: Beyond Traditional Politics 
The 2011 summer protest in Syntagma Square has become emblematic of public 
resistance to austerity in Greece. Although it was not, by any means, the only 
expression of resistance to austerity, it is seen by many in Greece as represen-
tative of spontaneous − not politically manipulated − indignation towards those 
responsible for the crisis. The targets of indignation were particular politicians, 
political parties, financial institutions, foreign nations and systemic factors, such 
as capitalism and globalised neoliberalism in all its manifestations. The protest 
united a great number of citizens who had previously supported the two main 
political parties that had shared power in Greece from 1974 to 2010 − ‘people 
who did not know politics beyond partisan voting’20 − but who appeared willing 
(and for some this was the first time) to challenge the two-party political estab-
lishment or, at least, to think beyond established political loyalties. 
This particular (summer 2011) protest ‘in the square’, as it is referred to 
by many in Greece, was inspired by the Spanish Indignados movement,21 
and similar square occupations realised in other anti-global-local nuclei of 
resistance at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. As I have 
argued in previous work, the global media, perhaps paradoxically, can play 
an important role in subverting globalised forms of hegemony.22 In the case 
of the summer 2011 protest in Greece, internet-based social networks, such 
as those generated through Facebook, contributed to the mobilisation of the 
Greek indignant movement.23 The response of the majority of the protesters 
was spontaneous, and as many among my respondents emphasised, the spirit of 
the protest departed from pre-existing party political lines.24 It was ‘something 
new, something blameless,’ explained a respondent in Patras who participated in 
the protest in Athens; ‘we felt as if we had turned our backs on a failed political 
system’. Here was another moral trope, that of purity or blamelessness, to add 
to the rhetorical repertoire of local protesters.
A sense of communitas − in Turnerian terms − was enhanced by the anti-
structural form of encampment at Syntagma Square: an ordinarily formal space 
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Figure 15.1 View of the protesters’ encampment, Syntagma Square, June 2011 
(Photo: D. Theodossopoulos).
was temporarily occupied by tents, camping equipment, kiosks and various infor-
mation stations that disseminated news, arguments and alternative political 
views. During the most mundane periods of the protest, the residents of this 
encampment retired to their tents, shared food, played music, danced and inter-
acted with the passers-by: pensioners who frequent the square’s benches, the 
homeless, immigrants and, more importantly, many ordinary ‘unlabelled’ citizens 
who visited the square driven by curiosity, or with the deliberate intention of 
expressing their sympathy. 
The upper part of the square, directly in front of the parliament, became 
the locus of confrontational indignation, demonstrated in front of a substantial 
police force patrolling the area and guarding the parliament, ‘the regime’ (to 
kathestós) responsible for governing the nation, legitimised by thirty-seven years 
of uninterrupted representational democracy. The police in turn responded 
to indignation by communicating their determination to enact enforcement 
− police practices can be seen as a symbolic language25 − in many cases by 
engaging in violent confrontation with the protesters. In contrast to this arena 
of dramatic protest, the ‘lower square’ where the encampment was laid out was 
for the most part a space where the protest was communicated in a dialogical 
form; the protesters articulated their views through dialogue with one another 
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Figure 15.2 Indignant protesters in front of the Greek parliament, June 2011 
(Photo: D. Theodossopoulos).
and exchanged ideas with passers-by, most of whom were also indignant. In the 
‘lower square’, explains Stathis Gourgouris in an article in the Greek Left Review, 
a whole other scene of collective self-organisation has been established: a 
first-aid station under a tent and then a proper hospital at the entrance to 
Syntagma metro station; a media centre operating the website www.real-
democracy.gr, in addition to voluminous other press work; a radio station, 
also streaming on the web; a neighbourhood organisation centre that coor-
dinates similar activity in various parts of the city; a translation centre for 
non-Greek visitors, activists and foreign correspondents; fully functioning 
stations for daily needs (kitchen, bathrooms); a performing arts centre; a 
central organisation table that handles the day-to-day requests by individuals 
for the agenda to be discussed publicly; and a number of designated areas in 
the square where people sharing a specific concern can gather separately. All 
such groupings remain rigorously unaffiliated with any identified political 
agency or party.26 
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The social and ideological heterogeneity of the protesting crowd, including the 
protesters that inhabited the occupied square, contributed to an overall sense of 
liminality, an anti-structural feeling of unity, which contrasted sharply with the 
structured fragmentation of ordinary politics. ‘There was a spirit of freedom,’ said 
two of my respondents from Patras, reflecting retrospectively about their time 
‘at the square’. Freedom here represented, as many other respondents clari fied, 
an escape from established political theorising, a belief that the particular 
movement was ‘pure’ (katharó) and ‘spontaneous’ (afthórmito), uncontaminated 
by party politics. Writing about this period a year and half later, it is now easier to 
acknowledge the infiltration of ultra-conservative indignants − the ‘dark’ aspect 
of indignation27 − at various points during the demonstrations, especially in the 
confrontational space of the ‘upper square’.28 But in the ‘lower square’ the discourse 
of the majority reflected a profoundly non-violent, anti-neoliberal orientation, 
and a systematic questioning of ideas taken for granted by mainstream politics.
A central position widely expressed by many protesters, but also by indignant 
citizens who did not participate directly in the 2011 protest, or any public 
protest, was that the Greek debt was a consequence of the mistakes of others 
(bankers, politicians, corrupt civil servants), not the responsibility of the 
ordinary people who were the main victims of the austerity. This idea was encap-
sulated by the slogan ‘We don’t owe, we won’t pay!’ and inspired a wide array 
of related arguments that challenged the economic rationality of international 
politics, and the particular imposition of the austerity measures (the mnimónio) 
on Greece. Instead of the Greek debt being blamed for the problem, a position 
represented by international media reporting,29 these arguments focused on 
neoliberal economics, seen as the real cause of the crisis. From the point of view 
of the protesters ‘in the square’, the possibility of bankruptcy at the national 
level was perceived as a ‘threat’ used to force the Greek public to comply with 
austerity measures. Thus, in many arguments expressed during the protest the 
threat of bankruptcy was nothing more than propaganda orchestrated by the 
government, the EU and the IMF. Many protesters with whom I talked, first 
in Athens and later in Patras, refused to calculate the economic consequences: 
‘Let’s go bankrupt!’ they proclaimed, ‘we have nothing to fear.’
After the Protest: Complicity with Party Politics
In comparison to the excitement and ideological effervescence of the protest, the 
period that followed seemed to many protesters an anti-climax. This is a more 
general characteristic of resistance movements: exhausted protesters need time 
to recover from protracted periods of activism, occupation or demonstration, 
especially those who have families with young children and/or full time jobs. 
During the late stages of the occupation at Syntagma Square, those protesters 
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who were unemployed and without dependants were the most resilient; and, 
in fact, for some the liminality of the protest came to be structured in (anti-
structural) everyday routines. As a lukewarm protester who stayed ‘in the square’ 
on an on-and-off basis described with mixed admiration and irony, his fellow 
occupants ‘would rise from their tents when the sun was too hot to sleep, do 
their email during the peaceful moments of the protest, shout at the police with 
audacious spirit [me palikarismó] and then stay awake late every night talking, 
smoking, relaxing’.
In all respects, however, readjustment to normal life after the protest was 
experienced by many as disappointing: this was a return to an everyday reality of 
increasing austerity. Even protesters who did not sleep in the square but partici-
pated in the protest for a few hours every other day shared this general feeling 
of disappointment. For example, a first-year university student from Patras − for 
whom the 2011 occupation ‘of the square’ had been her first activist partici-
pation − talked about ‘a tightening [sténema] in her life’, a perceived sense of 
limitation in voicing indignation in public. With self-irony she stressed that 
she knew ‘nothing would be the same as before, because nothing was the same 
anymore!’ A year after the 2011 occupation of the square, I recorded similar 
testimonies from young Patrinoi: ‘I felt a void within me [ena kenó],’ said a 
university graduate with a postgraduate degree from the UK, ‘a return to the 
same life [epistrofí sta ídia]: unemployment and dead ends [anergía kai adiéxoda]’. 
A friend of his, also unemployed, added: ‘For as long as [the protest at] the 
square lasted we had a voice [óso krátise I platía eíhame logo]; now we have left 
the managing of our lives to others [tora afísame tin diahírisi tis zoís mas se állous].’
It is important to shed some light here on who those ‘others’ are who are 
locally perceived as managing the representation of indignation politically in 
the time that has followed the 2011 protest. Two subsequent national elec-
tions in Greece, held on 6 May and 17 June 2012, have changed the political 
landscape dramatically. One of the two political parties that had dominated 
Greek politics since 1974, PASOK, was radically reduced in size during those 
two elections, and has since further withered away in popularity. Yet the two-
party political dynamic that has structured − and, according to some respon-
dents, ‘confined’ − political life in Greece for the last thirty-five years has now 
been adopted again in a familiar bipolar formation. SYRIZA, a previously small 
political party from the left, has grown spectacularly in size and is now officially 
leading the opposition, while it continues to attract enhanced public support. 
SYRIZA, in comparison to the moderately socialist PASOK, advocates a 
more left-wing political vision: it has captured more than half of PASOK’s elec-
toral body, but also contains a smaller percentage of voters with radical left 
predilections. Several of my respondents in Patras argued that SYRIZA had 
also captured the spirit of the protest, voicing anti-neoliberal indignation now 
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channelled via formal political representation. Those who support the party 
communicate a sense of optimism and hope about the future. Some said that 
‘the old two-party system has now collapsed’. For example, a respondent from 
Patras who was previously a committed PASOK supporter but had now jointed 
SYRIZA, explained, ‘Some of us feel that we won! The protest at the square was 
not for nothing! The left is gaining strength and the austerity measures are now 
seriously opposed in parliament.’ Another respondent, however, who had always 
been a devoted supporter of the Communist party, expressed some scepticism, 
which was shared by many conservative voters: ‘Don’t have any illusions,’ he 
said. ‘SYRIZA is the old PASOK.’ 
One year after the protest, local commentary in Patras reflects an awareness 
that the new political legitimisation of indignation − via parliamentary  elections 
− has drifted away from the original spirit of the summer 2011 occupation. Many 
indignant respondents, particularly supporters of SYRIZA, were satisfied with 
this transformation, which they saw as ‘natural’, a confirmation of democracy and 
its ability to reflect local indignation in the constitution of the parliament and 
the reconfiguration of political power. ‘The people (o laós),’ many stressed, ‘have 
punished, with their votes, the political parties that led Greece into this situ-
ation.’ It should be noted, however, that SYRIZA is not the only party that repre-
sents − and has benefited from − this recent ‘parliamentisation’ of  indignation. 
Two political formations from the right wing of the political spectrum also 
assert the idiom of indignation. One of these represents a politically conser-
vative-cum-nationalist anti-austerity position (Independent Greeks), while the 
other is explicitly and unashamedly a fascist political formation (Golden Dawn). 
The parliamentary representatives of these two parties − with as many as twenty 
and eighteen MPs respectively − have appropriated what was previously an anti-
structural discourse of indignation, but also a critique of western hegemony that 
sounds almost left wing but is now put in the service of a defensive nationalism 
and xenophobia. I will further reflect on the poetics of this ungainly rhetorical 
trajectory in my conclusion, but for now I will end this complicated detour into 
Greek politics with an important clarification.
A significant number of respondents in Patras who also claim to be indignant 
about the crisis and its repercussions on their lives are uncomfortable with 
the political appropriation of indignation. These include, first and foremost, 
supporters of the Communist party who oppose the pro-development (anáptixi) 
narratives of most other parties, and feel that SYRIZA and the parties on the 
extreme right are using the suffering of the everyday people for populist vote-
hunting purposes. Similarly, many supporters of the three parties that constitute 
the current government − a coalition led by the conservatives (New Demo-
cracy), the remnants of PASOK and a smaller party from the left (Democratic 
Left, or DIMAR) − feel uncomfortable with the practice of using ‘indignation’ 
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as an oppositional strategy. The most conservative among them criticised the 
anti-austerity protest from its early, spontaneous phase,30 while those from the 
left target SYRIZA’s political exploitation of indignation. ‘We are left-leaning 
[aristeroí] too,’ one DIMAR supporter told me in Patras, ‘but we are not thirsty 
for political power.’
Blame and its Many Trajectories
The anthropological study of blame has been established by, and is often asso-
ciated with, the anthropology of Greece. This association is mostly related to 
the work of Michael Herzfeld, who has discussed blame in the context of Greek 
everyday discourse. Well before the crisis, Herzfeld discussed how blame operates 
in everyday life, in responsibility-evading tactics that negotiate accountability 
discursively while facing the immediate injustice of bureaucracy or evaluating 
the role of foreign nation states and Greece’s relationship to the world.31 
Herzfeld underlined the defensive nationalism inherent in the Greek etymology 
of excuses, but also took care to highlight the creative agency and irony engen-
dered by everyday blame-oriented arguments. His work opened the way for 
subsequent anthropological accounts that take unofficial Greek discourse on 
accountability seriously without ‘pathologising’ the responsibility-evading local 
actors.32 In this respect, the anthropology of Greece has established a tradition 
of studying blame without turning blame into the practice of blaming.
The attention devoted in the anthropology of Greece to the aetiology of 
blame in local conversation has also set a foundation for approaching local 
Greek rhetoric from an anthropological perspective. This was partly accom-
plished by prioritising the ethnographic study of the imponderabilia of Greek 
political discourse, including the rhetorical tactics of local actors, situated on the 
periphery of economic power. Frustrated by their powerlessness in influencing 
significant timely events, local Greek actors address the power inequalities that 
constrain their lives with exceptional rhetorical eloquence and persuasion, a 
skill apparent in the narratives and arguments of the majority of Greek men and 
women. Yet this sustained anthropological attention to local political discourse 
in Greece has not relied on the notion of rhetoric as an analytic construct 
primarily for two interrelated reasons: firstly, in an acknowledgement that the 
term rhetoric ‘perpetuates the real-ideal distinction’, with the implication that 
the rhetorical may be less than real;33 and secondly, because an emphasis on 
the rhetorical dimension of local political discourse may contribute to its easy 
dismissal as emotional, manipulative or inconsequential.
Placed within this theoretical context established by the anthropology of 
Greece before the current crisis, the discourse of indignation that emerged with 
the protests of 2011 calls attention to three general directions of blame expressed 
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in local conversations explaining the crisis. These three explanatory directions 
of blame communicate with and reinforce each other in the overall context of 
indignation, and very often appear within the same conversation or narrative. 
Thus, they do not represent impermeable or fixed categories, but rather sources 
of inspiration for constructing arguments and transferring meaning – intertex-
tually − from one type of political exegesis to another. In acknowledgement 
of their explanatory capacity, and in a deliberate attempt to further depathol-
ogise the attributions they entail, I refer to these three directions of blame as 
‘exegetical’ − inspired by Herzfeld’s attention to political narratives of account-
ability as exegesis.34
The first direction of exegetic blame in Greek indignation discourse targets 
foreign nations that are economically more powerful than Greece (such as 
Germany and the US) and/or systemic factors, such as the EU economy and 
neoliberal capitalism more generally. In this particular type of political indig-
nation, the tactic of caricaturing more powerful others is interwoven with 
analytical threads generating a sharp local critique of power that combines 
irony with an awareness of political economy. In its exaggerated form, this 
particular type of exegetic blaming is articulated in everyday conversation as 
the relentless downgrading of particular nations representing ideal types: the 
heartless Germans, the capitalist Americans − a tactic that aims to caricature 
economic power and those perceived as representing it, the leaders of nations 
or institutions. Since 2011, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, and the 
IMF director, Christine Lagarde, have been the target of relentless critical 
commentary, often expressed with satirical embellishments and wit.35 This is a 
tactic that closely resembles local Greek commentary on US Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia.36 
The second direction of blame in the post-crisis Greek discourse focuses 
on Greek politicians and political parties − primarily, but not exclusively, the 
two parties that dominated political life before the crisis. Pre-crisis political 
life in Greece was founded on delayed reciprocity between voter and political 
representative,37 an unwritten contract of trust which the elected MPs of the 
post-crisis era are not in position to maintain, since nowadays there are no 
inexhaustible public funds to allow them to extend favours or safeguard social 
benefits. This general failure of the politicians to meet their part of the bargain 
has weakened their power and has encouraged the overturning of PASOK and 
its partial replacement by SYRIZA. Still, many among my respondents in Patras 
thought that the future success of SYRIZA would depend on its ability to defend 
‘jobs and hard-won social benefits’ against austerity, and maintain a standard 
living among the average lower-middle-class Greek family. 
The overwhelming majority of my respondents were critical of the untrans-
parent spirit of reciprocity between voter and political parties, accusing patron-
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client relations of being anachronistic, a deeply rooted relic of the past. Yet, 
at the same time, all blame the politicians (and the political parties), not the 
individual voter, for perpetuating political favouritism even during the austerity. 
Similarly, many citizens of diverse political affiliations accused the pre-crisis 
political parties of overspending, while most simultaneously complain about 
the cuts in public spending at the present time. This apparent contradiction, 
however, embraced another more implicit source of indignation, which emerged 
in the arguments of voters from both the traditional left and the right: some 
Greeks, they claimed, had benefited more than others from the overspending 
of previous decades. A disaffected supporter of PASOK put this in perspective: 
Yes, I admit that there has been waste [of public resources]; for years, the 
government’s wealth and EU benefits have been distributed unevenly, 
unjustly! But now comes the mnimónio [austerity arrangements] which says 
all Greeks should pay the consequences of the old injustice! Why should we 
all pay for the mistakes of the politicians? Not everybody has benefited in 
the same way. 
The third trajectory of blame relates to this internal perception of inequality 
in Greek society, as many respondents believed that the previous lack of 
transparency in managing public wealth − and the discrepancies that arose 
from it − should be taken into account in times of austerity. Here the target 
of local criticism shifts temporarily away from the realm of the powerful and 
concentrates on socioeconomic groups in Greek society, mostly occupational 
categories, which are perceived as bearing some responsibility for the nation’s 
predicament. One of the major occupational groups that is frequently blamed 
in Greek local discourse are the civil servants (dimósioi ypálili), who are often 
treated in everyday conversation as an undifferentiated, generalised category. 
They are criticised by citizens working in the private sector, but in some cases 
by people who are civil servants themselves, for enjoying privileged job security, 
low working hours with not-fully-justifiable benefits and, more importantly, for 
having acquired their jobs through political mediation. 
 ‘The civil servants are the curse of the nation [i pligí tu éthnus],’ said a retired 
lady in Patras, who earlier in her life worked as a secretary in a private company: 
‘they work less, they have all sorts of extras [privileges, benefits] and don’t have 
somebody above them to say “work more, work more!”’ ‘They are responsible,’ 
she concluded dramatically, ‘for the collapse of Greece [gia tin katrakíla tis Eládas].’ 
In sharp contrast, other citizens in Patras who were civil servants or pensioners 
blamed their fellow citizens who worked in the private sector for contributing 
to Greek debt through consistent tax evasion. Medical doctors who maintain 
private practices and restaurant owners were examples of frequently criticised 
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occupational categories, renowned for not issuing receipts, a practice so deeply 
established in Greece that many of my respondents confessed that they were 
ashamed to ask for a receipt. Then, ‘when the government wants to make 
cuts,’ many respondents argued indignantly, ‘they cut salaries and pensions.’ In 
austerity-ridden Greece − or ‘under the fear of the mnimónio’, to convey more 
accurately the poetics of Greek indignation − in this case civil servants and 
pensioners are widely perceived to be ‘the first victims’.
Conclusion
In a recent article in Current Anthropology,38 written immediately after the 
protest summer 2011, I put forward two interrelated arguments that emerged 
from my ethnographic observations. Firstly, that local voices of indignation in 
Greece have been much more complex, diverse and self-critical than the inter-
national media has portrayed them to be; therefore, ethnographic attention to 
the meanings of discontent contributes towards the de-orientalisation of the 
Greek crisis, encouraging a move away from prejudiced or even sympathetic 
stereotypes (such as ‘the ungrateful Greeks’ or ‘the poor Greeks’). Secondly, 
that despite its diversity and contradictions, local indignation about the crisis 
generates cultural meanings that may embrace or challenge western economic 
narratives. This negotiation of meaning at the local level, I have argued, can 
encourage a discursive self-empowerment, which in turn may inspire social 
change, as evident from the restructuring of Greek political parties in the last 
couple of years.
However, even if we assume that change at the level of politics may be super-
ficial − for example, one political party (SYRIZA) replacing another (PASOK) 
without challenging the bipolar structure of two-party political representation 
− I hesitate to treat the discourse of indignation in Greece as a mere discursive 
tactic or a weapon of the weak. There is more cultural logic and exegetical 
purposefulness here than James C. Scott’s classic analysis of how the weak use 
slander against the powerful.39 In the context of Greek indignation, blaming 
the powerful does not merely act as an ephemeral weapon, but also highlights 
an interpretive trajectory that outlines potential explanations of historical or 
political causality. Through blaming the powerful, the downtrodden unravel 
their culturally established logic and a set of principles or reasons that explain 
their resistance or critique of power. From a local point of view, being indignant 
can be seen as a complex and long-term process of interpretation, one that 
addresses and renders meaningful what is perceived as an unjust and unequal 
world.
In this respect, indignation can be seen not only as a tactic of evading respon-
sibility, but also, and primarily, as a committed pursuit of accountability. Such 
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an approach can contribute in depathologising local discontent, a perspective 
followed by several anthropologists of Greece before the crisis.40 In turn, the 
depathologisation of local discontent entails the recognition of its complexity 
and the purposeful search for explanations by indignant local actors. My respon-
dents in Patras, for example, examine the responsibility of foreign nations, and 
systemic factors, using what Sutton has described as ‘analogic thinking’41 − the 
use of lessons from the past to explain the present;42 they make sense of the 
current crisis by identifying recurrent patterns of inequality in international 
politics. They also blame Greek politicians and political parties, whose previous 
overspending has benefited some citizens more than others. Even occupational 
categories − the civil servants or particular employment groups in the private 
sector − do not escape from the relentlessness of local critique, as indignation 
in everyday conversation highlights endemic political dysfunction and lack of 
transparency.
There is also a more sinister twist in this search for accountability, which has 
become more noticeable during the crisis. This relates to a growing suspicion 
towards migrants, who have become an additional category of blame, a gener-
alised category of foreigners, often visible, on the streets.43 A strong sense of 
defensive nationalism motivates such blaming, which is rooted in older xeno-
phobic narratives. In the discourse of the extreme right, the critique of western 
hegemony and foreign intervention in Greek politics − appropriated by older, 
familiar arguments developed by the left − merges with the condemnation 
of powerless migrants (who represent the proximate concrete Other close to 
home). I have referred to such interpretative combinations as the ‘dark’ side 
of Greek indignation,44 which nevertheless represent one trajectory of a more 
widespread pursuit of accountability. Yet such misguided interpretative threads 
should not distract attention from the overwhelming desire of the Greek public 
to explain a crisis perceived as having arrived unexpectedly with direct and dire 
consequences for most families.
An overall local perception that the financial crisis in Greece represents an 
‘unnatural’ perversion (or reversal) of people’s expectations in life − a view that 
one’s entitlement to a better life should increase (rather than diminish) in the 
course of one’s life − permeates and motivates the search for explanation in 
the local articulation of indignation. Some political parties (from the left and 
extreme right) have appropriated this indignant desire for accountability; even 
political parties that do not explicitly challenge the economics of austerity try to 
appear more accountable than before. In this respect, indignation has triggered 
more widespread responses in Greek society. In local contexts of conversation, 
the term indignation (aganáktisi) has become a potent metaphor for negotiating 
accountability, a master explanatory trope in the poetics of discontent. Similarly 
the term mnimónio, signifying a reified conceptualisation of austerity measures 
The Poetics of Indignation in Greece 
— 385 —
and their consequences, facilitates the articulation of pointed arguments about 
causality and responsibility: somebody is accountable for this austerity-monster. 
The complex explanatory threads of the crisis are still unravelling in local 
‘indignant’ conversation and will continue to do so, extricating accountability 
and inviting further anthropological engagement.
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